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ABSTRACT
DISORDERLY AND INHUMANE:
EXPLAINING GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED MASS EXPULSION, 1900-2020
Meghan M. Garrity
Brendan O’Leary
Since 2015 over two million people have been expelled, en masse, around the world. Mass
expulsion is a major international issue that threatens peace and security around the globe.
This dissertation examines why and how governments expel ethnic groups en masse. What
motivates them to implement an expulsion policy and why don’t more governments do the
same? By isolating policies of intentional group-based population removal—distinct from
genocide, massacre, and coercive assimilation—I show that the motivations of expulsionist
governments are informed by the phase of nation-building and the perceived threat of the
target group. The four clusters of motivations are: fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism,
and counterinsurgency/reprisal. Since not all governments with one of the identified
motivations to expel go on to remove populations en masse, I also identify important
constraints on governments’ strategic choices. Through four paired-comparison case studies
of similarly motivated governments with different outcomes (expulsion or non-expulsion), I
show that alliances, target group homeland state(s), and the international community are the
key contributing factors that enable or deter mass expulsion policies. The evidence is drawn
from archival research conducted at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Nations archives in Geneva,
Switzerland, as well as from other primary sources, secondary historical sources, and extant
datasets. This dissertation contributes to the field of ethnic conflict and exclusionary politics.
viii

It fills a gap in the literature by systematically examining mass expulsion policies that
intentionally remove ethnic groups over the longue durée. The argument expands existing
explanations beyond war and security threats to highlight an entire class of expulsions that
target economic threats, which requires scholarly and international policy attention. The
dissertation also deepens our understanding of critical atrocity constraints and proposes
tangible policy recommendations for deterring its use.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
1.1 The Problem
Between 1900 and 2020 an estimated 30-42 million people were expelled, en masse, around the
world. Far from being simply an historical phenomenon, of that total, over two million people
have been expelled just since 2015: 250,000 Haitians from the Dominican Republic (20152019); 100,000 Nigerian refugees from Cameroon (2015-2019); 500,000 Afghan refugees from
Pakistan (2016); over 800,000 Rohingya from Burma (2016-2018); nearly 70,000 sub-Saharan
Africans from Algeria (2016-2020); 330,000 Congolese diamond miners from Angola (2018);
and more than 130,000 Syrian Kurds from Turkish-occupied Afrin (2018).1 Mass expulsion is
a major international issue that threatens peace and security around the globe. This dissertation
seeks to explain why and how governments expel. What motivates them to implement
expulsion policies and why don’t more governments do the same? In answering these
questions, the manuscript amasses all major expulsions since 1900 in a new dataset, proposes
a taxonomy identifying different government motivations for mass expulsion, documents the
crucial enabling and constraining conditions necessary for its implementation or impediment,
and offers tangible policy recommendations for deterring the decision to expel.
Mass expulsion is a rare event, but it is a recurring rare event, prevalent across time
and space. One of the earliest documented mass expulsion episodes is the Assyrian expulsion
of the Israelites in the eight-century BCE.2 Expulsion continued throughout the Middle Ages
in Europe, mostly targeting religious groups including Jews (from Crimea (1016), England

1
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Garrity, forthcoming.
Tägil, 1990: 64; Bell-Fialkoff, 1999: 8.
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(1290), France (1306), Spain (1492)) and Muslims (from Spain (1609-14)). During the wars of
the Reformation specific religious denominations such as Protestant Huguenots (from France
(1685)) and Catholics (from Ukraine (1648-54)) were targeted.3 Later during the colonial
period, settler populations including the British, Americans, Australians, and Spanish, used
expulsion to remove indigenous populations.4 While mass expulsion is therefore not new, this
dissertation focuses on modern mass expulsions, confined to the twentieth century and
beyond, following in the footsteps of scholars such as Naimark, 2001; Midlarsky, 2005;
Lieberman, 2006; Mann, 2005; Ther, 2014; and Bulutgil, 2016 among others. Because one of
my aims is to identify key constraints on enacting expulsions, I have excluded pre-1900 cases
since modern state structures and the international system have evolved substantially in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The years after 1900 saw the culmination of the age of
large-scale global empires, followed by their progressive dissolution into formal nation-states;
and the international system transformed from the hegemony of the “Great Powers,” to the
League of Nations, and then to the United Nations and its affiliated agencies.
While mass expulsion policies date to the BC era, they have continued and expanded
in frequency and geography throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In the 120
years examined in this manuscript, governments around the world initiated 139 mass expulsion
events, at an average rate of 1.56 expulsions per year, over the last 50 years. Despite its
consistent use, expulsion is motivated by different reasons and implemented in different
contexts. Expulsion occurs during war, immediately after war (via post-war peace treaties),
and during peacetime. While government motivations are distinct (see Argument below) the policy

3
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Bell-Fialkoff, 1999: 14-16.
Bell-Fialkoff, 1999: 18-21.
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intent of expulsionist governments is the same—to remove a target group outside of its
sovereign jurisdiction.
Mass expulsion is distinct from other policies of eliminating ethnic difference like
genocide, massacres, or coercive assimilation, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 2. But it is
also different because of its normative ambivalence among politicians and scholars.
Democratic liberal leaders, alongside their authoritarian brethren, have championed and
employed expulsion policies in the modern era. Influential political figures such as Greek
Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill,
Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš, and United States President Herbert Hoover, as well
as public intellectuals such as Joseph Schechtman and Eugene Kulischer advocated for
expulsion as a policy to bring about peace and end deadly wars,5 an assessment some still share
today.6 In fact, British historian Matthew Frank documents at least nine Nobel Prize laureates
that have endorsed and supported the policy of expulsion,7 with the most recent addition to
his list being Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, particularly after the first world war,
minority groups were seen as a dangerous trojan horse that sowed instability and brought
insecurity. Only by reuniting them with their co-ethnics and establishing homogenous nationstates, however fanciful that idea in practice, could world peace be sustainably achieved.8 In
post-conflict environments, mass expulsion was often considered a viable policy, typically

Mazower, 2009; Frank, 2017.
Kaufmann (1996: 156) and Bell-Fialkoff (1999: 285-86) are two such proponents.
7 Frank, 2017: 17n13. Frank’s list includes: Fridtjof Nansen (1922); Austen Chamberlain (1925); Robert Cecil
(1937); Winston Churchill (1950); Philip Noel-Baker (1959); Henry Kissinger (1973); Menachem Begin (1978);
Czesław Miłoz (1980); Yitzhak Rabin (1994). While U.S. President Herbert Hoover never won the Nobel Peace
Prize, he was nominated four times (1921, 1933, 1941, 1946).
8 Frank, 2017.
5
6

3

disguised in the more benign-sounding language of “transfer,” “exchange,” or “resettlement.”
Some scholars have argued that expulsion is effective because it achieves inter-state stability
through the “unmixing” of antagonistic populations.9 It was not uncommon for such policies
to be pursued in the first half of the twentieth century, especially in post-war peace settlements,
notably at international conferences such as Lausanne in 1923 and Potsdam in 1945.
Greek stateman Eleftherios Venizelos was not the first to propose the concept of
population transfer, but he was the first statesman to champion the policy, in his case as the
“‘only cure’ for the Greco-Turkish minority problems” in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars.10
Decades later, Edvard Beneš, president of the Czechoslovakia government in exile, wrote in
Foreign Affairs in the midst of WWII that, “It will be necessary after this war to carry out a
transfer of populations on a very much larger scale than after the last war. This must be done
in as humane a manner as possible, internationally organized and internationally financed.” 11
Scholars like Russian Jewish demographer Eugene Kulischer also argued in favor of expulsion:
“If war in Europe—in the circumstances of the twentieth century—meant world war,
exporting the continent’s surplus population provided the only scientific guarantee of world
peace.”12 Fellow Russian demographer, Joseph Schechtman, promoted expulsion as a global
strategy, useful in places beyond Europe as well, “A ‘Babel of tongues and peoples,’ even if
historically created and no matter in what part of the world’s area, can and must be
disentangled if threatening the peace of the world.”13

Schechtman, 1962; Bell-Fialkoff, 1996; Kaufmann, 1998.
Frank, 2017: 32.
11 Beneš, 1942: 238.
12 Mazower, 1999: 114-115.
13 Schechtman, 1962: 369.
9

10
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Examining such policies may seem anachronistic, but support for expulsion persists
in the contemporary era. During the Yugoslav wars of secession in the 1990s, Andrew BellFialkoff wrote, “As I watch thousands of refugees huddling in refugee camps…I keep thinking
that a timely settlement, including a timely and humane population transfer, would have
averted the tragedy.”14 Chaim Kaufmann agreed writing, “Refusal or failure to organize
necessary transfers does not protect people against becoming refugees, but inflicts disaster on
them when they do.”15 More recently a potential land swap has been proposed between
Kosovo and Serbia which would, de facto, involve a population exchange. 16 Other scholars,
by contrast, argue that quite aside from human rights violations, expulsion raises more
expectations than it can satisfy and that expelling states often suffer economically and
politically in the aftermath of an expulsion.17 Unlike genocide which is universally condemned
as abhorrent, expulsion has its exponents. Polarized views on mass expulsion’s utility, justice,
and effectiveness make it an important subject for social scientific examination. It requires
further investigation foremost because of its deep humanitarian implications but also because
of its repercussions for political stability—international and domestic.
1.2 Existing Explanations
The dominant narrative in the existing historical and social science literature is that war and
security threats facilitate mass expulsion. Expulsion either occurs during wars to remove rival
groups from strategic territory, or in the immediate aftermath of war to remove groups that
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were disloyal, or who are newly identified as security threats.18 Many wars in the early twentieth
century followed the collapse of empires and the rise of nationalism among imperial subjects,
therefore, a large sub-set of the literature focuses on the desire for homogenous nation-states
as a critical driver of expulsion.19 Closely connected to these explanations is that elite ideology,
particularly governments with exclusionary ideologies—defined as a belief system that justifies
the persecution of certain ethnic groups20—are more likely to expel.21 Since the creation of a
nation-state is often tumultuous, some predict that expulsion should closely follow political
upheaval, or occur where a previous expulsion has taken place. 22 In unstable situations,
governments may look for scapegoats and target minorities for expulsion.23
Non-war related explanations for expulsion are present, but less common. Some argue
that regime type is the critical determinant: democracies, they suggest, are less likely to expel
and autocracies more likely. This claim is closely linked to the exclusionary ideologies
argument, typically correlated with non-democratic regimes.24 Others argue that it is not
democratic or authoritarian regimes, per se, that determines expulsion but rather the process
of democratization.25 Rather than, or in addition to, regime type, some scholars suggest that
the ethnic characteristics of leaders is key, with governments led by ethnic minorities as an
important determinant of expulsion.26

Valentino, 2004; Mann, 2005; Mylonas, 2012; Straus, 2015; Bulutgil, 2016, 2018; Lichtenheld, 2020.
Zolberg, 1983; McGarry, 1998; Jackson Preece, 1998; Naimark, 2001; Walters, 2002; Bell-Fialkoff, 1999; Mann,
2005; Lieberman, 2006; Ther, 2014.
20 Harff, 2003: 63.
21 Fein, 1993; Marx, 2002; Harff, 2003; Straus, 2015.
22 Fein, 1993; Harff, 2003.
23 Naimark, 2001; Lieberman, 2006; Adida, 2014; Ther, 2014.
24 Harff, 2003; Marx, 2002; Mann, 2005; Straus, 2015
25 Mann, 2005: 4.
26 Harff, 2003; Adida, 2014.
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Another strand of the literature sees expulsion as a foreign policy instrument. Weaker
governments make rational cost-benefit calculations and use the forced removal of
populations to extract concessions from stronger powers.27 Or that expulsion is motivated by
revisionist foreign policy objectives driven by territorial losses, when the target group is
supported by an enemy state.28 Others, argue that expulsion, particularly expulsions in Africa,
occur because of economic chauvinism: when the economic resources of the non-dominant
group are seen as a usurpation of the rights and privileges of the majority.29 A related economic
argument is that structural features of the economy enable expulsion to occur. These features
include low trade openness or economies dependent on oil or high-value minerals that may
isolate governments from the effects of expulsion.30
One reason most existing explanations focus on war and territorial objectives is
because many of the most prominent books and articles of comparative ethnic cleansing are
largely focused on Europe.31 A European focus skews our understanding of mass expulsion
toward events in the first half of the twentieth century. Quantitative studies like Bulutgil’s
(2016), The Roots of Ethnic Cleansing in Europe, documented 41 cases of European ethnic
cleansing during 1900-2020, of which 37 (or 90 percent) occurred in 1950 or earlier. Mylonas’s
(2012), The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities, presents a
quantitative dataset of nation-building policies in the post-WWI Balkans during 1919-1923.
Similarly, historical works like Naimark’s (2001), Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth
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Century Europe, and Ther’s (2014), The Dark Side of Nation-States: Ethnic Cleansing in Modern
Europe, include minimal in-depth case studies after 1950—mainly just the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. While the quantitative studies suggest that their arguments travel to contexts
beyond Europe, the empirical evidence is confined to a single region, and largely a single
period—the early twentieth century—which may explain why war and security explanations
predominate in the literature. There is important non-European regional variation in expulsion
policies that is obfuscated by the largely Eurocentric work on mass expulsion to date.
Another issue with the existing research on “ethnic cleansing,” including work that
extends beyond Europe,32 is that it is mostly confined to the targeting of citizens.33 This despite
evidence that governments target both citizens and non-citizens for expulsion, and in some
cases both simultaneously. Given that mass expulsion is an ethnically targeted policy, the
citizenship status of the ethnic group may be irrelevant, or at least less relevant, to the expelling
authorities. The exclusion of non-citizen expulsions in the literature also biases the findings in
favor of war and security-based explanations as I will show in the data analysis in Chapter 2.
While I agree that security threats have been and are an important driver of mass
expulsion, my research shows that there is a sizable class of expulsions that are motivated not
by security, but rather by the desire to remove economic threats. Expulsions targeting groups
marked as economic threats were particularly prominent beginning in the late 1950s and
beyond. After colonies obtained their political independence, focus turned toward their
economic freedom. There is some useful literature on economically motivated expulsions in
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Africa,34 but this is not an Africa-specific phenomenon. Expulsionist governments have
targeted perceived economically threating groups in all regions of the world including in East
Asia, Europe, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, North America, and South Asia,
in addition to Sub-Saharan Africa. My dataset documents 50 expulsion episodes targeting
groups seen as economic threats, or 36 percent of the sample, justifying a closer look at these
cases.
Most of the existing work on this topic has focused on the determinants of compulsory
removal and the conditions under which governments remove ethnic groups en masse.35
Unfortunately, this approach ignores relevant cases where governments were motivated to
expel, and expulsion was probable, but where it did not occur. Many of the same factors that
the literature predicts should lead to expulsion—war, territorial disputes, ethnonationalism,
exclusionary ideologies, regime type, previous expulsions, economic chauvinism—are present
in cases where expulsion policies are not enacted. The literature on what constrains mass
expulsion is underdeveloped.
There is a relevant, albeit nascent, literature about restraints regarding the most
extreme forms of demographic engineering—genocide and politicide.36 These phenomena are
part of the same semantic field as mass expulsion but are distinct concepts. Governments that
expel intend to remove the target group, whereas genocidal governments aim to annihilate or
destroy their targets.37 We should not assume similar decision-making processes, nor similar
constraints on strategic choices, for these distinct policy options. Nevertheless, given the
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paucity of literature on expulsion constraints, they provide a useful starting point to investigate
if the same restraints on genocide apply to expulsion.
Scott Straus (2015) argues that counternarratives, capacity, economic incentives, and
external conflict-mediation forces are the key restraints on large-scale violence against
civilians.38 He defines counternarratives as inclusionary alternative political visions that
emphasize a multiethnic polity, peace, cooperation, neighborliness, and non-violence toward
antagonistic groups. Straus states that when these views are put forward by influential elites
they act as a restraint on genocide. Since authoritarian states are more likely to espouse
exclusionary ideologies, he argues that regime type, e.g., democracy, dovetails with this
restraint. Second, weak state capacity—the ability to coordinate, identify, control, and inflict
violence on the target population—is another restraint.39 Without this capacity, large-scale
killing is less likely. Third, Straus contends that the type of economy of the perpetrating state
matters. States that are dependent on revenue from sectors “highly sensitive to violence,” such
as labor-intensive industries like manufacturing or agriculture, will be restrained in their use of
mass violence.40 Whereas insulated sectors like oil, particularly offshore oil or mining, are less
affected if the country descends into violence and therefore are less likely to restrain. His
fourth, and final restraining factor, is international and regional actors. He argues that these
actors impose costs on would-be perpetrators through sanctions, travel bans, threats of
international criminal justice, and the imposition of peacekeeping forces.41
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In my case study chapters, I test Straus’ restraining arguments to see if they hold when
it comes to mass expulsion. I pair cases that share the same traits along his four dimensions.
For example, Uganda (1971-1972) and Kenya (1967-1969) were both authoritarian regimes
with exclusionary ideologies favoring their ethnic minority group (West Nilotics and Kikuyu
respectively). Both states had the capacity to inflict violence (against the Langi & Acholi in
Uganda, and the Somalis in Kenya), and had labor-intensive agricultural economies. And far
from sanctioning expulsion in the late 1960s-early 1970s, international and regional actors
remained silent or facilitated expulsion. Straus’ key restraints were absent in both Uganda and
Kenya and thus both should have been more likely to expel, yet only Uganda implemented
the policy. In another test case of Straus’ argument, my paired comparison of Nigeria (19791983) and South Africa (2008-2012), examines two countries with inclusive, multi-ethnic
“founding narratives,” with economies dependent on oil and minerals respectively, that Straus
would argue should constrain expulsion in both cases. And while South Africa did not expel,
Nigeria did, further challenging the relevance of genocide restraints for explaining mass
expulsion.
Why might genocidal restraints not pertain to mass expulsion? First, given that mass
expulsion policies are less resource intensive than genocide in the sense that to remove a target
group is tactically easier than annihilating it, state capacity for violence is less pertinent for
mass expulsion. Similarly, genocidal violence is much more disruptive than expulsion,
therefore the structural economic factors are less applicable to mass expulsion. I do agree with
Straus that governments with what he calls “founding narratives,” or with ideologies of
inclusion that are most often democratic, are less likely to expel. However, in my case analysis,
inclusive founding narratives are neither necessary nor sufficient to prevent expulsion. While
11

democratic regimes are less likely to expel, the puzzle is determining why two equally
authoritarian regimes failed to resort to expulsion policies (e.g., Uganda versus Kenya), or why
two democratic regimes (e.g., Nigeria42 and South Africa) have different outcomes. Within
case comparisons of authoritarian regimes with geographic variation (e.g., the Orthodox
Greeks along the Aegean & Pontic littoral versus those in Istanbul) and temporal variation
(e.g., the Rohingya in the early 1990s) in the use of expulsion policies are also useful to probe
specifications of the regime type argument.
Regarding international and regional actors, I agree with Straus that they can be an
important source of restraint on governments motivated to remove populations en masse.
However, building on Midlarsky (2005), these same actors may also act as a crucial facilitating
factor by supporting or acquiescing to mass expulsion. We should not only see international
and regional bodies as benign actors in preventing mass atrocities, but as often complicit in
their enactment or indifferent to their unfolding. In sum, genocide and mass expulsion are
distinct concepts, so we should not expect the same restraints to apply to both phenomena
although there is some overlap that serves as a useful launching point.
Writing about ethnic cleansing, which is conceptually closer to mass expulsion than
genocide, but still conflates distinct concepts, Bulutgil (2016) argues that salient non-ethnic
cleavages, either social or economic, in multi-ethnic societies, divide political elites and
constrain ethnic cleansing decisions. She argues that dominant ethnic elites who oppose ethnic
cleansing, because of their cooperation and engagement with members of the (potentially

Although Nigeria was not a consolidated democracy in 1983 and suffered a coup d’état at the end of that year,
it is coded as a democracy by the Polity V index in the period examined.
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targeted) non-dominant group, is the central factor in preventing ethnic cleansing.43 Bulutgil
goes on to argue that territorial conflicts can undermine the viability of the non-ethnic cleavage
constraint, as ethnic considerations predominate in times of war, but we should expect the
constraint to hold in periods without territorial conflict.
Like Bulutgil (2016), previous literature from economics and sociology emphasizes the
importance of cross-cutting economic cleavages. Jha (2013) argues that inter-ethnic
commercial complementarities are a source of moderating violence.44 Similarly, Chirot &
McCauley (2006) state that exchange between groups moderates violence because killing
eliminates important buyers and sellers of labor and goods.45 Harff, (2003) proposes a related,
but slightly distinct economic constraint, of trade openness or economic interdependence. 46
She argues that states that are more deeply intertwined in global markets will be more
constrained in the decision to expel than those that are more isolated.
My findings agree with the literature that argues cross-cutting non-ethnic cleavages,
especially economic cleavages, can be an important constraint on mass expulsion. This is seen
in the negative cases of Kenya—where the cross-cutting economic cleavage between the
wealthy Kenya African National Union (KANU) party elites and the wealthy Asian
businessmen was an important constraint—and in the negative case of Istanbul where the
financial contribution of the Orthodox Greeks was an important consideration in their
exemption from the population exchange. However, in both cases these cross-cutting
economic cleavages were a necessary but insufficient factor for constraining expulsion.
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Transnational alliances, the homeland state of the target group, and the international
community were also significant. Furthermore, as I shall show, it is not cross-cutting cleavages
but domestic alliances that are the important constraint. The lens of alliance patterns is more
expansive and, as such, also encompasses negative cases like South Africa and Burma where
there were no cross-cutting cleavages between the leadership and the African migrants and
Rohingya, respectively. Instead in these cases it was the domestic “corporatist” alliance
between business, labor, and the state47 that was key to restraining expulsion in South Africa,
and in Burma (1992) it was fractures within the Tatmadaw that enabled the emergence of
moderate forces that agreed to repatriate the Rohingya.
Finally, Mylonas (2012) examines a different dependent variable—nation-building
policies—in explaining variation in accommodation, assimilation, and exclusion policies. His
exclusionary policy category includes mass expulsion, as well as ethnic cleansing and genocide.
While conflating distinct eliminationist policies, and not proposing constraints per se, we can
assess whether his factors explaining non-exclusion policies are possible constraints. Mylonas
argues that if the target group either has no external support, or has external support from an
ally, then exclusion is unlikely. In addition, he states that governments with status quo, as
opposed to revisionist foreign policy goals (that seek to regain lost territory), will not pursue
exclusionary policies.48
My expulsion decision-making framework elaborated below concurs with Mylonas
that international factors must be considered. However, my analysis suggests it is not about
external support for the target group per se, but rather external support for the government—
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both from transnational allies and the homeland state of the target group—that is key. In
addition, status quo foreign policy objectives are not a sufficient constraint on mass expulsion.
This observation is linked to my critique of the existing literature’s heavy focus on territorial
conflict as a precondition for expulsion, which comes out of the Eurocentric nature of this
literature. My framework of decision-making explains the full range of constraints on strategic
choices—including domestic and international factors—as well as how these constraints are
overcome to enable mass expulsion (Chapter 2).
This dissertation seeks to build on existing research on ethnic cleansing and expulsion,
and the scholarship of political scientists, sociologists, and historians. It aims to make sense of
the cacophony of explanations regarding the causes of expulsion, particularly the seemingly
conflicting war and non-war determinants. It also builds on the burgeoning literature on the
restraints of mass atrocities by proposing a framework which identifies the critical enabling
and constraining factors that influence a government’s decision-making when it comes to mass
expulsion. We now turn to the central argument of the dissertation.

1.3 The Argument
This dissertation tackles two main research questions. First, why do governments expel? What
motivates them to use this policy of demographic engineering to remove populations en masse.
Second, how do governments expel? What factors enable the implementation of mass
expulsion policies in some cases but constrain those choices in others? I argue that there are
four main government motivations for, or “types” of, mass expulsion. These are outlined in
my taxonomy in Figure 1 below: removing a fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and
counterinsurgency/reprisal.
15
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of Mass Expulsions
Target Group Threat

Counterinsurgency/
Reprisal

Nativism

Governments are motivated to expel when they classify a target group either as a
security or economic threat to the state during the establishing or consolidating phase of
nation-building. Threats that governments identify may be real threats, based on specific
actions or events, or perceived threats that lead to false accusations49 of the group in question.
Security threats manifest in threats to the territorial and/or political control of the state. These
may include challenges to a state’s sovereignty or claim to authority; relations with enemy
external powers; secessionist movements; inter-state disputes; or “refugee warriors.50”
Economic threats are those related to control of state resources, industries, assets, and/or
business and employment opportunities.
Nation-building is defined as the process of making the political and national
boundaries of the state congruent.51 In this process governments construct the boundaries of

Drawing on Mylonas (2012: 173), groups falsely accused include those whom governments erroneously label
as security or economic threats to the state, as well as those that are scapegoated (a sub-category of false
accusation). Scapegoated groups are both falsely accused and simultaneously blamed, unfairly, for the problems
facing the host state.
50 Refugee warriors refers to militant elements of refugee populations that continue to engage in cross-border
military operations against their home country and in turn associate the host country with acts of war (Zolberg,
et al., 1986: 275-77).
51 Mylonas, 2012: xx.
49
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the dominant core and promote a common national identity.52 My classification rests on two
phases of nation-building: establishing and consolidating. The first is the process by which
newly created states, or existing states with new borders because of territorial annexation or
contraction, define their members—which groups should be included, and which (if any)
should be excluded. In this phase, governments are defining citizens and the demos. The
second phase, consolidating, is the process by which existing states re-define their
membership. As the composition of the nation changes over time because of immigration,
emigration, or demographic changes within the populous, state’s return to the question of
“who belongs,” and who does not, as they seek to consolidate, and strengthen, the nation.
To operationalize the nation-building phases, the first 15 years after a state gains its
independence, or the first five years after territorial changes to state borders, are categorized
as in the nation-establishing phase; and a state is considered in the nation-consolidating phase
after 15 years of independence or changes to its borders. Any attempt to classify 139 events
over the course of more than a century into four neat categories is bound to be challenging.
Not every case is a perfect fit, but most cases are accurately captured by the four expulsion
types, described in detail in Chapter 2.53 In short, security threats in nation-establishing phases
are fifth column expulsions; economic threats in nation-establishing phases are anticolonialism expulsions; economic threats in nation-consolidating phases are nativism
expulsions;
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Fifth column expulsions seek to remove “disloyal” minorities that present a threat to
the territorial integrity of the state. Anti-colonialism expulsions aim to remove alien
populations that were privileged by colonial rulers and dominate key sectors of the economy.
Nativism expulsions seek to remove ethnic groups that are an, alleged, strain on the local
economy to improve conditions for national labor. Lastly, counterinsurgency/reprisal mass
expulsions aim to remove populations identified as insurgents and/or to retaliate against a
neighboring state. This taxonomy of government motivations to expel helps to clarify diversity
within the class of events that is expulsion. The reasons motivating the Ottoman Empire to
expel its Greek Orthodox minority, a fifth column expulsion, were not the same as those of
Idi Amin in Uganda in expelling the country’s Asian population, an anti-colonial expulsion,
despite both using the same demographic engineering policy. To validate this part of my
analysis, in each of the empirical chapters I provide detailed evidence for each motivation and
refute alternative explanations.
However, since not all governments with motivations to expel go through with
removing populations en masse, I introduce a framework of mass expulsion decision making
that explains the key factors that enable or constrain expulsion policy implementation (Table
1).
Table 1: Factors that enable or constrain mass expulsion policy decisions
Key Factors

Enablers

Constraints

Benefit

Harmed

Indifferent / Support

Harmed / Opposed

Weak ties

Strong ties

Acquiesce & resettle

Resist & deny entry

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
Transnational Alliances
Homeland State(s)
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response
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International Community
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

Weak ties

Strong ties

Support, facilitate, ignore

Resist

What differentiates governments that expel from those that do not—when motivation is held
constant—is their alliances, the homeland state of the target group, and the international
community.

Alliances
A government motivated to remove a target group will consider the effect of an expulsion
policy on its domestic alliances including political parties, military, business community, and
trade unions. In many cases, the executive’s internal allies would directly benefit—politically
or financially—from removing the target group. Benefits would include eliminating a security
threat to the ethnonational state, appropriating assets and income of an economically
dominant group, opening new employment opportunities, or eliminating internal opposition.
These benefits may assist governing elites in building a new nation state or in consolidating
the ethnonational majority; they may also generate political good will in advance of critical
elections. However, in other cases, the interests of the executive’s core domestic allies would
be harmed by expelling the target group—affecting an important source of revenue, cheap
labor supply, political buffer, or future bargaining chip. For these governments, altering the
existing political or economic status quo is too costly for domestic partners. In still other cases
the effect of expulsion on domestic alliances is ambivalent, there may be some benefits but at
the same time, some draw backs, creating mixed results for the alliance. When the costs of
expulsion to domestic allies outweigh the benefits, then expulsion is constrained.
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In addition to domestic alliances, the effect of expulsion on transnational alliances—
bi-lateral economic and military relations with external states and/or foreign multi-national
corporations—are a determining factor in government expulsion decisions. Governments
with transnational alliances that are indifferent to or support expulsion, are more likely to
expel; whereas governments concerned that expulsion may harm relations with their
transnational allies or that those allies would oppose the removal of the target group will
hesitate to implement expulsion. Concerns that expulsion may jeopardize critical transnational
alliances act as an important constraint on the decision to expel.

Homeland State (of the target group)
When it comes to the effect of expulsion on the “homeland” state(s)54 of the target group
there are two important considerations. The first is the strength of ties between the expelling
(or potentially expelling) government and the homeland state(s): strong or weak. The second
is the anticipated, or actual, reaction of the homeland state(s) to the expulsion. Will it resist
and deny entry to the expellees or acquiesce and resettle them? Strong ties between
governments and homeland state(s) act as a constraint because expulsion could damage
relations. Whereas weak ties between expelling governments and homeland state(s) are more
likely to enable expulsion as there are fewer consequences to damaging the relationship. In
addition, expelling governments also must consider the reaction, or anticipated reaction, of
the homeland state(s) to the expulsion. Where the homeland state(s) responds, or announces

When a government expels non-citizens the expellee homeland is the state of citizenship. However, when
citizens are expelled, the expellee “homeland” refers to the state(s) with co-ethnics where the target group is said
to “belong” which is why the word is in quotations.
54
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it would respond, by resisting and denying entry to the expellees then expulsion may be
constrained. Whereas if the homeland state(s) acquiesces and resettles the expellees then the
expulsion will be enabled. Governments faced with strong homeland state ties that resist and
deny entry are the most likely to be constrained; but other cases are more mixed—strong ties
but acquiesce & resettle, or weak ties but resist & deny entry—in these cases both aspects of
the homeland state relations must be considered.

International Community
The last factor is the relationship with, and the reaction of, the international community
defined to include the “Great Powers” and the League of Nations in the first half of the
twentieth century, and the United Nations, humanitarian organizations, international
institutions, and regional bodies in the latter half of the twentieth and the twenty-first
centuries. Like the homeland state(s) factor, governments with strong ties, or desiring to
cultivate strong ties, with the international community are more likely to be constrained in
their expulsion decisions than those with weak ties. But the response, or anticipated response,
of the international community—whether to support, facilitate, ignore, or resist—further
enables or constrains expulsion.
This framework seeks to explain why we do not see more mass expulsion given the
many governments that may be motivated to do so. The effects of expulsion on alliances,
target group homeland state(s), and the international community enables or constrains this
demographic engineering policy option. Importantly, not all three of the key elements weigh
equally on the minds of government officials. In different cases, some factors may take
primacy over others. While the executive may be pulled in different directions, the relative
21

strength of the constraints will determine an expulsion outcome. This will be further explained
in the empirical chapters when the framework is applied to each of the paired comparison
cases through detailed process tracing.

1.4 Research Design: Methodology, Case Selection, Sources
Methodology
My dissertation research design is a mix of quantitative global analysis and qualitative in-depth
cases. To establish the universe of cases to be examined I developed the Global Mass
Expulsion Dataset (GSME) documenting expulsion events around the world from 19002020.55 The new dataset isolates mass expulsion from the broader, and cloudier, concept of
ethnic cleansing in order to isolate policies of population removal—as opposed to population
destruction (genocide, massacre), assimilation (coercive assimilation), or a combination of the
three (ethnic cleansing).56 This comprehensive and systematic survey of mass expulsion
introduces a significant amount of new data to the field because of its distinct concept,
extended duration, cross-national nature, and inclusion of citizens and non-citizens.
To build and test my framework of government expulsion decision making processes,
I constructed four paired-comparison case studies, one for each of the four types of mass
expulsion:

removing

a

fifth

column,

anti-colonialism,

nativism,

and

counterinsurgency/reprisal. Pairing cases of expulsion and non-expulsion is an original
attempt to determine the enabling conditions that facilitate expulsion in some cases, and the
constraining conditions that deter it in others. The four paired comparison cases are:

55
56

Garrity, forthcoming.
Further details on this distinction are outlined in the conceptual section in Chapter 2.
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•

Ottoman/Turkish expulsion of Greek Orthodox Christians from the Aegean and
Pontic littoral (1913-1923) versus Istanbul;

•

Uganda’s expulsion of its Asian minority (1972) versus the treatment of Asians in
Kenya (1967-1969);

•

Nigeria’s expulsion of West African migrants (1983) versus the treatment of African
migrants in South Africa (2008-2012); and

•

Burma’s expulsion of Rohingya (1991-1992) versus their repatriation and the reversal
of the expulsion policy (1992-1995).

The four case study pairs are illustrated below according to my taxonomy of government
motivations to expel.
Figure 2: Case studies by expulsion type

Economic

Establishing

Fifth Column
Ottoman littoral (1913-23)
vs.
Istanbul (1913-23)

Anti-colonialism
Uganda (1972)
vs.
Kenya (1967-69)

Consolidating

Phase of Nation-building

Target Group Threat

Security

Counterinsurgency
Burma (1991-92)
vs.
Burma (1992-95)

Nativism
Nigeria (1983)
vs.
South Africa (2008-12)

Case selection
The four expulsion cases examined in this dissertation—Ottoman Empire, Uganda, Nigeria,
Burma—are crucial cases, albeit each for different reasons. The Ottoman/Turkish expulsion
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of Greek Orthodox included the first compulsory population exchange agreement in world
history. Although the Ottomans had enacted a similar exchange with Bulgaria in 1913 57 that
agreement was, in theory, voluntary, despite force being used by each side to remove the
opposing population from the border regions. The Lausanne Convention of 1923, on the
contrary, was an internationally negotiated post-war treaty in which both the Ottoman, soonto-be Turkish, and Greek governments agreed to forcibly remove the Orthodox Greek and
Muslim populations, respectively, from their territories. This agreement set an international
precedent and was used as a model for future population exchanges.
The Ugandan expulsion of South Asians in 1972 seems to be a classic case of what
some refer to as a “middleman minority” expulsion,58 and it is an episode that first comes to
mind for many when contemplating this phenomenon. Although the size was smaller in
comparison to other episodes, it garnered international attention given the expulsion of tens
of thousands of Asians with British citizenship, and the character of President Idi Amin who
escalated the breadth of the expulsion as pressure intensified for him to change course. This
is also an important case because it involved the expulsion of both citizens and non-citizens,
creating stateless persons in the case of the former.
Nigeria’s expulsion of West African migrants in 1983 is a crucial case because it is the
largest mass expulsion on the African continent and the fourth largest expulsion in the entire
sample. An estimated 1-2 million Africans, mostly Ghanaians, were affected by Nigerian

After the Second Balkan War, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria signed the Treaty of Constantinople on
September 29, 1913 (part of the larger Treaty of Bucharest that ended the war), which included the Protocol of
Adrianople, outlining the first “voluntary” population exchange in an international agreement (Ladas, 1932: 18;
Macartney, 1934: 434; Psomiades, 1968: 60; Psomiades, 2011: 216).
58 Blalock, 1967; Bonacich, 1973.
57
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President Shagari’s decision to remove migrants en masse within two weeks, later extended to
six weeks. While there were many West African expulsions in the immediate aftermath of
independence, this expulsion episode came later, 23 years after Nigerian independence, and
was associated with the consolidation of the nation, and the corresponding exclusion of
foreigners, in the lead up to critical national elections. Finally, Burma’s expulsion of Rohingya
is a crucial case both for its contemporary relevance, with over 800,000 recently expelled to
Bangladesh in 2016-2018, and for its persistent nature with expulsion episodes in 1978, 1991,
2012, and 2016. This case is also distinct because the government targeted a population with
a precarious citizenship status, many of whom were stateless, and as such did not have a home
state to which it could turn.
In addition to the crucial nature of each case, and the distinct government motivations
for each expulsion, the four expulsion cases examined also vary in terms of period, region,
target group, citizenship status, and regime type (see Table 2).
Table 2: Expulsion cases variation
Ottoman Empire

Uganda

Nigeria

Burma

Temporal

1920s

1970s

1980s

1990s

Regional

Middle East/Europe

East Africa

West Africa

Target Group

Ethno-religious

Ethno-racial

National

Citizenship status

Nationals

Nationals/resident
aliens

Foreign nationals/
resident aliens

East Asia
Ethno-religiousracial
Nationals
(many stateless)

Regime Type
(Polity V)

Interregnum/Autocracy

Autocracy

Democracy

Anocracy

Temporally the expulsion cases occurred throughout the twentieth century with one case in
the first half of the twentieth century and three in the latter. Two occurred during the Cold
War (Uganda/Nigeria) and one after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Collapse of the Soviet
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Union (Burma). Regionally, cases are drawn from the Middle East/Europe,59 East and West
Africa, and East Asia. By definition, a mass expulsion must specifically target an ethnic, racial,
religious, or national group and each of the four cases targets a different category of persons.
According to the population exchange agreement, the Greek Orthodox were expelled because
of their Christian Orthodox religion, but their Greek roots were also clearly a key factor,
making them an ethno-religious target. The Asians in Uganda were both ethnically and racially
distinct from the black African majority. In Nigeria the expulsion was based on national origin
with Ghanaians as the main target. And, in Burma the Rohingya were largely targeted for their
Muslim religion (in opposition to the Buddhist majority), as well as their ethnicity and race—
being excluded from the list of 135 “national ethnic races.” The citizenship status of the target
groups also varied in the four cases with citizens (or nationals) and non-citizens (resident
aliens, foreign nationals) expelled, as well as a stateless group (the Rohingya). Finally, the cases
include variation in regime type ranging from states in transition (interregnum60), autocracies,
democracies, and anocracies. This variation across my four expulsion episodes presents a
“hard case” for my framework of government expulsion decision making.
To have variation on my key dependent variable, mass expulsion, I identified four
negative cases where conditions and contexts were similar, with governments that that seemed
likely to expel—i.e., had a similar motivation to expel the target group as the expelling
government (e.g., fifth column, anti-colonialism, etc.)—yet where expulsion did not occur.
The four negative cases are: Istanbul, Kenya, South Africa, and Burma (1992-1995). Istanbul
and Burma are within case comparisons, whereas Kenya and South Africa are across-case

59
60

Parts of the Ottoman Empire during this time were in Europe, particularly relevant, Western Thrace.
Polity V defines interregnum as “a complete collapse of central political authority.”
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comparisons. The within case comparisons examine geographic and temporal variation. In the
Ottoman Empire case I examine geographic variation in the expulsion decision—the Greek
Orthodox were expelled from the Aegean and Pontic littoral (as well as Anatolia) but not from
Istanbul. The Burma case looks at temporal variation, with the Rohingya expelled from the
country between March 1991-July 1992, but then abruptly repatriated from September 19921995.
Using a most-similar systems design I selected the negative cases according to the
“possibility principle” in which expulsion seemed possible, if not probable, based on the
existing theories about this phenomenon.61 These cases matched the expulsion cases along a
series of key attributes that existing theories suggest explains the variation including the
security environment, economy (GDP, GDP per capita, dominant sector), region, geography,
regime type (Polity V and V-dem), population size, target group (size, percentage of total
population), colonizer, and public opinion/sentiment toward target group. Holding these
attributes constant I was able to deduce the key contributing factors that explained the
government decisions to expel versus the decisions not to expel.
As depicted in Table 3 below, the negative cases varied, like the expulsion cases, adding
temporal and regional range to the case study sample. Importantly, while none of the four
negative cases expelled the target group, they responded differently to the group in question.
Table 3: Negative cases variation62
Temporal

Istanbul

Kenya

South Africa

Burma

1920s

1960s

2010s

1990s

Mahoney & Goertz, 2004; Straus, 2015.
In the case of Istanbul and Burma, the expelling and non-expelling governments were the same since they are
within-case comparisons, but as noted, these negative cases present geographic and temporal exemptions to the
expulsion.
61
62
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Regional
Target Group

Middle
East/Europe
Ethno-religious

Citizenship
status

Nationals

Regime Type
(Polity V)

Interregnum/
Autocracy

Action against
target group

Accommodation
(temporarily)

East Africa

Southern Africa

East Asia

Ethnic/racial

National

Ethno-religious-racial

Nationals/resident
aliens

Foreign nationals/
resident aliens

Nationals
(largely stateless)

Democracy

Anocracy

Individual
deportation

Accommodation
(temporarily)

Anocracy/
Autocracy
Discriminatory
legislation
encouraging
departure

In Istanbul the Orthodox Greeks were exempted from the 1923 population exchange
and were accommodated by the regime, albeit temporarily.63 In Kenya, the government passed
discriminatory legislation that targeted Asian permanent residents and traders encouraging the
departure of non-citizens, but not expelling them en masse. The South African government did
not expel its African migrant population like Nigeria, but maintained a vast deportation
machinery, one of the largest in the world, individually deporting tens of thousands of African
foreigners each year.64 And in Burma from 1992-1995 the government reversed its expulsion
policy and repatriated the Rohingya refugees, temporarily65 accommodating them while
continuing to implement discriminatory policies.
After identifying the four paired comparison case studies, I conducted detailed process
tracing of the six cases using comparative historical methods. First, I documented the
contextual environment and predisposing conditions in each case and then traced how the
expulsion episode unfolded on the ground, looking for evidence of the governments’
motivations for the expulsion. As I studied the historical archive and secondary sources

In 1964 the remaining Greek Orthodox population in Turkey, largely concentrated in Istanbul, was expelled
from the country in response to rising diplomatic tensions with Greece over Cyprus.
64 Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014: 58; Vigneswaran, 2011a: 111.
65 The Rohingya were expelled again during 2012-2013 and 2016-2018.
63
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chronicling events, I noted any existing explanations for the expulsion. In each case I argue
that my taxonomy of mass expulsion motivations is valid by refuting alternative explanations
offered. I then detail the critical enabling or constraining factors that either facilitated or
deterred government expulsion decisions by comparing the situations in the expulsion and
non-expulsion cases.

Sources
Since expulsionist governments are rarely transparent in their decision-making processes, nor
have open access records on this topic, to find evidence for my case studies I conducted
archival research at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and at the League of Nations (LoN)
archives in Geneva, Switzerland. Telegrams, cables, confidential memos, meeting minutes,
reports, and documented conversations with expelling government officials helped to identify
government expulsion motivations, detect new cases, and reveal the international community’s
response to expulsion events. By triangulating this data with governmental public statements,
I was able to capture the discourse that motivated mass expulsion. The archival evidence was
complemented with other primary sources including the U.S. Committee for Refugees and
Immigrants digital archive of Refugee Reports (1979-2006) and World Refugee Surveys (19612009), Kessing’s Record of World Events, African Recorder, African Contemporary Record
(1968-2000), government documents and speeches, the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS), and various news articles from a wide array of international media outlets.
Other evidence was gathered from reports and briefs published by the United Nations
(U.N.) and its agency affiliates (UNHCR, OHCHR, IOM, OCHA, Human Rights Council),
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human rights organizations, particularly Human Rights Watch (and the relevant regional watch
organizations before 1988) and Amnesty International, humanitarian organizations (MSF,
OFDA, ReliefWeb), and think tanks (International Crisis Group, Migration Policy Institute,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, among others). These sources were invaluable
for understanding how governments used different tactics on the ground and the systematic
nature of the expulsion episodes. Secondary historical sources, as well as biographies and
memoirs of key government officials were also useful in understanding decision-making
processes and external events unfolding at the time.

Disorderly & Inhumane
This dissertation analytically focuses on the state as the perpetrator because its aim is to
identify government motivations for expulsion and to determine how those governments
decided whether to implement an expulsion policy, or not. Based on my findings I propose
specific policy recommendations for deterring the use of mass expulsion in the future (see
Chapter 7 - Conclusion). A project like this is at risk of overlooking the victims and survivors of
mass expulsion, and the physical, psychological, emotional, economic, and political
consequences of their removal.66 International actors and governments have often described
mass expulsion as an “orderly and humane” policy—a necessary short-term pain for a greater
long-term security and peace gain.

There are many outstanding books of fiction and non-fiction that focus on the lives of expellees and offer their
perspectives on the lived experience of expulsion such as: Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions That Forged Modern
Greece and Turkey; Birds without Wings; Orderly and Humane: The Expulsion of the Germans After the Second World War,
among many others.
66
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The most famous, or infamous, usage of the phrase “orderly and humane” to describe
mass expulsion was in the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, drafted by the Allied Powers after the
Second World War. This communiqué facilitated the removal of 9-12 million ethnic Germans,
the Volksdeutsche and Reichsdeutsche, from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary67.68 Article XIII
of the protocol stated,
“The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize
that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining
in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that
any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner”
[emphasis added].69
The idea that mass expulsion was orderly and humane was echoed nearly three decades later
by the United Nations. In response to Idi Amin’s 1972 expulsion of the Ugandan Asians, the
UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner, Charles Mace, stated in a cable to the UNHCR
Director of the Protection Division: “We and international public opinion generally would
wish departure (if it has to take place) to be conducted in [an] orderly and humane way, from [a]
purely humanitarian viewpoint” [emphasis added].70
But it was not only internationally facilitated expulsions that adopted this language.
Expelling governments themselves appropriated the phrase. Nigerian Minister of Internal
Affairs, Ali Baba, announced his government’s extension of the African migrant expulsion
timeline from two weeks to six weeks “in order to allow for smooth and orderly exist [sic] of the

The Allied Powers only authorized German expulsions from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, but
Yugoslavia, Romania and the Netherlands also expelled ethnic Germans from their territories at the same time.
68 Mazower, 2009; Douglas, 2012; Garrity, forthcoming.
69 U.S. Department of State – Office of the Historian, 1945.
70 Outgoing Cable from UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner, Mace, to Dadzie, UNHCR Director Protection
Division, 05.09.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series
2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.
67
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affected people” [emphasis added].71 In later press briefings he again referred to “the orderly
departure of aliens” [emphasis added].72 Similarly, in 1978, after almost a year of expulsions, the
Vietnamese government in Hanoi announced a “seven-point programme” for the “orderly
departure” of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam.73
Even local news articles referred to the idea of expulsion as “humane” as noted in a
Uganda Argus article from August 1972 entitled “Asian questions Answered,”
“General Amin has shown in his typical humane way that he is only sorting the chaff
from the wheat in ordering British Asians, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladesh
nationals from Uganda’s borders in three months from now. He is merely pruning the
very tree of life of the nation. Away with the dead and rotting fruit” [emphasis added]. 74
Perpetrators, facilitators, and observers alike used the language “orderly and humane” to
describe the abhorrent atrocity of mass expulsion.
This dissertation, on the contrary, documents that expulsion is anything but orderly
and humane. In fact, it is consistently and perpetually Disorderly and Inhumane as the title
indicates. As a result, the manuscript aspires to influence government officials and policy
makers to abandon expulsion as a positive policy option and to take specific action to reduce
the incidence of mass expulsion in the future. The greatest tribute to the victims and survivors
of mass expulsion is to strive to reduce the number of future expellees.

Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 4.
Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 11.
73 Chang, 1982: 220.
74 Uganda Argus. (1972, 04 August). Asian question answered. Retrieved from https://carleton.ca/ugandacollection/the-bennett-collection-uganda-argus-newspaper/
71
72
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1.5 Dissertation Plan
This dissertation proceeds as follows. Part I outlines my theory of mass expulsion. It includes
a detailed conceptual section arguing that ethnic cleansing, the term most often conflated with
mass expulsion, should be dispensed with, and each of its distinct component parts should be
individually analyzed. I then provide an overview of my Global Mass Expulsion Dataset and
a descriptive synopsis of the phenomenon over the period 1900-2020. This is followed by a
presentation of my taxonomy of government motivations for expulsion detailing the logic
behind: fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and counterinsurgency/reprisal expulsions.
Subsequently I outline my framework of government expulsion decision making that explains
what enables some governments to expel but constrains others.
Part II provides the empirical evidence for my theory with Chapters 3-6 dedicated to
each of my four paired comparison cases studies. Chapter 3 examines the Orthodox Greek
population in the Ottoman Empire from 1913-1923, particular near the conclusion of the
Greco-Turkish War and in its aftermath at the Lausanne Peace Conference. Chapter 4 turns
to post-colonial East Africa and investigates the Asian minorities in Uganda and Kenya, where
economic freedom severely lagged political independence. Chapter 5 stays on the African
continent but pivots to West and Southern Africa and the treatment of African migrants in
1983 Nigeria compared to 2008-2012 South Africa, both burgeoning democratic states in
crucial election years with fledgling regimes trying to hold onto power and consolidate the
nation. The last empirical case study chapter examines Rohingya in Burma during 1991-1995,
a period in which they were expelled en masse, and then promptly repatriated. Lastly, Part III
contains the conclusion and supplementary materials. Chapter 7 summarizes my argument and
contributions, proposes policy recommendations based on my findings, and outlines
33

remaining questions that demand further investigation. The appendices provide supplemental
details to the substantive chapters in Parts I and II.
I now turn to the foundational question—what is a mass expulsion?
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PART I. Concepts & Theory
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CHAPTER 2: Concepts, Data, Taxonomy, Decision Making Process
2.1 The Concept of Mass Expulsion
Mass expulsion is a government policy of demographic engineering. It is part of a broader
repertoire of policies that aim to eliminate ethnic difference within a territory.75 The literature
on these policies includes a wide array of terms including genocide, mass killing, massacre,
ethnic cleansing, expulsion, deportation, democide, forced/coercive assimilation, and forced
displacement/migration.76 This proliferation of terms has resulted in unexamined conceptual
stretching—augmenting the extension without diminishing the intension77—particularly as it
relates to ethnic cleansing, often deployed as an umbrella concept, encompassing many of the
terms above.
In this dissertation I extract mass expulsion from the concept of ethnic cleansing to
isolate policies of intentional population removal—as opposed to annihilation (genocide),
control (massacre78), cultural elimination (coercive assimilation79), or a combination of the
three (ethnic cleansing). Three of the concepts are policies of ethnic elimination (genocide,
expulsion, coercive assimilation) and one is a policy of ethnic management (massacres
intending to control80).81 I argue that defining these concepts by the intention of the
perpetrator(s) clarifies the semantic field of exclusionary politics by clearly bounding and

McGarry & O’Leary, 1993; McGarry, 1998.
Garrity & Mylonas. (2022, April). Nesting exclusionary politics approaches [Paper presentation]. International
Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention 2022, Nashville, Tennessee.
77 Sartori, 1970.
78 Semelin’s (2007) concept of massacres aiming to subjugate, or force collective surrender, would fit here as well
as Valentino’s (2004) “counterguerrilla mass killings.”
79 Some scholars do not include coercive assimilation as a policy of exclusion (Mylonas, 2012; Bulutgil, 2016),
although many quantitative datasets do (Bellamy, 2011; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2004; Butcher et al., 2020).
80 See footnote 78.
81 McGarry & O’Leary, 1993.
75
76
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differentiating the concepts from each other. Much existing research in this field has
aggregated some, or all, of these events,82 often capturing the practices or tactics used in
implementation (e.g., mass killing, deportation, displacement), rather than the policy or
intention of the government. While the methods of governments intending to remove a group
(mass expulsion) may in some cases be similar to those of governments intending to annihilate
the target (genocide), or to control them (massacres aiming to subjugate or counterguerrilla
mass killings83), these policies have different intents.84 Focusing on specific policies, rather than
on the practices or tactics implemented by the perpetrator(s), avoids the definitional
discrepancies associated with ethnic cleansing. This allows for a better understanding of
government motivations and policy choices, and in turn the causes and consequences of these
atrocities.
This dissertation focuses on one slice of the exclusionary politics field: mass expulsion.
I introduce mass expulsion as a neovalent—an existing term85 given new meaning with
increased denotation.86 Mass expulsion is defined here as:
a systematic government-sponsored policy to remove an ethnic, racial, religious, or national group, as
such, with no individual legal review and with no recognition of the right to return.87

Harff, 2003; Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Orchard, 2010; Bellamy, 2011; Bulutgil, 2016; Butcher et al., 2020;
Lichtenheld, 2020.
83 See Valentino (2004) & Semelin (2007).
84 Schabas, 2000: 200.
85 Expulsion is codified (but not defined) in various human rights conventions including the Refugee Convention
(1951); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); European Convention on Human Rights,
Protocol 4 (1968); American Convention on Human Rights (1969); African Charter on Human & Peoples’ Rights
(1981); and Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004).
86 Sartori, 1984.
87 Garrity, forthcoming.
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Six core attributes form the core of this concept. The perpetrator of mass expulsion is the
government of an established state—either directly through the military, police, or intelligence
services or indirectly through a paramilitary force with state-support. The policy systematically
intends to remove the target group—to force them to leave the territory of the state, not to
annihilate the group or to control them within the territory. It is a group-based phenomenon,
targeting a specific ethnic, racial, religious, or national group. To count as an expulsion the
group must be targeted specifically because of its shared group characteristics, not because of
larger indiscriminate violence. The expellees’ legal standing must not be individually evaluated
by the perpetrator, thereby distinguishing mass expulsion from individual expulsion. Lastly,
the expelling government must deny the expellees the right to return at the time of their
removal.
This definition requires an empirical determination of a government’s aims in
implementing the policy. In some mass expulsion cases the intention to remove is explicit.
State authorities either officially announce an expulsion order or decree (Mexico, 1931;
Uganda, 1972; Nigeria, 1983) or consent to a bilateral or multilateral population transfer or
exchange agreement (Turkey-Greece, 1923; Czechoslovakia/Poland/Hungary, 1945). In most
instances, however, the intent to remove must be inferred from official state actions such as
announced and unannounced police and/or military “clearance” operations or raids that corral
target populations, destroy or confiscate their legal documents, and force them across borders
(United States, 1929; Uganda, 2010; Algeria, 2016). In these cases, physical force is used but
violence is typically limited. In a small number of episodes, the intent is more difficult to
discern because killing is used to induce flight—often, but not always, during inter- or intrastate war (Greece, 1912; Cyprus, 1974; Burma, 2016). Killing is also a tactic, or preliminary
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evidence of, other eliminationist policies like genocide, or difference-management policies,
including massacres that seek to control.88 In these cases, other evidence must be used to assess
a government’s intention,89 such as reports of state or state-sponsored actors threatening the
target group to leave “voluntarily” or face violence, or tactical—as opposed to wholesale—
authorized state force to provoke flight, or deliberate decisions not to restrain militia intent on
expulsion. In such episodes, departure from the territory is coercively encouraged, not
prevented.90 This dissertation’s focus is confined to events in which the government’s policy
is to systematically remove an ethnic group, regardless of the tactics used.
Governments may adopt different eliminationist or management policies for different
groups.91 For example, the Ottoman Empire implemented different policies toward its
Orthodox Greek (mass expulsion) and Armenian (genocide) populations;92 Idi Amin’s regime
in Uganda expelled South Asians (1972) but massacred rival Acholi and Langi ethnic groups
(1970s); and the Burmese government repeatedly expelled Rohingya (1978, 1991-92, 2012-13,
2016-18) while using a combination of control and coercive assimilation strategies against the
Karen, Kachin, and Chin minorities. Focusing on policies of systematic removal (e.g.,
Ottoman Greeks, Uganda Asians, Rohingya) allows us to better understand the phenomenon

As Schabas (2000: 200) notes, while the material acts of governments intending to remove a group (mass
expulsion) may overlap with those of governments intending to annihilate the target or control them, these
policies have different intentions.
89 See Appendix A (Section 3) for relevant evidence to determine intent.
90 Theories of why governments implement mass expulsion as opposed to policies of genocide or massacre are
underdeveloped, but Valentino (2004) suggests territorial availability, cost, time, and the possibility of the target
posing a continued threat are all important considerations.
91 McGarry & O’Leary, 1993.
92 Evidence from the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive outlines different government policies toward the
Greek Orthodox and Armenian populations: “The Greeks…were deported and expelled with brutality, but the
Armenians were targeted for outright annihilation” (Akçam, 2012: 21).
88
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of mass expulsion. Having defined the concept of interest, we now turn to the universe of
mass expulsion cases.
2.2 Global Mass Expulsion Dataset, 1900-2020
The Global Mass Expulsion Dataset (GSME) developed for this thesis is a novel dataset that
documents mass expulsion events around the world from 1900-2020.93 For an event to be
coded as a mass expulsion it must have met five criteria, drawn from the above definition, and
two scope conditions.94
1. The event must be sponsored by the government of an established state95;
2. The government policy must be the systematic removal of the target population;
3. The target population must be an ethnic, racial, religious or national group;
4. The population must be removed because of its shared group characteristics, not
incidentally displaced by violence; and
5. The target population must be denied the right to return at the time of the expulsion.
In addition to these five criteria, an expulsion episode must meet two scope conditions: 1) the
expelled population must be moved across an international border, and 2) at least 1,000
persons must be expelled in an annual period.
The purpose of the first scope condition is to distinguish between episodes of internal
and external expulsion. The main reason for excluding internal expulsion is empirical
feasibility. Feasibility both in terms of determining what qualifies as an internal expulsion

Garrity, forthcoming.
Appendix A.2 includes further details on coding decisions.
95 Mass expulsion by non-state actors is not included in the dataset, nor are “from below” cases of violence
initiated by individuals, or communities, that are not organized by the government.
93

94
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event, and perhaps more importantly, access to reliable information for internal expulsions
dating back to 1900. Coding internal expulsions would require a much larger number of,
arguably more subjective, determinations for inclusion in cases ranging from developmentinduced internal displacement, displacement caused by natural disasters because of deliberate
government neglect, or government “red-line” policies that disproportionately affect one
ethnic group, forcing them to move internally. In addition, there are severe barriers to
systematic data collection for cases of internal expulsion. Internal displacement was not a
significant focus of the international community until recently. Data from the Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre, the most authoritative source on internal displacement,
does not begin until 1998. In contrast, cross-border mass expulsion, at least in cases involving
the removal of citizens, creates refugees. And since 1920, the League of Nations and then the
UNHCR (1950) have had the mandate to track and trace refugee populations. Other refugeespecific sources like the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants digital archive of
Refugee Reports (1979-2006) and World Refugee Surveys (1961-2009) have records dating to
the early 1960s.
The second scope condition quantifies the scope of the “mass” in mass expulsion, an
inherently contentious exercise. The minimum threshold of 1,000 persons expelled is an
arbitrary limit, but it aligns with the international relations literature on civil wars,96 and it
excludes small-scale expulsions of a few hundred persons that are difficult to verify, as well as
those without a confirmed number of victims. While ideally a relative proportion of the group
affected would be used, that approach requires reliable census figures of the target group size,

96

Sambanis, 2004.
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which are often unavailable. Regular censuses are not conducted in many countries, and
manipulation and deliberate under counting of ethnic minorities is a chronic deficiency of
country-level population data.97 In addition, since the GSME dataset also includes the
expulsion of foreign nationals, resident aliens, and refugees, a relative measure of persons
affected would require population figures for categories of persons that are not included in
national censuses. In many of the contexts examined here immigration statistics are either not
available or are extremely unreliable, particularly because migrant workers, who may or may
not have residency, are often transient. These are the reasons the GSME dataset documents
the absolute size of the population expelled.
Despite best efforts to include all incidents of mass expulsion accurately, there are
limitations to observational data. Particularly for events in the first half of the dataset (19001960), data quality and sources are more suspect because of the rudimentary nature of data
collection at the time. Accuracy in the number of persons expelled is particularly variable.
Therefore, the GSME dataset captures low- and high-end estimates which provide a range of
the total persons affected in each case. The minimum number of persons expelled has been
used in analyzing the data to err on underestimating rather than overestimating the
phenomenon. Because expulsion is a political decision, sources documenting expulsion events
are inherently politicized, with expellees and expellers presenting different versions of events.
Efforts have been taken to collect data from both sides (e.g., from Turkish and Greek sources
for the 1923 Turkey-Greece population exchange) as well as more neutral third parties (UN
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Ulfelder & Valentino, 2008; Mylonas, 2015.
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and human rights organizations). To overcome uncertainty, multiple sources were collected
for each episode to verify its occurrence and event details.
Another possible limitation may be geographic bias, particularly for the first 50 years
of the dataset, given the limited data collection available outside of Europe. However, of the
44 expulsion episodes that occurred before 1950, seven cases98 (15 percent) are non-European.
Given the establishment of UNHCR in 1950, and its slow, but steady, expansion outside of
Europe in the late 1950s/early 1960s,99 after 1960 any apparent geographic bias declines
significantly. Lastly, given the importance of intent in the production of the dataset, there is
potential for bias in interpreting governmental aims. The coding criteria decision tree is
included in Appendix A.2 to document how case inclusion/exclusion was determined as well
as the relevant evidence required. While the present dataset may not be exhaustive, due
diligence has been performed to include most mass expulsion episodes during 1900-2020.100
The GSME dataset includes 139 episodes of mass expulsion during 1900-2020 across
seven world regions.101 Mass expulsion events have consistently been initiated throughout the
period examined (see Figure 3).

United States, 1929-39; Mexico, 1931; Cuba 1933, 1937; Dominican Republic, 1937; Peru, 1942; Israel, 194748.
99 Loescher, 2001.
100 See Appendix A.1 for a full list of mass expulsion episodes during 1900-2020.
101 These regions correspond to the World Bank’s classification: East Asia & Pacific; Europe & Central Asia;
Latin America & the Caribbean; Middle East & North Africa; North America; South Asia; and Sub-Saharan
Africa.
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Figure 3: Mass expulsion episodes initiated (1900-2020)

Ten or more expulsion events occurred in eight of the 12 decades examined. The first
15 expulsion cases (1900-1923) occurred during the First and Second Balkan Wars, the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the immediate aftermath of World War I. The Second
World War and the post-war peace agreements (1938-1948) led to a surge of over 20 European
cases of mass expulsion. Decolonization across Africa and Asia (1960-1980) and the end of
the Cold War period (1981-1989) brought another wave of expulsion episodes as new states
emerged following the collapse of colonial empires and as new governments vied to maintain
and control power. The end of the Cold War in the 1990s saw political upheaval across the
world with the first Gulf War, the collapse of Yugoslavia, the aftereffects of the Rwandan
genocide, and the persecution of the Rohingya. All led to various mass expulsion episodes. As
indicated by the continued expulsions in the last two decades examined (2000-2020), this
instrument of demographic engineering remains favored by governments around the world.
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Over the last fifty years an average of 1.56 expulsions have been initiated per year, or three
expulsions every two years.
While Figure 3 indicates that the absolute number of mass expulsion events initiated
has remained steady during the period examined, because the number of countries in the world
increased in the latter half of the twentieth century, the relative number of expulsions has
decreased over time. In the two peak periods (1912-1914 & 1944-1947) the number of
countries in the state system actively expelling was between 7-11 percent. Since 1960, as more
states arrived in the world system, the peak proportion of states expelling has been four
percent (in 1964, 1978, & 1979). Figure 4 illustrates the number of active mass expulsion
events during 1900-2020. To indicate the pervasiveness of this phenomenon, in 92 of the 120
years catalogued there was at least one ongoing mass expulsion event somewhere in the world.

Figure 4: Active mass expulsion episodes (1900-2020)

The duration of mass expulsion episodes, presented in Figure 5, indicates how long
each expulsion event lasted. This data contains some uncertainty because while the starting
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point of an expulsion episode is usually clear, its end date is less so. Nevertheless, mass
expulsion is marked by a relatively short duration, compared to other related phenomena: 66
percent of cases lasted one year or less and 87 percent lasted two years or less. Only seven
cases in the dataset (5 percent) lasted four years or more. The duration of genocide and
politicide episodes, by comparison, is typically over three years (59 percent), with 45 percent
lasting more than six years.102 The expulsion data matches the intuition that a strategy of
removal is more expeditious than one of destruction.
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Figure 5: Duration of mass expulsion episodes

Geographically, mass expulsion occurs all over the world—no region has been spared
(see Figure 6). Europe & Central Asia tops the chart with 51 cases (37 percent) in the period
examined, with 73 percent of those incidents occurring in the first half of the twentieth
century. Sub-Saharan Africa comes next with 31 percent of total mass expulsion events, all
concentrated in the latter half of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century.
The Middle East & North Africa (MENA), East Asia & Pacific, and Latin America & the
Caribbean regions all hover around 10 percent each of total cases. South Asia and North
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America were the least likely to expel with 3 percent and 1 percent, respectively, of the total
caseload.
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Figure 6: Number of mass expulsion episodes by world region

To see how the regional variation has changed in more recent years, the grey bars in Figure 6,
show the geographic distribution of mass expulsion during 2000-2020. While the top three
expulsionist regions remain the same, sub-Saharan Africa moves to the top (46 percent)
followed by MENA (18 percent), with Europe & Central Asia moving down to third (14
percent). The rest of the regions remain in the same order when compared to the full period,
although East Asia & Pacific’s share rises (tied with Europe), and North America drops out
of the sample with zero expulsion events during the last twenty years.
To determine if a small group of states was driving the geographic distribution of the
data, distinct expulsionist countries, by region, are depicted in Figure 7. The results reveal that
61 countries account for the 139 expulsion events examined. Intra-regional variety in
expulsionist states is shown by the relatively high proportion of countries expelling in five of
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the seven regions with four over 30 percent (Sub-Saharan Africa, MENA, South Asia, and
North America), and a fifth (Europe & Central Asia) just under at 27 percent.
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Figure 7: Number of distinct expulsionist countries
and proportion of expelling countries, by region

The mass expulsion data show that the phenomenon is widespread, recurring, and is
implemented on a large scale. Although quantitative data on the number of persons expelled
is imprecise as indicated in the methods section, low- and high-end estimates were collected
from numerous sources. The sources indicate that from 1900-2020 between 30.35 million and
42.90 million persons were expelled. Figure 8 shows the minimum number of people removed
in an expulsion episode. Just over one-third of expulsion cases (47) affected 5,001-50,000
persons, with another third (48) affecting 50,001-250,000. Seventeen percent of the cases (23)
were small-scale expulsions with 5,000 or fewer persons expelled. The remaining 14 percent
(21) expelled more than 250,000. Only five cases of expulsion removed more than one million
persons.
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Figure 8: Total number of persons expelled per expulsion episode
(minimum estimates)

The GSME dataset documents four different categories of persons expelled: nationals,
foreign nationals, resident aliens, and refugees. Oftentimes governments that claim to
exclusively target non-citizens also sweep up citizens in their expulsions. Since the foundation
of expulsion is group-based removal, legal status is often irrelevant (or at least less relevant) to
the expelling regime. Therefore, to exclude cases of non-citizen expulsion, which much of the
existing scholarship on ethnic cleansing does, is to overlook a large portion of expulsion
events.
Over half of the 139 expulsion events examined—78 episodes, or 56 percent—
targeted citizens of the expelling state. However, of those 78 episodes, only 47 incidents (34
percent of the total caseload) exclusively targeted citizens (see Figure 9). Almost all of the 47
cases that only targeted citizens occurred in Europe (89 percent) and 74 percent of those
incidents took place in the first half of the twentieth century. The heavy focus in the existing
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literature on European ethnic cleansing,103 may explain why non-citizen expulsions have been
largely overlooked.
The fact that only 12 cases of citizen-only expulsion occurred after 1950 may at first
glance seem to indicate that the customary international law against expelling citizens has
diffused around the world. But, on the contrary, the evidence suggests that expelling states
have simply modified their strategy by removing citizens simultaneously with non-citizens.
There are 31 documented cases (22 percent) of hybrid, citizen and non-citizen expulsions, of
which 26 cases (84 percent) have occurred after 1950. These hybrid expulsions include the
removal of citizens and a variety of combinations of foreign nationals, resident aliens, and
refugees.

Only non-citizens

22%
44%

Only citizens
Citizens & noncitizens

34%

Figure 9: Percentage of total expulsion episodes by category of persons expelled

Perhaps surprisingly, the plurality of expulsion cases during 1900-2020 targeted only noncitizens (44 percent), a fact not captured in the existing literature. Most of these non-citizen
expulsions (67 percent) targeted foreign nationals and/or resident aliens. The remaining 33
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percent expelled foreign nationals and/or resident aliens along with refugees (18 percent), or
exclusively targeted refugees (15 percent). Refugees are often swept up in the expulsion of
other non-citizens with 16 different states across four regions—East Asia & Pacific, MENA,
South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa—expelling refugee populations, en masse.
Finally, Map 1 shows the frequency of mass expulsion among the 61 countries that
have implemented expulsion policies. Fifty-six percent of the countries in the dataset have
expelled more than once: 21 percent have expelled twice, 18 percent have expelled three times,
7 percent have expelled four times and 10 percent five times or more. The remaining 44
percent of countries have implemented a policy of mass expulsion only once.

Map 1: Frequency of mass expulsion, 1900-2020

Since this dataset includes states with varying durations of existence as modern nation-states,
one might conclude that these findings are biased against countries like Turkey, Bulgaria, and
Greece (with seven to eight expulsion events each), which were sovereign for the full 120 years
examined. Perhaps it is also unfair to compare new states that emerged in the latter half of the
twentieth century with older states built on historic expulsions before 1900, such as the United
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States, France, and England. Nevertheless, younger states such as Kenya, Libya, Uganda, and
Burma have each expelled four to five times. Length of statehood does not seem to be a
prerequisite for repeated use of mass expulsion. The frequency data support the finding of
genocide researchers that governments with records of past mass atrocities are more likely to
be repeat offenders.104 Therefore, the GSME dataset could help inform early warning and
prevention systems, providing researchers with a new list of high-risk countries for mass
expulsion to complement those for genocide.

2.3 Taxonomy of Mass Expulsion
While a variety of typologies of genocide and mass killing have been developed, 105 and some
of ethnic cleansing,106 none exist for mass expulsion. Typologies proposed by genocide
scholars most frequently classify their cases by the perpetrator’s objective or motivation. 107
Rather than creating a typology of mass expulsions, I have instead inductively used my GSME
dataset to create a taxonomy of mass expulsion which maps the 139 expulsion events into four
distinct categories based on the government’s implicitly or explicitly stated motivation to expel:
removing a fifth column, anti-colonialism, nativism, and counterinsurgency/reprisal. Figure
10 shows the distribution of the four types across the total sample of 139 expulsion events.

Harff, 2003.
Smith, 1987; Harff & Gurr, 1988; Chalk & Jonassohn, 1990; Fein, 1990; Valentino, 2004.
106 Bell-Fialkoff, 1999; Mann, 2005; Ther, 2014. These three scholars (two sociologists and one historian) offer
35 different types of ethnic cleansing based on diverse classification criteria. Bell-Fialkoff (1999) presents eight
different categories, or “dimensions,” of ethnic cleansing: historical; geographic; paradigmatic; ideological;
strategic; economic; and temporal (51-56). Mann proposes 18 kinds of “violence and cleansing in intergroup
relations” based on different types of cleansing combined with types of violence (2005: 12). And Ther (2014)
proposes two typologies, one historical, similar to Bell-Fialkoff, and one based on “empirical findings” which
describe the “character of ethnic cleansing” 106 (231-252). There is a proliferation of different types of ethnic
cleansing but no consistent classification criteria.
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The plurality are fifth

column

expulsions

(33

percent), followed closely by

counterinsurgency/reprisal (31 percent) and nativism (27 percent) expulsions. The anticolonialism type is the smallest, with nine percent.
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Figure 10: GSME cases by expulsion type
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These four types are based on the government’s view of the target group as a real or alleged
threat and the relevant phase of nation-building. The real or perceived threats posted by the
target group—either security or economic—indicate the type of danger that the government
believes the group poses. Security threats concern both territorial and political control of the
state such as challenges to a state’s sovereignty or claim to authority; relations with enemy
external powers; secessionist movements; inter-state disputes; and “refugee warriors.”108
Economic threats relate to the control of state resources, industries, assets, and employment
opportunities. Threats that governments identify may be genuine, based on specific actions or
events, or perceived based on false or manufactured information. In the latter case,
government officials may use propaganda to win internal support and persuade public opinion.
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In short, the threats that motivate mass expulsion are those that affect the security or economic
interests of the expelling state.
These threats combine with phases of nation-building to determine the type of, or
motivation for, mass expulsion. The phase of establishing the nation is the process by which
newly created states define their membership: who is included in, and who is excluded from,
the demos. Given that this dataset examines the 120 years between 1900-2020, the nation
establishing phase encompasses the creation of new nation-states after the collapse of empires,
the emergence of new states after the end of colonial rule, and state expansion or contraction
through territorial annexation or the cession of territory, respectively. Conversely, the nation
consolidating phase is the process by which existing states re-define their membership as the
composition of the nation changes over time because of emigration, immigration, and other
demographic shifts. To operationalize these phases, the first 15 years after a state gains its
independence, or the first five years after territorial changes to state borders, are categorized
as in the establishing phase of nation-building; and a state is considered in the consolidating
phase of nation-building after 15 years of independence or changes to its borders. Although
not all 139 expulsion events fit precisely in the four specified categories,109 most cases are
accurately captured by the types outlined, which are described in detail below.
Fifth Column Expulsions (security threat, establishing phase of nation-building): Fifth column
expulsions target groups that are believed to pose an existential security threat to the territorial

Empirically, all 139 expulsion episodes were coded into one of the four quadrants of the 2x2 taxonomy. Of
the 59 expulsions that took place in the nation-establishing phase, four cases did not fit the operational criteria
(Côte d’Ivoire, 1958; Libya, 1970; Cambodia, 1970 & 1975). And of the 80 expulsions that took place in the
nation-consolidating phase, three cases did not fit (Uganda, 1970; Algeria, 1975; Bangladesh, 1978).
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integrity of the state, most often based on their real or alleged ties to an external “kinstate.”
These expulsions typically occur in the wake of imperial collapse (e.g., Ottoman Empire),
following territorial annexation or cession (e.g., Germany’s Anschluss, 1938; Bulgaria, 1940), or
in the aftermath of war as populations are “unmixed” to fit newly drawn borders (Turkey,
1923; Czechoslovakia, 1945). Governments engaged in expelling fifth columns seek to remove
“disloyal” minorities as they homogenize their populations. Turkey removed its Christian
minorities to become a Turkish-Muslim state (1913-1923), Israel expelled Palestinians to create
a Jewish state (1947-1949), and Hungary removed Slovaks to establish a state for the majority
Magyars (1946). The idea of homogenous nation-states, and the congruence of national and
political boundaries, is the core of the Gellnerian explanation of nationalist sentiment and that
is why this type of mass expulsion closely aligns with the establishing phase of nationbuilding.110
The modalities of fifth column expulsions are unilateral force or transfer (59 percent),
bilateral population “exchange” agreements (26 percent), or multilateral population
“transfers” or “exchanges” (15 percent). At the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly
after the First World War, negotiated treaties to “unmix” populations, however involuntary,
were widely viewed as the best solution for the maintenance of international peace and
security.111 However, by mid-century population transfers and exchanges fell out of favor and
the usage of these agreements drastically declined, although they still have their proponents.
Fifth column expulsions comprise a third of the total cases in the mass expulsion
dataset, 46 of 139 episodes (33 percent). Of the 46 instances, 85 percent occurred in Europe
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& Central Asia, with the remainder in Africa (Niger, 1963; DRC, 1964; Eritrea, 1998), East
Asia (Cambodia, 1975; Vietnam, 1978), and MENA (Israel, 1947; Egypt, 1956). The
predominance of European cases in this category aligns with the current literature that explains
the drivers of expulsion as a combination of inter-state wars, territorial conflict and
revanchism, extreme ethnonationalism, and utopias of homogeneity.112 One possible reason
for the lack of fifth column expulsions in other regions, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, is the
stability of borders and the principle of uti possidetis in the post-colonial period. Most fifth
column expulsions (78 percent) occurred in the first half of the twentieth century, but this
form of mass expulsion could reappear with the emergence of new states, or changes to
existing borders (e.g., Kosovo or Nagorno-Karabakh).
Anti-Colonialism Expulsions (economic threat, establishing phase of nation-building): Like fifth
column expulsions, anti-colonialism expulsions occur in the establishing phase of nationbuilding, but rather than targeting populations that present a security threat, these
governments seek to remove an economic threat, typically posed by “alien” minorities. During
the colonial period, European commercial, mining, plantation, and urban centers attracted
people throughout their empires seeking jobs and economic opportunities. As part of the
colonial divide-and-rule strategy, Europeans preferred allegedly “industrious” outsiders to
native inhabitants to keep the majority population economically, and in turn politically,
subservient. These alien groups, or “strangers” as they were often called,113 served as
intermediaries between the colonizer and the colonized as traders or civil servants (Burma,
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1962; Uganda, 1972), or as laborers in the colonial resource extraction machine (Sierra Leone,
1968; Ghana, 1969; Zambia, 1971). In the aftermath of colonial rule, economic independence
often did not follow political independence and alien populations that controlled key sectors
of the economy were targeted for expulsion to empower the “indigenous” population,
however defined by the government.
Some might wish to label this category “middlemen minority” expulsions, however, it
was not just alien middlemen (e.g., Asians in Uganda), those dominating the commercial,
petite-bourgeoisie class who were expelled. Similar colonial-induced migrants, sometimes
referred to as “enterprising African114 foreigners,” such as bureaucrats, doctors, teachers,
carpenters, and other skilled workers (e.g., Congolese in Gabon, 1962) were also expelled.
Therefore, the anti-colonialism type encapsulates government policies to remove both alien
middlemen as well as skilled workers and professionals that had been previously favored by
the colonial regimes. Removing them “completed” the process of decolonization.
Anti-colonialism expulsions are the smallest proportion of the four types of mass
expulsion: 13 episodes, or nine percent. These expulsions are concentrated in three regions—
former colonies throughout Sub-Saharan Africa (69 percent), East Asia (23 percent), and
MENA (8 percent). All but two of the cases (Indonesia, 1958; Libya, 1970) targeted fellow
colonial subjects, many from neighboring countries. Pan-African and Pan-Asian sentiment
quickly fell away as economic decline and inequality persisted. This type of expulsion occurred
in the two decades between the late 1950s and late 1970s during decolonization when many
countries began building their newly independent states. Since the colonization of territories
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has been largely eliminated, anti-colonial expulsions are the least likely to occur in the present
time. However, if currently occupied territories obtain their independence, such as the West
Bank or Western Sahara, we could see a revival of this form of expulsion, targeting settlers.
Nativism Expulsions (economic threat, consolidating phase of nation-building): Nativism mass
expulsions target groups that pose an economic threat to the state in the consolidating phase
of nation-building. In these expulsions groups are accused of undermining the economic
opportunities of the indigenous population and usurping their rights as natives. Governments
state that they seek to remove these groups to improve conditions for national labor by
nationalizing the labor force and riding the country of foreigners (Cuba, 1933, 1937; Uganda,
1970), or to remove a strain on the local economy (Bangladesh, 1978, 1992; Iran, 2007; France,
2009). Others falsely accuse the targets of undercutting domestic wages (United States, 1954)
or appropriating the national wealth (Mexico, 1931; Honduras, 1969), and/or taking
employment opportunities for natives in specific sectors, including trade and unskilled work
(Republic of Congo, 1977; Angola, 2003). Expulsions motivated by nativism sometimes falsely
accuse the target group of increasing crime in urban areas or for not being law-abiding
residents (Chad, 1979; Kenya, 1980). In some of these cases the target group is scapegoated
and branded as exclusively responsible for the fiscal woes of the state in times of economic
crisis or decline (United States, 1929; Nigeria, 1983; Dominican Republic, 1991).
In many cases governments brand the target population as “illegal aliens” or “illegal
immigrants,” regardless of their documentation status. Economic chauvinism is pervasive in
these cases with governments justifying their expulsions to nationalize labor, augment native
job creation, and increase wages by eliminating foreigners who work for a pittance. In many
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nativism cases, the executive promises that the removal of the expellees will solve domestic
economic problems. However, since the root causes are not successfully addressed via
expulsion, the problems are not resolved and the same group is often targeted for expulsion
multiple times (e.g., Mexican agricultural workers in the U.S., 1929 & 1954; Haitian sugarcane
cutters in the Dominican Republic, 1991, 1996 & 1999; and Congolese diamond miners in
Angola, 2003, 2008 & 2011).
Just over one quarter (27 percent) of the expulsion cases in the dataset are nativism
expulsions. It is the only type that includes episodes in all seven world regions, the most in
Sub-Saharan Africa (51 percent), Latin America & the Caribbean (22 percent), and MENA (8
percent). Nativism expulsions occur throughout the entire period examined, beginning in 1929
and continuing through 2018. These expulsions are likely to persist into the future given the
default temptation among politicians to blame foreigners when domestic economies slump.

Counterinsurgency/Reprisal Expulsions (security threat, consolidating phase of nation-building):
Counterinsurgency/reprisal mass expulsions are motivated by a real or perceived security
threat (like fifth column expulsions) in the consolidating phase of nation-building. In these
cases, the expelling government is not trying to establish the nation but is instead trying to
consolidate and strengthen the nation after migration or demographic changes altered the
ethnic make-up of the state. Threats that motivate counterinsurgency/reprisal expulsions can
be internal or external and include alleged domestic rebel or secessionist movements (Burma,
1991; Yugoslavia, 1990s), inter-state disputes (Turkey, 1964; Iraq, 1971), support for the
hostile side in third-party conflicts (Peru, 1942; Saudi Arabia, 1990), and “refugee warriors”
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(Thailand, 1979; Tanzania, 1996). These expulsions aim to remove entire populations branded
as insurgents and/or to retaliate against a neighboring state.
Counterinsurgency/reprisal expulsions make up nearly a third of the total cases
examined (31 percent). They occur throughout the entire period of study (the first instance in
1937 and the last in 2018) and in six of seven world regions (the majority in Sub-Saharan
Africa, MENA, and Europe & Central Asia). While the counterinsurgency and reprisal
elements of this type of expulsion occasionally go together, a plurality of these cases (47
percent) are instances of reprisal (e.g., Algeria, 1975; Mauritania & Senegal, 1989), most often
in retaliation for a border or foreign policy dispute. Others (42 percent) are more clearly
counterinsurgency expulsions (Israel, 1967; DRC, 1995) targeting groups seen to be internally
dangerous to the state; and a smaller portion (14 percent) are a mixture of both
counterinsurgency and reprisal elements (French Somaliland, 1967; Kuwait, 1991). This type
of expulsion is likely to continue as climate change puts increasing strain on natural
resources—potentially erupting in inter-state disputes over water and grazing rights—and as
the size and duration of refugee flows increase with protracted intra-state conflicts.
Table 4 classifies each of the 139 mass expulsion events in the dataset by the type
outlined in the taxonomy. Mass expulsions are motivated by security threats (fifth column &
counterinsurgency/reprisal) in 64 percent of the cases, and by economic threats (anticolonialism and nativism) in 36 percent of expulsions. To date, most of the research on mass
expulsion (and ethnic cleansing) has been confined to the left side of the taxonomy depicted
in Figure 10, where security threats drive the decision to expel. However, the new dataset
presented here identifies nearly 40 percent of events that are not a result of security
considerations, obliging us to widen our understanding of the drivers of mass expulsion.
60

Table 4: Types of mass expulsion
Fifth column
46 (0.33)
Counterinsurgency/reprisal
43 (0.31)
Nativism
37 (0.27)
Anti-colonialism
13 (0.09)
All four expulsion types target citizens and non-citizens for removal, indicating the
importance of incorporating both categories of persons into the analysis of this phenomenon.
However, of the 47 expulsion episodes that only targeted citizens (34 percent), all are confined
to fifth column and counterinsurgency/reprisal expulsions, indicating a security driver for
citizen-only expulsion. Since much of the existing scholarship has excluded non-citizens from
its analysis, it is perhaps not surprising that security explanations for mass expulsion
predominant. Hybrid expulsions, targeting citizens and non-citizens, and exclusively noncitizen expulsions are found across all four expulsion types.
The taxonomy also indicates that 42 percent of expulsions occur in the establishing
nation-building phase (fifth column & anti-colonialism), while 58 percent occur in the
consolidating nation-building phase (counterinsurgency/reprisal & nativism). This suggests
that mass expulsion is not an outdated phenomenon confined to the emergence of new states,
but rather a recurrently available government policy used to re-establish and consolidate the
preferred demographics of the state and remove unwanted populations.
One of the challenges in determining the causes of mass expulsion is to ensure that
like cases are being compared. The reasons motivating the Tatmadaw in Burma to expel the
Rohingya (counterinsurgency expulsion) were not the same as those motivating the Nigerian
government to expel African migrants (nativism expulsion), despite both using the same
demographic engineering policy. The taxonomy presented here helps to clarify distinct
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government motivations that lead to similar policies of mass expulsion. It also sheds light on
how the two strands of the literature—war- and non-war explanations—can co-exist in our
understanding of the phenomenon of mass expulsion.
2.4 Framework of Government Expulsion Decision Making
Based on comparative historical research and detailed process tracing of governments similarly
motivated to expel, where one does and the other does not, this manuscript presents a new
framework conceptualizing the process of government mass expulsion policy decisions. Mass
expulsion is a top-down, state-driven phenomenon therefore macro-level factors are central
in explaining its constraints. Figure 11 illustrates the three contributing factors that enable or
constrain mass expulsion policy choices: alliances, target group “homeland” state(s),115 and the
international community. In different situations some of these factors may be more or less
salient. What is important in determining a government’s decision to expel is the relative
strength of the constraints, compared to the enablers, and whether the constraints can be
successfully overcome. The framework does not intend to suggest that governments progress
through Figure 11 sequentially, but rather that each factor is considered in deciding to proceed,
or not, with mass expulsion implementation. Each factor will be examined in turn.

In cases where expulsion targets non-citizens, the “homeland” state is the expellees’ state of citizenship; in
cases where citizens (or stateless persons) are expelled, the homeland state is the state to which the expelling
government believes the expellees belong, e.g., U.S citizens of Mexican descent expelled to Mexico (1929; 1954)
or Rohingya expelled from Burma to Bangladesh. The latter is an example of expelling a stateless population that
the government views as belonging to another state, e.g., Burmese government officials referring to Rohingya as
“illegal Bengalis” despite many living in Burma for generations.
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Figure 11: Framework of Mass Expulsion Decision-Making Process

One of the first considerations for a government contemplating mass expulsion is the effect
of the policy on its domestic allies—political, military, business, etc. If expulsion politically or
economically benefits its key friends and constituents, then it becomes more likely. Political
gains from removing the target group may include eliminating internal political opposition or
removing a security threat to the ethnonational state, as defined by the dominant group in
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control of the government. Economic gains from removing the target may range from
appropriating the assets and income of an economically successful minority or opening new
employment opportunities by removing an ethnic group concentrated in a specific labor sector
or that held key positions in the bureaucracy or in desirable skilled trades. If the governing
executive believes expulsion will help consolidate its domestic alliances via the political or
economic gains outlined, then this policy option becomes more attractive. Whereas if the joint
interests of the executive and its internal allies would be harmed by expulsion, or if the payoffs
are mixed, then the decision is likely to be constrained.
In addition to domestic alliances, transnational alliances—financial and military—are
another determining factor in governmental expulsion decisions. These transnational alliances
may be formal (treaties, agreements, defense pacts) or informal (strong trade relations,
preferential arms sales) relations with external states or with foreign multi-national
corporations (e.g., Royal Dutch Shell, Anglo American). States with core transnational
alliances that are indifferent to or support expulsion, are enabled to expel. Indifference may
manifest among key transnational allies by simply “looking the other way” or continuing
business as usual in the face of the expulsion. Support occurs in cases where transnational
allies have a common interest in removing the target group from the territory as in the case of
Soviet, French, and Italian support to Mustafa Kemal and his Nationalist Army in removing
Greece (and Greeks) from the soon-to-be Turkish state. However, in other cases governments
may be concerned that expulsion would harm their transnational relationships or that those
allies would oppose the decision to expel. This harm may result from real or anticipated
instability and loss of confidence in the existing government, or damage to political ties and
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trade relations. The joint dynamics of domestic and transnational alliances greatly influence
government expulsion decisions, and either enable or constrain their policy choices.
Alliances are not the only important factor in decision-making regarding expulsion.
Governments contemplating this policy option also must consider the reaction of the
homeland state of the target group. The response or anticipated response of this state—often,
but not always, a neighboring state—is a key aspect of the decision-making process. A
government will evaluate both the strength of its ties with the homeland state—strong or
weak—as well as whether the homeland state would respond to expulsion by acquiescing and
resettling the expellees or by resisting and denying them entry. Importantly, the ability to deny
entry to the expellees is contingent on the geography of the border region and the capacity of
the homeland state.
While in some cases more than one homeland state is affected—e.g., Britain and India
in the case of Uganda’s 1972 expulsion, or Ghana and other West African states in the case of
Nigeria’s 1983 expulsion—governments’ decision calculus is typically based on the homeland
state of the majority of the expellees. Since Asians with British citizenship were most of the
target group in 1972 Uganda (approximately 50,000 of 80,000 expelled), the effect on Britain
was more of a factor in Idi Amin’s decision than India, which only had 5,000 citizens living in
the country at the time. Similarly, when Nigerian President Shagari expelled 1-2 million West
African migrants in 1983, most of the expellees (estimated at 700,000-1,000,000) were
Ghanaian, so Ghana was the primary homeland state of concern.
Finally, both a government’s ties with the international community and its response or
anticipated response to an expulsion, also play a critical role in decision making. The
international community is defined here to include “Great Powers” (in the early twentieth
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century before the creation of international organizations), international organizations (League
of Nations, UN and agency affiliates, IMF, World Bank, ICRC), and regional bodies (African
Union, ECOWAS, ASEAN, SADC). Strong ties with the UN and respective regional bodies
constrains expulsion because of concerns about damaging relations with, and status within
these organizations, whereas weak ties will ease removal. In addition, the international
community can enable expulsion by supporting, facilitating, or ignoring the policy, or it can
resist the decision by pressuring governments to change course. Overt support from the
international community most often appears in facilitating or backing bi-lateral or multi-lateral
population “transfer” or “exchange” treaties.116 But international support also materializes in
the physical extraction of expellees from a territory on behalf of the government, as the
UNHCR and ICRC did in 1972 Uganda. The international community also signals its indirect
support by ignoring expulsion decrees, or small-scale expulsions, that may be testing the waters
for larger events as in Uganda in 1970 (expulsion of Kenyan Luo) and early 1972 (expulsion
of Israelis). However, the international community can also play a critical constraining role
through resistance in the face of imminent or planned expulsion decisions as they did with the
emerging Turkish Republic in 1923 at the Lausanne Conference, exempting the Orthodox
Greeks in Istanbul from the population exchange.
In sum, not all governments motivated to expel implement an expulsion policy. Their
decisions are conditional on the effect of expulsion on their alliances, the homeland state of
the target group, and the international community. This framework of mass expulsion decision
making explains why we do not see more expulsions, given the many countries that may be

Examples include Bulgaria/Greece 1919; Bulgaria/Romania 1940; Poland, 1944; Soviet Union, 1945;
Czechoslovakia, 1945; Yugoslavia, 1945, among many others.
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motivated to expel. While each of the three factors laid out here influence expulsion decision
making on its own, it is when these factors operate in combination that the constraint on
expulsion policy implementation is strongest. Importantly, not all three of the key elements
weigh equally on the minds of government officials. In different cases, some factors may take
primacy over others. Nevertheless, all influence the discourse of mass expulsion within the
executive and shed light on how governments decide to expel.
Having presented the new taxonomy and framework of mass expulsion decision
making, Chapters 3-6 will apply them to six different historical case studies. We begin in the
aftermath of the Balkan Wars.
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CHAPTER 3. “Turkey for the Turks”: Greek Orthodox in the Ottoman
Empire
Over the course of a decade, from 1913 to 1923, the Ottoman Empire reduced its Greek
Orthodox Christian population from approximately 1.75 million117 to less than 500,000.118 The
mass expulsion of the “Rum,” as Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals were known, coincided
with the collapse of over 600 years of Ottoman rule and the birth of the Turkish Republic. 119
The removal of the Rum (“Romans” or Byzantines) spanned four wars—the First and Second
Balkan Wars, World War I, and the Turkish War of Independence—and culminated in the
first, internationally-sanctioned compulsory population exchange. Religion was used as the
demarcation criterion: Turkish-speaking, Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox faith were
forced from their homes in Turkey to Greece, and Greek-speaking, Greek nationals of the
Muslim faith were forced from Greece to the new Turkish nation-state. In addition, refugees
from Greece and Turkey, who had fled the two countries over the preceding decade, were
prevented from returning to their homes and were required to adopt the citizenship of their
country of refuge. According to the Allied Powers, the 1923 population exchange was

The size of the Greek Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire during this period is estimated to be 1.52 million. A detailed discussion regarding population figures is included in the “Population & Displacement Numbers”
section below.
118 There is no precise figure of how many Greek Orthodox remained in the Turkish Republic in 1923. Ladas
(1932) claims that 189,916 Rum of Turkish nationality were affected by the Lausanne Convention and were
expelled between 1923 and 1926 (Ladas, 1932: 438-39). Estimates of the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul—exempted
from the exchange—at the time of the Lausanne Conference were around 300,000 (Lausanne Conference on
Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace, 1923: 318). Adding these
two figures together, gives a rough estimate of just under 500,000 Greek Orthodox remaining in Turkey at the
end of 1923 (including the 189,916 expelled in the subsequent three years).
119 The Turkish Republic was officially declared on October 1923 with Mustafa Kemal as its first president, but
the Ottoman Empire was de facto eliminated at the end of WWI in 1918.
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necessary to bring sustainable peace. For those expelled from their ancestral homelands, never
to return—both Orthodox and Muslim—it was an unjust sacrifice.
This chapter is organized into three parts. The first explains the contextual
environment and predisposing conditions; description of the expulsion episode; the
motivation for expulsion, per my taxonomy; and possible alternative explanations. The second
part explains the critical factors—alliances, homeland state, and international community—
that enabled the expulsion. Lastly, the final section examines the negative case of Istanbul.120
This case highlights important constrains on mass expulsion to explain why the Istanbul
Greeks were exempted from the 1923 population exchange and were temporarily121 allowed
to remain.

3.1 Contextual Environment and Predisposing Conditions
Greek Presence in Asia Minor
The Greek presence in Asia Minor spanned millennia. For our purposes, a brief historical
overview, beginning in the fourth century, must suffice. The Byzantine Empire, also known
as the Eastern Roman Empire, ruled over Asia Minor for 1,123 years, from 330 until 1453.122
It emerged when Constantine the Great, Emperor of Rome, decided to move the capital of

The imperial capital of the Ottoman Empire had a plethora of names with few people consistently using a
single name. These names included Byzantium, Constantinople, Islambol (city of Islam), Stambul, Estambol,
Kushta, Gosdantnubolis, Tsarigrad, Rumiyya al-kubra, New Rome, New Jerusalem, among many others (Mansel,
1996: xi). In 1926 the Turkish Post Office only accepted Istanbul (Mansel, 1996: 416), but the colloquial usage
of “Istanbul” dates to the eleventh century. Some suggest Istanbul is an onomatopoetic transfer from the Greek
phrase “eis tin Polin” or “to the city.” In much of the European archival materials the city is referred to as
Constantinople, which Mansel (1996) states was “the name most often used in other languages” (xi). Here the
name will be Istanbul; although names used in primary material quotations will be left unchanged.
121 In 1964 the remaining 36,000-47,000 Greeks were expelled, mostly from Istanbul (Alexandris, 1983: 282;
Alexandris, 2003: 119; Icduygu et. al, 2008: 372).
122 Norwich, 2013: xxxvii.
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the Roman Empire east and established a second, or “Eastern,” Rome with a new capital
named in his honor: Constantinople. Byzantium reached its apogee under Basil the II, the
Bulgar-Slayer, and its first great defeat came over 700 years after its founding, in 1071, to the
Seljuk Turks, foreshadowing events to come.123 In 1453 the expanding “House of Othman,”
which gave its name to the Ottoman Empire, captured the Christian capital, Constantinople. 124
What remained of the Byzantine’s Christian Empire fell into Muslim hands. The famous Saint
Sophia church was transformed into a mosque by twenty-one-year-old Sultan Mehmet, known
as Mehmet the Conqueror.125 For the next four and a half centuries the Ottomans ruled over
large portions of Asia, Europe, and North Africa, forming a powerful multi-ethnic empire.
To govern its diverse empire the Ottomans established the “millet system” for peoples
of the book: followers of Abrahamic, monotheistic religions; all pagans or non-believers had
the Manichaean choice of conversion or the sword.126 Each millet—the three largest were the
Orthodox,127 Armenian, and Jewish—was ruled by its respective religious authority, for
example the Ecumenical Patriarchate had authority over the Greek Orthodox. The millets
were subservient, but in return for ensuring their populations remained obedient to the Sultan,
they were given complete autonomy over their religious institutions, civil courts, education
systems, cultural associations, and tax collection, a portion of which was paid to Ottoman

Norwich, 2013: xxxvii.
Norwich, 2013: xxxvii.
125 Norwich, 2013: 381.
126 Karpat, 1982: 148; Psomiades, 1968: 17.
127 The Orthodox millet was composed of Orthodox dyophysites—Christians who believed that Jesus was both
man and divine. This millet came under the jurisdiction of the Greek Patriarch but included Greeks, Bulgarians,
Serbians, Albanians, Wallachians, Moldavians, Ruthenians, Croatians, and Arab Christians among others.
Orthodox monophysites—believers that Jesus only had one nature—were part of the Armenian millet under the
jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarch (Karpat, 1982: 146; Psomiades, 1968: 16).
123
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authorities.128 This system of separate and unequal was not a peaceful melting pot as is
sometimes described but was a stable system of domination for centuries giving religious
minorities significant autonomy and authority over their own affairs.
Greek Orthodox Christians were members of the Rum millet, a reference to Rome as
the seat of Christianity, and were referred to as Rum or Romios. The word “Greek,” Yunanli,
had no national significance until Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman Empire
in 1830. Thereafter, Yunanli was used to describe citizens of the newly independent Greek
state, and Rum continued to refer to Hellenes living outside of Greece, who were not Greek
citizens, including those residing in the Ottoman Empire. 129
Since Islamic law discouraged Muslims from engaging in commerce and banking,
Christian populations, as well as Jews, dominated the economic and industrial sectors of the
empire.130 Rum were particularly prominent in commerce, shipping, manufacturing, banking,
and foreign trade.131 Trade with Europe increased significantly in the second half of the
nineteenth century, augmenting the size of coastal trading hubs along the Aegean, particularly
Smyrna, and Black Sea littoral controlled by Greek and Armenian merchants.132 The Greek
Orthodox population steadily grew over the nineteenth century largely because of Greek
migration from the independent Kingdom of Greece. The Ottoman Empire offered more
economic and entrepreneurial opportunities than the new Greek nation state and many left to
join their kin on the eastern side of the Aegean.133 Mid-century Ottoman railway concessions

Psomiades, 1968: 15-6; Alexandris, 1983: 24.
Hirschon, 2003: xii; Oran, 2003: 98.
130 Naimark, 2001: 19.
131 Alexandris, 1982: 138.
132 Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 21.
133 Clogg, 1982: 195; Alexandris, 1983: 49.
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to the Great Powers opened the interior of the empire and corresponding vast trading
opportunities. Ottoman Greeks set up trading posts and small shops along the rail lines and
served as agents for the influx of foreign capital.134 Although the Rum saw themselves as kin
of the Greeks living in Greece, they traced their historical lineage back to Romano-Byzantine
Constantinople.135 They maintained cultural ties with the Greek population in the new nationstate, but politically were content within the Ottoman Empire.136
An important component of the long historical presence of Greek Orthodox in Asia
Minor was the emergence of the pan-Hellenic nationalist idea known as the “Megali Idea,” or
Great Idea. The core aim of this idea was to unite the Hellenic people within a single Greek
nation-state, essentially reviving Christian Byzantium. The territorial scope of this idea
included Epirus,137 Macedonia, Thrace, western Anatolia, and the Aegean islands, which were
all under Ottoman control before 1912. The culmination of the Megali Idea would be the
recapture of Istanbul and its return to a Christian city.138 Greek nationalist held firmly to this
idea which guided Greek foreign policy for over a century.139 The emotional connection with
Byzantium was held to be stronger than that to ancient Athens.140 But in the early twentieth
century the Megali Idea was far from being realized with only 37 percent of the estimated
seven million Greeks living in the Greek state by 1910.141

Llewellyn-Smith, 1998: 25-27.
Oran, 2003: 98.
136 Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 25.
137 Epirus is an historical region that is now shared between Albania and Greece.
138 Alexandris, 1982: 137.
139 Psomiades, 1968: 18; Alexandris, 1982: 137-38.
140 Pentzopoulos, 1962: 26.
141 Pentzopoulos, 1962: 27.
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The “Sick Man of Europe”
Throughout the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire acquired the unfortunate sobriquet,
the “Sick Man of Europe,”142 as its territory contracted and it lost much of its political status. 143
But its problems had begun earlier in the late eighteenth century, after which the Ottomans
never won another war.144 Serbia and Greece were the first subject peoples to break away from
the Ottoman Empire, inspiring nationalist sentiment throughout the Balkans. 145 The
Ottomans responded with a series of reforms known as Tanzimat, or reorganization. The
reform period began in 1839 and ended with the first constitutional era in 1877. The Ottomans
launched the reforms to quell nationalist movements within the empire by instituting Muslim
and non-Muslim equality before the law. The idea of “Ottomanism” arose in this period to
create Ottoman citizens that were defined secularly, based on territory, regardless of religious,
ethnic, or linguistic affiliation.146 Yet, the elimination of the millets, translated as “nations,” did
not erase the cultural legacies of the institutions and the communities they comprised, both
Muslim and non-Muslim.147 The reform process ultimately failed with renewed war with
Russia.
The Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) led to further territorial losses, particularly in the
Balkans.148 The 1878 treaties of San Stefano and later the revised Treaty of Berlin, dictated by

This first appeared in print on May 10, 1860, in a New York Times article titled “Austria in Extremis” attributing
the reference to Nicholas I of Russia (“Austria in Extremis,” 1860; Mylonas, 2012: 67).
143 Naimark, 2001: 20.
144 Anderson, 2008.
145 Ladas, 1932: 5.
146 Karpat 1982: 162.
147 Karpat, 1982: 165.
148 Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 17-18.
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European powers, also included substantive reforms for the empire’s Armenian population
such as increased autonomy, representation in local government, and security guarantees. 149
Soon after, the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II responded to these losses and concessions
with an iron fist, overturning the reformist constitution, dissolving parliament, and resorting
to repression.150 The Armenians were the first to face his wrath.

Armenian Massacres (1894-1896)
There is an immense literature on the origins of the Armenian conflict with the Ottoman
Empire and the subsequent Armenian genocide.151 This chapter only engages with the history
of the Armenians to the extent that it shaped and influenced Ottoman policy in relation to the
Greek Orthodox. Sultan Abdülhamid II believed the Treaty of Berlin concessions empowered
secessionist minorities and increased Christian influence in the empire. 152 The Armenian
patriarch’s outreach to Russia, and the inclusion of minority protections and rights in the
treaty, furthered Abdülhamid’s suspicions about the loyalty of the Armenians and his fears
that foreign interference would bring about Armenian statehood.153
Perceiving the Armenians as a security threat to the Empire, Abdülhamid responded
with extreme repression. He outsourced the violence to a newly created paramilitary force,
largely composed of Kurds, called the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments, named after

Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 18.
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151 Bryce & Toynbee, 2000 [1916]; Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]; Balakain, 2003; Dadrian, 1995; Bloxham, 2005;
Akçam, 2006; Suny, 2015; Kieser, 2018; Morris & Ze’evi, 2019. These works on the Armenian genocide are
simply illustrative, not an exhaustive list of scholarship.
152 Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 38.
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himself.154 The stated purpose of these regiments was to patrol the border with Russia and
prevent territorial encroachment, but their deployment to heavily populated Armenian areas
belied their true purpose.155 By mobilizing the Kurds into the Hamidiye, Abdülhamid solved
two problems at once. He suppressed the Armenian revolutionaries, killing an estimated
200,000 persons, and won over restive Kurdish tribes who had been imagining their own
independence.156 Although foreign powers had advocated for the Armenians during the Berlin
treaty negotiations, they did little to intervene and stop the violence. These massacres
foreshadowed the annihilation of the Armenians by the Young Turks, who deposed
Abdülhamid in a coup after over three decades of his tyrannical rule.

The Young Turks157
Sultan Abdülhamid II was not well liked by the army. The despotic ruler ignored the basic
needs of his troops and they grew restless. Young cadets, mostly from the Ottoman’s Balkan
territories, and among its ruling elite, began mobilizing against the Sultan. Although these
cadets had excellent military training, many abroad, they believed the Ottoman army was out
of date and they were concerned about the shrinking Empire and its weak defenses. 158 Their
political ideology centered on restoring the constitution and defending the fatherland. 159
Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 42.
Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 42.
156 Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 192; Morris & Ze’evi, 2019: 486.
157 Before the CUP Revolution in 1908, the word “Turk” was not a part of the Turkish language. It was
appropriated from foreign languages that used the word as a pejorative. The revolutionaries known as the Young
Turks, at the time, called themselves “New Ottomans” harkening back to the constitutional days of the late
1870s. In fact, supporters of the Palace first called these New Ottomans, Jeunes Turcs, or Young Turks in French,
to express distain toward what they perceived as foreign-influenced, infidel revolutionaries. The “Old Turks,”
the members of the old regime, thought of themselves as the true Ottomans and Mohammedans (Emin, 1930:
188). Today Young Turks is an idiom for any radical, revolutionary-minded group.
158 Lewis, 2002: 206.
159 Lewis, 2002: 206.
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Growing frustrations bubbled over in 1908 with a series of mutinies and strikes across the
empire from Anatolia to Rumelia.160 The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) which had
been secretly conspiring in Macedonia against the incompetent government, took leadership
of the mutineers and called for the restoration of the constitution.161 Turks, Armenians,
Muslims, and Christians embraced and celebrated together in the streets; optimism for future
unity and brotherhood was high.162 Much of this optimism, particularly among the nonMuslim communities, was rooted in the belief that nothing could be as bad as Abdülhamid’s
reign.163 But the Young Turks soon became as despotic as their predecessor.
The primary geopolitical aim of the Young Turks was to save the Ottoman Empire by
restoring its sovereignty and protecting its territory. In restoring the constitution, the Unionist,
as members of the CUP were known, “were Ottoman patriots rather than Turkish
nationalists” fighting to restore the concept of “Ottomanism,” uniting all persons within the
empire, including minorities.164 The CUP was not very Turkish and not very Muslim. Almost
none of its leaders were “pure-blooded Turks,” and most were secular in outlook.165 Therefore,
it is not surprising that their initial commitment was to Ottomanism rather than Turkish
nationalism.
Although the Ottoman Empire was not a colony like India or Algeria, the Great
Powers exerted significant influence over the empire’s affairs through financing its public debt,
regulating import/export duties, and meddling in the treatment of minorities through the
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Capitulations.166 The Capitulations were long-standing bilateral contracts between the
Ottoman Empire and European powers, which expanded in the eighteenth century to include
the right of Europeans to intercede on behalf of Christian minorities.167 The Great Powers
strategically used the Capitulations to interfere in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire,
and the Young Turks sought to break free from these semi-colonial chains.168 However, while
they despised European meddling, the Young Turks were not anti-Western; they sought to
preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and modernize the state in order to
be seen as a peer of the powerful Western countries.169
While initially united in the restoration of the constitution, the Young Turks quickly
divided into two main camps: the Unionist (CUP) who sought central authority and control,
and the liberals who favored decentralization and autonomy for religious and national
minorities—the latter divided into many factions.170 The years between 1908 when the Young
Turks first came to power, and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) saw a dizzying power struggle
between the Unionists, the Liberals, and the Porte. The details of this period are fascinating,
but less relevant to the matter at hand. Suffice it to say, though the CUP came to power amid
high hopes of unity and constitutionalism, it faced fierce opposition with competing visions
of the empire, resulting in a bloody power struggle with each faction in control for brief
periods. In the end, the CUP returned to power in a bloody coup d’état amid the tumultuous
Balkan Wars and remained in power until the end of the First World War.
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The Balkan Wars (1912-1913)
In October 1912 the First Balkan War broke out over control of the Ottoman Empire’s
remaining European lands. Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria formed a secret alliance
and defeated the Ottomans in six weeks.171 In January 1913 the Young Turks returned to
power in a coup d’état, fearing the Liberal Party cabinet would surrender Adrianople to
Bulgaria leaving Istanbul vulnerable.172 The subsequent peace treaty divided the spoils of the
war, with Greece and Serbia the biggest winners. But disputes over the allocation of conquered
lands left the situation unsettled. Bulgaria, unsatisfied with the allotment forced upon it,
attacked Serbia and Greece, sparking the second war, which latest barley a month. 173 The
Ottomans, with the Unionists back in power, managed to regain portions of Eastern Thrace
from Bulgaria in the second war, but the overall results were still disastrous. 174 The Second
Balkan War formally ended on August 10, 1913, with the Treaty of Bucharest. The treaty
granted Greece further territorial gains including Crete, a portion of Epirus, southern
Macedonia, and the eastern Aegean islands.175 The acquired islands put Greece mere miles
from the Ottoman coast. Within a year the Ottoman Empire had lost more than 80 percent
of its European lands and 70 percent of its European population.176 Its European presence
was essentially eliminated, ending over 500 years of territorial control.
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Population movements during the wars radically transformed the demographics of the
repartitioned lands increasing nationalist sentiment and shaping population policies in its
aftermath. The two wars displaced an estimated 890,000 persons, of which hundreds of
thousands of Muslims177 fled to the Ottoman Empire.178 By 1914 the Ottoman Empire had
become more than 85 percent Muslim.179 Muslim refugees and migrants, known as muhacir,
dispersed throughout the empire—along the coasts and into the Anatolian interior.180 These
populations became some of the fiercest advocates and proponents of expelling the Greek
Orthodox.181 Demographic and territorial changes contributed to growing nationalism in the
Ottoman empire, which took on a new synthesis of Turkish and Islamic dimensions.

Turkish Nationalism
The territorial loses of the Balkan Wars were different than any previous Ottoman
dismemberment. Most of the previous loses were on the outskirts of the empire where there
was minimal control and only nominal sovereignty. The Balkan territory, on the contrary, was
“the life blood of the Ottoman Empire” and the home of many of the Young Turk182 leaders.183
This was personal. Although the winds of Turkish nationalism had been in the air before 1913,
the Unionists had held firm in their commitment to Ottomanism and the preservation of the

A.A. Pallis (1925) notes that no records exist to precisely determine how many Muslims were killed or fled
during the Balkan wars. However, he estimates the number is at least 125,000 (Pallis, 1925: 322-23); Ladas
estimates 100,000 Turks fled the Balkans in 1912 and another 48,570 in 1913 (Ladas, 1932: 15).
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multi-ethnic empire. That ended in 1913. The party leaders became radical proponents of
Turkish nationalism.184
After the Balkan Wars, the CUP’s primary aim was to transform what remained of the
Ottoman Empire into a Turkish nation-state. Influenced by sociologist Ziya Gökalp, the party
sought to “Turkify” the country by creating a Turkish national identity in Ottoman Muslims. 185
The remaining territory of Asia Minor was deemed the Turkish homeland, Türk Yurdu, and
the site of Turkification.186 “Turkey for the Turks” became a popular nationalist slogan, likely
drawn from similar European mantras of the time such as “Macedonia for the Macedonians”
or “Poland for the Poles.”187 The trauma of the Balkan Wars led to the conclusion that only
Muslims could be loyal to the empire; Christian communities were traitors, supportive of antiMuslim tactics during the wars.188 CUP leaders thought that non-Muslim minority populations
posed an existential threat to the territory of the empire.189 They had to be removed or
eliminated.

Population & Displacement Numbers
It is difficult to determine precise population and displacement figures during this period given
their politicized nature and questionable measurement techniques. Turkish historian Taner
Akçam argues that while it may seem that there is much disagreement between Greek and
Turkish sources, the narratives are simply a mirror image of one another—one side’s
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“voluntary” migrant is the other’s forcibly expelled refugee.190 Therefore, statistics and
evidence should be interpreted with knowledge of which side of the mirror one is examining.
Many of the figures in the existing literature come from Alexander Pallis and Alexandre
Antoniades—both Greek—which presents one side of the mirror. Pallis, held various
positions with the Greek government191 and data in his 1925 book, Statistical Study of Racial
Migrations in Macedonia and Thrace, 1912-1924, is drawn from his own work on the ground as
well as Greek government sources including the 1913 and 1920 censuses. Antoniades, was a
Greek civil engineer based in Istanbul, and published population figures in his 1922 work: Le
développement économique de la Thrace. Stephen P. Ladas, another prominent Greek scholar of this
period, was attaché to the Greek Embassy in Paris from 1921-1922.192 The figures in his 1932
book, The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, are largely drawn from Pallis and
Antoniades, while adding some of his own information.193 Ladas argues that while statistics
were published by Turkish officials and the Greek Patriarchate, any pre-WWI statistics are
unreliable: “the Ottoman Empire had no reliable statistics. All other statistics or maps are
either subject to bias or purely speculative.”194 He also stated that Balkan countries, including
Greece, exaggerated their claims, making government-produced statistics unreliable. Other
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scholars support Ladas’s claim, noting that Ottoman authorities historically underestimated
the Christians present in the empire.195
On the other side of the mirror, Turkish historian Kemal Karpat, steeped in Ottoman
population statistics, wrote a 1985 book that compiled Ottoman demographic information
from 1830 to 1914. Karpat disagrees with Ladas: “the most consistently reliable sources of
demographic data were the figures issued by the Ottoman government itself.” 196 While
acknowledging deficiencies and technical errors in the data—including general population
undercounting, particularly of women—Karpat agrees with the Greek sources, that population
statistics were a crucial tool of political manipulation by various ethnic and religious groups. 197
He goes so far to say: “population statistics were the first weapons in the battle that was later
carried forward with guns and bullets.”198 Nevertheless, since the two main purposes of the
Ottoman census was to levy taxes on non-Muslims and conscript Muslim adult males into the
military, Karpat argues there were strong incentives for the information to be accurate. 199
With that lengthy disclaimer, the sources largely agree that by 1914, the beginning of
the period addressed in this chapter, there were between 1.5 and 2 million Greek Orthodox
living in the Ottoman Empire.200 The arguments and evidence outlined here are not dependent
on precise population figures. It suffices to say that the size of the Greek Orthodox population
in 1914 dramatically declined in the following decade as a direct result of the Ottoman
government’s mass expulsion policies.
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3.2 Mass Expulsion of Greek Orthodox (1913-1923)
The mass expulsion of Greek Orthodox from the Ottoman Empire during 1913-1923
occurred in four phases: 1) the pre-WWI phase culminating in the first attempted population
exchange between the Ottoman Empire and Greece; 2) the First World War phase (19141918), in which Greeks were not primarily targeted, but faced internal expulsion; 3) the Turkish
War of Independence phase (1919-1922), in which civilian populations were expelled along
with the retreating Greek armed forces; and 4) the final phase (November 1922-1923), the
Lausanne Convention, part of the post-war Lausanne Peace Treaty, which agreed the first
mandatory population exchange. These phases were cumulative, each building on the next,
but were also distinct chapters in a larger governmental strategy of population removal.

Phase 1: Pre-WWI, First Attempted Population Exchange (1913-1914)
The Balkan Wars wounded Ottoman pride. The empire was diminished in both size and status.
These loses were particularly distressing for the Young Turks, as many of the CUP leaders
originated from the lost European territories. The shrinking empire was also saddled with
hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees, muhacir, in need of resettlement. Any lingering
ethnoreligious solidarity crumbled with the Ottoman defeat in Europe. The Greek occupation
of the Aegean Islands brought Greece perilously close to the prosperous Turkish coast,
heightening concerns about securing the shoreline and resisting any further Greek conquests
of over a million “unredeemed Hellenes.”201 Anticipating those desires, and with the recent
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Ottoman-Bulgarian Protocol of Adrianople202 in mind, the Young Turks began expelling the
Rum.
The CUP knew that the Greek government would never willingly enter into an
exchange agreement like Bulgaria, so they forced the issue by violently removing Orthodox
Greeks from their homes.203 They also hoped that these expulsions would pressure Greece to
return the Aegean Islands that it had occupied during the Balkan Wars, and which the Allies
had sanctioned.204 In the months following the conclusion of the Balkan Wars, and into 1914,
an estimated 100,000-270,000205 Greeks were expelled from Eastern Thrace and Anatolia. 206
This deed was done by irregular bands of chettés, comprised mostly of Balkan refugees who
had recently arrived, in collusion with Ottoman authorities.207 Greek families were forced to
flee through an official campaign of intimidation, threats, looting, and select killings—many
Rum headed for Greece, just as the Ottomans wanted.208
Evidence for government involvement in, and direction of, these expulsions is found
in a coded telegram from Interior Minister, Talat Pasha, to the District Governor on April 14,
1914: “‘Talat reports that a large number of Greek villagers had assembled on the coast and
requests that it be ‘ensured that they emigrate by boarding steamships but without any
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indication being given that [the process] is the result of [a government] directive.’”209 Not only
did the government give directives, but it intentionally distanced itself from any evidence of
involvement. The Ottoman government chartered steamships and provided free transport to
Greece for the expellees.210 Simultaneously, in 1913 and carrying into 1914, the Ottoman
authorities organized an economic boycott211 of Greek products and businesses with the goal
of forcing Rum merchants to leave.212 All these tactics, violent and non-violent, direct and
indirect, were used to expel the Greek Orthodox population.
In May 1914 the Ottoman minister in Athens, Ghalib Kemaly Bey, wrote to Greece
Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos to officially propose a population exchange on behalf of
the Ottoman government.213 Kemaly emphasized that this was the only way to bring peace to
the region. Greece was keen to end the violence and believed an exchange could both assist
in populating its newly acquired Balkan territories and in overcoming economic losses from
the recent emigration of 1.5 million Greeks to the Americas during 1900-1914.214 It was also
believed that through a formal exchange, with an exchange commission, the expellees would
be compensated for their loses.215 Venizelos accepted the Ottoman proposal,216 but insisted
that the agreement be voluntary and that the properties of the emigrants should be appraised
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and liquidated by a Mixed Commission.217 The Commission was established in Smyrna and
began its work in August 1914, focusing on populations in Aydin Province (including Smyrna),
Eastern Thrace, Greek Macedonia, and Epirus.218 However, the outbreak of the First World
War suspended the Commission’s work and the exchange was never implemented. 219
Nevertheless, between the conclusion of the Balkan Wars in August 1913 and the Ottoman
entry into WWI in November 1914, hundreds of thousands Greek Orthodox were expelled
from the Ottoman empire.
While the 1923 Lausanne Convention is the most well-known population exchange
agreement, conversations and plans to facilitate the exchange of Greek Orthodox and Muslim
populations from the Ottoman Empire and Greece respectively, were in motion almost a
decade before, interrupted only by contingent global events. The following phases of mass
expulsion were all efforts to realize the spirit of the stymied 1914 exchange—the complete
removal the Greek Orthodox population from Ottoman/Turkish soil.

Phase 2: World War I (1914220-1918)
After the Balkan Wars, aware of their isolated and weakened status and fearing Greek and
Russian aggression, the Ottomans sought an alliance with a foreign power.221 They first turned
to the British and the French, but both refused support, driving them into the arms of the
Germans.222 The alliance with Germany was a return to the days of Sultan Abdülhamid II who
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had established strong ties with the Germans in the late nineteenth century.223 These relations
frayed when the Young Turks sought to overturn all elements of the previous era. But unable
to secure any other foreign backing, the Ottomans accepted German support. As early as
January 1914, well before the outbreak of the Great War later that year, Germans held highlevel positions in the Turkish military.224 In July 1914, on the eve of the war, the Ottomans
signed a defensive alliance with Germany “for the purpose of preserving peace.” 225 United
States Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Henry Morgenthau Sr., described the German
takeover of Ottoman military sovereignty in his memoirs. He quoted German Ambassador to
the Ottoman Empire, Baron Von Wangenheim in August 1914: “we now control both the
Turkish army and the navy.”226
While some scholars believe German attacks against Russia brought Turkey
unwillingly into WWI,227 others argue that the Ottomans were eager to enter to be free of
foreign influence in their affairs, particularly regarding Armenia.228 Furthermore, the Ottomans
were already de facto at war with Russia in the Caucasus, so their formal entry was not a
surprise.229 There was a split in the Ottoman cabinet between those who were strongly against
war and others, particularly Talaat and Enver Pasha, who were optimistic about the
opportunities war might bring.230 The anti-war cabinet members resigned after German
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officers, on Turkish vessels, attacked Russia from the Black Sea without cabinet approval. 231
Russia immediately declared war on Turkey, followed by Britain and France on November 4.
The Ottomans joined Germany and Austria on the side of the Central Powers.232 The cabinet
resignations left pro-war officials in charge of the Ottoman government, under the full control
of the CUP.
Intuitively one might think that entry into the Great War would have expedited the
ongoing Greek expulsions, however, it had the opposite effect. The Ottoman’s new ally
Germany wanted to court Greece, which had declared its neutrality in the war, to join the
Central Powers. Thus, the Germans directed the Ottomans to stop expelling Greek
Orthodox.233 These orders were immediately implemented as seen in a cable from Talat Pasha
to the provinces in November 1914, the same month the Ottomans entered the war: “in light
of the state’s current political situation, no attacks on or oppression of Greeks shall be allowed
as such acts of oppression against them would not be appropriate.”234 The Rum expulsions of
Phase 1 came to an immediate end.
In Phase 2, because of a combination of German foreign policy desires and war
contingencies, the Ottoman tactics toward the Greek Orthodox shifted from cross-border,
external expulsion to internal expulsions.235 The policy was focused on militarily securing the
borders by removing an untrustworthy population from the Aegean and Black Sea coasts.236

Morgenthau, 2000 [1918]: 84.
Emin, 1930: 77.
233 Akçam, 2012: 99.
234 Akçam, 2012: 75 (Cites Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archive: BOA/DJ.ŞFR, no. 46/133).
235 Internal deportation is not the same as mass expulsion as defined in this manuscript (my scope conditions
limit the concept to cross-border expulsions), but the Ottoman use of internal deportation is important for
understanding the decisions of the government.
236 Akçam, 2012: 97.
231
232

89

Not all coastal Rum were removed, just those in strategic areas that were militarily
vulnerable.237 From late 1914, until Greece’s entry into the war in 1917, an estimated 500,000550,000 Greek Orthodox were deported to the interior of the country.238 Initially these
deportations were concentrated among those along the Aegean coast, closest to Greece, but
in later stages of the war, after Greece’s entry, the Ottomans also targeted “Pontic Greeks”
located along the southeastern coast of the Black Sea.239 The Aegean deportations spiked
during the Allied advance in the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus where, after an eight month
struggle, the Ottoman military had its most significant victory in the war at the Battle of
Gallipoli.240
Greek inhabitants in and around the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, as well as on
islands in the Sea of Marmara, were targeted for internal expulsion. Many were deported on
the orders of German General Liman von Sanders, who led the defense of the Gallipoli
peninsula.241 When western governments protested the expulsions, the Ottoman government
responded that the target populations were in military zones and were therefore moved for
military reasons.242 Similarly, the Pontus expulsions were justified by Ottoman and German
officials as a military necessity to protect the country’s flanks and prevent fears of separatism. 243
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Though the focus was on internal deportation, many Greek Orthodox fearing deportation fled
to Greece244 (and some to Russia)—a win-win outcome for the government.245
The entry of Greece on the side of the Allies in 1917 had important consequences for
the outcome of the war, and for the future of the Greek Orthodox in the Ottoman empire. In
January 1915, the Allies determined they needed Greece to assist with the Gallipoli campaign
and made significant territorial promises to persuade Greece to join.246 On behalf of the Allies,
the British Ambassador to Athens, Sir Francis Elliott, dangled the territories of Northern
Epirus, the Dodecanese islands (except Rhodes), and the western coast of Asia Minor in front
of Greek Prime Minister Venizelos if Greece abandoned its neutrality.247 The Greek
government was divided on what to do: Venizelos, a strong supporter of the Megali Idea, was
eager to join the Allies and potentially reap significant territorial gains; whereas King
Constantine wished to remain neutral. Unable to reconcile, Venizelos broke away and
established his own government in Salonica, where he joined the Allies and declared war on
the Central Powers.248 The Greek governmental schism officially ended in June 1917 with the
abdication of the Greek King. Not surprisingly, Orthodox internal deportations rapidly
increased in late 1917 after the Greek entrance on the Allied side.249
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Four years after the Ottomans entered the war, they unconditionally surrendered with
the signing of the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918.250 The simultaneous collapse of
the Macedonian and Palestinian fronts had left the Ottomans exposed in the east and the
south; by this time most of the Arab lands were already lost to the British.251 The Ottomans,
exhausted and with no defenses left, resigned in defeat. The armistice was negotiated in
Mudros harbor on the British ship HMS Agamemnon.252 In general, the Ottoman government
and the Turkish people viewed the armistice agreement as fair, if not favorable. The Sultanate
and Caliphate remained intact and although the empire was reduced in size, it still existed—
the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres two years later would not be as generous.253 Ottoman officials
were most concerned about two articles in the agreement: Articles VII and XXIV. Article VII
stated: “The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation
arising which threatens the security of the Allies” and Article XXIV: “In case of disorder in
the six Armenian vilayets, the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of
them.”254 The Ottomans viewed these articles as mechanisms for continued foreign
intervention and ripe for abuse by minority nationalists.255 Their instincts were right. In fact,
it was not the terms of the armistice but the abuse of its terms that infuriated Turkish
nationalists.256

Phase 3: Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922)
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Of the four expulsion phases considered here, the largest occurred during the Turkish War of
Independence. May 1919 to September 1922 was a rollercoaster of competing nationalist
aspirations. The period began with the realization of the Greek Megali Idea, uniting Hellenes
within the Greek nation-state and those along the Ottoman Aegean littoral, albeit very briefly.
And it ended with a Turkish nationalist revival, re-conquering some of territory lost in the
Treaty of Sèvres. The former brought Greek Orthodox expellees back to their homes along
the Aegean coast; the latter removed almost all traces of Ottoman Greeks from the country.
The Turkish War of Independence, known in Greece as the Asia Minor Catastrophe,
or “the Catastrophe,” was a continuation of the war for Turkish sovereignty and freedom that
began in 1913 and ended with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. 257 In the spring of 1919,
empowered by the Allied victory and their promised territorial gains, Greece invaded Turkey
before the Treaty of Sèvres was finalized.258 British Admiral Calthorpe, who had negotiated
the Armistice of Mudros just a few months before, informed Aydin’s Turkish Governor that
the Greeks would occupy the area the next day based on Article VII of the armistice: the
precise article the Turks had feared at its signing.259 Many competing interests were at play: the
Greeks sought to realize the Megali Idea, the Italians were advancing north from their
occupation of Antalya to try to gain Smyrna as promised in a secret agreement during WWI,
and the British wanted to block the Italian advances and therefore tacitly supported the Greek
invasion—the Greeks got their way with British and French backing.260
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Twenty thousand Greek troops disembarked in Smyrna before advancing further into
Ionia, the areas surrounding Smyrna. On the heels of the Greek troops were an estimated
140,000-180,000 Greek civilians—removed from Smyrna and Eastern Thrace before and
during the war—who sought to re-inhabit their former homes.261 The Allies had agreed, in
November 1918, that Orthodox Greeks who had fled their homes in the Ottoman Empire
during the war would be entitled to return home, a decision the Turks strongly resisted. 262
Shortly after the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia, the victorious Allied powers
signed the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919, ending the state of war between the Allies and
Germany. However, it was not until a year later in August 1920 that the Levant-related Treaty
of Sèvres was completed and signed. This treaty decapitated the Ottoman Empire and de facto
proclaimed its final demise.263 The Treaty of Sèvres was devastating for the Ottomans,
promising multiple partitions of the empire. The empire lost all its European lands and some
Aegean islands (to Greece); Armenia (to independence); Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine (to
Allied administrative mandates); Hedjaz and the holy sites of Mecca and Medina (to
independence); Egypt and Cyprus (to Britain); Morocco and Tunis (to France); and a string of
islands in the Aegean Sea (to Italy).264 The treaty also reinstated the Capitulations granting the
Allied Powers large economic concessions.265 Istanbul and the straits were deemed an
“international zone” and occupied by the British. Although the new Sultan was de jure still in
control, he was effectively an Allied stooge.266
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The treaty authorized a “reciprocal and voluntary emigration” of Turks and Greeks in
the exchanged territories;267 and compelled Turkey to allow the return of “the Turkish subjects
of non-Turkish race who have been forcibly driven from their homes by fear of massacre or
any other form of pressure since January 1, 1914.”268 Before the treaty text was finalized, on
August 10, 1920, Italian troops landed at Antalya (April 1919), Greece invaded western
Anatolia (May 1919), and Britain occupied Istanbul (March 1920). These events roused
Turkish nationalism in the heart of Anatolia and mobilized the Turkish resistance; the Treaty
of Sèvres was additional fuel to the nationalist fire.269 Importantly, Turkey never ratified the
treaty.270
Not satisfied with their occupation of the Aegean coast, the Greek army pushed
further east in July 1921 toward the newly established Turkish capital in Angora (today’s
Ankara).271 Hoping to displace Kemal’s government, by August Greek troops were 40 miles
from Ankara on the banks of the Sakarya River.272 Mustafa Kemal rallied his troops from
disappointing defeats the year before and halted the Greek advance forcing them to retreat
west. This victory won Kemal international attention and put the world on notice that he and
his new government were the real leaders of the country.
In 1922, Turkish envoys to London and Paris attempted to negotiate a peaceful end
to the war with Greece. But the Allies refused.273 In the summer of 1922, the Greek army,
weakened by internal divisions and regime change in Greece, was defeated by Mustafa Kemal’s
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forces in the final phase of the war and retreated to the Aegean coast using scorched earth
tactics along the way.274 Greek civilians followed the retreating Greek army, some on military
orders,275 and others in fear of Turkish reprisals.276 The Turkish army entered Smyrna, on the
morning of September 9, 1922 with no resistance.277 The Allied Powers—Britain, France, Italy,
and the U.S.—watched events unfold from their ships in the harbor but did not come to the
aid of the Greeks.278 The scene was chaos. Tens of thousands crowded into public buildings
and along the quay desperately seeking transport across the Aegean Sea to Greece. In panic
many jumped into the sea and attempted to swim to the allied ships, others crammed into
small boats which capsized.279 Four days later, the city burned to the ground.280 Given the
disorder, and risk of the fire to the masses of people along the quay, the Turkish authorities
permitted the Allies to assist in transporting Orthodox Christians to Greece.281 Simultaneously,
the Turkish government deported an estimated 100,000 males, aged 18-45, inland to hold
hostage as prisoners of war, and no doubt as potential bargaining chips during future peace
negotiations.282
Shortly after the Greek withdrawal from Anatolia, the British reluctantly accepted the
fait accompli of the Turkish victory. Britain signed the Armistice of Mudanya on October 11,
1922, pledging to return Smyrna, Eastern Thrace, the Straits, and Istanbul to Turkey, and
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authorizing a peace conference in Lausanne, Switzerland.283 By the end of the month another
250,000 Rum followed the departing Greek troops overland from Eastern Thrace to Greekcontrolled Western Thrace.284 Similar to their strategy in 1913 with the Bulgarians, and in 1914
with the first, proposed, Greek-Turkey exchange agreement, the Turks sought to create a fait
accompli and expelled as many Orthodox as they could in the fall of 1922.285 It is estimated, that
in the months leading up to the Lausanne Conference over one million Greek Orthodox were
expelled to Greece.286

Phase 4: Lausanne Conference & Exchange of Populations (1922287-1923)
The Lausanne Conference began on November 20, 1922, in Lausanne, Switzerland on the
banks of Lac Leman at the Hôtel du Château. Delegates from the relevant Allied Powers—
Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States—attended along with representatives from
Greece and Turkey. The aim of the conference was to create peace in the Near East and
relitigate the defunct Treaty of Sèvres, redrawing the boundaries of the soon to be Turkish
Republic. Ismet Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, led the Turkish delegation to Lausanne
and was its lead negotiator; Eleftherios Venizelos was the lead for Greece. 288 The conference
lasted eight months, with a three-month hiatus in the middle, much longer than the Allies had
anticipated. The reason was Ismet Pasha’s obstinate negotiating tactics, refusing to be treated
like the defeated empire it was in 1918, and instead negotiating from a position of strength as
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a new nation-state, victorious in war.289 The conference culminated with the signing of the
Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923 and the ratification by Turkey and Greece on August 23
and August 25, respectively.290
A wide range of issues were tackled at the conference by three different
commissions—Territorial and Military Questions, the Régime of Foreigners, and Economic
and Financial Questions—and 13 corresponding sub-commissions tasked with thematic areas
of concern, including demilitarizing the frontiers of Eastern Thrace; protecting minorities;
legal/economic status of foreigners; financial questions, public debt, and reparations; ports,
waterways, and railways; and sanitary matters, just to name a few.291
The third sub-commission of the first commission was the Exchange of Populations,
and it held 24 meetings from December 2, 1922 to January 24, 1923.292 The output of the subcommission was the Lausanne Convention, signed on January 30, 1923, distinct and separate
from the peace treaty of the same name, and arguably the most transformative aspect of the
peace. The convention enacted the first internationally sanctioned, compulsory population
exchange between two countries. The first article outlined who would be exchanged from
Turkey and Greece, respectively. Although the convention title refers to an “exchange of
populations” the criteria set in Article 1 establish a clear case of expulsion—a compulsory

Davison, 1965: 200.
League of Nations Archives (LNA), R1618, 41/33595/807: Letter from Erik Colban to Mr. O’Molony, 26
January 1924; UN Archives at Geneva.
291 Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace,
1923.
292 LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, December 1922; UN
Archives at Geneva; Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and
Draft Terms of Peace, 1923; Conférence de Lausanne sur les affairs du proche-orient, 1922-23: Recueil des actes
de la Conférence, 1923.
289
290

98

removal, of a religious group, on the grounds of belonging to that religious 293 group, without
individual legal review, and denying the expellees’ right to return. It may seem strange for the
new Turkish nation-state, with a leader fiercely committed to secularism, to have agreed to a
religious criterion for expulsion. However, since many Greek Orthodox spoke Turkish and
were not part of a single race, just as Muslims in Greece spoke Greek and were racially distinct
from the Muslims of Anatolia, linguistic and racial criteria would not have sufficed.294 Religion
was the only criterion that united these national minorities.
The goal of removing national minorities is clear in the Convention’s title—Convention
Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations—not the exchange of Greek Orthodox,
or Christians, and Muslims.295 Article 1 of the Convention created new refugees:
“As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish
nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek
nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall
not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorisation of the
Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively.”296
An estimated 355,635 Muslims from Greece and 189,916 Rum Orthodox from Turkey were
affected by this article between 1923 and 1926.297
Article 3 affected the largest number of persons and endorsed the fait accompli of their
forced expulsion. This article denied the right to return to both Greek and Muslim refugees
who fled Turkey and Greece, respectively, at any time in the previous decade: “Those Greeks
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and Moslems who have already, and since the 18th October, 1912,298 left the territories the
Greek and Turkish inhabitants of which are to be respectively exchanged, shall be considered
as included in the exchange provided for in Article 1.”299 This article disproportionately
impacted Greece. The country had already received approximately one million Orthodox
refugees following the defeat of the Greek army in 1922.300 But it also included the hundreds
of thousands of Muslims who had fled Greek territories during or after the Balkan Wars, albeit
a much smaller population.
Article 7 accompanied Article 3 and denationalized these refugee populations who
were denied the right to return; however, it did not make the refugees stateless because it
immediately provided them the nationality of their new “home” country:
“The emigrants will lose the nationality of the country which they are leaving, and will
acquire the nationality of the country of their destination, upon their arrival in the
territory of the latter country. Such emigrants as have already left one or other of the
two countries and have not yet acquired their new nationality, shall acquire that
nationality on the date of the signature of the present Convention.301
Article 2 outlined exemptions from the exchange: “The following persons shall not be
included in the exchange provided for in Article 1: (a) The Greek inhabitants of
Constantinople. (b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.”302
This second article created national minorities. However, because the Convention
defined the expellees in religious, rather than national terms (e.g., Orthodox Christians rather
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than Greeks), the Turks were able to deny the presence of national minorities in their territory,
insisting they only had religious minorities.303 This explains the important linguistic distinction
between Greek Orthodox (Rum Ortodoks) and Greeks (Yunanli), the latter being nationals of
the Greek state.304 Approximately 240,000 persons were exempted under Article 2—130,000
Muslims in Western Thrace and 110,000 Greek Orthodox in Istanbul, roughly equal
populations on both sides.305 Throughout the Convention the word “emigrants” was used in
reference to those being expelled, neither “expulsion,” nor “expel,” appear in the text.
The remaining articles of the convention outlined the role and duties of the Mixed
Commission charged with overseeing the exchange of populations and the liquidation of the
movable and immovable property and assets of the expellees. The treaty came into force after
the ratification of the Lausanne Peace Treaty in August 1923. Because most of the Greek
Orthodox population in Turkey had already departed by January 30, 1923, the signing of the
Convention was largely a fait accompli, like the 1913 Ottoman-Bulgarian Convention. By
refusing the return of any Greek Orthodox who left after October 18, 1912, the day Greece
declared war on the Ottoman Empire in the First Balkan War, the Lausanne Convention
finalized a process that began over a decade before.
While senior diplomats negotiated the terms of the Convention, exchanging people
like cattle, the public outrage was immense. Greek refugees angrily protested not being allowed
to return to Turkey, their country of birth and ancestral homeland for centuries. Refugees in
Salonica, Greece protested against the “disgraceful bartering of bodies to the detriment of
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modern civilization.”306 Many of these refugees saw themselves as Ottomans, and Anatolian
Christians, not Greeks and thus felt like strangers in their new land.307 The Muslims in Turkey
also rejected the idea of leaving their homes in Greece and moving to a foreign land,
abandoning their lives and livelihoods.308 In addition to the outcry of the expellees themselves,
international public opinion was also against the idea of a mandatory, forcible exchange of
populations.309
In response to the public outcry, the Lausanne Convention delegates fiercely denied
the paternity of the compulsory population exchange.310 Yet in the end they agreed and
supported its implementation. Turkey for the Turks had been achieved. Although a Mixed
Commission was established to oversee the exchange of populations and compensation for
their properties, by 1930 the Angora Convention abandoned all attempts at individual
appraisals—the Greek and Turkish governments agreed to “wipe the slate clean” and most
expellees were not properly compensated.311

3.3 Expulsion Motivation: Removing a Fifth Column
The expulsion of the Greek Orthodox is well documented by scholars across a range of
disciplines including history, law, and social science, as well as in the memoirs of government
officials, survivors, and their descendants. Of the four types of mass expulsion explained in
this dissertation, the fifth column category presented here is the most prominent and well-
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treated in the literature. As noted in Chapter 2, this is likely because of the large scholarly focus
on European mass expulsions, of which many episodes fit into the fifth column type.
Defining this case of mass expulsion as the removal of a fifth column is not a novel
interpretation. Scholars seeking to explain why the Rum expulsion occurred have pointed to
the Greek Orthodox connection to the Greek nation-state as a critical determining factor. 312
And, research on comparative eliminationist policies that seeks to either explain or describe
expulsion has previously included case studies on the Greek Orthodox expulsion episode.313
There are three novel aspects to my treatment. First, fifth column mass expulsions are a
specific type of expulsion, and the case of the Greek Orthodox is illustrative of a larger pattern
of government motivations for expulsion when security threats are coupled with nationbuilding. Second, this is the first study to introduce Istanbul as a negative case, where the
Greek Orthodox were also a “fifth column” but were not removed. Third, I use uses League
of Nations archives as evidence for my claims, documenting the discourse of mass expulsion
among the key officials involved in deciding and negotiating the fate of the Rum population.
After the Balkan Wars the Unionists shifted their political strategy from preserving the
multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire to creating a modern Turkish nation-state. This shift began at
the outset of the period examined here (1913) and culminated in the declaration of the Turkish
Republic in October 1923. The four phases of Greek Orthodox expulsion took place during
the height of Turkish nation-building and the establishment of the new Turkish national
identity that defined a “Turk” as a (Sunni) Muslim. This historical resume places the Rum
expulsion episode in the top row of Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Taxonomy of mass expulsion – Ottoman
Empire, 1913-1923
Target Group Threat

Counterinsurgency/
Reprisal

Nativism

During this phase of establishing the Turkish nation, the Ottoman/Turkish
government had two main security concerns: 1) the territorial integrity of the
Ottoman/Turkish state, and 2) ending foreign interference in their domestic affairs. These
threats were heightened after the Balkan Wars in which Greece nearly doubled in size, at the
expense of Ottomans lands, coupled with Greece’s occupation of eastern Aegean Islands
bringing it closer than ever to the Ottoman coast.314 Well aware of the Megali idea, CUP
officials feared that Greek territorial ambitions would not cease with the new boundaries
outlined in the Treaty of Bucharest and they would continue pressing east toward Aydin
Province on the Aegean coast.315 The loss of almost all of its European territory was a
significant shock and blow to Ottoman officials and it impacted their view of the loyalty of
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their subject populations. Loyalty was now equated with religion: Muslims were loyal and nonMuslims were disloyal. The latter were traitors by virtue of their spiritual kin.316
This shift in perceived loyalty was crucial in the government’s appraisal of the threat
posed by the non-Muslim, “non-Turkifiable,” populations within the shrunken empire.317 The
Greek Orthodox population was regarded as a national minority, “a part of the population
akin in race, language or religion to the neighboring state,” in this case Greece. 318
Ottoman/Turkish officials identified Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals as an existential
security threat to the survival of the state.319 They had to be removed to eliminate this threat.
In addition, Christian minorities in general, including the Greek Orthodox, but not exclusively,
had been the main pretext for Great Powers involvement in Ottoman internal affairs.320 After
the Greek occupation of Smyrna in 1919, it was alleged that the Rum minority and the Greek
Patriarchate had collaborated with the Greek military offensive, fueling security perceptions
of implacable Greek irredentism.321
A fifth column is defined as, “a group within a country at war who are sympathetic to
or working for its enemies.”322 The origin of the phrase in English dates from the Spanish Civil
War (1936-1939) during which Spanish General Mola, advanced toward Madrid with four
columns of soldiers and declared that he had a fifth column within the city itself.323 Although
the concept’s origin dates after the this case study, the phenomenon of a Trojan Horse used
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to conceal enemy combatants within the walls of the city is apropos. Perhaps even more so
because the infamous Hellenic city of Troy is located on the Aegean coast of western Anatolia,
a main site of Greek Orthodox expulsion.
The idea of a deceitful fifth column population in this case was combined with the
fear of the irredentist tendencies of the Greek state. The Megali idea of uniting all Hellenes
within the Greek nation-state included the “unredeemed Hellenes” in the Ottoman Empire.
Though not all Greek Orthodox were complicit with the Greek government’s foreign policy
strategy, they were the object of its desires and thus were seen as a fifth column, or potential
fifth column, by Ottoman/Turkish officials. This view was linked to the long historical
memory of the Capitulations and persistent Great Power inference in Ottoman domestic
affairs on behalf of Christian minorities.324 This perspective was not just the Turkish view, the
Greek government also saw the Rum as a useful fifth column. Prime Minister Venizelos, the
sternest advocate of the Megali Idea, told Greek King Alexander in 1919 that the city would
be “conquered from within” after Greece had occupied the Aegean coast and Thrace.325
British historian Clement A. Macartney observed of the Turkish approach to the
Lausanne Convention: “Their attitude was clear: they wished ‘to suppress the Greek
irredentism in Turkey.’”326 Ismet Pasha, Foreign Minister and Head of the Turkish delegation
to the conference, stated this directly:
“The truth, as shown by historical evidence ever since the days of Mehmed II, was
that the minorities, by continual and persistent misuse of the privileges granted to them
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and by making themselves the instrument of foreigners, had brought about the deplorable
results which had ensued” [emphasis added].327
Riza Nour Bey, second Turkish delegate, reminded the sub-commission on the exchange of
populations of the “real reason” motivating the Turkish government to push for the
population exchange in a January 1923 meeting after eight weeks of negotiations: “[He]
considers it necessary to recall the true reason which motivated, on the part of the Turkish
Government, the proposal to exchange the populations. The Turkish Government wishes to
eliminate Greek irredentism in Turkey” [emphasis added].328 Both the first and second Turkish
delegates emphasized throughout the conference that concerns about Greek irredentism, and
the Greek Orthodox population as a potential fifth column, motivated their expulsion
decision.
Although the 1913-1914 Ottoman government expulsion decisions may have been
based on perceived security threats, by 1919 those threats were realized with the Greek
occupation of Smyrna. The Greek Orthodox of the Aegean and Pontic littoral were now
identified as real fifth columns who might assist the Greek army in their conquest. 329 Greece
used the unredeemed Hellenes as justification for the annexation of Ottoman territory. 330 At
the Lausanne Conference, Ismet Pasha further outlined the reason for a compulsory
population exchange between Greece and Turkey:
“‘The amelioration of the lot of the minorities in Turkey depends above all on the
exclusion of every kind of foreign intervention and of the possibility of provocation coming from outside’,
which could best be attained by an exchange of Greek and Turkish populations, and
for the remainder, by ‘the liberal policy of Turkey with regard to all communities
Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace,
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whose members have not deviated from their duty as Turkish citizens’” [emphasis
added].331
Here Ismet Pasha specifically notes the “possibility of provocation” coming from minorities
in Turkey—in this case a reference to the Greek Orthodox minorities, who therefore must be
expelled. He went on to say that the Turkish view toward expelling the Greek Orthodox was,
“based on their legitimate desire to prevent minorities in Turkey becoming weapons in the hands
of foreigners, capable of being utilised for subversive purposes” [emphasis added].332 Had the expression
“fifth column” been available, Ismet Pasha would have used it to describe the Rum.

Alternative Explanations
Given that there is meaningful consensus around the explanation that the Ottoman/Turkish
government saw their Greek Orthodox population as a fifth column, there are limited
alternative explanations to refute, unlike my other case studies. However, one alternative
explanation is that the Greek Orthodox population was expelled simply because they were a
Christian minority. This explanation, however, does not account for the different policy
approaches that the Ottoman government implemented in relation to the Greek Orthodox
and the Armenian communities. The grimly appropriate comparative question is: why did the
government expel the Greek Orthodox but annihilate the Armenians?
From 1915-1916, an estimated one million333 Armenians were systematically deported
to death or killed on the spot in the Armenian genocide.334 This was the completion of previous
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efforts under Abdülhamid II to eliminate the Armenian population from the empire. The
Armenians and Orthodox Greeks were both Christian minority populations, intensely disliked
by Turks, and seen as security threats by the government. Although some similar tactics,
particularly deportation, were used against both populations, the government’s intentions were
different: the Armenians were to be annihilated, the Rum removed. Turkish historian Taner
Akçam, prominent scholar of the Armenian genocide, states:
“Extant Ottoman documents reveal that the Unionist government made clear
distinctions in its wartime policies between the Armenians and the empire’s other
Christian communities. The Greeks…were deported and expelled with brutality, but
the Armenians were targeted for outright annihilation.”335
It is not necessary to debate the horrors of mass atrocities, but it is analytically important to
examine why the government approached these two populations differently.
Armenian territorial claims, unlike previous nationalist groups that had broken off
from the periphery of the Ottoman Empire, were located in the heart of Anatolia. 336 As a
stateless minority their aim was not territorial augmentation but self-determination and the
creation of a new state.337 While there were multiple factions within the Armenian nationalist
movement with different ideas of how to achieve their dreams of statehood, the two Armenian
revolutionary groups—Dashnaks and Hunchaks—used violence as part of their overall
strategy.338 Although their views and tactics were not supported by the overall Armenian
community, any violence was seen by the Turks as a direct threat by the Ottoman government.
For example, a 1913 Armenian conspiracy to assassinate Talat Pasha, planned in Romania by
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rogue elements of the Hunchak Party, but thwarted by the Ottoman authorities, was used as
justification for later government massacres.339
The Armenians were seen by the Ottoman government as disloyal traitors for making
alliances with Russia—a main geopolitical adversary at the time—and with other foreign
powers to support their autonomy claims.340 The Armenian reform process, initiated with the
Treaty of Berlin in 1878, and culminating in the Armenian Reform Agreement with Russia in
February 1914, was of major concern to the Unionists.341 They believed the reforms would
lead to the partition of Anatolia. With the Balkan War defeats fresh in their minds, the Russia
Agreement—which combined the empire’s eastern provinces into larger provinces and
appointed a foreign inspector for each—harkened back to a similar process in the Ottoman’s
former European territories.342 The Ottoman leadership wanted to avoid additional territorial
loses at all costs. When the Great War began, some Armenians fought with the Russians in
the eastern part of the empire, increasing fears of an Armenian uprising.343 After a disastrous
military loss against the Russians in the Battle of Sarıkamış344 in the east in January 1915, and
the Entente naval attack on the Dardanelles in the west a month later, Ottoman fears were high
that the war was about to be lost, spurring action against the Armenians.345
Because the Armenians were stateless, they had no haven to flee to for protection in
their fight against the Ottomans.346 And even if they had tried to flee—for those in the east
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Russia was nearby—Ottoman policy was to contain the Armenians within the territorial
bounds of the country. Akçam cites a coded telegram sent from the Ottoman Interior
Ministry’s General Directorate of Security to provincial governors and district officials in April
1915 stating that: “no Armenian male or female of any age be allowed to leave the country
without a command from the High Command.”347 The Armenians were prohibited from
leaving, to be massacred on the spot, whereas the Greek Orthodox were actively encouraged
to depart. All these factors, in addition to Abdülhamid II’s 1894-1896 massacres of over
200,000 Armenians, set the stage for genocide.348 Although the Great Powers espoused strong
rhetoric in support of the Armenians, and advocated treaties that de jure increased their
autonomy and representation within the empire, in both 1894 and 1915 they did nothing to
stop the killing.
Unlike the Armenian rebels, Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals did not rise up against
the Ottoman state. There was no Greek Ottoman national movement within the empire, nor
political demands for union with Greece, at least before 1919.349 There was also no violence
against the state.350 Perhaps the most significant difference between the Armenians and the
Greek Orthodox was the existence of the Greek state itself.351 Fear of intervention by the
Kingdom of Greece on behalf of persecuted Greek Orthodox was a concern for Ottoman
officials who also feared potential reprisal attacks against Muslims living in Greece.352 During
the first part of WWI, Greece was neutral, and while violence against Armenians reached its
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peak, the Ottomans were careful not to provoke Greece into ending its non-belligerent status
and entering the war, although it eventually did in 1917.353 The Ottomans knew that the Greek
state had the support of the European powers, even before its entrance on the side of the
Entente, and a significant attack on Orthodox Greeks may have provoked their intervention
as well.354
In addition, while both the Armenians and the Greek Orthodox suffered internal
deportation, Rum property was not subject to liquidation, it was to be protected and preserved,
while the Armenian property was to be appropriated by the state.355 In some cases, Greek
Orthodox were allowed to return home after deportation, or if it was discovered that Rum
had been erroneously deported with Armenians, they were often set free.356 In an angry
telegram, Talat Pasha chastised the Governor of Diyarbekir for using violence against all
Christians: “the policy of annihilation was to be limited to the Armenians and not to include
other Christian groups.”357
In sum, up to 1919 the Armenians presented a different security threat to the territorial
integrity of the empire than the Greek Orthodox based on their desire for an autonomous
homeland, the international reform agreements, their violent tactics, and military support for
Russia. They also did not have a state of their own to come to their aid, nor a state (before
1918358) to which they could be expelled. Therefore, the Ottoman/Turkish policies toward the
Armenians and the Greek Orthodox took two different paths—an extraordinary proportion
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of Armenian population was murdered,359 forbidden to leave, and forcibly deported to death
within the empire, while most of the Greek Orthodox population was not killed, but expelled,
encouraged to depart.360 As Akçam succinctly puts it, the treatment of the two Christian groups
“differed in scope, intent and motivation.”361
This dissertation does not aim to explain why governments choose mass expulsion
instead of genocide—that is the subject of another book. However, this discussion suggests
that Christianity in and of itself is not a sufficient explanation for why the Greek Orthodox
were expelled, since other Christian groups, notably the Armenians (and the Assyrians), met a
different fate. In fact, not even all the Greek Orthodox were expelled from the empire. The
Rum of Istanbul were exempted from expulsion from 1913-1923, a puzzle examined shortly.
Next, we turn to how the Ottoman/Turkish government expelled the Greek Orthodox,
describing the critical enabling factors that facilitated their removal.

3.4 Enabling Factors for Ottoman Expulsions
The presence of populations branded as “disloyal” in the early phase of establishing the nation
is not unique to the Ottoman/Turkish state. As empires crumbled in the early twentieth
century, many states had minority populations that did not “fit” within the newly drawn
territorially boundaries of the state and had ethnic ties with kin in another state. Yet not all
governments implemented expulsion policies to eliminate these minority groups. This section
explains the key factors that enabled the Ottoman expulsion, given the motivation to remove
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a fifth column target group. It underscores the critical role of alliances, of the homeland state
of the target group, and of the international community in facilitating the expulsion. While, as
noted above, the Greek Orthodox were expelled in four phases from 1913-1923, this section
will focus on the latter two—events during 1919-1923. This is both for concision and because
the majority of Greek Orthodox were removed in these two phases. Nevertheless, the three
factors hold for the full period examined.
Table 5: Factors that Enabled Expulsion in the Ottoman Empire
Key Factors

Ottoman Littoral (1919-1923)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances

Benefit from expulsion (↑)

Transnational Alliances

Support expulsion (↑)

Homeland State(s)
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

Weak ties (↑)
Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)

International Community
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

(Cultivating) Strong ties (↓)
Support & facilitate expulsion (↑)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
While the Sultan collaborated with the Allied forces that occupied the capital, Turkish
nationalists mobilized throughout the country. War hero Mustafa Kemal arrived in Samsun
on the Black Sea coast four days after the Greeks occupied Smyrna.362 He was tasked by
Istanbul with the demilitarization of Turkish troops as part of the Armistice, but he quickly
began mobilizing soldiers and putting together a nationalist army.363 Kemal resigned from his

362
363

Davison, 1965: 176; Lewis, 2002: 242-43.
Lewis, 2002: 242-43.

114

position as a military officer to avoid any direct conflict with the Ottoman government, and
in the autumn of 1919 he chaired two unofficial congresses—the first at Erzurum with
delegates from the eastern provinces and then at Sivas with delegates from across the country.
The Sivas congress drafted the first version of what became “the National Pact.” 364
The core demands of the pact were independence and territorial integrity—a sovereign Turkey
for the Turks.365 The aims of territorial integrity and sovereignty meant the preservation of the
borders draw in the armistice, and the end to foreign economic and political interference in
Turkish affairs.366 In January 1920 the nationalists officially separated from the Sublime Porte,
proclaimed a new Turkish capital in Angora (Ankara), and released their National Pact—a
declaration of principles.367 In April 1920 the first parliament, known as the Grand National
Assembly, was inaugurated in the Anatolian heartland, abandoning the imperial capital of
Istanbul, which was under British control.368
Mustafa Kemal, and his nationalist domestic allies, knew that Greece’s territorial
aspirations would continue while there were unredeemed Hellenes residing in the Turkish
state. They feared that Greek advances in Smyrna and Eastern Thrace would turn the Aegean
Sea into a “Greek lake.”369 Turkish popular support was behind Kemal and the new nationalist
government. Kemal’s domestic allies were in full agreement that the Orthodox Greeks had to
be removed from the future Turkish sovereign state; the benefit was the realization of the
National Pact’s goals.
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Transnational Alliances
After the armistice, Ottoman finances and defenses were controlled by the Allied forces—in
January 1921 the Sultan handed over both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of War. 370
In direct opposition to the Sultan and the Allied occupation of Istanbul, Mustafa Kemal
worked to identify alternative sources of financial and military support for his nationalist
forces. He first turned to the Soviets, a former nemesis of the Ottoman Empire, but who had
just gone through a revolution. From 1920-1921 Kemal’s nationalist government established
close ties with the Bolsheviks who declared their support for the National Pact. With a shared
enemy in the British, the Soviets and Turkish nationalists officially established diplomatic
relations in August 1920 and signed a Treaty of Friendship in March 1921:371
“The Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic and the
Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, sharing as they do the
principles of the liberty of nations, and the right of each nation to determine its own
fate, and taking into consideration, moreover, the common struggle undertaken against
imperialism, foreseeing that the difficulties arising for the one would render worse the
position of the other, and inspired by the desire to bring about lasting good relations
and uninterrupted sincere friendship between themselves, based on mutual interests,
have decided to sign an agreement to assure amicable and fraternal relations between
the two countries.”372
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The treaty expressed solidary against imperialism, and secured Turkey’s eastern border. 373 This
alliance crucially provided economic and military support for the nascent nationalist
government and its military forces.
Kemal’s impressive military victories in 1921 drew international notice and western
states began to recognize that he and his new nationalist government, not the Sultan, were the
real leaders of the country. Soon after solidifying support from the Soviets, Kemal secured
additional military and financial support from the Italians and French who had begun to sour
on the British. Both the Italians and French were concerned about Britain’s increasing control
of the Bosphorus and support for Greek expansionist aims.374 A French newspaper jeeringly
referred to Istanbul (Constantinople) as “Constantinobralter”—a reference to British control
of Gibraltar, along another key trading route at the southern tip of Spain.375 In the spirit of
“the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” the Italians negotiated a withdraw from southern
Anatolia if they could retain the Dodecanese islands.376 And in October 1921 the French
agreed to evacuate Cilicia and drew a new border for Syria, more favorable to the Turks,
allowing Turkish troops to turn their attention toward the Greeks.377
Trade deals with the Bolsheviks and French provided needed resources for the Turkish
advance against the Greeks and removed the military threat from the Italians, who agreed to
leave Antalya, and the French who departed Cilicia.378 The Turks used Russian money to
purchase Italian weapons.379 Additional military supplies poured in after the January 1922
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Turkish-Ukrainian treaty.380 Mustafa Kemal’s skillful balancing of strange bedfellows—
Russians and (some) Allied Powers—enabled him to acquire sufficient military and financial
resources to fuel his nationalist campaign. These arms and funds enabled the Turks to detach
public support from the Sultan and Istanbul through successive military victories, while
simultaneously defeating the Greeks and their British backers.
These transnational alliances bolstered the international standing of Kemal and his
forces and strengthened them militarily for their final assault. The treaties and agreements with
both eastern and western powers showed Kemal’s commitment to balancing the Turkish state
between the east and west.381 It is clear from their financial and military support that the
Nationalists’ transnational allies were supportive of Kemal’s war of independence and
corresponding removal of the Greeks, further enabling expulsion.

Homeland State
In 1922 many Orthodox Greeks had resided in the Ottoman Empire for generations, and
some spoke only Turkish and had never set foot in Greece. Yet from the Turkish nationalists’
perspective Greece was the clear homeland state of concern. While Ottoman Greeks may have
had no personal connection to the Greek nation-state, Mustafa Kemal and his government
believed that is where Greek Orthodox Christians “belonged.”
In the first decades of the twentieth century Greece was one of the Ottoman Empire’s
greatest enemies. When Greece invaded the Aegean coast in the spring of 1919, any possible
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détente after the First World War evaporated. The war waged against the Greeks and the
expulsion of the Rum was not at all constrained by the relations between the two states—their
ties were extremely weak. Furthermore, the Nationalists’ military victory over Greece in the
autumn of 1922, made it difficult for Greece to resist Turkish expulsions and deny entry to
the expellees. When the Nationalist Army reached Smyrna, Turkish troops compelled the
Orthodox population to depart, forcing them into the sea. Greek ships, with Allied support,
acquiesced to their defeat and resettled the expellees. Overland in Eastern Thrace the situation
was similar. The Nationalists’ triumph resulted in the removal of Greeks to Western Thrace
and beyond, which the Greek government de facto accepted as the loser of the war. They had
no capacity to resist and deny entry to the hundreds of thousands of refugees.
In the summer of 1914, the Ottoman’s successful expulsion of tens, if not hundreds,
of thousands of Rum first brought Greece to the negotiating table where they agreed to a bilateral exchange. Though this was interrupted by the First World War, the Turks used a similar
strategy in 1922, expelling Orthodox Greeks at the conclusion of the Turkish War of
Independence, forcing Greece to accept the expellees and negotiated from a position of
strength at the Lausanne Conference. The Greek government was unable to constrain Mustafa
Kemal and his nationalist government in their policy of full-scale expulsion of the Rum.

International Community
In the period examined here, the international community was the “Great Powers” or the “Big
Four”—Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, who were all represented at the Lausanne
Conference—as well as the emerging League of Nations, founded in 1920. As the Ottoman
Empire crumbled, the Turkish Nationalists believed military strength would breed diplomatic
119

and reputational strength—that only battlefield victories would bring political respect.
Although the Turks wanted to cultivate strong ties with the international community, they
knew they first had to secure military victories and reclaim territory to negotiate from a
position of power. In a sense the Turkish desire for strong ties with the international
community was predicated on first trampling those ties, at least with the British, to win the
war. According to the mass expulsion decision making framework, this desire for strong ties
with the international community should have constrained expulsion.
However, in the first phase of expulsion in late 1913, early 1914, the international
community ignored the Ottoman expulsions of Greek Orthodox, which was directly related
to the Allied decision to award Greece eastern Aegean islands mere miles from the Ottoman
coast.382 As Greece and Turkey moved forward negotiating a population exchange in 1914
before the outbreak of the First World War, there was no resistance from any of the Great
Powers. During the Greco-Turkish War the Great Powers similarly ignored the expulsion of
the Greek Orthodox and even facilitated their transportation from the coasts to Greece. In
the final phase of expulsion, the Great Powers presided over the development of the first
compulsory population exchange agreement. The international community endorsed both the
fait accompli of the Orthodox refugees who had fled the Ottoman Empire from 1913-1923 by
prohibiting them from returning home and removed the remaining Greek Orthodox
populations through a forced exchange. This was negotiated under the purview of the League
of Nations who provided international relief and coordination for the expulsion. In this case
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the international community enabled mass expulsion by ignoring it in the early phases, and
then after the war supporting and facilitating the expulsion of the Rum.

3.5 Istanbul, 1913-1923: A negative case, constraints on mass expulsion
We now shift to the negative case of Istanbul to examine why the Greek Orthodox population
of the imperial city were not expelled. Unlike the Ottoman Greeks along the Aegean and
Pontic littoral as well as those in Anatolia, the Rum of Istanbul were spared throughout the
decade from 1913-1923. At the conclusion of the 1923 peace treaty, unlike the rest of their
co-ethnics, they were allowed to remain in the city and retain their Turkish nationality.
The case of Istanbul is puzzling because the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul should have
been the most likely to be expelled of all the Greeks. These Rum were more powerful,
educated, and connected to foreigners than Ottoman Greeks in any other part of the empire.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate, the religious authority of the Greek millet, was located in the
heart of the capital, and was an extremely powerful institution which influenced the ideological
orientation of its entire flock. Of all the pockets of Greek Orthodox presence throughout the
country, the Istanbul Greeks were the most irredentist. Their irredentism was most
pronounced at the end of the First World War. Many Ottoman Greeks believed the Allied
occupation of the city would quickly fulfill the Megali Idea and restore the Christian glory of
Byzantium.383 The Greek Orthodox cheered the Allies as they entered Istanbul, and Greek
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flags hung from homes, businesses, and the Patriarchate itself.384 These displays of disloyalty
were precisely what the Turks had accused them of back in 1912.385
Since the Ottoman/Turkish government’s motivation in expelling the Rum was to
remove a dangerous fifth column, those in Istanbul were arguably the greatest threat. Greek
Prime Minister Venizelos had openly stated to King Alexander that the “city would be
conquered from within,” all but admitting that the Istanbul Rum were the Trojan horse he
hoped to use to win back the imperial city.386 After the Turkish war for independence, domestic
public opinion among Ottoman Muslims was strongly in favor of expelling the Greek
Orthodox from the reclaimed imperial capital city in 1922. They saw their continued presence
as an enduring threat to the new nation state.387 Yet throughout the period examined, from
1913-1923, in all four phases of Rum mass expulsion, the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul were
not expelled. Before I explain why, a brief description of the Ottoman Greeks of Istanbul is
necessary.

Greeks of Istanbul
With its strategic location on the banks of Bosphorus, Istanbul is the gateway between the
orient and the occident. Straddling both Asia and Europe it was a mosaic of languages,
cultures, religion, and peoples; and a central hub of commerce, trade, and intellectual activity
bringing together people from around the world. French was as likely to be heard on the
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streets of Istanbul as Ottoman, and the road signs were printed in both languages. 388 In
addition to the Ottoman (Muslim) elites, including the Sultan and his advisors in the Sublime
Porte, the city was full of Christian intellectuals and prominent businessmen, both Greek
Orthodox and Armenian. For the Greek Orthodox, the capital was also their religious capital,
the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, religious and political authority of the Rum millet. 389
Although reports vary, an estimated 205,375 Ottoman Greeks resided in Istanbul in 1914, 23
percent of the total population.390 To this total was an estimated 65,000 Greek citizens who
lived in the capital as foreign nationals.391 As the former capital of Byzantium, Istanbul held
special significance for the Rum; they were symbolically more attached to city than any other
place in the empire.
The Greek Orthodox of Istanbul, just as those outside of the capital, dominated
commerce, banking, shipping, manufacturing, railways, and the professions. 392 The large influx
of foreign capital into the empire in the mid-nineteenth century largely passed through
Christian hands.393 Of the total capital investment in the Ottoman Empire in 1914, 50 percent
was Greek Ottoman, highlighting their economic dominance.394 Compared to the Ottoman
Greeks outside of the city they were generally wealthier, more educated, and more connected
to Europe—with the Rum of Smyrna a close second. There were two main types of Ottoman
Greeks in Istanbul, those who supported the status quo under Ottoman rule, and those
committed to the Megali Idea—the idea that Istanbul, and large sections of the empire, should
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be united with Greece. The former was composed of the Ecumenical Patriarchate elite, both
religious and lay notables, government bureaucrats, and the commercial class; the latter largely
the professionals: medical, legal, and literary.395 These differences became more salient during
1913-1923, particularly in the aftermath of the Great War and the Greek invasion of western
Anatolia.
Despite their differences, both factions were committed to Hellenization efforts,
which were achieved through educational, cultural, and literary societies. In the late nineteenth
century Greek cultural and educational institutions proliferated at a rapid rate, financed by
wealthy Istanbul Greeks, with 20 cultural societies, including the most prominent Greek
Literary Society, and more than 113 schools in the capital.396 Although an 1894 Ottoman law
mandated that Turkish be taught in all schools, the Rum millet otherwise had complete
autonomy over the curriculum.397 Not surprisingly, Hellenization efforts were more successful
in urban areas where irredentism was more prominent.
Politically the Istanbul Rum held prominent roles in the Ottoman bureaucracy, as
ambassadors and attachés to European embassies, including Great Britain.398 When the
Unionists came to power and reinstated the constitution, Greeks won 24 seats in the 1908
parliamentary elections.399 Greek elected officials largely voted as a single bloc, upholding the
interests of the Rum community, but they were split between the CUP and liberal parties, with
the majority supporting the latter.400 After the disastrous First Balkan War, Greek political
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participation was terminated ending the presence of Greek bureaucrats, diplomats, and cabinet
officials in the Ottoman government.401
The Ecumenical Patriarchate, located in the Phanar district of Istanbul, also played an
important political role in the empire. The Patriarch was a member of the Sultan’s bureaucracy,
and as head of the Rum millet, he had religious, political, and administrative power over his
flock.402 When the Young Turks came to power in 1908 with their ideas of Ottomanism and
equality for all citizens, the Patriarchate resisted these changes because they threatened its
power and control. Equality meant the dissolution of the millets, removing their political and
administrative autonomy, and diminishing their role in the empire. These changes, as well as
the introduction of mandatory military service for non-Muslims, were particularly unpalatable
to the Patriarchate.403 Its fears were justified. The Unionists introduced legislation to reduce
the power of the millets, including in education—the core element of Orthodox
Hellenization.404 Unable to effectively resist the Young Turks, the Patriarchate acquiesced. But
WWI brought unexpected changes to Rum fortunes.
After the armistice, and the election of a new Patriarch in October 1918, the two
disparate factions of the Ottoman Greeks consolidated around the pursuit of the Megali
Idea.405 Both the Patriarchate and the Orthodox commercial class now sided with the Greek
Ottoman professionals in their support for irredentism. 406 Even the previously non-political
Greek Literary Society announced its desire for Istanbul to be incorporated into Greece.407
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Emboldened by the Allied occupation, in March 1919, the Patriarch formally ended the Rum
millet, issuing a resolution for the “Union with Greece,” breaking off all relations with the
Ottoman government, and assuming “unilateral and complete sovereignty over the
community.”408 Ottoman Greeks were discharged from their civic duties as Ottoman citizens
including voting and working in the Ottoman bureaucracy and the Patriarchate began issuing
its own passports with Allied permission.409 As directed, the Greek Orthodox did not
participate in the 1919 elections, effectively opting out of Ottoman governance and
government.410 In December 1921 the Patriarchate went a step further, appointing a Greek
national as Patriarch, breaking a centuries-old Ottoman tradition that the Patriarch be an
Ottoman national, further infuriating the Turks.411

Four Phases of Non-Expulsion in Istanbul
The Greek Orthodox of Istanbul were not expelled in any of the four mass expulsion phases
examined here. After the Balkan Wars (1913-1914) the Ottomans targeted the Greek
Orthodox in Eastern Thrace and the Aegean littoral because they inhabited border regions
and were the easiest to expel directly into Greek lands, in the case of Eastern Thrace, or toward
Greek-controlled Aegean islands in the case of the coastal communities. This first Orthodox
Rum expulsion used the 1913 Bulgarian exchange agreement as a model and specifically
targeted border populations. Thus, the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul were unaffected.
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In the second phase of mass expulsion during WWI (1914-1918), the expulsions of
the Greek Orthodox in Eastern Thrace and along the Aegean largely stopped. Since the
Germans were still trying to court Greece to join the Central Powers, they ordered the
Ottomans to halt any activities, such as Rum expulsions, that might push Greece into the arms
of the Entente.412 During the war, the Ottoman government, together with the Germans,
focused on strategic internal deportations413 from vulnerable military areas, rather than on
cross-border expulsions. Although in early 1915 during the Entente advance toward the
Dardanelles there were concerns that Istanbul would fall to the Allied powers, and plans were
made to evacuate the Sultan to Eskişehir,414 the city itself was never a direct theater of war. 415
Targeted looting and violence did take place in the city, as well as economic boycotts against
the Greeks prompting some Rum to flee, but the Istanbul Orthodox population escaped
internal expulsion.416
Months after the Armistice of Mudros was signed, conflict reignited with Greece in
May 1919. The Greek occupation began in Smyrna on the Aegean coast and moved east
toward the new nationalist capital in Ankara. Istanbul was not a main front in the war. Allied
troops unofficially occupied Istanbul at the end of 1918, and officially announced Allied,
mainly British, occupation in March 1920. When Mustafa Kemal and his forces defeated the
Greek army, after over three years of war, hundreds of thousands of Greek Orthodox civilians
were expelled with the retreating troops. Many Greek Orthodox fled toward Istanbul for
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safety, increasing the size of the Rum population in the imperial capital. Some Istanbul Greek
Orthodox left the city for Greece during this period, but many remained. Once Kemal’s forces
reclaimed Smyrna they moved north, and a clash was set with the British for control of the
Straits, the gateway to Istanbul and Eastern Thrace. A war between Britain and Turkey was
avoided by the sage thinking of British General Harrington who ignored the U.K. Cabinet’s
instructions to give Kemal an ultimatum—to withdraw or fight—and an armistice was
agreed.417 Once again, this time during the Turkish War of Independence, the Greek Orthodox
population in Istanbul was not expelled. Finally, Article 2 of the Lausanne Convention, as we
have seen, exempted the Greek inhabitants of Istanbul from the population exchange. While
the Orthodox Greek Turkish nationals throughout the rest of the country were forced to
depart for Greece, the community in the imperial capital was once again spared. The last
section explains what preventing the Ottoman/Turkish government from removing the
Istanbul Rum despite all logic to the contrary.

Constraints on Mass Expulsion in Istanbul
Table 6 displays a side-by-side comparison of the enabling and constraining factors in the
Ottoman littoral and Istanbul. As will be discussed in detail, the same three factors—alliances,
homeland state, and the international community—constrained the removal of the Istanbul
Rum, unlike the rest of the Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire.
Table 6: Mass Expulsion Decision Making Framework Applied to the Ottoman Empire
Key Factors
Ottoman Littoral (1919-1923)
Istanbul (1919-1923)
Alliances
Domestic Alliances
Benefit from expulsion (↑)
Harmed by expulsion (↓)
Transnational Alliances
Support expulsion (↑)
Opposed to expulsion (↓)
417
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Homeland State(s)
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response
International Community
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

Weak ties (↑)
Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)

Weak ties (↑)
Resist & deny entry to expellees (↓)

(Cultivating) Strong ties (↓)
Support & facilitate expulsion (↑)

(Cultivating) Strong ties (↓)
Oppose & resist expulsion (↓)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
Since this study is a within-case comparison, the domestic alliance between Mustafa Kemal
and his nationalists’ forces is the same for the negative case of Istanbul as outlined above in
the Ottoman littoral section. However, their control over, and influence in, Istanbul was
different than in the rest of the country, which altered the government’s calculus of how
expulsion would affect its domestic alliances.
Although the Armistice of Mudros did not authorize an occupation of Istanbul, at the
end of 1918 an Allied military administration was established in the city, and 3,626 Allied
troops de facto took control.418 Although the occupying forces were composed of British,
French, and Italian troops, almost three-quarters were British with a British Commander at
the head.419 The British claimed that the Ottoman Sultan was still de jure Head of State, but he
was simply their puppet, providing legal cover for the occupation.420 The Allies slowly took
more and more power from the Sultan, establishing an International Police Commission with
executive control of the city’s police, creating military courts, and stationing their personnel at
the prisons, hospitals, banks, and embassies.421 Over the next four years a rotating group of
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Allied High Commissioners were the de facto sovereigns of the city and the Allied presence
expanded to over 28,000 British, Indian, French, and Italian troops by 1920. 422 Despite the
occupation, the Sultan and his associates were pleased to have the façade of Allied
endorsement of his sovereignty. Having lost all control to the CUP during the war, the Sultan
was fiercely anti-nationalist and eager to cooperate with the Allies against them.423
When the new nationalist Grand National Assembly met in April 1920, under the
direction of Mustafa Kemal, a sovereignty crisis emerged: the Sultan, with British backing,
controlled Istanbul and the surrounding areas, and the nationalist controlled the rest of Asia
Minor, at least the parts not occupied by Greece, from their new capital in Ankara.424 The
Sultan went so far as issuing a fatwa against Mustafa Kemal and authorizing British forces to
go after him and his nationalist army.425 Therefore, in the third phase of expulsion (19191922), the Sultan wanted Allied support and therefore did not want to expel the Rum, and
with Allied troops occupying the capital, the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul were safe.
Mustafa Kemal’s disgust at the Sultan’s cozy relations with the Allied forces motivated
him to move East and set up a new capital in Ankara where the Nationalists declared their
aims in the National Pact and mounted their military resistance to the Greek invasion. Since
the primary goal of the Nationalist Pact was to regain full territorial sovereignty and remove
foreign powers, Kemal’s domestic alliances would have benefited from the elimination of both
the Greeks and their British backers from the country’s largest city. However, unlike Smyrna
and the Aegean coastal communities, at the conclusion of the Greco-Turkish War the
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Orthodox Greeks in Istanbul did not face the wrath of the Nationalists because British
General Harrington agreed to an armistice on October 11, 1922, eliminating the need for the
city to be taken by force.426 The fate of the Istanbul Greeks would instead be decided at the
Lausanne Conference.
When the representatives of the soon-to-be Turkish Republic took their positions at
the Lausanne Conference, they kept in mind how their decisions would impact their nationalist
domestic allies back in Ankara who had supported not only the war effort, but also the risky
break from the Sultan. Two considerations shifted the government’s calculus regarding the
expulsion of the Istanbul Greeks at the conference. The first was the economic cost.
At the outset of the conference Turkish negotiators strongly refuted Greek and Allied
arguments that the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul would be “complete
commercial and financial suicide.”427 Shukri Bey, an expert on population exchanges sent to
Lausanne as a member of the Turkish delegation, argued to the sub-commission that the
Istanbul Greeks “were not an indispensable element” to the city; they were simply
“intermediaries, not producers” and could easily be replaced.428 Ismet Pasha, Head of the
Turkish Delegation, similarly argued to the First Commission that: “…everyone knew that
[the Greeks of Istanbul] formed a class of small traders (grocers, &c.), and that it would not
be difficult to replace them.”429 Rather than economic and social ruin, Tewfik Bey, another
Turkish representative to the conference, contended that, “the disturbance to the commercial
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life of Constantinople would be of short duration.”430 Even if negative economic
consequences would flow from the removal of the Rum from the city, Shukri Bey said: “In
any case, the anxiety of the Turks to secure their independence and immunity from
disintegrating influences at home was a reason which exceeded in importance any economic
consideration.”431
However, domestic economic concerns were a real constraint. On January 19, in one
of the last sub-commission meetings on the population exchange, Riza Nour Bey, second
Turkish delegate, conceded:
The Turkish delegation has accepted the obligatory exchange as a necessity and it is in
order to mitigate the painful consequences that she admitted that the Greek
inhabitants of Constantinople were not subject to it. The economic reasons for which this
derogation was accepted must also apply to the Strouma valley [emphasis added].432
Although Riza Nour Bey did not get an exemption for Muslims in the Strouma valley in
Greece, he did reluctantly admit that “economic reasons” were a factor in the decision to
accept the Istanbul Rum derogation. Given the high level of economic interdependence
between Istanbul and European commerce, banking, and manufacturing, concerns about
risking foreign financial investment in the country’s largest city, much of which passed through
the hands of prominent Greek Orthodox financiers and traders, were important to the new
nation-state. While it may have been difficult to accept, the removal of the Istanbul Rum was
an economic catastrophe the nationalist government could not afford.
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Another key Turkish delegation demand at the conference, stemming from Article 3
of the Turkish National Pact, was for a plebiscite in Western Thrace, Greece. 433 The Turks
believed that given the right to choose, the residents of Western Thrace, largely Muslim, would
vote to become a part of the new Turkish Republic. Western Thrace was particularly important
to the Turkish government dating back to the loss of most of its European lands in the Balkan
Wars, and they wanted to maintain a territorial presence in this area. Therefore, at the outset
of the peace conference, the Turkish delegation put forward the request for a plebiscite in in
Western Thrace and in turn, argued for the Muslims of Western Thrace to be exempted from
the exchange.434 They tried to present their case as a numerical argument, suggesting that the
numbers to be exchanged on each side would be roughly equivalent if the Muslims of Western
Thrace were excluded and the Orthodox of Istanbul included, but Greece and the Allied
Powers contested their figures.435 Instead, the Allied Powers proposed the Muslims of Western
Thrace and the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul both be exempted from the exchange.436
The Turkish government reluctantly decided it was willing to accommodate a small
population of Greeks in Istanbul in the hopes of a future plebiscite in Western Thrace. Since
the Allied Powers refused to allow the Muslims of Western Thrace to remain without also
allowing the Greeks to stay in Istanbul, expelling the Greeks would have meant abandoning
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the possibility of reclaiming lost lands in Europe. Although the plebiscite never came to pass,
it was an important consideration at the conference. In this case, the interests of the Turkish
government and its domestic nationalist alliance would have been harmed by expelling the
Istanbul Rum. The negative economic and political consequences for the newly emerging
Turkish Republic outweighed the desire to remove the Orthodox, thereby constraining the
decision to expel.

Transnational Alliances
The Turkish Nationalist government’s main transnational allies were the Soviets, France, and
Italy. Two of the three—France and Italy—were present at the Lausanne Conference and thus
could influence the decision on the Istanbul Rum expulsion. When Kemal and the Nationalists
demonstrated their military prowess on the battlefield, the French and Italians switched sides,
anticipating their takeover of the state and keen to counterbalance British influence and
control in the region. Both France and Italy were pleased to see the British occupation of
Istanbul come to an end—although French and Italian troops were also there, albeit in smaller
numbers—but they were not willing to cede all their interests in the city to the new Turkish
leaders.
France and Italy, along with other European Powers, had tremendous financial and
strategic interests in maintaining a presence in Istanbul. With its strategic location on the banks
of Bosphorus, it was a central hub of commerce and trade. The large influx of foreign capital
into the empire largely passed through Christian hands, many of whom were Greek

134

Orthodox.437 As noted above, of the total capital investment in the Ottoman Empire in 1914,
50 percent was Greek Ottoman.438 Although France and Italy supported the Nationalists in
the Greco-Turkish War, and approved of their reclaiming of Istanbul, they did not want to
lose their key liaisons within the city, which were largely Greek Orthodox residents. Even
though they no longer held political positions in the state, the Greek Orthodox were still
financially dominant. Since European investments passed through their hands, French and
Italian commercial interests would have been harmed if they were expelled. Thus, France and
Italy opposed the Istanbul Rum expulsion. Their disapproval was part of the larger opposition
by the “Great Powers.” The new Turkish government’s transnational alliances acted as an
important constraint on the expulsion of the Greeks from the imperial capital.

Homeland State
Greece and Turkey were enemies and the weak ties between them were not mended at the
Lausanne Conference. While Greece had de facto accepted the expulsion of the Orthodox
population from the littoral communities and Eastern Thrace, at the conference, the Greek
negotiators mounted a fierce resistance to the expulsion of the remaining Orthodox in
Istanbul. The Greek delegation tried to persuade the Allied Powers to sympathize with their
appeals and resist the Turkish demand to expel the Rum from Istanbul.
First, Greece claimed that the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul would
have international consequences. They argued that many of the Allied Powers had political
and economic interests in the city that would be harmed by the removal of this population.
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Nicolas Politis, former Greek Foreign Minister, and Greek delegate to the peace conference,
wrote to Fridtjof Nansen, League-appointed head of Near East refugee relief, before the peace
conference began: “It is impossible that all the foreign nations which have interests in this city
do not realize that the mass departure of Greeks would condemn Constantinople and would
bring their interests to irremediable economic and social ruin.”439 Later at Lausanne, Venizelos
formally argued to the First Commission that, “such an expulsion would amount to an
unprecedented political, economic and social catastrophe.”440 When a special sub-commission
was established to discuss details of the population exchange in greater depth, Demetrius
Caclamanos, Greece’s second delegate to the conference, “besought the Turkish Delegates to
reconsider their position. If they persisted, they would repent of the loss of an indispensable
factor, a loss which would be disastrous to the economic life of their capital.”441
Greece’s second argument was that the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul had no irredentist
tendencies and that they should not be considered a threat by the Turkish government.
Caclamanos told the sub-commission that “Constantinople was not an irredentist centre” and
that although some Greeks participated in demonstrations, “those who had taken part in
them…had already left.” Venizelos argued to the First Commission that, “…the Greeks of
Turkey hav[e never] revolted against the Turkish administration. Throughout the history of
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the Turkish Empire no Greeks had ever revolted against Ottoman rule at any place in Thrace
or Asia Minor, or at Istanbul.”442 Caclamanos concurred stating that,
“[The Greek Orthodox] had always lived on good terms with the Turks; they had
continued to do so even after the outbreak of the general war and before Greece had
joined in the war. Constantinople had been so little a centre of irredentism that the
Constantinople Greeks were sometimes reproached by other Greeks with their failing
in this respect.”443
The Greek delegation also advocated against the expulsion of the Rum from the
perspective of the potential expellees themselves. The Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul
was an urban community, and an urban people, they alleged, could not be settled in the
agricultural areas that the Muslim Greeks were abandoning in the exchange. 444 Caclamanos
insisted that this urban population “could not possibly be absorbed by Greece…[the] burden
would be intolerable if she had to accommodate this large number of city-bred people in
addition to the vast number of immigrants already on her hands.”445 Greece pleaded that it
simply could not absorb any more refugees;446 that an additional 300,000 people would
overwhelming their already strained capacity.447
The Turkish delegation, naturally, refuted each of the Greek arguments in turn. We
have seen they initially rejected the economic case. They also vehemently disagreed with the

Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace,
1923: 226.
443 LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 05 December 1922;
UN Archives at Geneva, p. 5.
444 LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 07 December 1922;
UN Archives at Geneva, p. 5.
445 LNA, C1112/8/N15: Sub-Commission for Exchange of Populations Meeting Minutes, 04 December 1922;
UN Archives at Geneva, p. 5.
446 By the time the Peace Conference started in November 1922 it is estimated that Greece had received one
million refugees from Turkey (Ladas, 1932: 392; Hirschon, 2003: 6; Mazower, 2004: 345; Morris & Ze’evi, 2019:
465.).
447 Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923: Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace,
1923: 318.
442

137

Greek claim that the Rum of Istanbul were not irredentist. Shukri Bey confessed that
previously the Greeks of Istanbul lived peacefully with their Turkish neighbors, but
“a point had been reached at which the only thing to do was to separate them out from
each other…Turkey could not agree to make an exception in favour of the Greek
population of Constantinople which was the main centre of Turkish life and a political
centre of Greek political activity if the Greeks remained.”448
Tewfik Bey added that: “So long as [the Greek Orthodox] remained Constantinople would be
a centre of conflict which would provoke European intervention.”449 Removing the Greek
Orthodox from Istanbul would increase European security by extracting “a hot-bed of
trouble” from the East.450 Tewfik Bey said that, “the Turks wanted to be friends after peace;
but…their experience had shown that Turks and Greeks could no longer live together side by
side and all the Greeks must leave.”451 Regarding the Greek arguments that it was unfair to
have an urban-for-rural population swap, the Turks argued that the Muslim population in
Greece also included “townspeople” and thus the Orthodox expulsion would be an even
trade.452 Finally, to the point of Greece being overwhelmed with refugees, the Turks argued
that they also had absorbed hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees.453
Although the Greeks resisted the expulsion of the Orthodox from Istanbul at the
Conference, their efforts would have likely come to naught without the backing of the Great
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Powers. It was up to the Allied Powers, running the peace conference, to adjudicate these
competing claims. In this case the homeland state factor and international community factor
worked in tandem to constrain the expulsion of the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul.

International Community
It was clear to all that the Treaty of Sèvres had to be renegotiated given the success of the new
Turkish nationalist government. The Turkish delegations’ diplomatic strategy was not to
isolate itself from the Great Powers but rather to become an equal. Ismet Pasha announced
that Turkey was willing to join the League of Nations at the end of the proceedings and
become a member of the international community.454 This desire to cultivate strong ties with
the international community negated the possibility of completely ignoring Allied arguments.
However, that did not deter the Turks from driving a hard bargain, extending the duration of
the conference much longer than the Allies wanted or anticipated. While there was strong,
albeit reluctant, backing from all parties at the peace conference for the population exchange,
there was no international support for the exchange of the Istanbul Rum. From the outset,
key Allied figures empathized with the Greek side. The Allied arguments against expelling the
Rum from Istanbul largely mirrored those of the Greek delegation. They included: economic
anxieties, political concerns, refugee absorption, and making a fair trade.
The Great Powers were concerned about their financial interests in Istanbul. Erik
Colban, Director of Administrative Commissions and the Minorities Questions Section for
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the League Secretariat, wrote in a letter to British politician, Noel Buxton, two days after the
peace conference began, that: “The Great Powers with strong economic interests in Istanbul
would never agree to the total evacuation of the Christians from that town…because all the
European business in Istanbul is based upon the collaboration of the Greek element.” 455 While
the Allied Powers were openly concerned about their own economic interests, they also
believed the economic losses would be too great for Turkey to handle. Nansen wrote to the
Greek delegate Politis on October 31, before the peace conference opened, that he believed:
“…the Turkish government will find it cannot afford to expel the Constantinople Greeks if it
has to pay for their possessions.”456 Furthermore in an official report to the League on
November 15, five days before the start of the conference, Nansen wrote: “It would be
superfluous to stress what a complete commercial and financial suicide would result from the
flight of the Greek and Armenian populations from Constantinople; in effect by such an
event…Turkey will sacrifice her richest asset.”457
Sentiment was similar within the Political Section of the League Secretariat. Thanassis
Aghnides, a League official and an Ottoman Greek born and raised in Istanbul, wrote in an
internal report that: “…the removal of the non-Turkish elements will mean financial ruin for
Turkey including instant ruin for Constantinople and Smyrna. Turkey would be reduced to a
country of no economic importance whatever.”458 Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary and
President of the Conference’s First Commission stated that the removal of the Greek
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Orthodox from Istanbul “would entail a very serious economic and industrial loss to Turkey
herself. He believed this population was vital to the existence of Constantinople as a great city
of commerce and industry, and that without it Constantinople would be in danger of losing
its authority, wealth and trade.”459 Later in the conference proceedings, reflecting generally
about the number of Rum expelled from Turkey in the last few months of 1922, Curzon
remarked to the Commission: “I sometimes wonder if the Turkish Government have at all
fully considered the economic results of this gigantic transference of peoples, to which there
is no parallel in modern history, and by which I expect that in many cases Turkey will lose
much more than she gains.”460
Other League of Nations officials expressed political concerns, such as the possibility
of Russia benefiting from the Rum expulsion. Internal correspondence from Aghnides, stated,
“In my opinion, the real motive of the Turks…is the political motive….You have,
perhaps, observed that the Russians back up the Turks in this respect, as in many
others. Again I must point out, the reason for this is that to-day [sic], as in the past,
Russia has an eye on Constantinople.”461
He continued on to say that removing the Christians from Istanbul would make it less a city
of international commerce and complex politics, making it easier for Russia to pursue its aims:
“that explains both the Russian attitude and also why the Allies are against the expulsion of
the non-Turks from Constantinople.”462 Importantly, British troops still occupied Istanbul in
November 1922 when the peace conference began, and they did not leave until a year later in
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October 1923463.464 Control of and influence in the city was still an open question in early
1923. The Great Powers were keen to maintain their political advantage in the city, and not to
cede it to rival powers.
Nansen, as head of the League’s refugee relief effort, was very concerned about the
number and state of refugees in Greece and the consequences of adding any more. He
advocated that Greece could not accept any more refugees, that it was fully saturated.465 Lord
Curzon agreed with Nansen, and said in a Commission meeting on January 10, 1923, that “…it
would enormously aggravate the difficulty experienced by Greece in finding homes for all
these refugees” if the Greek Orthodox from Istanbul were included.466 The Allies also echoed
the Greek argument about the inability of Greece to accommodate an urban population:
“residents in towns could not be exchanged for residents in country districts.”467 H. G. Dwight
of the American Delegation, observers at the conference, said that the Americans also could
not approve of the Istanbul expulsion, “particularly under conditions which will send an urban
people used to artizanship [sic] and commerce to a rural district.”468
Giulio Cesare Montagna, second Italian delegate, and chair of the sub-Commission
for the Exchange of Populations, summarized the general sentiment of the international
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community, urging the Turkish delegation to reconsider its insistence on expelling the Greek
Orthodox from Istanbul:
“…[you] should not bring about catastrophe by expelling the Greek population of
Constantinople…everyone including the American Representative [is] against [you] on
this question. [You] were wrong from every point of view, including the political point
of view. [You] were preparing [your] own ruin. If the Greeks in Constantinople had
compromised themselves, those compromised Greeks had left.”469
Although the Allied powers were united against the Turks regarding expulsion of the Greek
Orthodox of Istanbul, Lord Curzon tried to appear unbiased by suggesting that if the Muslims
of Western Thrace were exempted from the exchange, then the Rum of Istanbul should be
too: a fair trade.470 French delegate, de Lacroix, agreed and offered that the Moslems of
Western Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul should be “left over for a future possible
exchange.”471 In the end, there was significant international resistance to expelling the Greek
Orthodox from Istanbul, constraining the Turkish government’s policy.

Summary
This first case study has explained why and how the Ottoman/Turkish governments expelled
its Orthodox Greek minority population during 1913-1923, and why the Greeks of Istanbul—
the most irredentist, wealthiest, most political active—were allowed to remain. The
Ottoman/Turkish governments were motivated to expel the Ottoman Greeks because they
saw them as a dangerous fifth column. The expulsions occurred as the leaders—first the CUP
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and then the Nationalists—sought to cast off the idea of multi-ethnic “Ottomanism” and
instead usher in a new phase of Turkish nationalism. This new phase of nation-building created
a Turkish national identity among Ottoman Muslims—a “Turkey for the Turks”—that in turn
required the removal or elimination of non-Muslims. The Orthodox Greeks, with their coethnic ties to the Greek nation-state, and the continued territorial incursions of Greece into
Ottoman lands, were a security threat that had to be removed. The application of my mass
expulsion decision making framework to the situation of the Greek Orthodox along the
Aegean and Pontic littoral (as well as Anatolia) versus those in the imperial capital of Istanbul,
explains the key enabling and constraining factors for mass expulsion. Alliance patterns, the
homeland state of the target group—in this case Greece, and the international community
enabled expulsion in the case of the former, while constraining expulsion in Istanbul.
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CHAPTER 4. “They only milked the cow”: Asians in Post-Colonial
Uganda and Kenya
On August 4, 1972, President Idi Amin gave a speech to his troops from the Airborne
Regiment in Tororo, eastern Uganda. He told them there was no place, “for the over 80,000
Asians holding British passports who are sabotaging Uganda’s economy and encouraging
corruption,” 472 and that the Ugandan economy should be in the hands of indigenous African
Ugandans. Five days later, he announced that Asians in the country had 90 days to leave. 473
Amin’s decree set off an international scramble to resettle tens of thousands of individuals of
Asian descent, with the United Kingdom both leading the efforts and deflecting responsibility
to absorb 50,000 of its own citizens residing in Uganda. Although the expulsion order targeted
Asians with foreign citizenship,474 Amin declared that the government would “double-check”
the citizenship of Asians who were registered as Ugandan citizens.475 Through the citizenship
verification process many Asians had their legitimate claims rejected.476 The United Nations
and international organizations coordinated the documentation, transportation, and
resettlement of approximately 20,000 Asians who had Ugandan citizenship but were left de
facto stateless by the expulsion order.
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Explaining the expulsion, Amin claimed that, “Uganda will not be independent until
the Asians have gone…I want to see all Ugandan African faces in Kampala streets and
offices.”477 While initially the expulsion garnered international headlines and outrage, within
three months only 1,500 Asians remained in Uganda.478 In comparison to other twentieth
century mass expulsions, one might be tempted to describe this episode as relatively smooth—
minimal deaths, a coordinated international response, and a safe and swift resettlement of
expellees—but that would be to overlook the devastation of thousands of individual lives and
livelihoods, and the damage to Uganda’s development.

4.1 Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions
Asians in Uganda
Asian traders had facilitated the exchange of goods in the Indian Ocean corridor, along the
East African coast, long before the arrival of the British.479 Their presence increased with the
British colonization of East Africa, particularly in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. The British
proclamation of the Protectorate of Uganda in 1894 drew Asians deeper inland as Indian
indentured laborers built the railway network from Mombasa, Kenya to the White Nile in
present day Uganda.480 These indentured laborers largely originated from the Indian states of
Gujarat and Punjab but also from what was then the Portuguese colony of Goa. 481 Most of
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these workers returned home to India at the end of their contract, died in Uganda, or were
invalided home. Only 6,724 of the estimated 32,000 laborers permanently settled in Uganda.482
By 1960 this group was just 10 percent of the total Asian community in East Africa. 483
A larger group of Asians arrived in East Africa in a second wave of immigration in the
1920s and 1930s.484 These voluntary immigrants often called dukawallahs485 were motivated by
adventure and economic opportunity, and served middle-class functions, engaging in smallscale trade, cotton ginning, transportation, and clerical services for the colonial
administration.486 Most of these migrants were male and rarely stayed for long—they came to
Africa to work, and then returned home in a circular migration pattern. These immigrants
opened and developed the interior of East Africa extending the monetary economy into
previously subsistence areas. They brought consumer goods to rural, indigenous populations
and served as the main outlet for surplus produce from African farmers, controlling most of
the export-import trade.487 The Asians in Uganda lived a much higher quality of life than their
kin in India, and after World War II greater opportunities encouraged family migration and
more permanent settlement in Uganda.488 As depicted in Table 7, a combination of family
reunification and high birth rates increased the Asian population in East Africa between 1910
and 1972.
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Table 7: Asian Population in Uganda, 1910-1972489

Year
Population

1910
2,000

1921
5,000

1935
15,000

1948
34,000

1959
69,000

1969
70,000

1972
74,000

Despite similar circumstances drawing them to Uganda, the Asian community was far
from homogenous. There were divisions along caste, religious, occupational, and after the
partition of India in 1947, national lines. Most Uganda Asians were Hindus of the Lohana or
Patidar caste, but there were also Muslims (mostly Ismailis), Sikhs, and Catholics.490 There
were three main occupational classes: skilled professionals, commercial businessmen in
wholesale or processing, and retail traders, of which the traders made up the majority. 491 While
the Asians lived segregated, by choice, from their African neighbors, the Ismailis did the most
to integrate into Ugandan society, investing in schools and hospitals to support both Asian
and African populations.492 At Ugandan independence the Aga Khan, spiritual leader of the
Ismailis, strongly encouraged Ismailis in Uganda to adopt local citizenship, suggesting their
future lay in Africa.493 Nevertheless, when it came to the 1972 expulsion decree these intraAsian differences were ignored and the Asians were treated as a single racial group.

Tripartite Societal Divisions
The British Protectorate government in Uganda institutionalized a tripartite separation of
races: European, Asian, and African.494 The Europeans controlled political power and owned
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the major industries, including financial institutions and many of the larger distribution
enterprises. Asians filled the middle-class functions. Africans were the third rung on the
racialized British ladder, politically and economically marginalized, working mostly in
agriculture but also as wage laborers, taxi drivers, and servants.495
The Asian population was economically successful, socially segregated, and political
isolated.496 Their near monopoly on medium-sized commerce and industry constrained the
entrepreneurial aspirations of local Africans.497 Besides the colonial restriction on Asian land
ownership, the Protectorate policies favored Asian businesses to the exclusion of Africans,
giving them a foothold in the territory. This hierarchy was by design. An alien mercantile class
ensured Africans could not easily obtain the resources, skills, or vision to organize against
colonial rule. It also facilitated the circulation of goods within the British Empire as Asian
traders imported British iron and cotton from Bombay to sell in Uganda, and exported
domestic, African cash crops to the metropole.498
The economic separation between Asians and Africans was also a geographic
segregation between urban and rural areas. Systems of trade licensing dating back to the early
colonial era, and policies such as the Trade Act of 1938, meant that Asians were confined to
large towns, particularly Entebbe, Kampala, and Jinja, three cities located in south-central
Uganda along Lake Victoria.499 This geographic segregation was reinforced by the close
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relations and connections that Asian immigrants maintained with their relatives in India.500
Endogamy was standard; mixed marriages between Asians and Africans were rare.
Although Africans and Asians were physically segregated, they had regular, hierarchical
interactions as retailer-customer or master-servant. Africans purchased their consumer goods
from Asian shops and worked in Asian homes as servants. Most African retailers did not have
access to banks and thus Asians were retailers and lenders, with debt cementing the
subordinate relationship of the African buyer.501 Even successful African traders had trouble
advancing because Asian networks controlled the wholesale-retail and export-import supply
chain, making it difficult to break their market monopoly.502
In the late 1940s, Africans protested the Protectorate’s discriminatory treatment in a
series of peasant uprisings and working-class strikes. The economic disparities between the
African and Asian traders are illustrated in Table 8. In 1952, although African traders made up
69 percent of all traders, they only accounted for 27 percent of retail trade, making just over
one-sixth of their Asian counterparts.503 Most of the African trade was in traditional, low-cost
products including meat, fish, produce, and other local goods.
Table 8: Retail trade in Uganda, 1952504

Retailers
Asians
Africans

No. of traders
5,227
11,634

Annual revenue (£)
28,400,000
10,600,000
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Avg revenue per trader (£)
5,433
911

The British responded to the African protests with reforms, embarking on a series of
Africanization policies during 1951-1955.505 The colonial administration passed two major
ordinances in 1951: the Acquisition of Ginneries Ordinance and the Cotton Ordinance. Under
the former, the Protectorate appropriated ginneries from Asian owners and transferred them
to African cooperatives. And in 1955 a Committee on the Advancement of Africans in Trade
and Commerce was established.506
After these largely cosmetic policy changes, the historically powerful Buganda
Province organized the first major trade boycott against Asian traders. Led by aspiring
Baganda businessman, Augustine Kamya, the boycott lasted from March 1959 to mid-1960.
The aim was to pressure the colonial authorities to bring about political and economic change
in Uganda. While the boycott was directed at all non-African shops, Asian traders were the
primary target.507 Asian shops were burned, rudimentary bombs were thrown into shops and
public areas, thousands of coffee farms were laid waste, and dozens were assaulted.508 As the
boycott unfolded, violence and intimidation were directed not only at Asian shopkeepers but
also at Africans who violated the boycott.509 Africans were disproportionately affected by
higher prices and reduced supply.510
The Protectorate authorities condemned the boycott and demanded its end.
Interestingly, the boycott remained confined to Buganda and did not spread throughout the
rest of the country. An undeveloped African business class in other regions of Uganda may
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explain the variation in support for the boycott, as well as the fact that at this time African
political elites were more focused on decolonization than economic control. While the
violence associated with the Baganda trade boycott was relatively contained and did not reach
the status of a pogrom, or a deadly ethnic riot, it highlighted serious inter-group tensions, even
if provincially concentrated. A harbinger of events to come.
Although Asians dominated almost the entire distributive trade, the British owned
Uganda.511 Three British banks controlled Uganda’s commercial bank assets. Wholesale trade
in raw materials, machinery, and goods for heavy industry were all managed by businessmen
in London.512 Even after independence, the British controlled the commanding heights of the
economy. But outside Kampala, few Africans saw many Englishmen, rather it was the Asian
trader who was omnipresent. The daily buyer-seller interactions reinforced the colonial
hierarchies, deepening resentment and frustration.

Post-Colonial Political Transition (1962-1971)
Uganda was granted independence from Britain on October 9, 1962. The first democratic
election in 1962 was won by an alliance between two parties: the Uganda People’s Congress
and Kabaka Yekka. The Kabaka (king) of Buganda Province became the first president and
Milton Obote, the prime minister.513 Though the Kabaka was the head of state, Obote had
political control in a standard version of the Westminster model. The military structure
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remained unchanged at independence with the Nubian514 ethnic group at the core of the army,
and Idi Amin as its central figure.515
The British pushed Uganda to automatically grant British Asians local citizenship at
independence, but the newly installed government demurred. According to Chapter II, Article
7(1) of the 1962 Ugandan constitution, a person automatically became a Ugandan citizen at
independence if he was born in Uganda and at least one of his parents was also born in
Uganda.516 If neither of his parents were born in the country, he had two years to apply for
citizenship.517 Therefore, most Asians had three choices: retain foreign citizenship, return to
their country of origin, or naturalize and adopt Ugandan citizenship. The majority chose to
retain their existing citizenship, not confident in the new government and wanting to keep
British (or other) citizenship as an insurance policy.518 Even among those who did obtain
Ugandan citizenship, most had at least one family member with alternative citizenship.519
The Ugandan Citizenship Ordinance stated that after registering as a Ugandan citizen,
one had to renounce any other nationality or citizenship, and take an oath of allegiance within
three months of approved registration.520 Since dual nationality was not permitted, without
this renunciation Ugandan citizenship was invalid. Ignorant of this clause, or not realizing its
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importance, some Asians did not submit evidence of their renunciation, or the British
government did not process their renunciation on time. Therefore, in many cases Ugandan
citizenship was nullified, often without the person’s knowledge, making them effectively
stateless.
Importantly, there was a distinction in the status of Asians who had lived in British
India and Asians from the Princely states. The former were British subjects, and the latter were
British Protected Persons. Under UK law, British subjects could have dual citizenship, thus
they could hold UK and Ugandan citizenship, although this was illegal from the Ugandan side.
British Protected Persons lost that status on the acquisition of Ugandan citizenship and were
particularly vulnerable after the expulsion.521 Five years after independence, 10,527 Asians who
had applied for Ugandan citizenship were still waiting for their applications to be processed.
These pending applications would lead to further confusion during the expulsion episode. 522
Democracy did not last long in Uganda. In January 1964, Obote announced his desire
to create a one-party state to consolidate control. In response the army mutinied, inspired by
the successful revolution in Zanzibar, and as similar events were occurring in Kenya and
Tanzania.523 Obote turned to the British for help, and British paratroops suppressed the army
revolt. While Obote had preached transcending ethnic identity and destroying tribal divisions,
after the mutiny, he packed the military with his Langi and Acholi ethnic kin and put in place
policies to disadvantage his ethnic rivals, particularly the Baganda.

Memorandum, Ugandan Asians – Statelessness, 22.09.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[b] - Refugees from Asia
in Uganda [Volume 2-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 204; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
522 Mamdani 1975: 52.
523 Southall, 1975: 95.
521

154

Obote’s authoritarian behavior continued in May 1966 when government military
forces, led by Amin then Commander of the Army, removed President Kabaka in a bloody
coup in which 2,000 Baganda police and civilians were killed.524 Obote took over as president
and quickly dissolved Uganda’s federal structure—abolishing kingdoms, provinces, and
autonomous regions—and created a unitary state. He pushed for a centralized Ugandan
national identity and the elimination of ethnic and sub-national identities: “...the problem of
people putting the tribe above national consciousness is a problem that we must face, and an
issue we must destroy.”525 The unitary state model emphasized cohesion and solidarity, but it
also clipped the wings of Obote’s biggest rival: the Baganda. In one fell swoop Obote replaced
the constitutionally elected Baganda president as leader of the country and restricted
Buganda’s historic privileges and autonomy.
During his rule Obote greatly expanded the size of the army from 1,000 personnel at
independence to 7,680 in less than a decade.526 This growth came at a high cost: in 1968, 10.2
percent of the national budget was allocated to military spending compared to 3.8 percent in
Tanzania and 6.9 percent in Kenya, two neighboring countries with much larger
populations.527 Obote intended to protect his rule with the stick, but he also offered carrots.
He introduced three Africanization initiatives in 1969, modelled after those in Kenya—the
National Trading Corporation, the Trade Licensing Act, and “Operation Bring African
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Traders Into Town.”528 In the same year he also ordered a national census: the Asian
population numbered 74,308 of whom 34.5 percent were citizens.529
On Labor Day, May 1, 1970, Obote launched his socialist “Move to the Left” policies
which included plans to nationalize large sectors of the economy in a 40:60 split between state
and private ownership.530 He also imposed strict currency controls limiting the amount of
money that could be sent out of the country.531 Although Obote advocated Africanization and
partial nationalization, his “Move to the Left” was crafted to exclude the Baganda, the most
established and experienced of the African traders. Forcing out non-citizens residing in
Uganda through Africanization policies, as Kenya was doing next door, would have directly
benefited Baganda landlords and property-owning classes. Since this would have threated
Obote’s plans, he stifled the emergence of an African (i.e., Baganda) merchant class and
allowed Asians and Europeans to continue to dominate the commercial and industrial sectors
respectively, with the state as a junior partner—profiting but not controlling.532 To many
Africans, the façade of Obote’s nationalization and Africanization policies merely perpetuated
the status quo.
In the summer of 1970, amid Obote’s Africanization efforts, the first group expelled
from Uganda was not Asians but Africans. On July 10, the Minister of Labor announced that
the wage-earning sector was comprised of too many non-Ugandans,533 and that the positions
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needed to be “Ugandanized” within two months.534 The largest group among these nonUgandans were approximately 20,000-30,000 Kenyan Luos who were expelled across the
border to Kenya.535 Obote initially distanced himself from his labor minister’s decision, but
when outrage rose in Kenya Obote defended him, and stated that he did not want unemployed
Kenyan workers to be exported to Uganda because of President Jomo Kenyatta’s failed
capitalist policies.536 Fierce ideological battles over the best economic model—capitalism or
socialism—were prominent in late 1960s, early 1970s East Africa. The expulsion was news for
a day but then largely forgotten.

British Immigration Policies
British immigration policies are a crucial component of the 1972 Ugandan expulsion story.
The story begins after WWII when in 1946 Canada passed citizenship legislation that breached
the British Imperial “common code.” The common code was a 1911 agreement about
freedom of movement for British Dominion537 subjects throughout the British Empire. Under
the new Canadian citizenship law, British subject status was derivative of Canadian citizenship,
which undermined the “common” basis of imperial nationality.538 The Canadian legislation set
off a cascade of events that resulted in the 1948 British Nationality Act. This Act extended
citizenship and immigration privileges to the New Commonwealth countries—India, Pakistan,
and Ceylon539—in addition to the Old Commonwealth British Dominions creating a new
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status: Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies or CUKC.540 The act was largely symbolic.
It aimed at maintaining cohesion within the Empire during decolonization.541 Not anticipating
large-scale immigration of former colonial subjects, extending the right to free entry seemed,
at the time, like a benign policy.
However, the 1948 British Nationality Act combined with decolonization, brought a
wave of immigrants to the UK. New Commonwealth, sometimes referred to as “non-white
Commonwealth,” immigration increased rapidly in the 1950s, peaking in 1961-1962 and then
falling by the mid-1960s (see Table 9).542 As domestic opposition to these immigrants grew in
England, the UK tightened its immigration controls.
Table 9: New Commonwealth Immigration to the U.K., 1955-1966543

Year
No. of Immigrants

1955
42,700

1956
46,850

1960
57,700

1961
136,400

1962544
100,000

1966
46,953

Domestic nativist anger at non-white immigration culminated in race riots, which prompted
the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. The act instituted immigration controls over
Commonwealth citizens, distinguishing between persons with personal connections to the
UK, either by birth or by naturalization, and those without such personal connections. 545 This
distinction effectively eliminated, if not seriously reduced, CUKC immigration from newly
independent African and Asians states.546

Uche, 2017: 824.
Deakin, 1969: 82.
542 Memorandum from UNHCR London Representative to High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva,
29.01.1969; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11,
Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
543 Adapted from text in Tandon& Raphael, 1978: 11-12.
544 This figure is only the first six months of 1962.
545 Uche, 2017: 824; Aiyar, 2015: 285.
546 Uche, 2017: 826.
540
541

158

Back in Uganda, President Obote closed observed UK immigration policy.
Commenting on its relevance to Uganda’s Asians, he stated: “We will keep non-Ugandan
citizens at our pleasure, but if, for national interests, that pleasure runs out, they will have to
go to their countries.”547 East Africa was an unstable place for Asians in the late 1960s.

The Second Coup
On January 25, 1971, while Obote attended a Commonwealth Conference in Singapore,
Major-General Idi Amin led a military coup.548 A week later Amin announced that the powers
previously vested in the president would now reside with him as Military Head of State and
Commander in Chief. He dissolved Parliament and stated that the new government would
legislate by his decrees, with advice from the Cabinet.549 Despite taking power
undemocratically, Amin was heralded by many inside and outside Uganda. Local African and
Asian traders, along with international governments—Britain, Israel, Ethiopia, and South
Africa—hoped he would steer the state toward capitalism and cast off Obote’s socialist
policies.550 But not all countries were happy with Amin’s coup, particularly regional African
countries. Neither Kenya551 nor Tanzania recognized Amin’s government. Tanzanian
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President Nyerere offered refuge to Obote and his political allies, and Zambia President
Kaunda discouraged Western leaders from recognizing the new regime.552
Amin placed his ethnic kin into key military positions and initiated a campaign to purge
any traces of the previous regime. Large-scale killings of Langi, Acholi, and Teso members of
the armed forces, intelligence, and police ensued.553 Although Amin criticized Obote for
imprisoning his enemies, within four months Amin had detained 500-800 persons without
trial, far exceeding the less than 100 who were imprisoned at the time of the coup.554 Estimates
of the total persons killed in the first years of Amin’s reign vary dramatically from low estimates
of 12,000 to high estimates of 300,000, but almost all are aggregated based on his eight-year
rule.555 Historian Jan Jelmert Jørgensen (1981) wrote that most figures are exaggerated and
based on peak killing periods rather than averages. He estimated the total killed by the state
during Amin’s rule at 12,000-30,000, or approximately 1,500-3,750 per year.556 These figures
are similar to those cited in the 1974 International Commission for Jurists (ICJ) report to the
UN on the Violations of Human Rights in Uganda that stated several hundred people were
killed in the first five months of Amin’s rule.557

Amin & the Asians
In the aftermath of the coup, Amin did not directly target the Asian population in Uganda.
Instead, he focused on eliminating his African military rivals. However, the Uganda Asian
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community’s optimism about the new president was short lived. On October 12, 1971, Amin
called for a census of all Asians—citizens and non-citizens—a clear racial targeting. Asians
were required to participate or forfeit any claims to live in Uganda and many had their
passports confiscated during this process, rendering them stateless.558 After the census, Asians
were required to carry green passes to indicate they had been counted, without which their
movement was banned.559 The results of the census were not made public until after the
expulsion decree. Many suspect that Amin was not happy with the data indicating that 23,242
Asians were Ugandan citizens.560
Shortly after the census, in response to public statements and letters complaining
about the Asian population, Amin convened an “Indian Conference.” During December 7-8,
1971, Asians from across the country travelled to Kampala for the meeting, an event that
inadvertently united a population that had strong internal divisions.561 To open the meeting
the Asians presented the First Indian Memorandum in which they graciously thanked Amin
for convening the meeting between the Asian community and the President. Their message
addressed social integration, education, civil rights, citizenship, immigration, and the economy,
while refuting the attacks against them, particularly racial propaganda in the media.562 The next
day, Amin attended the conference and delivered a speech about his views on the Uganda
Asian community which foreshadowed events to come.
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Amin began his speech by placing the conference in the context of a series of meetings
that the government was conducting with “different groups of persons” in Uganda such as
the Muslim Leaders Conference and the Church of Uganda Leaders Conference. 563 Amin
described his intentions, “My aim is to ensure that, like a father in a family, understanding and
unity between the different communities in this country are established on a permanent
basis.”564 The speech began with praise for the Asian community and their contributions to
commerce and trade, employment opportunities, education and medical facilities, and various
fields of government. However, after a few pleasantries, his speech took a negative turn. Amin
criticized the Asian community for their disloyalty, refusal to integrate, commercial
malpractice, and citizenship choices. He also announced that the pending citizenship
applications of 12,000 British Asians were cancelled.565
In the new year, on January 4, 1972, Indian leaders met again with Amin to present a
Second Indian Memorandum in response to the December conference. Shortly after this
meeting Karim Aga Khan,566 spiritual leader and Imam of the Nizari Ismaili Shias, visited
Uganda and was greeted warmly by Amin who gave him a lavish welcome and assured him
that he had been misunderstood regarding the Asian community. Amin told the Aga Khan
that he did not blame all Asians for the current problems. Many Asians were hopeful for
improved conditions after this positive visit.567
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4.2 Mass Expulsion (August-November 1972)
In 1972 the total Ugandan population was approximately 10 million, of which an estimated
100,000 were non-Africans (See Table 10). Most of the 74,000 Asians were of Indian descent
and approximately one-third of this group, 24,500, believed they had Ugandan citizenship.568
Table 10: Uganda Population Figures, 1972569

Group
Africans
Asians
Europeans
Arabs

Total Population
9,900,000
74,000
10,000
3,000

When Amin announced the expulsion on August 4, 1972, it was not immediately clear if the
80,000 Asians, “holding British passports who are sabotaging Uganda’s economy and
encouraging corruption,”570 referred to all the Asians in the country or only Asians with British
citizenship. Amin’s August 9 presidential statement,571 followed by the release of Official
Decree 17 and Statutory Instrument No. 124, clarified and formalized what Amin had first
announced to the troops in Tororo. Decree 17 stated:
“On and after the commencement of this Decree, every entry permit or certificate of
residence issued or granted under the provisions of the Immigration Act, 1969, to any
person who is of Asian origin, extraction or descent and who is a subject or citizen of
any of the countries specified in the Schedule to this Decree shall cease to have any
validity whatsoever.”572
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The schedule of countries in the decree included: the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the Republic of India, the Republic of Pakistan, and the Republic of
Bangladesh. Thus, the official government decree extended the expulsion to all Asians with
foreign citizenship, not just British Asians.573 The corresponding Statutory Instrument No.
124 outlined exemptions from Decree 17. Two categories of persons would not be expelled:
“1. All persons in the employment of Government, Government bodies, the cooperative movement, the East African Community and international organisations.
2. Professionals such as teachers, practising lawyers, medical practitioners,
pharmacists, dentists, chemists, auditors, architects, accountants, surveyors, quantity
surveyors, engineers; technicians in industries, commercial and agricultural enterprises;
managers or owners of banks and insurance companies; owners of and professionals
and technicians engaged in plant, animal, agriculture and forestry production,
processing and marketing of these products; and school owners.”574
In short, Statutory Instrument No. 124 exempted Asian civil servants and Asian professionals.
This was significant. Asian sources estimated that 10,000 people, approximately 12.5 percent
of the total Asian population, qualified under this provision.575 Although mass expulsion
appealed to the Ugandan public, many bureaucrats and Cabinet officials favored broad
exemptions from Amin’s initial announcement.576
Despite events foreshadowing Amin’s expulsion announcement, the Uganda Asians
and the international community were caught off guard. Given Amin’s history of erratic
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behavior, many were not convinced that he would follow through with his plans.577 For almost
six weeks the Asians and the British government took limited actions in the hopes that Amin
would change his mind.578 But Amin continued to ratchet up his rhetoric stating, “I must
emphasize that after the 90-day period has expired, any of these people still in Uganda will
face the consequences. They will be sitting on a fire and they will not sit comfortably.” 579 It
was not until mid-September, over a month after the initial announcement, that evacuations
began in earnest.580 Before departure, Asians were required to declare all their assets and
labilities to the Register of Properties and Businesses,581 and complete income tax and foreign
exchange clearances at the Bank of Uganda.582 They were only allowed to take £50 per
person583 and a maximum of 485lbs of personal effects out of the country.584
Although Decree 17 targeted Asian non-citizens, Amin announced in his presidential
statement of the same day that the government would “double check” the citizenship of
Asians who were registered as Ugandan citizens in the 1971 census.585 On August 14 a
spokesman for the Ministry of Internal Affairs fulfilled Amin’s order and instructed Asian
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citizens to report to the Immigration Office in Kampala by September 10 to verify their
documents or they would be considered non-citizens.586 The spokesman outlined a timetable,
by region, for reporting to the Immigration Office and noted that all documentation must be
original—no duplicates, photocopies, or carbon copies would be accepted.587 The stated
purpose of the verification campaign was to eliminate “false citizens” who illegally obtained
citizenship or who held dual citizenship, which was illegal under Ugandan law. Illustrating
Amin’s frank views, he was quoted as saying, “If all of them go I’ll be very, very happy.” 588
Confidential cables sent between the UNHCR Branch Office in Kampala to the
UNHCR High Commissioner in Geneva indicate concerns that the citizenship verification
exercise was a façade: “We suspect that the scrutiny of citizenship will be used as a means of
rejecting the bulk of the Asian community holding Ugandan citizenship. The [Asian]
community leaders fully share our views.”589 Through the verification process over half of the
23,000 Asians claiming Ugandan citizenship had their claims rejected. There were four main
modes of rejection: lack of renunciation of secondary citizenship, or delayed renunciation; 590
photocopies or carbon copies, rather than original documents; omission of Ugandan Central
Registry page numbers from birth certificates; and destruction or confiscation of documents
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by officials, which Amin vehemently denied.591 Verified Asian citizens remaining in the country
were required to purchase special identification cards to facilitate their continued stay and
movements.592
Additional confusion ensued on August 16 when Amin rescinded the exemption
outlined in Statutory Instrument 124. Now all Asian professionals would be expelled. Amin
explained his about-face: “they [the Asians] could not serve their country with a good spirit
after the departure of the other Asians.”593 Adding to the chaos, three days later at a mass rally
in Rukungiri in south-western Uganda, Amin stated that even Ugandan Asian citizens would
have to leave.594 He also ordered all refugees residing in Uganda to return home, including an
estimated 100,000 from Rwanda, 80,000 from southern Sudan, 30,000 from Zaire, and some
from Burundi.595
Student leaders from Makerere University protested against Amin’s decision to add
citizens to the expulsion decree.596 They were joined by members of the Cabinet and regional
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African leaders.597 The next day, on August 22, Amin shifted course again, returning to his
previous position that Asian citizens would not be expelled if they could prove their citizenship
status; he also agreed the refugees could stay but should return home soonest. 598 Not fully
acceding to the student demands, Amin said that a “second phase operation” would look at
the remaining Asian citizens.599 Much of the confusion stemmed from the fact that Amin’s
personal declarations often contradicted or preempted official policy decisions; thus, Asians
and government officials were left guessing which declarations would become official decrees
and which were simply musings from the president.
On August 31, 1972, UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim weighed in on the matter
during a press conference at the Vienna airport. He told reporters that “Uganda had declared
the matter an internal one and Article 2, para. 7 of the Charter600 forbade Unations [sic] to
intervene in domestic affairs. However Unations [is] always ready to help in humanitarian
matters.”601 Amin was resistant to any international meddling, and rebuffed UN involvement
or any persuasion to reverse course.
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Taking advantage of the chaos, on September 17, 1972, supporters of former Ugandan
President Obote based in Tanzania attempted to invade Uganda to remove Amin.602 Local
newspapers reported that Tanzanian troops invaded Uganda, captured three towns, and
advanced within 100 miles of Kampala. Tanzania claimed that the fighting was between
Amin’s troops and dissidents from the Uganda “People’s Army,” i.e., Obote’s troops backed
by Tanzania.603 The Government of Uganda accused Britain of supporting the invasion. 604
Nonetheless, Amin repelled the attack.
On October 19, Amin expanded the expulsion scope announcing that Asians with
Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Zambian citizenship would also be expelled because of the
“continued sabotage by the Asians” and allegations that Asian citizens of neighboring
countries were helping Uganda Asians smuggle property out of the country.605 With less than
a month to go it was clear that all Asians would be expelled. The UN was concerned about
the humanitarian consequences, especially the approximately 25,000 Asians with Ugandan
citizenship who were being rendered stateless. Although Amin initially refused UN
involvement, stating that it was the responsibility of the U.K. to resettle the Asians—even
though not all expellees were U.K. citizens—he eventually relented, but did “not wish to make
any official statements to this effect.”606
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In a two-day meeting on October 24 and 25, 1972, the UN and the Ugandan Ministry
of Foreign Affairs discussed the modalities of international assistance to facilitate the removal
of Asians of undetermined nationality.607 The three main areas of assistance were: travel
documentation, temporary and permanent resettlement, and transportation from Uganda to
the resettlement sites. It was agreed that the United Nations Development Program would
have overall responsibility for the operation, the ICRC would provide travel documentation,608
the UNHCR would organize resettlement, and the Inter-governmental Committee for
European Migration (ICEM)609 would facilitate transportation.610 Although the UN issued a
press release on October 26 outlining this division of responsibilities, the UNHCR had already
been contacting UN member states and non-member states regarding financial support and
resettlement of stateless Asians.611 Since the U.K. only accepted 27,000 of its 50,000 citizens, 612
the UNHCR negotiated resettlement for the remaining British Asians as well as those of
“undetermined nationality” to various countries including Canada, India, United States,
Pakistan, Sweden, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Norway, New Zealand, Gulf States, Iran,
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and Latin America.613 As the November deadline approached, most Asians departed Uganda
on commercial flights or with support from international organizations.
Another surprise came on November 2 when Amin announced that any Asian citizens
remaining in Uganda after the deadline would have to leave the towns and move to the
villages.614 Amin directed the Minister of Public Service and Local Administrations and the
Minister of Internal Affairs to count all Asians remaining in Uganda beginning on November
9.615 Amin believed this forced resettlement to rural areas would facilitate Asian mixing with
African people and allow the commercial sector to be taken over by Ugandans, i.e., black
African Ugandans. Confidential internal memos between UNHCR officials in Kampala
expressed skepticism about Amin’s order: “It is reasonable to believe that President Amin is
whipping up fear amongst the remaining Ugandan Asians to force them to leave the country
and claim later that Ugandan Asians left on their own. It is unlikely, for the time being, that
he will implement his threats.”616 His threats were effective because many Asian citizens left
after this announcement for fear of being forced to move to the countryside. In the last 24
hours before the expulsion deadline, 2,000 stateless Asians departed on a dozen flights, the
highest number in one day since the Asian airlift began. The remaining 800 departed by Friday,
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November 10.617 An estimated 1,500 Asian citizens remained in Uganda after the expiry of the
90-day timeline. They were counted, and their citizenship verified again, at special registration
centers in Kampala and other towns.618
Despite Amin’s assurances that the expelled Asians would be fully compensated, this
did not happen. Over the weekend of December 16, a Ugandan government spokesman
announced that properties left behind, as well as other assets, would be taken over by the
government without compensation.619 Amin later requested a loan from the British to pay the
Asians for their assets, citing the same British actions in Kenya,620 but this loan never came
through.621 The Asian middleclass was replaced largely by an aspirant Nubian, Muslim, West
Nilotic middleclass, one ethnic monopoly for another.622 The unequal asset redistribution left
the poorest income groups—peasants, pastoralists, and urban workers—in the same difficult
economic state as before. Africans who had supported Amin’s expulsion soon complained
that the newly enriched African traders were worse than the Asians, calling them “black
Asians” or “black Patels.”623 In a midnight address on December 17, 1972 Amin explained the
justification for his “economic war”: “We are determined to make the ordinary Ugandan
master of his own destiny, and above all to see that he enjoys the wealth of his country. Our
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deliberate policy is to transfer the economic control of Uganda into the hands of Ugandans,
for the first time in our country’s history.”624
Following the speech Amin did something Obote had promised but never delivered,
he nationalized British industries with the state takeover of British tea plantations, Brooke
Bond (the major tea brand), the Ugandan Transport Company, British Metal Corporation, and
Kampala Club just to name a few.625 Although the British were not expelled, their companies
and assets were confiscated without compensation, completing the second phase of the
“economic war.”

4.3 Expulsion Motivation: Anti-Colonialism
In my taxonomy of government motivations to expel, Uganda’s 1972 expulsion is an anticolonial expulsion. Anti-colonial expulsions aim to complete the decolonizing process, after
independence, by removing minority groups that held privileged status under the colonial
regime.626 These expulsions occur when a country is in the phase of establishing the nation
and when a target group is identified as an economic threat to the state. In 1972, Uganda was
a decade removed from independence and in the early stages of establishing which groups
should be included in the nation, and which excluded. It was also seeking to establish itself as
fully independent, free from the vestiges of European rule, securing economic freedom
alongside its political freedom. Part of that process was to reward the indigenous population
with economic fruits so long denied.
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One of Amin’s favorite metaphoric lines regarding the Asians in Uganda was that
“they only milked the cow…but did not feed it to yield more milk.”627 In his speech at the
Indian Conference Amin enumerated specific examples of Asians “milking the cow”:
commercial malpractice, abuse of foreign exchange, smuggling, creating artificial shortages,
tax evasion, and bribing public officials—all acts enriching themselves at the expense of
Ugandans.628 Asian businessmen were also accused, perhaps accurately, of discriminating
against their African counterparts in renting retail space, hiring African labor, and increasing
prices for African clients. While many of these complaints were common business practices,
since the Asian community had a monopoly on wholesale and retail trade, this was racially
charged.629
In his September 1972 UN General Assembly address, Uganda’s Permanent
Representative to the UN, Grace Ibingira, detailed the government’s rationale in expelling the
Uganda Argus. (1972). “Asians milked the cow: They did not feed it – Gen.Amin.” August 7. In Z. Lalani
(1997), Ugandan Asians Expulsion: 90 Days and Beyond Through the Eyes of the International Press (pp. 5). Tampa, FL:
Expulsion Publications.
628 O’Brien, 1972: 30.
629 Ghai & Ghai, 1965: 40.
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Asians in a five-page speech titled, “Historical Background of Asians in Uganda Explained to
the World Body.”630 He described the history of the Asian arrival in Uganda and the British
support for their privileged economic position:
“…the British organized [the Asians] and engaged them to settle and to provide an
instrument for promoting colonial trade and commerce. … [the Asians] established
their mastery over our trade and commerce. The British, who administered Uganda
until 1962, systematically ensured that their nationals of Asian extraction continued to
dominate our economic life, without any reasonable effort to promote the interests of
the indigenous people in this field.”631
Ibingira recalled the 1959 Buganda Trade Boycott as evidence of Ugandans trying to shake off
the Asian trading monopoly for decades. He stressed that despite Uganda’s political
independence the country was not fully sovereign: “In 1962 Uganda became an independent
sovereign State and was admitted as a Member of this Organization. But the economy was still
almost totally dependent on these foreign nationals.”632 The Asians were an economic threat
to the realization of their full independence.
To combat this threat, the government embarked on an “economic war,”633 a
continuation of the decolonization process to destroy the colonial economic hierarchy, by
removing the Asians, and returning the economy to the native, African Ugandans. Amin
articulated this when he first announced his expulsion decision: “I want the economy to be in
the hands of Ugandan citizens, especially black Ugandans.”634 In fact, the hasty 90-day timeline
for the Asians to leave the country was a reference to the 90-days’ credit typically extended by
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Asian businessmen to African customers.635 Amin further stressed themes of economic
control and independence in his speech on September 21 where he described the motivation
for the expulsion:
“…our policy is designed purely and simply to place the economy of this Country in
the hands of the nationals of Uganda. We know that in 1962 we got political
independence from Britain. We also know that despite that political independence, the
economy of the Country remained under the control of foreigners, as it had been for all the years
during colonial rule. It became obvious to my Government that political independence
without economic control of the resources of our Country was of very little use. We therefore took
a decision which we are determined to implement, and that is to transfer the economy of
this country firmly into the hands of the nationals”636 [emphasis added].
Even the human rights NGO, International Commission of Jurists, seemed to sympathize
with the rationale, if not the policy of expulsion. Its September 4, 1972, press release stated:
“The Commission recognizes that the motive of this decision stems from the legitimate
aspirations of freedom and independence of Africans. Like many other countries, Uganda
does not want its economy to be owned or controlled by foreigners.”637 Although the
organization deplored President Amin’s racist statements, it understood its logic.
Regional papers shared similar sentiments. The Nigerian Observer, a Benin-based paper,
characterized Amin’s predicament as typical of African leaders, “Many African governments
have come to realise that for their political independence to be meaningful, they cannot afford
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to leave their economy in the hands of aliens.”638 The former Ugandan Minister of Agriculture
and Forestry, Mr. Kakonge, said to Amin, “the economic war…will help in establishing a very
good foundation for nation-building.”639
This discourse illustrates that the Ugandan government’s motivation for expelling the
Asians was driven by their identification of the Asians as an economic threat during the
foundational years of nation building. This is not to condone, or agree with, the threat
identified by the Uganda government, but to outline the language used as evidence for
categorizing the 1972 case as an anti-colonialism expulsion. The Ugandan government
believed that expelling the Asians would resolve the economic threat. As Amin stated himself,
“these people milked away a lot of our economy and when they go Uganda will be alright
economically.”640 The goal in removing the Asians en masse was to remove all remnants of
colonial rule and replace them with a new, indigenous, middle class.

Alternative Explanations
This section examines three alternative explanations for the 1972 expulsion of Uganda Asians:
Asians expelled as a scapegoat, Asians expelled to punish the British, and Asians expelled
because of Amin’s personalist’s rule as a brutal dictator. Although each of these explanations
have merit, they can be refuted in sequence.
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The scapegoat theory of prejudice suggests that cumulative frustration breeds
aggression, which builds and generates rage, which is taken out on weak, defenseless, innocent
victims.641 In many cases these targets are minority groups, stereotyped as homogeneous, and
collectively blamed for problems, sometimes those caused by the perpetrators themselves. In
times of social or political instability, such as 1971 Uganda after Amin’s coup, minorities are
increasingly at risk of being scapegoated. The Asians in Uganda held coveted economic
positions which was a deep source of frustration for indigenous Africans, particularly the
Baganda; and they were an easy and unarmed target for immediate seizure of property, capital,
and employment.642 Amin knew that any actions against the Asians would be popular with the
public.643
The scapegoat theory explains the public “need” for the victim—a target for pent-up
frustration—but not the choice. There were other minorities, albeit smaller, in Uganda in 1972,
both Europeans and Arabs,644 yet the Asians were singled out in Decree 17. The scapegoat
explanation does not help us understand why Asians were targeted. The idea of Asians as a
scapegoat is predicated on the idea that they were entirely falsely accused.645 However, they
were not all innocent bystanders. The Asians had benefited from the preferential colonial
economic structure that had allowed them to dominate the wholesale-retail and export-import
trade.646 After independence, most Asian businessmen did not incorporate or support African
traders. In addition, as illustrated by the sizable majority who retained British citizenship, most
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Asians did not place their confidence in the young Ugandan state. This description does not
condone the expulsion of the Asians, but it qualifies the notion of the group as a blameless
victim, required for the scapegoat theory.
In any case, in August 1972, there was no need for a scapegoat. Amin was in control
of his military regime with ongoing killings against his political rivals. Given the climate of
fear, few spoke about Amin’s management of the economy. At the beginning of Amin’s rule,
Uganda had the most viable economy in East Africa, and despite some economic decline there
were low levels of hunger and poverty and no shortages of essential goods—the latter thanks
to Asian traders.647 Since most Ugandans were subsistence farmers, and Uganda is well known
for its fertile soil, life was manageable for average Ugandans. Thus, there was no urgent need
for a scapegoat. While there was much unfair stereotyping and blame during the Asian
removal, scapegoating is an insufficient explanation of the expulsion.
Another alternative explanation is that the 1972 expulsion was motivated by foreign
policy concerns. Scholars such as Kelly Greenhill (2010) promote the idea of strategic forced
displacement as a “weapon of mass migration” that weaker states use to target stronger ones.
Greenhill cites Uganda’s Asian expulsion as an example:
“…these expulsions happened at the same time that Amin was trying to convince the
British to halt their drawdown of military assistance to his country. In short, Amin
announced his intention to foist 50,000 refugees on Britain, but did so with a
convenient ninety-day grace period to give the British an opportunity to rescind their
decision regarding aid.”648
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Amor (2003) concurs, arguing that in addition to the immediate “booty” available from the
mass expulsion of the Asians, the expulsion would “punish” Britain.649 Amin often referred to
the Asian population in Uganda as a British creation and “Britain’s responsibility,” regardless
of their nationality.650
In an address to East African traders on August 8, after Amin had announced the
expulsion, he said:
“If it were not for the British these Asians would not have been faced with the situation
in which they have found themselves now. Instead of the British Government being
grateful to the Uganda Government for having looked after her citizens for many years
we are being criticized by Whitehall for having taken such a decision…. Uganda is
therefore determined to teach Britain a lesson. Whatever is said in Whitehall regarding
economic and military aid to Uganda, this cannot worry us at all” [emphasis added].651
Another angle of this argument is that Amin was motivated to expel the Asians en masse
because of the recent more restrictive UK immigration policies which would have elongated
the time horizon for their removal through legislation, potentially taking ten years to lawfully
get rid of all the British Asians.652 These arguments portray the Asians as unfortunate pawns
in a strategic move targeting Britain. There was certainly no love lost between Amin’s
government and that of the United Kingdom, but this is an incomplete explanation for the
expulsion.
First, the expulsion did not just target Asians with British citizenship. Decree 17
included, “any person who is of Asian origin, extraction or descent and who is a subject or
citizen of any of the countries specified in the Schedule to this Decree.”653 The schedule listed
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citizens of the UK, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. If Britain was the main target, why were
exemptions not made for citizens of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, also victims of British
colonization? In his December 1971 address Amin had specifically called out those with “backup” nationalities, indicating his frustration with any Asians without Ugandan citizenship, not
just the British ones: “many of you have not shown sufficient faith in Uganda citizenship.” 654
The lack of Ugandan citizenship seemed to be of greater concern to Amin. The Uganda News,
published by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, wrote that, “[Amin] reminded the
ex-Ministers how the Asians were asked to take up Ugandan citizenship, but refused.” 655
Further evidence of Amin’s dislike of all Asian non-citizens, not just those with British
citizenship, may be found in the decision to add Asians with Kenyan, Tanzanian, or Zambian
citizenship to the list of those expelled.656 He accused them of colluding with the Uganda
Asians in “continued sabotage” of the economy.657 These non-citizens Asians of other African
nationalities had no legal ties to Britain, and thus hardly count as a strategic weapon against
the British government.
After the August 1971 census Amin cancelled the processing of 12,000 outstanding
Asian citizenship applications, indicating his dislike not just of British Asians, but also those
trying to become Uganda citizens.658 The “verification exercise” undertaken after the expulsion
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announcement to validate Asians with Ugandan citizenship was a clear effort to rescind their
status and expel Asian citizens as well as non-citizens.659 In fact, in a Q&A with reporters, Amin
stated that, “the Asian problem in Uganda was entirely a British problem” while also stating,
“Uganda will not be independent until the Asians have gone.”660 While Amin may have blamed
the British for bringing the Asians, and wanted their citizens out, he wanted all the Asians
gone.
Greenhill (2010) argues that the Asian expulsion was a means of negotiating with
Britain to “halt their drawdown of military assistance [and aid] to his country” by threatening
to “foist 50,000 refugees on Britain.”661 But the timing does not work. Britain did not halt any
of its assistance to Uganda until August 29, twenty days after the official expulsion decree was
released. It was then that Britain froze a £10 million loan to Uganda, to try to persuade Amin
to change course.662 Hence, it is inaccurate to say that “…these expulsions happened at the
same time that Amin was trying to convince the British to halt their drawdown of military
assistance to his country.”663 By the spring of 1972, Amin had already found other sources of
military and financial support, securing $2 million from Libya and other Arab donors. Amin
did not need to expel the Asians to negotiate with the British and re-secure their military
support.
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Lastly, Greenhill describes Amin’s threat as “his intention to foist 50,000 refugees on
Britain,” but the British Asians, strictly speaking, were not refugees, but citizens of the United
Kingdom. While the mass expulsion of Asians, citizens and non-citizens, was a human rights
violation given its discriminatory character and the lack of individual evaluation, the expelled
British citizens were not refugees, they were going to their country of citizenship. Britain may
have been inconvenienced because of the rapid influx, combined with its domestic racial
tensions, but its responsibilities were clear under Article 3 of the Fourth Protocol of the
European Convention on Human Rights: “no one shall be deprived of the right to enter the
territory of the state of which he is a national.”664 The clarification that the British Asian
citizens were not refugees is important because Greenhill’s argument may hold in other cases
where governments use refugee populations as a “weapon of mass migration” such as by Cuba
against the U.S. in the 1980s. However, the Asian expulsion is not one of those cases. Though
the expelled Ugandan citizens became refugees, they were resettled in numerous countries
around the world with the UK accepting very few.
The last alternative explanation is that Amin was a brutal, tyrannical dictator and he
expelled the Asians simply because he was a vicious, unpredictable autocrat who lashed out as
part of his violent rule. Proponents of this rationale often highlight Amin’s mental state,
pointing to his announcement that the Asian expulsion was inspired by a dream. 665 None
would disagree that Amin was a cruel dictator who repressed many populations within Uganda:
African and non-African, citizen and non-citizen. The brutality of Amin’s rule is well
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documented, but it is important to remember that his coup d’état was initially praised by
Britain and Israel, and western states maintained their support throughout most of 1972—up
until the expulsion.666 The viciousness of Amin’s regime grew with his time in office. His later
actions should not cloud the analysis of this earlier period.
While these alternative explanations highlight features of the expulsion decision, none
are as convincing as, nor provide enough evidence to overturn, the anti-colonialism
explanation.

4.4 Enabling Factors for Uganda’s Asian Expulsion
Unfinished decolonization was not a unique feature of independent Uganda. Many former
British colonies, as well as former colonies of other European powers, had dominant or
middlemen minorities that controlled key sectors of the economy or held coveted positions in
the civil service. Yet not all newly independent colonial states expelled these economically
dominant minority populations, as is demonstrated in the Kenya case below. So, what factors
enabled the Ugandan government, motivated by anti-colonialism, to expel its Asian population
en masse? This next section examines the critical role of alliances, the target group homeland
state, and the international community in facilitating expulsion in Uganda.
Table 11: Factors that enabled expulsion in Uganda
Key Factors

Uganda (1972)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances

Benefit from expulsion (↑)

Transnational Alliances

Indifferent to expulsion (↑)

Homeland State(s)
Relation to Government
666
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Weak ties (↑)
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Response/Anticipated Response

Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)

International Community
Relation to Government

Weak ties (↑)

Response/Anticipated Response

Facilitate expulsion (↑)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
While Obote had outwardly eschewed ethnic clientelism in favor of a united Ugandan national
identity, though internally promoting his own groups, Amin, a Kakwa,667 actively and publicly
emphasized ethnic identities.668 After successfully overthrowing Obote, Amin’s main concern
was strengthening his power and purging any traces of the previous regime. He placed ethnic
groups from his home region into key military positions, including West Nilotics (Kakwa,
Madi, Lugbara, Alur, Nubians) and co-ethnic foreign nationals from Zaire and Sudan.669 Amin
expanded the armed forces from 7,680 to 20,000 persons (by 1974) and more than tripled
military expenditure by the end of his first year in power. 670 Amin used military patronage to
buy loyalty and maintain his rule.
Amin’s ethnic preferences were combined with religious preferences to reverse the
legacy of British bias against Islam.671 Muslims had been excluded from the colonial
educational system, which subsidized Christian missionary schools and educated the
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intellectual elites who became the post-independence leaders.672 Ethnic, religious, and regional
identities were important to Amin, “As he became older and acquired power, he considered
himself first and foremost a Nubian/Kakwa, secondly a Muslim, thirdly a West Niler, and
fourthly a Ugandan.”673
To gain legitimacy Amin first turned to the Baganda, the largest and formerly most
powerful ethnic group in the country, and Obote’s main rival.674 Under the Obote regime, the
Baganda had been politically and economically marginalized, and Amin quickly restored their
power and status, seeking to undo the work of his predecessor.675 He made a series of
concessions including releasing Baganda detainees, holding a state funeral for the Kabaka, and
renaming districts that were previously part of the Buganda Kingdom, from East and West
Mengo to East and West Buganda.676 Despite these adjustments, the Baganda made further
demands for the Africanization of trade; but, Amin, like Obote before him, was initially
cautious in making economic policy changes. Amin knew that if the Baganda became
economically powerful, political aspirations would follow—a risk he wanted to avoid.
In August 1971 Amin held a meeting with Baganda elders to discuss their demands
for Africanization. During the meeting Amin argued that “the Baganda were already advancing
rapidly in trade and warned that Ugandanisation of commerce and industry must not lead to
tribal discrimination, a veiled warning against commercial hegemony.”677 Amin was hesitant to
replace the Asian commercial monopoly with a Baganda monopoly. Although Amin initially
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ignored Baganda calls to Africanize the economy, he did take actions to appease them
including the October 1971 Asian census;678 the December 1971 “Indian Conference”;679 and
the cancellation of 12,000 Asian citizenship applications.680
While Amin wanted Baganda political support to bolster his domestic legitimacy, the
Baganda were not his core domestic allies. Those were his military co-ethnics.681 This ethnic
alliance eliminated Amin’s military rivals and helped to consolidate his rule. By the summer of
1972, Amin had been in power for over a year and violence against his domestic African rivals
continued. Amin’s expanded military size and spending required liquid financial resources to
reward his loyal supporters and continue his patronage system. As these resources dried up,
the appropriation of Asian assets and income was the most expeditious policy to, at least
temporarily, achieve his aims. Expulsion of the Asians would open a windfall of new economic
assets and opportunities for his co-ethnics, strengthening his domestic alliance.
The political elites amongst Amin’s ethnic kin who may have been able to persuade
him to reconsider his expulsion order were not consulted about the decision. 682 The civil
service and the Baganda aristocracy were as surprised as the Asians when they heard the
news.683 Some, albeit limited, domestic constrains on Amin’s expulsion decision can be seen
in the issuance of Statutory Instrument No. 124 that permitted expulsion exemptions for Asian
professionals and government workers.684 While advocating exemptions is not the same as
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contesting the expulsion decision, this addendum to Decree 17 indicates some influence by
Ugandan bureaucrats and Cabinet officials. However, shortly after the Statutory Instrument
was released, it was rescinded by Amin demonstrating his disregard for any dissenting opinions
within his inner circle.
Amin’s ethnic allies were the main beneficiaries of the looting and theft during the
Asians’ 90-day departure, with limited redistribution to the wider population.685 Amin was
cunning enough to know that the symbolism of Asian removal, and retaking control of
business and trade in black African hands, was more important than financial redistribution.
The spoils included 5,655 firms, factories, ranches, and agricultural estates, along with all the
abandoned Asian assets—vehicles, homes, household goods—neatly registered as part of the
exit clearance process.686 Civilian Business Allocation Committees (BAC) were established to
distribute Asian properties, allocating large, technical companies to parastatal corporations and
the rest to African traders, civil servants, and soldiers. However, the BACs were quickly
coopted by the military because of alleged delays in allocating properties, and therefore most
Asian businesses were divided among Amin’s military allies and their families.687
Through this maneuver, Amin was able to economically marginalize the Baganda while
simultaneously removing the Asian “buffer class.” Expelling the Asians achieved a briefly
expanded pie for Amin’s military allies and created opportunities for African relatives of
military loyalists to fill middle-class economic functions, spurning the Baganda and enriching
his allies. Since the strength and maintenance of Amin’s regime was reliant on ethnic military
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patronage, the benefit of expulsion to his domestic allies was a critical enabler in the Ugandan
case.

Transnational Alliances
Uganda was neither economically nor militarily self-sufficient, thus the risk of alienating its
transnational alliances—including the United Kingdom, United States, and Israel—should
have acted as a significant constraint on Amin’s decision to expel; and may have done so until
early 1972. But Amin gradually cultivated new transnational alliances which opened alternative
sources of financial and military support shifting his expulsion calculus.
Before Amin’s August 1972 expulsion decree, Uganda had robust transnational
alliances with western states, receiving an estimated $25.5 million per year in aid from OECD
countries and multi-lateral institutions.688 Much of that aid came from the U.K., Israel, and the
U.S. all of whom ignored Amin’s anti-democratic seizure of power and repression of his
domestic opponents.689 In 1972 the U.S. provided over $2.1 million in grants for technical
assistance in education, agriculture, and healthcare.690 Israel increased its in-kind support after
Amin displaced Obote from power, including £1 million worth of arms, tanks, aircrafts,
military trainers, and technical advisors.691 And in July 1971, amid local massacres, Britain
signed a £2 million defense contract with Uganda to provide military training and armored
personnel vehicles, and the following month offered a three-year £10 million loan.692 British-
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Ugandan military cooperation continued into 1972693 with a visit to the U.K. by Uganda
Defense Minister Oboth-Ofumbi in January to purchase additional equipment and armored
cars.694
In February 1972, after Amin’s current donors refused to fund his plans for aggressive
military action against Tanzania, where Obote had fled after the coup, Amin sent his Minister
of Education, Abu Baker Mayanja, to Egypt to meet with Egyptian President Sadat. 695 Sadat
could not offer any support given Egypt’s financial strain, but he referred Mayanja to Libyan
President Gaddafi.696 Gaddafi was willing to assist Amin, a fellow Muslim, on the condition
that he align with the Arab cause and expel Israelis697 from Uganda.698 This was no small
request. Israel had played a prominent role in post-colonial East Africa, providing military and
financial support across the continent to counteract its Arab enemies, principally Egypt and
Sudan.699 Uganda was acutely attractive given its shared border with Sudan and Israel had
developed a close relationship with Obote to arm the Anyanya, southern Sudanese rebels, in
their civil war against the Arab, and Muslim, north.700 After Amin took power, his first
international visit was to Israel and the country agreed to continue, and even augment, its
military and economic support to Uganda. But resources for an invasion of Tanzania were a
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bridge too far.701 Eager for unconstrained financial and military support, Amin complied with
Gaddafi’s request, and in March 1972 Uganda expelled an estimated 700 Israelis—military
advisors, diplomats, and their families.702
After meeting with Gaddafi, Amin visited seven Arab states including Morocco,
Sudan, Syria, and Jordan, and he sent his Foreign Minister to Iraq and Somalia—Amin even
went on the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca.703 In addition to Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait became
key donors, pleased with Amin’s militant anti-Zionism and support for pan-Islam. Libya and
the Palestinian Liberation Organization swiftly replaced the military aid and training gap left
by the Israelis.704 By the summer of 1972 Uganda was no longer reliant on its previous
transnational alliances. Amin received substantial economic and military support from Arab
states.705
Consequently, the economic leverage the U.K., and other western countries, may have
had to convince Amin to repeal or modify his expulsion decision had vanished. Amin was
immune to the retaliatory U.K. and U.S. withdrawal of £10 million 706 and $3 million loans,
respectively, in response to his expulsion decree. He had already replaced the $25.5 million in
western support with an estimated $26-33 million from Arab states and OPEC sources.707
Amin’s new transnational alliances had no concerns about expulsion708 as a viable policy
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option—in fact, in 1970, shortly after coming to power in a coup, like Amin, Gaddafi had
expelled 20,000 Italians.709 The shift in Amin’s transnational alliances opened alternative
sources of financial and military support and overcame this potential constraint on the decision
to expel. These new alliances were indifferent to Asian expulsion, further enabling the policy
implementation.

Homeland States
Most mass expulsions involve the removal of a population to a neighboring state where there
are co-ethnic kin of the targets. However, the Uganda expulsion is distinct. The “homeland”
states for most of the expellees—Britain and India—do not share a border with Uganda, and
for those with Ugandan citizenship, the “homeland” state was Uganda itself. In addition, after
Amin’s expulsion announcement, two of the country’s neighbors, Kenya and Tanzania, where
at least some Asians would likely have fled because of their proximity and sizable Asian
populations, immediately closed their borders with Uganda.710
Kenyan Vice President and Minister for Home Affairs, Daniel Arap Moi, stated Kenya
would not, “allow Asian British passport holders from Uganda to flock into the country since
Kenya is not a dumping ground for citizens of other countries…maximum border patrols will
be deployed to combat any intended influx.”711 Tanzanian Minister for Home Affairs, Saidi
Maswanya, expressed similar sentiments, albeit more diplomatically, “our policy is very clear
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on this question that Uganda Asians are not our responsibility, and therefore allowing them
to settle or giving them refuge was far from thought.”712 Although there were other
neighboring states with porous borders and weak capacity—Rwanda, DRC, Sudan—Uganda’s
Asians were unlikely to seek refuge there because of limited familial connections and low levels
of development. Thus, although there were neighboring states with co-ethnics, their borders
were sealed removing cross-border flight as an option.
Since Uganda’s Asian community was composed of non-citizens (an estimated 50,000
with British citizenship and 5,660 with Indian citizenship) and citizens (an estimated 24,500)
the two key “homeland” states of concern were the U.K. and India.713 Since most of the target
group was British nationals, and the U.K. was then more powerful than India, it is the key
homeland state to assess.
As previously outlined, Uganda had reduced its dependence on Britain in early 1972
and by August the ties between Uganda and its former colonizer had weakened. Just over a
month after the expulsion announcement Uganda’s defense council gave Britain’s military
training mission four days to leave the country.714 Amin was not concerned about damaging
relations with the U.K.—this constraint was no longer operative.
The U.K. initially “lived in a twilight period of false optimism,” taking limited action
and hoping Amin would change his mind.715 There were doubts that he would follow through
with the expulsion policy.716 After realizing Amin would not relent, the U.K. government
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launched overt and covert operations to pressure Amin.717 British officials’ main concern was
the anticipated domestic backlash to the absorption of 50,000 non-white immigrants and the
possibility that Kenya and Tanzania might follow Amin’s example.718 The UK first tried
lobbying concerned states—Tanzania, Kenya, India, Pakistan—to try to convince Amin to
reverse course.719 Tanzanian President Nyerere condemned Amin’s actions, calling him an
animal and accusing him of “racialism,” but also called on Britain to accept responsibility for
its citizens and stop “pursuing racist immigration policies.”720 Kenyan Vice President Moi, in
contrast, announced his support for Amin’s expulsion decision. And while President Kenyatta
did not endorse Moi’s statement of support, he refused the U.K.’s requests to intervene with
Amin.721
When bi-lateral and regional efforts failed, the U.K. took its case to the UN General
Assembly urging member states to support a revision to Uganda’s “arbitrary and inhumane”
expulsion policy, or at least extend the 90-day deadline and to help resettle Asian expellees.722
They advocated for an assembly debate and stated that the U.K. was ready to table a UN
resolution.723 The irony of the U.K. accusing an African state of racial discrimination was not
lost on Grace Ibingira, Uganda’s Permanent Representative to the UN. He pointed out the
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hypocrisy of the UK’s concerns, “Britain had never protested when East African countries
expelled black Africans from neighboring countries724 in the early post-colonial era.”725 The
U.K. dropped its request for a UN debate after an African initiative to send Zaire’s726 President
Mobutu Sese Seko to Uganda to negotiate with Amin. Mobutu travelled to Kampala at the
request of the African UN members to try to dissuade Amin from expelling the Asians, but
his efforts failed.727 The U.K. finally acquiesced and resettled most of its citizens with the UN
resettling the remaining U.K. passport holders.728
Regarding India, Uganda’s ties with the country were moderate. But given India’s
foreign policy, Amin would not have anticipated any backlash to his expulsion decree. When
African states achieved independence, then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had
encouraged Indians abroad to adopt local citizenship and integrate with indigenous Africans,
stating they should “cease to seek a separate and better destiny from their fellow
countrymen.”729 Therefore, the Lok Sabha statement on August 11 did not come as a surprise:
“the Government of India recognized the right of the Ugandan government to regulate their
internal affairs according to their best judgement.”730 India’s foreign policy was focused on the
non-aligned movement among former colonies, like itself, and it was not willing to risk those
ties on behalf of Indians living in Uganda.731 The Indian government acquiesced to Amin’s
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expulsion decision, swiftly repatriating its citizens living in Uganda. Thus, the two principal
“homeland” states enabled expulsion in Uganda.

International Community
Amin was not concerned about the effect of expulsion on Uganda’s relations with the
international community, nor did he anticipate fierce resistance. In 1972 Uganda had weak ties
with the international community. Amin’s disposition is demonstrated in a telegram he sent to
UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and Israel Prime Minister Golda Meir after the
September 1972 Munich Olympic massacre. In it he praised the killings of Israeli athletes,
stating that Germany was the appropriate site for the attack given Hitler’s murder of more
than six million Jews.732 In addition, had Amin reflected on recent history, he would have good
cause to be unconcerned about the international response. There had been no reaction to
Obote’s expulsion of Kenyan Luos in 1970 nor to many other African expulsions in in the late
1960s—from Gabon, 1962; Côte d’Ivoire, 1964; Ghana, 1969; and Libya, 1970.
But, unlike some mass expulsions in the first half of the twentieth century, Amin’s
1972 expulsion decree was not internationally endorsed. On the contrary, immediate
condemnation flowed from the international press and from countries around the world. The
African press also spoke out again Amin’s actions. The Nigerian newspaper, Renaissance,
condemned the decision calling it “rash and unrealistic,” the Malawi Times said, “Amin’s move
would help neither his country’s economy nor its international image,” and the Times of Zambia
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said, “Idi Amin is a buffoon. Period.”733 Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda
of Zambia both spoke out against Amin’s decision.
While there was no international approval for the expulsion, the international
community, particularly agencies such as the UNHCR, ICEM, and ICRC, played a critical role
in facilitating Asian departures. Since expellees could not flee to neighboring states, removal
required air transportation and, in some cases, train journeys to ships for oceanic transport. In
1972 the United Nations, and its affiliated agencies, were still young. Both the UN and the
UNHCR had their origins after the Second World War, and the latter had been exclusively
focused on Europe. It was not until the 1960s, responding to the Algerian War (1954-1962),
that the UNHCR had assisted non-Western refugees.734 The UNHCR also had to tread a fine
line to remain true to its mandate—the protection of refugees—persons who had fled their
countries across an international border in fear of persecution. Domestic civilian persecution
was outside its remit.
With Kenyan and Tanzanian borders closed most Asian expellees were stuck within
Uganda. Although some were able to purchase commercial airline tickets and fly out of the
Kampala airport, others needed support with documentation, resettlement, and
transportation. UNHCR correspondence shows that the agency was aware of, and monitoring,
the situation in Uganda immediately after Amin’s expulsion declaration. The UNHCR High
Commissioner, Sadruddin Aga Khan, was personally connected to the Ismaili community in
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Uganda, as the uncle of Karim Aga Khan, the head of the Ismailis sect who had met with
Amin in January 1972.735
There is much recorded communication about the Asian crisis between the UNHCR
branch offices in Kampala and Nairobi and the headquarters in Geneva. The UNHCR’s main
concern was the protection of refugees. The High Commissioner wrote to Uganda’s Minister
of Foreign Affairs expressing concern about, “reported statements made in Kampala to the
effect that the refugees having received asylum in Uganda would now be compelled to leave
your country.”736 Although at the time of his letter, Decree 17 had been in effect for 11 days,
the High Commissioner concluded his message stating, “I should like to renew my
appreciation of the generous policy practised hitherto by the Government of Uganda in these
matters…”737 In this case, “these matters” related to refugee policies, but the positive tone at
the end of his letter, and the absence of commentary on the likely refugee flows associated
with the Asian expulsion decree, is notable.
On the same day the High Commissioner sent a confidential cable to Nxo Ekangaki,
Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), about his concerns regarding
potential refugee expulsion as well as the Asians, the latter which he omitted from his letter to
the Ugandan Minister of Foreign Affairs:
“I am also concerned over other measures announced in Kampala which would, if
implemented, lead to [the] creation of new refugee groups either by expulsion [of]
residents of Uganda who are at present stateless as they have no defined nationality or
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by expulsion of other groups who would be de jure or de facto deprived of their
Ugandan nationality.”738
The lack of criticism of the Asian expulsion policy in the High Commissioner’s
communication with the Ugandan government was likely a diplomatic sleight of hand because
on August 31 the Ugandan Foreign Minister responded to his message stating that refugees
would not be forced to return to their countries of origin. Instead, contradicting the previous
declaration by Amin, he wrote, “there is no intention whatsoever of sending back to Rwanda
or any other country refugees who are in Uganda who are not themselves willing to return to
Rwanda or any other country concerned.”739
This dialogue highlights one reason why the UNHCR may not have more actively
negotiated with the Government of Uganda to rescind or modify its Asian expulsion decree.
It was primarily concerned with its mandate: refugee protection. These sentiments are
documented in notes from a meeting between the UNHCR and representatives from 22
countries held at the Palais des Nations in Geneva on Friday, October 13:
“There was a UNHCR Branch Office in Uganda but he [the High Commissioner] had
naturally not felt it desirable to involve that office in the problem. Great caution had
to be exercised to avoid a situation which might lead to members of the staff of that
Branch Office being declared persona non grata, a development which would be most
undesirable in view of the large number of refugees from Rwanda, Southern Sudan
and Zaire at present in Uganda and receiving help from the UNHCR through that
Branch Office.”740
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The Government of Uganda made repeated statements that the expulsion was not a problem
for the UN, but rather the responsibility of the UK—even though not all expellees were U.K.
citizens.
Although the international community did not endorse, or approve of, the expulsion
as they had at Lausanne (1923) and Potsdam (1945), it effectively facilitated the Asian removal
with minimal resistance or pressure applied to the Uganda government to reconsider or
modify its position. Echoing the exact language from Article XIII of the 1945 Potsdam
Agreement regarding the expulsion of Germans, the UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner,
Charles Mace, stated in a cable: “We and international public opinion generally would wish
departure (if it has to take place) to be conducted in [an] orderly and humane way, from [a] purely
humanitarian viewpoint” [emphasis added].741 No archived correspondence between the
UNHCR and the Government of Uganda indicates any attempts to influence the decision to
expel Asians, nor highlights the relevant human rights violations. Only one internal UNHCR
cable from Mace to the UNHCR Director of the Protection Division on September 5, 1972
gently suggested mentioning Uganda’s obligations under the 1954 Convention Relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons742 which states in Article 31 that: “The Contracting States shall not
expel a stateless person lawfully in their territory save on grounds of national security or public
order.”743 While the Asians were accused of many things, they were never presented as a
national security concern, nor as a concern to public order.
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Rather than condemning the Ugandan government, the UN praised its cooperation.
A cable from the UNHCR/New York office describing decisions made between the Ugandan
authorities and the UN about international assistance stated, “the Government of Uganda has
been most cooperative in working with the United Nations Officials involved.” 744 Moreover,
the day after the expulsion deadline, on November 10 the UN held a press briefing in New
York in which Under Secretary General Bradford Morse stated,
“…the operation on behalf of the Asians of undetermined nationality in Uganda had
been successfully concluded…We have had in the last several weeks the full cooperation of the Ugandan Government…The President of Uganda has gone out of
his way to express his respect for the Secretary-General’s part in this and for other
elements of the United Nations family which did participate.”745
Read out of context, this statement could be confused with a successful UN partnership with
a democratic government, jointly responding to a natural disaster, rather than the UN
responding to a military dictatorship violating human rights in expelling an entire ethnic group
en masse. It is not surprising that the Uganda authorities would have been most pleased to
collaborate with the UN in implementing its expulsion order.
The ICRC, by contrast, seemed to question its involvement in the operation, albeit in
hindsight. Frank Schmidt, ICRC Regional Delegate for East Africa, expressed concern about
assisting Amin to “finish his dirty work.” In the conclusion of his final report, dated November
25, 1972, after the expulsion was complete, he wrote:
“From a humanitarian point of view our intervention is not without ambiguity. In the
end we have helped Amin finish his dirty work on time. So far no one has reproached us, not
even the concerned Asians, and our action is perfectly defensible from the point of
Incoming Cable from UNHCR/New York, 26.10.1972; 11/2/10-100.UGA.ASI[c] - Refugees from Asia in
Uganda [Volume 3-1.UGA.ASI]; Series 2, Box 205; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
745 Cable from New York to UNHCR/Geneva, November 10, 1972; 11/2/64-641.UGA[c] Expulsion and
Deportation – Uganda [1972] Volume 2; Series 2, Box 1281; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
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view of ICRC doctrine. However, documenting these families, some already separated,
and sending them to distant, unknown and cold countries has not been a perfectly
positive achievement” [emphasis added].746
There was likely a high level of anxiety among international organizations about what may
have happened without their intervention, although this is not documented in the archives.
Given the ongoing and escalating violence in Uganda against Amin’s African opponents, and
his comments endorsing the Holocaust, concern about potential Asian massacres may have
been front of mind. Nevertheless, the international community facilitated the Asian removal
further enabling Uganda’s expulsion policy.
In sum, alliances, the homeland states, and the international community enabled
expulsion in Uganda. The conducive enabling environment, combined with the motivation to
remove the Asians as the last vestiges of colonial rule, and to replace them with indigenous
black Africans, resulted in the mass expulsion of the Uganda Asians.

4.5 Kenya, 1967-1969: A negative case, constraints on mass expulsion
The Asian population in Kenya was similar to its counterpart in Uganda in its arrival time on
the continent, colonial sponsor, occupations, and segregated status. Kenya Asians formed the
majority of the middle class and were accused of taking jobs from black Africans, not
integrating into Kenya, and unscrupulous business practices that were discriminatory toward
Africans. Anti-colonial sentiments and black nationalism were prominent in public discourse.
The indigenous Kenyan public despised Europeans and Asians.

ACICR B AG 232 152-002.03; Rapport de mission Ouganda, Frank Schmidt, 25.11.1972 (translated from the
French original).
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Examining the contrasting treatment of Asian minorities in Uganda and Kenya is
legitimately comparable on multiple dimensions. At independence Uganda and Kenya both
had small Asian populations, roughly 0.8 and 1.8 percent of their populations respectively. 747
Indigenous Africans believed the structural privileges previously enjoyed by the Europeans
and Asians during the colonial period would be eradicated, or reversed, and public opinion
favored the expulsion of Asians.748 Members of Kenya’s Parliament referred to Asians as
“blood suckers” and “devils.”749 Kenyan President Kenyatta told Asians “who were unwilling
to work with Africans to ‘pack their bags and go.’”750 The Kenyan government-run Voice of
Kenya radio station broadcasted: “…Indians [are] a hangover from the colonial past…[they
are] onerous to the nation…The ‘lip service’ they had paid to integration…[was] evidence of
their continuing ‘racist’ and ‘exploitative’ colonial attitudes.”751 In short, African-Asian
tensions ran high in both countries and many favored Asian expulsion.
Uganda and Kenya had similar histories and structural conditions. Great Britain had
colonized both countries in the late nineteenth century—Uganda as a Protectorate and Kenya
as a white settler colony—with different administrative structures but the same exploitative,
extractive rule. Uganda obtained its independence in 1962, Kenya followed the next year. They
were East African neighbors with a shared border, similar geographic environments, and
populations of approximately 10 million752 inhabitants.753 Their economies were nearly the

An estimated 75,000-80,000 Asians resided in Uganda (1972) and 176,613 in Kenya (1962) (Gertzel et. al,
1969: 21; Ghai, 1965: 92; Melady & Melady, 1976: 1). There were two censuses conducted in 1960s Kenya (1962
& 1969), therefore the precise Asian population estimates for 1967-1968 are unknown.
748 Ramchandani, 1973: 2301; Parsons, 2007: 56; Cullen, 2017a: 163.
749 Aiyar, 2015: 270.
750 Aiyar, 2015: 270.
751 Aiyar, 2015: 269-70.
752 Estimated population size for late 1960s Kenya and 1972 Uganda.
753 World Bank, 2020a.
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same size and composed of similar sectors. Uganda’s GDP in 1972 was $1.49 billion ($150.22
per capita) while Kenya’s average GDP during 1967-1969 was $1.35 billion754 ($127.68 per
capita).755 Subsistence agriculture employed most people. The principal exports were coffee
and tea as well as sugar, cotton, sisal, and hides/skins. 756 Each country had some
manufacturing, largely of food stuffs, textiles, and timber, as well as wholesale and retail trades.
Kenya was more industrialized and had more developed tourism and transportation sectors,
given its Indian Ocean coastline, but the two economies were very similar.757
Uganda and Kenya were both autocracies. The Polity V Project categorized both
governments with a polity score of -7 (“autocracy”),758 and the Varieties of Democracy (VDem)759 electoral democracy index ranked them both in the lowest quartile: 0.085 and 0.217, 760
respectively.761 Although Kenya initially had an active parliament, regular elections, and
constitutional checks on executive power, Kenyatta used colonial-era authoritarian tactics to
cement and maintain his power.762 What began as a two-party system was quickly dissolved
into a one-party state.763 When the left-wing KANU faction broke away and formed a new

The years 1967-69 is the period examined in this paper therefore this figure is an average GDP over those
three years. In 1969 Kenya’s total GDP was 1.46 billion (133.67 per capita), almost exactly equivalent to 1972
Uganda.
755 World Bank, 2020b, 2020c.
756 Keesings, 1963: 19778; Ghai, 1965: 100.
757 Ghai, 1965: 95; Howell, 1968: 42, 45.
758 A Polity V score of -10 is the most autocratic and +10 the most democratic. Since the Kenya case looks at
events from 1967-69 the Polity V scores during this time were -1 (1967), -1 (1968), and -7 (1969). While in 1967
and 1968 Kenya’s Polity V scores codes the country as an “anocracy,” the -7 score (“autocracy”) in 1969 shows
that Kenyatta’s policies became increasingly authoritarian in the period examined.
759 V-Dem measures the degree to which a country approximates Dahl’s concept of polyarchy. The V-Dem
electoral democracy index scores countries on a continuum from 0.0 indicating no attainment of the relevant
attributes to 1.0 indicating the full realization of electoral democracy.
760 Kenya’s score here is the average of its scores from 1967-69.
761 Marshall & Jaggers, 2018; Coppedge, M., et al., 2020.
762 Ghai, 1967: 1; Gertzel, 1970: 41; Mueller, 1984: 401; Branch & Cheeseman, 2006: 11, 24.
763 Gertzel, 1970: 127; Aiyar, 2015: 264.
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political party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU), in 1966, Kenyatta responded with an iron
fist. He orchestrated a series of constitutional amendments to undermine the new party and
expanded executive powers including discretion over detention without trial, emergency
powers, censorship, control of the press, and the denial of opposition party organization.764
These changes culminated in the banning of the KPU in October 1969 and the jailing of its
leaders.765 The similar autocratic regime challenges one of the most common (mis)explanations
for Uganda’s expulsion: Amin was simply a brutal military dictator. Kenyatta was not as brutal,
but he wielded dictatorial power, nonetheless.
Finally, from a methodological standpoint, Kenya is a “hard case.” Intuitively Kenya
should have been more likely to expel. Unlike Uganda which had a peaceful transition from
colonial rule, Kenya had a violent anti-colonial struggle. The British killed thousands of
Kenyans in the Mau Mau rebellion, imprisoned and exiled future President Kenyatta as the
alleged head of the insurgency, and incarcerated tens of thousands of Kikuyu in camps or
reserves.766 Given this experience, one might have expected the Kenyan government to be
more likely to retaliate against the British, and the comparatively privileged colonial-derived
Asian minorities. But the Kenyan government did not expel its Asians, which makes this paired
comparison even more puzzling.

Keesings, 1966: 21525, 21718; Ghai, 1967: 12; Gertzel, 1970: 147, 152; Mueller, 1984: 408.
Mueller, 1984: 415; Ochieng, 1995: 100.
766 Anderson, 2005: 4-5; Elkins, 2005: xiv, 358; Walton, 2013: 237.
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Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions
Asians in Kenya
Established in 1895, Kenya was part of the British East Africa Protectorate. In 1920 it was
transformed into a British Crown colony and was directly administered by imperial officials
with no indigenous legislature, becoming a site of significant settler colonization. The first
British census conducted in 1911 estimated 11,787 Asians in Kenya. This figure roughly
doubled in each of the next four decades, peaking in 1962 with an estimated 180,000 Asians
(see Table 12).
Table 12: Kenya Population Figures, 1911-1969767
Population Group
Asians

1911

1921

1931

1948

1962

1969

11,787

25,253

43,623

97,687

176,613

139,037

Europeans

3,175

9,651

16,812

29,660

55,759

40,593

Arabs

9,100

10,102

12,166

24,174

34,048

27,886

1,750,099

2,250,525

2,801,346

5,254,445

8,369,843

10,735,189

1,774,161

2,295,531

2,873,947

5,405,966

8,636,263

10,942,705

Africans
Total

As in Uganda, Asians in Kenya were initially coastal traders who moved into the interior with
the arrival of the British as laborers constructing the railroad from Mombasa to the White Nile
in Uganda. During the first half of the twentieth century, significant Asian population growth
occurred because of both increasing local births as well as immigration from India.768 The
Asian population in Kenya was largely concentrated in urban areas; the 1962 census estimated
approximately 85 percent of Asians lived in the five largest cities.769 A sizable population
reduction had occurred in the late 1960s, because of Africanization policies and U.K.
immigration restrictions.

Adapted from Nowik (2015: 121) and Herzig (2006: 30).
Herzig, 2006: 31.
769 Ghai, 1965: 93.
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Tripartite Societal Divisions
The societal structure of colonial Kenya was very similar to that of Uganda with three
segregated, hierarchical groups—Europeans, Asians, and Africans—with minimal economic,
social, or political integration. Racial segregation manifested in separate schools, hospitals,
residential areas, and social spaces.770 As in Uganda, the Asians in Kenya formed the middle
class. In the public sector they worked in skilled and semi-skilled positions, especially railways
and schools, and mid-/lower-level positions in the civil service serving in clerical and
secretarial roles. In the private sector they worked as professionals—doctors, lawyers,
teachers—or provided technical services to European firms as clerks, accountants, or sales
assistants.771 Finally, as in Uganda, the Asians dominated the Kenyan retail and wholesale
trade.772
Inequality within the Crown colony was stark with vast gaps in wealth and income
both between the British and Asians and between the Asians and Africans. The colonial
government paid Asian workers an average of 400 shillings per month, compared to 56
shillings per month for Africans. Although Asians typically held more skilled positions, income
disparities existed even at the same level.773 The private sector was no different with 18 percent
of Asians earning more than £750 per year, compared to one percent of Africans earning £600
per year.774 Inequalities in education existed as well: at independence 59 percent of Asians had
received at least nine years of schooling compared to four percent of Africans. 775 Not
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surprisingly, low levels of education reduced employment opportunities—23 percent of Indian
adult males held technical positions, compared to only one percent of African men. 776 Few
Africans worked in the private sector, and they occupied the lowest levels of public sector
jobs, receiving the lowest wages.777
As independence approached, Africans were skeptical of Asian commitment to the
new order and were resentful of their presence. As in Uganda, the Asian monopoly on trade
was a particular focus of resentment. Many Africans saw Asians as the immediate obstacle to
their participation and success in commerce. They were accused of remitting all their savings
to India, exporting capital, bribery, tax evasion, price raising, false bookkeeping, and
bargaining.778 Similar to Uganda, dishonest business practices took on a racial dimension
because of the high concentration of Asians in trade. During the colonial period almost all
commercial transactions in imports and local produce went through Asian networks. 779 In
post-independence Kenya, Africans hoped the structural privileges previously enjoyed by the
Europeans and Asians would be abolished in favor of the native population.

Independence and KANU Rule
Kenya was the third country to obtain independence in its East African neighborhood—
Tanganyika780 was first in 1961, followed by Uganda in 1962, and then Kenya in 1963. After
independence Kenya wanted to grant automatic citizenship to all Africans and contingent

Aiyar, 2015: 266.
Tignor, 1998: 293.
778 Tangri, 1966: 121.
779 Himbara, 1994: 40.
780 In October 1964, three years after Tanganyika gained its independence, the United Republic of Tanganyika
and Zanzibar was renamed the United Republic of Tanzania.
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citizenship to non-Africans, based on applications. But the British insisted on modifications.
Kenya’s final citizenship scheme was similar to Uganda’s, granting automatic citizenship to all
those born in Kenya, including non-Africans, with the proviso that at least one parent had to
have been born in Kenya.781 Given the long presence of Asians in Kenya, 48,000 Asians
qualified for citizenship under this automatic de jure policy, approximately 30 percent of the
Asian population at that time.782
As in Uganda, Asians who did not automatically qualify for Kenyan citizenship had
two years to apply.783 Few Asians took advantage of this opportunity, uncertain of the new
Kenyan government and wanting to keep their British, or other, citizenship as insurance. Since
Kenya, like Uganda, did not allow dual nationality, applications for Kenyan citizenship
required renunciation of other citizenships. During the first 22 months of Kenya’s two-year
grace period, less than 12,000 Asians registered for citizenship; slightly less than 10 percent of
the relevant population.784 As the deadline approached at the end of 1965, a surge of 10,000
applications were submitted.785 An estimated 20,000 of the 130,000 non-citizen Asians, 15
percent, applied for Kenyan citizenship, but the majority opted to maintain their British, or in
some cases Indian or Pakistani, citizenship.
The low level of Asian citizenship applications was not just because of uncertainty, or
disloyalty. The application process was expensive and cumbersome. Not all Asians could
afford the £200 security deposit per applicant and a bond from a Kenyan citizen with

Hansen, 1999: 825.
Rothchild, 1970a: 28.
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immovable property in the country. For an average family of five or six the cost was £1,000£1200, out of reach for most petty traders.786 In addition, not all Asians had the necessary
documentation, such as birth certificates, required to apply. Regardless of the rationale for
their citizenship decisions, many Africans perceived Asians who adopted Kenyan citizenship
as simply “economic” or “paper” citizens.787 Thus, even Asians with Kenyan citizenship were
viewed negatively by the African majority.
In 1964, as Kenyatta assumed the presidency, he urged his fellow countrymen to start
anew and “erase [from its memory] all the hatreds and the difficulties…which now belong to
history.”788 He called on Kenyans to unite under the slogan “harambee,” Swahili for “all pull
together” putting aside differences to focus on the common goal of nation building. Kenyatta’s
rhetoric indicated he wanted to build an inclusive state, but his actions signified it was one in
which he maintained full control from which his ethnic kin, the Kikuyu, benefited.789
Kenyatta was fully committed to developing an indigenous capitalist bourgeoisie
believing capital brought prosperity, and prosperity peace.790 To articulate his vision, Kenyatta
asked Tom Mboya, Minister of Labor, to produce a policy paper which became Sessional Paper
No. 10, African Socialism. The almost 60-page document sought to clarify the meaning of
African Socialism and articulate its practical application to Kenya’s Development Plan. The
main goals outlined in Sessional Paper No. 10 were rapid economic growth, which would bring
economic development and social progress for Kenyans; a commitment to non-alignment,

Aiyar, 2015: 279.
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Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
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rejecting Western capitalism and Eastern communism; Africanization of the economy and
public service, but without doing harm to the economy; and building the Kenyan nation. 791
Section 53 of Sessional Paper No. 10 best summarizes these aims:
“The most important of these policies is to provide a firm basis for rapid economic
growth. Other immediate problems such as Africanization of the economy, education,
unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies must be handled in ways that
will not jeopardize growth. The only permanent solution to all of these problems rests
on rapid growth...Growth, then, is the first concern of planning in Kenya.”
Despite the stated commitment to African Socialism, never defined in the document, and
neutrality on capitalist and communist approaches to development, the Government of Kenya
had clearly taken a side—it had no intention of changing property rights in industry and
commence and was committed to capitalist development. What was essentially proposed was
the substitution of colonial elites with African elites.792 In May 1965 Parliament voted
unanimously to approve Sessional Paper 10 as the blueprint for Kenyan development. 793

Africanization Part I – Public Sector
The Kenyatta government prioritized land redistribution as its first Africanization initiative
since access to land hand been a key demand of the Mau Mau struggle, and the indigenous,
African population was largely agricultural. In one of its first initiatives, KANU oversaw the
compensated transfer of 1.5 million acres of European lands in the “White Highlands,” the
prime agricultural land, to African farmers.794 This policy brought the majority of Kenyan land
under indigenous control for the first time since colonization, albeit at a significant debt
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because Kenya had to borrow money from Britain to pay the European land holders.795 Asians
could not own land under the colonial administration, so they were not affected by this initial
Africanization effort.
After land, the next priority area for Africanization was the civil service. In 1963 the
Kenya African Civil Servants’ Union demanded the removal of all non-Africans from the civil
service, and the government began its efforts in earnest.796 Table 13 shows the demographic
composition of the Kenyan Civil Service in 1962, shortly before independence. Asians
comprised an estimated 29 percent of the civil service workforce—largely in clerical or
secretarial positions—despite making up less than 2 percent of the total population.
Table 13: Kenya Civil Service, 1962797
Position

European

Upper Administration

African

Asian

Total

71

18

-

89

193

181

-

374

2,820

180

-

3,000

Clerical

-

2,600

2,100

4,700

Secretarial

-

1

417

418

3084

2980

2517

8581

Provincial Administration
Professional and Sr. Technical Staff

Total

By 1965 most of the administrative positions within the civil service had been replaced with
Kenyan citizens—by mid-1967, 91 percent of the civil service was Africanized.798 There was
also a drastic expansion of the public service.799 From 1961 to 1969 the total number of

The British government provided a £9.7 million grant (one third of the total cost) to the Government of
Kenya, but the remaining £17 million had to be borrowed from Britain and other outside agencies (Tignor, 1998:
385).
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797 Adapted from data in Himbara, 1994: 115.
798 Himbara, 1994: 116; Maxon, 1995: 113.
799 The public service was comprised of government positions that provided “services of general interest” such
as courts, schools, electricity, railways, telecommunication, military, police, health care, etc. It included the civil
service, but the civil service was distinct.
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employees in the public sector increased from approximately 10,000 to over 200,000. 800 Many
Africans coveted these public sector positions because they paid well, with excellent benefits,
and provided job security.801
The Africanization of the public sector resulted in the first wave of Asian emigration.
Between 1961 and 1969, an estimated 4,800 Asians lost their jobs affecting 24,000-28,800802
persons, with others departing in anticipation of the next phase of Africanization targeting the
private sector.803

Africanization Part II – Private Sector
When it came to the private sector, Kenyatta’s Africanization efforts relied more on rhetoric
than policy change. Kenyatta and his cabinet showed no interest in nationalizing industry or
creating a state-dominated economy. Unlike in Uganda, many in the KANU conservative
block saw no issue with continued foreign economic dominance.804 KANU’s solution to low
levels of African participation in the economy was to expand commercial and industrial
opportunities which required private, usually foreign, capital investment.805 But not all KANU
politicians agreed with this approach.
It was an open secret within the government that Sessional Paper No. 10 was the
brainchild of a single man, Tom Mboya, and that many within the party, particularly KANU’s
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left-wing faction, disagreed with its core message. Despite its unanimous endorsement,
Sessional Paper No. 10 was not submitted to the Party for review and feedback, although it
was shared with the Cabinet and the Cabinet Development Committee.806 While KANU’s left
and right factions agreed on the nationalist slogan “Africa for Africans,” they disagreed about
the means to achieve it. Ideological Cold War battles occurred within the party.
Notwithstanding the stated commitment to non-alignment, the left-wing accused Kenyatta
and the conservatives of being Western capitalists, and the right-wing criticized the dissidents
for bringing a foreign ideology, communism, to Kenya. 807 In addition to internal government
discord, the trade unions were upset with the African socialism outlined in Sessional Paper
No. 10 and started to speak out in favor of “real socialism.”808
Sensing a credible threat, Kenyatta dissolved the Kenya Federation of Labour and the
Kenya African Workers Congress, and created a new organization, the Central Organization
of Trade Unions with significant government oversight.809 Other government officials raised
motions in parliament to Africanize the private sector and to remove Asians from managerial
positions, but Kenyatta remained focused on solidifying his power and removing any
challengers to his authority. He continued to promote the growth of the Kenyan economy
above all else.810 In a speech to Kenyan businessmen at Nairobi City Hall Kenyatta stated:
“…we are determined that the development of African business and industry should be carried
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out without damaging the existing fabric of the economy. A simple transfer of a business from
one man to another does not necessarily expand business or develop a country.”811
Although Mboya had announced some restrictions on certain kinds of trade and
business in 1965, no systematic Africanization of the economy was implemented. Five years
after independence, many African Kenyans were upset that they had not seen the economic
fruits of post-colonial government and Asian’s continued to dominant commerce and petty
trade. Kenya’s population was growing fast, at three percent per year, and the economy was
saddled with chronic unemployment. Approximately 80,000 students entered the job market
annually, many moving from rural to urban areas to seek employment, but only a fraction of
that total was absorbed into the formal labor market.812
In March 1966, internal KANU disagreements reached their apogee and KANU’s leftwing faction formally split from the party and formed the new Kenya People’s Union (KPU).
KPU advocated socialist—not African Socialism—policies with the support of urban workers,
trade unions, and students.813 In his resignation speech, Oginga Odinga, former KANU Vice
President and new head of KPU, stated:
“…this government [KANU] represents first, international forces purely concerned
with [the] ideological colonization of the country and has no genuine concern for the
development of the people. Secondly it also represents the commercial interests,
largely foreign, whose primary concern is big profits for the shareholders. Here, too,
the interest of the people of Kenya is only secondary to the profits and understandably
not their concern.”814

Kenyatta, 1968: 237.
Cable, 1969: 227.
813 Ochieng, 1995: 98.
814 Ochieng, 1995: 99.
811
812

215

The first objective of the KPU constitution was to fight for the economic independence of
the people of Kenya. In their war of words from 1966 to 1969, KPU consistently described
KANU’s “African Socialism” as merely a guise for tribalism and capitalism. 815 By October
1969 Kenyatta had had enough of KPU and banned the opposition party throwing their
leaders in jail.816
Facing populist pressure, in 1967 the government passed two legislative bills: the
Kenya Immigration Bill (July) and the Trade Licensing Bill (October). The Immigration Bill
cancelled permanent residency certificates that allowed non-citizens to work in Kenya and
replaced them with work permits. The work permits would be issued by the government and
only licensed businesses that employed and trained Kenyan citizens would be eligible. 817 In
addition, certain skilled and semi-skilled workers—clerks, secretaries, shop assistants, tailors,
carpenters, plumbers, construction workers—also had to apply for work permits.818 Applying
for work permits was expensive, and they were issued only for a limited duration of three to
six months. Each application cost £25 and required a £150 security bond.819
The Trade Licensing Bill, passed three months after the Immigration Bill, required all
businesses to apply for new trade licenses and restricted the trade of basic goods—sugar,
posho, and other staples—to citizens. It also restricted the areas of the country where Asians
could trade, designed to remove Asian traders from rural areas, although this was only 10
percent of the total.820 The government believed these two legislative actions would create
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20,000 private-sector jobs for Africans.821 Importantly, the Trade Licensing Act did not apply
to manufacturing licenses, a sector dominated by Asians and which generated significant
economic revenues for Kenya.822 This legislation deeply affected non-citizen Asians in Kenya,
many of whom were permanent residents and worked in occupations restricted by the new
bill. Kenya’s economic Africanization initiatives encouraged many Asians to leave the country.

The “Asian Exodus” 1967-1969
Racial tensions were high and growing in 1960s Britain because of the approximately 750,000
non-white Commonwealth citizens823 who had arrived in the country between 1962 and
1968.824 In reaction to Kenya’s Immigration Bill, the U.K.’s Conservative opposition party
strongly lobbied the British government to restrict the entry of Asians with British passports.825
Fearing both Kenya’s new Africanization measures and the possibility of limited U.K.
immigration access, British Asians in Kenya rapidly fled the country, with a total of 13,600
Asian U.K. passport holders arriving by the end of 1967.826 Thus began the “Asian exodus.”
Some scholars argue that rather than Kenya’s legislative action, it was the impulsive
and imprudent British immigration policy that resulted in large-scale Asian emigration from
Kenya during 1967-1969. British Home Secretary, Labour’s Roy Jenkins, a liberal in the
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cabinet, argued that the threat of British legislation that was causing the exodus.827 The Kenya
government denied responsibility for the surge in emigration. It blamed the British
government and their hastily enacted immigration policies which pushed Asians to depart
before the British legislation was enacted and came into force.828 According to Kenya’s
Attorney-General Charles Njonjo:
“There was ‘no intention on the part of the Kenya Government to, irrationally, throw
these British nationals out of the country’…[instead] what they sought was a smooth
transition to full African participation, not a hasty change-over which would have
adverse effects upon the country’s growth prospects or relationships to the Western
capitalist market.”829
Njonjo’s comments are consistent with Kenyatta’s policies, dating back to Sessional Paper No.
10, with a clear emphasis on policies fostering rapid economic growth. Since a hasty removal
of Asian traders would have negatively impacted growth, it is plausible to believe that increased
out-migration was not the government’s intent. In addition, although the Trade Licensing Bill
was passed in October 1967, it did not come into effect until January 1969, almost a year after
the UK Commonwealth Immigration Act, giving more weight to the argument that the “Asian
exodus” was a reaction to U.K. immigration policy change rather than the implementation of
Kenya’s Africanization policies.
Regardless, by mid-1969, after the dust had settled from the “Asian exodus,” the
Kenyan Government enforced its Trade Licensing Act and withdrew, or did not renew, 3,000
licenses affecting approximately 15,000 Asians.830 It is difficult to specify how many Asians
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left Kenya in the late 1960s because of the politicized nature of the figures, but combining
public sector Africanization data with 1967-1969 emigration figures, an estimated 39,00046,800 Asians left Kenya between independence and 1969.831
Unlike Uganda, the Government of Kenya did not expel its Asian population en masse.
Although Kenyatta, like all post-colonial leaders, wanted to Africanize his country’s political
and economic systems, he did not implement change through mass expulsion. Instead, Kenya
implemented various Africanization initiatives, through legislative means, which gradually
reduced the non-citizen Asian population in the country, while protecting Asian-dominated
manufacturing and Asians with Kenyan citizenship. Thus, although both Kenya and Uganda
shared the motivation to remove the Asian remnants of their colonial pasts, Kenya did not
expel its Asian population. The next section explains the constraining factors that prevented
Kenya from doing just that.

Constraints on Mass Expulsion
Table 14 displays a side-by-side comparison of the enabling and constraining factors in the
Uganda and Kenya cases. As indicated in the first column, Amin’s government overcame all
four constraints to enable expulsion in Uganda, while in Kenya, by contrast, the constraints
outweighed the enablers deterring expulsion.
Table 14: Mass Expulsion Decision Making Framework Applied to Uganda & Kenya
Key Factors
Uganda (1972)
Kenya (1967-69)
Alliances
Domestic Alliances
Benefit from expulsion (↑)
Harmed by expulsion (↓)
Transnational Alliances
Indifferent to expulsion (↑)
Opposed to expulsion (↓)
Homeland State(s)
Relation to Government
Weak ties (↑)
Strong ties (↓)
831
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Response/Anticipated Response
International Community
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)

Resist & deny entry to expellees (↓)

Weak ties (↑)
Facilitate expulsion (↑)

Strong ties (↓)
(Likely to) ignore expulsion (↑)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
Like Amin, Kenyan President Kenyatta was primarily focused on maintaining control of the
Kenyan state, including resource distribution to his Kikuyu co-ethnics, and he cultivated
domestic alliances that ensured the stability and continuity of his rule.832 After the British
transferred power to Kenya in 1963, an African elite inherited the top positions in the
independent government. An alliance developed between Kenyatta, wealthy conservative
KANU members, and the Provincial Administration, all of whom had shared economic
interests in maintaining the status quo.833 These officials, in Nairobi and in the countryside,
were keen to maintain their newfound wealth and status which largely came through politics
rather than successful economic endeavors. By extracting rents for state programs and
contract allocation they enriched themselves and their allies. To maintain this status quo,
Kenyatta needed the Kenyan economy to continue functioning smoothly and Asian
dominance of commerce and manufacturing, particularly the latter, generated significant
economic growth for the country.834
Despite its one-party state structure, there was intense debate in the Kenyan National
Assembly about nationalization—really Africanization—of the economy with internal factions
disagreeing about what to do about the Asian minority. The KANU left-wing faction, led by
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Vice President Odinga, wanted (black) Africanization—the removal of non-indigenous
control of the economy through the nationalization of industry, the institution of statemandated racial preferences, and the removal of Asians from managerial positions.835 Urban
workers, trade unions, and students were supportive of these policy positions, so this was far
from an isolated stance. The right-wing faction, supported by Kenyatta and led by Mboya,
preferred piecemeal policies rather than major structural change, advocating Kenyanization,
really partial Kenyanization, targeting non-citizens.836
Although the parliamentary debate around Africanization of the economy, and the fate
of the Asian minority, was robust and public, the legislative institution lacked teeth.837 It was
a colonial artifact, “verbally vigorous but politically impotent.”838 Kenyatta and the majority
right-wing faction resisted demands by the KANU leftists for structural economic changes
that would have threatened their positions.839 Instead, they responded to internal opposition
with piecemeal policies, such as the Africanization of the civil service and expansion of the
public sector, but not robust Africanization of the private sector. Even the title of their
capitalist, development plan—African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya—was a
rhetorical sleight of hand.840 By coopting and repackaging the “socialist” language of the leftwing, Kenyatta and the conservative faction outwardly projected concessions and
compromise, while proceeding undeterred with their plans for rapid economic growth.
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Members of Kenyatta’s tripartite alliance benefited politically and economically from
the economic status quo, which would have been harmed by Asian expulsion. Despite internal
KANU opposition and popular pressure to remove the Asian minority, expulsion was
constrained in Kenya.

Transnational Alliances
Throughout the early 1960s Kenya leveraged transnational alliances with Eastern and Western
states to get the best deals and the most support.841 With Cold War rivalries running high at
independence, Kenya found willing donors in the Soviet Union, China, Britain, U.S., Israel,
and West Germany. In 1964 the Soviets were the first to sign an economic agreement with
Kenya. They provided a technical college for 1,000 students, a 200-bed hospital, loans for
agricultural and industrial development, and technical experts. Two weeks later the Chinese
gave the Kenyan state a $3 million grant and a £5.3 million interest-free loan for development
projects.842 Not to be outbid in its former colony, Britain delivered enormous support with
£50 million, in both grants and loans, for civil and defense programs, including capital
development, arms, equipment, vehicles, aircraft, and British military trainers.843 Israel
contributed with small loans and investments in construction projects and agricultural and
water management training; it was also the first country to build an embassy in independent
Kenya.844 In addition to donor governments, multi-lateral institutions such as the International
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Development Association and the World Bank provided loans of $2.8 and $4.5 million,
respectively, for enhanced tea production and road improvement.845
Post-colonial Africa was not only underdeveloped, requiring large economic
investment, it was also politically precarious with coups and mutinies threatening new leaders.
Kenya was not immune. In January 1964, mere weeks after independence, army mutinies
swept across East Africa, originating in Zanzibar and then spreading to Tanganyika, Uganda,
and finally Kenya.846 Kenyatta, like Obote in Uganda and Nyerere in Tanzania, immediately
turned to Britain for military support, and the small-scale mutiny was quickly put down by
British soldiers.847 Afterward, Kenya signed a major defense agreement with Britain including
military equipment, arms, technical assistance, and the continued presence of 160 British
troops to assist in “dealing with internal disturbances.”848
Britain’s military support extended to intelligence collaboration. Kenyatta and his inner
circle received regular access to detailed British intelligence reports and Kenyatta retained
MI5’s colonial-era Nairobi-based Security Liaison Officer as an “advisor” to the Kenyan
government.849 Kenyatta deployed the same colonial intelligence apparatus once used against
him to surveil the activities of his political rivals.850 Kenyatta also collaborated with Israel’s
intelligence agency, meeting with the Head of Mossad as early as 1962: Nairobi became
Mossad’s East Africa hub.851 Asian expulsion would have harmed Kenya’s transnational

Keesing, 1965: 20619.
Parsons, 2007: 51; Clayton, 1986: 222.
847 Parsons, 2007: 51, 62; Cullen, 2017a: 115.
848 Keesing, 1964: 19964; Parsons, 2007: 67; Cullen, 2017a: 125; Cullen, 2018: 46.
849 Walton, 2013: 271.
850 Walton, 2013: 272.
851 Jacob, 1971: 178; Naim, 2005: 79; Bishku, 2017: 81-82.
845
846

223

alliances: jeopardizing investor confidence, hindering economic growth, and risking military
support.
The pertinent counterfactual question arises: if Kenya was not self-sufficient and relied
on transnational alliances—like Uganda—why couldn’t Kenyatta have identified new allies
and alternative resources like Amin? Some options were not open to Kenyatta. Amin was
Muslim, which opened the door to Islamic sources of funding with pan-Islamic, and antiZionist, objectives that were not available to Kenyatta. Kenya was also closely aligned with
Israel, receiving military and financial support as well as collaborating with Mossad. Israel’s
strongest African partner was Ethiopia, with whom Kenya had signed a mutual defense pact
in 1963—both countries were battling Somali insurgencies.852 The Shifta War against Somali
nationals fighting to secede and become part of “Greater Somalia” in Kenya’s Northern
Frontier District was one of Kenya’s most significant domestic-cum-foreign policy issues in
the mid-1960s.853 The agreement with Ethiopia was a crucial insurance policy. Abandoning
Israel would likely have meant harming relations with Ethiopia.854 Kenya’s direct ties with
Israel for economic and military support, as well as its indirect ties through Ethiopia, meant
alternative funding from Arab states was not a viable option.
Another possible alternative, given the Cold War environment, would have been the
Soviets or the Chinese, and, as noted, Kenya had relations with, and received financial support
from, both countries. However, in 1965 rumors spread about a planned coup against the
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Kenyatta regime headed by Odinga with Soviet support.855 Although many scholars
retrospectively agree these rumors were unfounded, both Kenyatta and the British took them
seriously, and on Kenyatta’s request, Britain made plans to intervene if necessary. 856 The
Soviets also provided significant financial support to Somalia—an estimated $30 million in
1963—against whom Kenya was fighting in its border region.857 Kenyatta’s capitalist leanings
and Soviet support for the Kenyan opposition—internally and externally—ruled out an
alternative alliance with the Soviets.
Relations with communist countries continued to deteriorate in 1967 when the
Chinese Chargé d’Affairs was ordered to leave Kenya after the Chinese Embassy made
statements attacking Mboya, one of Kenyatta’s closest advisors.858 Although outwardly
committed to a policy of non-alignment, the Kenyatta regime had clearly chosen sides—its
relationships with the West, especially Britain, were prioritized.859 Given this context, there
were no viable alternative transnational allies to turn to, leaving Kenyatta highly dependent on
British, Israeli, and American financial and military support to develop the economy and
protect his rule. Since Asian removal would have jeopardized these transnational alliances, and
no alternatives could be identified, mass expulsion of the Asian minority was further
constrained in Kenya.
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Homeland State
What distinguishes the homeland state factor from the transnational alliance factor in this case
is the U.K.’s response to the “Asian exodus.” Given that Kenya is a negative case, there was
no expulsion decree for the homeland states to respond. But the U.K. government’s response
to the 1967-1969 “Asian exodus” is a useful parallel to examine.860 Kenya’s Asian community
was slightly larger than Uganda’s—176,000 compared to 80,000—but it was composed of a
similar proportion of non-citizens and citizens: approximately 108,000 British/Indian
citizens861 and 68,000 Asians with Kenyan nationality. Therefore the U.K. and India were the
pertinent homeland states in this case, with the majority of the potential target group U.K.
citizens.
To try to halt the “exodus” of Asians from Kenya the U.K. Cabinet sent its Special
Representative in East Africa, Malcolm Macdonald, to meet with Kenyatta. In their Nairobi
meeting in February 1968, Macdonald tried to persuade Kenyatta to put a stop to the rapid
emigration of Asians from Kenya.862 Kenyatta refused. On March 1, 1968, the U.K. parliament
passed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act imposing an immigration quota for British citizens
without at least one parent or grandparent born, or naturalized, in the UK.863 This law directly
targeted former colonial subjects and restricted Asian immigration to the UK to 1,500 heads
of households, and their dependents, per year—approximately 6,000-7,000 persons, half the

Africanization legislation, although resulting in Asian emigration, is not the same as mass expulsion. These
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amount that had arrived the year before.864 Through this legislation the U.K. effectively barred
additional Asians in Kenya from moving home to Britain. If the Kenyan government had
wanted to reduce its Asian population, Britain was shutting its door, or leaving it slightly
cracked with the new quota. Unlike in Uganda, where the U.K. acquiesced and resettled its
expelled citizens, in the Kenya case the U.K. resisted and denied entry to its Asian citizens
seeking admission.865 Sensing that it would become a dumping ground for denied U.K.
immigrants and dismayed at Britain’s abdication of its responsibility toward its citizens, India
announced that it would not resettle Asians with British passports.866
Back in Kenya, President Kenyatta did not bend to the U.K.’s requests to rescind the
Africanization legislation, nor did he openly encourage Asians to remain. However, he did not
object to the new British legislation and indicated to various British representatives that their
immigration policy would not damage Kenya-British relations.867 Kenyatta announced that the
private sector Africanization legislation would be gradually phased in over a two-year period
and that the government would not “endanger the buoyant state of the economy by forcing
the pace of localization,” in line with the country’s development strategy. 868 Vice President
Moi further clarified that this gradual implementation would only affect certain positions
where unemployed Kenyan citizens had the skills to replace non-citizens—a low percentage
given high rates of illiteracy and low levels of education among Africans. Moreover, the new
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trade licensing legislation would first restrict the types of goods sold rather than immediately
withdraw all licenses.869 Therefore, both the strong ties between Kenya and the U.K., and the
U.K.’s fierce resistance to Kenya’s 1967 Africanization legislation, constrained expulsion when
it was most likely in Kenya.

International Community
The Kenyatta government had strong ties with both the UN and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) which acted as an important constraint on the decision to expel. Kenya was keen
to be recognized by the international community and to play a part on the global stage. 870
Supporting the UN and its founding principles was a key component of Kenyan foreign policy
and Kenya had achieved “a steady growth in prestige abroad.”871 At the regional level, Kenyatta
was a prominent figure in the OAU, as a well-respected nationalist leader across the continent.
He was selected as chairman of the Congo Conciliation Commission in 1964, although it failed,
and was the diplomatic leader of the African Commonwealth.872 The Kenyan government’s
stability, amid much turmoil and leadership changes across the continent, was another reason
Kenya played a prominent regional role in the OAU.873 Given Kenya’s desire to be recognized
on the international stage and its championing of the human rights of “small states,” its strong
ties with the international community constrained the implementation of a policy that could
damage its reputation or contradict its stated goals.
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Given that this is a negative case, it is not possible to determine exactly how the
international community would have reacted to a Kenyan expulsion of its Asians, however it
can be argued that it likely would have ignored the policy. In the 1960s expulsion was rampant
across Africa874 with seven different expulsion events during 1962-1969, with little outcry at
the United Nations. However, actors within the international community were closely
monitoring events in Kenya. The UNHCR High Commissioner travelled to Kenya in January
1969 and reported concerns about its Asian minorities. Internal UNHCR communication
highlights that the agency did not view the current situation in Kenya as “within the realm of
our offices” but,
“…the problem may be of concern to this Office at some stage, whether on the basis
of ‘good offices’ or otherwise. He [the High Commissioner] also believes that it
belongs to the duties of the High Commissioner to try and prevent the emergence of
a refugee or statelessness problem, if at all possible.”875
A year later, in 1970, the UNHCR was still focused on this issue and the High Commissioner
asked his legal division to prepare a study on the status of East African Asians in regard to
potential refugees and stateless persons.876 The report criticized the U.K. policy of different
citizenship rights for different categories of citizens, but concluded, “It remains to be seen, of
course, exactly what we can actually do in terms of permanent solutions for these people.”877

Gabon, 1962; Republic of Congo, 1962; Niger, 1963; Democratic Republic of Congo, 1964; Côte d’Ivoire,
1964; Sierra Leone, 1968; Ghana, 1969. See GSME Dataset for more details (Garrity, forthcoming).
875 Letter from UNHCR Director, Africa and Asia Division, Gilbert Jaeger to J.D.R. Kelly UNHCR
Representative for the United Kingdom, 10.01.1969; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation - Refugees from
Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.
876 Letter from Mr. J. Colmar to the High Commissioner, 08.04.1970; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation
- Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
877 Letter from the High Commissioner to J. Colmar, 09.04.1970; 11/1-1/0/KEN/ASI, Refugees situation Refugees from Asia in Kenya; Series 1, Box 26; Fonds 11, Records of the Central Registry; Archives of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
874

229

Because Kenya pursued legal, legislative approaches that exclusively targeted noncitizens, there was nothing for the UN or the OAU to resist, although they did openly criticize
U.K. immigration policies. While it cannot be conclusively determined how the international
community would have responded, given the apathy toward other African expulsions
occurring at the same time, it may have simply ignored the expulsion. Therefore, the strong
ties Kenya had with the international community was the more relevant constraint associated
with this factor.

Summary
This chapter has explained why and how the Ugandan government expelled its Asian
population in 1972, and why the Government of Kenya, with similar motivations, and a similar
colonial history and contextual environment, did not. The Ugandan government expelled its
Asian population because it saw them as an economic threat during the early phase of nationbuilding. In the terms of my taxonomy, it executed an anti-colonial mass expulsion. But
motivation alone is not enough to bring about expulsion. The decision making framework
developed here highlights how Uganda expelled, detailing the key enabling conditions that
facilitated expulsion: alliances, the target group homeland state, and the international
community.
Stopping here would effectively have been selecting on the dependent variable,
explaining mass expulsion by only looking at a mass expulsion case. That is why this chapter
has also considered the negative case of Kenya, a country comparable to Uganda, with similar
anti-Asian sentiments and strong post-colonial desire for native economic control. Kenya’s
decision not to expel its Asian population allows for a robust application of the framework.
230

The Government of Kenya also wanted to Africanize its economy and replace the colonial
Asian commercial hierarchy with Africans. But Kenya successfully reduced its non-citizen
Asian population through legal, legislative maneuvers. Kenyatta’s administration was
constrained from executing a mass expulsion policy because of its alliances, the homeland
state, and the international community.
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CHAPTER 5. “Ghana must go,” “makwerekwere878 go home”: African
migrants in Nigeria and South Africa
On January 17, 1983, Nigerian Minister of Internal Affairs Alhaji Ali Baba stepped up to the
podium at a press briefing and announced the expulsion of two million “illegal migrants.” He
accused them of roaming the streets without employment, taking jobs in violation of
immigration policies, contributing to religious violence, and destroying property and lives.
They had two weeks to leave. The bombshell announcement took West African migrants,
neighboring countries, the international community, and Nigerian officials by surprise. No one
saw it coming. Even Idi Amin had given the expelled Uganda Asians 90 days to depart. The
expulsion order set off a mass scramble of Ghanaian, Nigerien, Cameroonian, Chadian,
Beninese, and Togolese migrants to pack and exit in a fortnight. Roads, ports, and flights were
jammed with West Africans trying to get home, and sturdy plastic bags piled high on trucks,
acquired the unfortunate moniker “Ghana must go” bags.879 The uncoordinated, unexpected
nature of the announcement left the affected countries unprepared to resettle hundreds of
thousands of their citizens. The Western press severely condemned Nigerian President Shehu
Shagari’s decision describing it as “The Cruel Exodus.”880 But neighboring countries and
regional organizations were muted in their response, and Western governments remained
indifferent. Official figures ranged from 1-2 million persons affected, making Nigeria’s 1983
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expulsion the largest twentieth century expulsion on the African continent and one of the
largest twentieth century mass expulsions in the world.
5.1 Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions
West African migration
West Africa has a long history of economic migration. While much is made of the colonial
influence on labor and trading patterns, pre-colonial migration had been present before being
disturbed by European colonizers. Pre-colonial West African migration was relatively small,
with merchants and their families transporting goods and news throughout the region. 881
Foreigners were subject to the local hierarchies and stayed at the pleasure of local chiefs or
headmen. European colonizers disrupted historic trade routes and transformed the
relationship between foreigners—locally known as “strangers”—and natives. Local structures
were ignored as migrants operated under European rules and authority.882
Within the British and French Empires labor migration increased significantly with
Africans gravitating toward new urban, commercial, plantation, and mining centers in search
of work.883 Improved transportation, communication networks, and common currency
systems eased barriers to travel and allowed migrants to remain connected with their home
communities while away.884 Europeans often preferred the “enterprising African foreigner,”
viewed as more industrious and ambitious, over native inhabitants.885 Migrants worked as cash-
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crop laborers on plantations, as bureaucrats in the colonial civil service, and as self-employed
traders—all in both temporary and permanent migration patterns.886
The situation changed after West African countries obtained their independence.
While migration continued, constraints were introduced through the enforcement of new
national borders and new citizenship laws.887 When economic independence did not directly
follow political independence, expulsions of “non-native” populations proliferated.888 Nigeria,
however, was not one of these places. The country had long been an attractive, and relatively
hospitable, destination for migrants from the pre-colonial through the post-colonial periods.
Push and pull factors brought West African migrants to Nigeria. The largest pull factor was
the 1970s oil boom, which created immense economic opportunities in the formal and
informal sectors. Migrants flocked in droves, particularly Ghanaians. Nigeria’s oil boom, and
subsequent decline in agricultural production, also led to increased internal migration with
many Nigerians moving from rural to urban areas seeking employment.889 Migrants were also
pushed by myriad factors ranging from natural disaster (drought in the Sahel), conflict (in
Chad), and deteriorating economic and political security (in Ghana).890 Nigeria’s economic
prosperity, and its long and porous borders,891 made entry attractive and feasible.

Wallerstein, 1965: 152-53; Peil, 1971: 210-11.
Wallerstein, 1965: 158; Peil, 1971: 213; Mabogunje, 1972: 121.
888 Examples of African expulsions in the post-independence period include: Côte d’Ivoire (1958, 1964); Gabon
(1962); Republic of Congo (1962); Sierra Leone (1968); Ghana (1969); Zambia (1971); and Uganda (1970, 1972),
among others (Garrity, forthcoming).
889 Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 148.
890 Adepoju, 1984: 429; Henckaerts, 1995: 66.
891 Nigeria borders four states: Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, with the Gulf of Guinea to the south. The BeninNigeria border is 500 miles; Niger-Nigeria 1,000 miles; Chad-Nigeria 50 miles; and Cameroon-Nigeria 1,200
miles.
886
887

234

Map 2: Political boundaries of Nigeria 892

West African migrants took up a variety of positions in Nigeria. Skilled foreigners
worked as teachers, doctors, engineers, technicians, and bureaucrats, many employed by the
federal government to work in remote “hardship posts” where natives refused to go. 893 The
majority of migrants worked in the informal sector, estimated at three to four times the size
of the formal sector, in menial jobs shunned by Nigerian citizens who favored government or
white-collar jobs.894 These unskilled or semi-skilled positions—domestic workers, drivers,
watchmen, manual laborers (in factories, farms, construction, docks), traders, hawkers—came
with low wages and unpleasant working conditions.895 Nigerian employers, including the
Nigerian state, often preferred foreigners to natives because they could pay them less than the
₦125 minimum wage.896 Foreign migrants played complementary, non-competing roles in the
Nigerian economy, filling unglamorous but essential functions.
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Nigeria’s Oil boom
Before the 1960s oil was a cheap, abundant energy source for the industrialized world.
However, the West’s growing energy demands soon exceeded supply and by the late 1960s,
early 1970s global oil reserves contracted for the first time in history. 897 International oil
companies could not discover new fields fast enough and oil became “black gold” for
producing countries.898 Nigeria was one of those countries. In 1970 it produced 396 million
barrels of oil per day (bpd) with annual petroleum revenues of ₦166 million. Just two years
later that total rose to 643 million bpd with revenues of ₦767 million—a mammoth 462
percent increase.899 Nigeria quickly became the richest country on the African continent.900
Joining the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971, Nigeria’s
oil fortunes were linked to world events, including the Yom Kippur War in October 1973
between Israel and a coalition of Arab states.901 In response to the West’s support for Israel
during the war, OPEC countries embargoed western oil sales.902 Oil prices skyrocketed. In
October 1973 a barrel of oil cost $3.80, three months later: $14.70.903 As a result, the “Seven
Sisters”904 lost control over oil price setting and the producing countries realized their power
on the global stage. Nigeria’s oil production rose further to 823 million bpd by 1974 with
revenues of nearly ₦4 billion.905
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Before the discovery of oil, Nigeria had a cash-crop economy, producing groundnuts,
palm oil, cocoa, cotton, sugar, and timber.906 Through the mid-1960s, most of Nigeria’s
exports were agricultural products (See Table 15) and over 70 percent of the labor force
worked in agriculture.907 That quickly shifted in the 1970s, and Nigeria became a singlecommodity export economy.
Table 15: Share of Nigeria’s agriculture and petroleum exports, 1960-1980908

Export
Agriculture
Petroleum

1960
75.8

1965
54.9

1970
28.6

1975
4.4

1980
2.4

2.7

25.9

57.6

92.7

96.1

Nigeria dramatically expanded imports using its oil wealth to purchase finished goods, luxury
items, weapons, labor, and food.909 Until the mid-1970s the country was relatively selfsufficient in food production, but the oil boom accelerated the shifting economy and Nigeria
soon imported much of its food from the West, including many of the staples it used to
produce.910 To capture the size of the import shift, in 1971 Nigeria imported ₦88 million
worth of agriculture products, a decade later in 1982 the country spent ₦2 billion on food
imports.911 The oil rents captured from the West went straight back to western governments
via imports, further depleting the country’s foreign exchange. Despite government rhetoric
about economic diversification, with oil prices high the Nigerian government allowed the
economy to be dominated by oil to the detriment of all other sectors.912
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Using its oil profits, in the 1970s the Nigerian government launched massive federal
development projects, promising to build, or rebuild, roads, schools, irrigation systems, and
hospitals.913 The expansion of the construction sector, along with commercial services,
attracted large-scale labor migration from neighboring states.914 Nigeria’s Head of State at the
time, General Yakubu Gowon, expanded the size of the public sector, raised wages for
government employees, and massively increased defense spending.915 Public sector
employment grew from 500,000 to 1.5 million during 1973-1981, with generous benefits to
senior officials.916 People throughout the region flocked to the “land of milk and honey.”917

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
On May 28, 1975, Nigeria and 15 other West African states signed the Treaty of Lagos
establishing the Economic Community of West African States or ECOWAS. The organization
was the culmination of Nigeria’s commitment to regional economic integration dating back to
the early 1960s.918 Given the significant rift and competition in West Africa between
Francophone and Anglophone states, ECOWAS had not been inevitable.919 The Francophone
Conseil de l’Entente and Communauté Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) were competing
economic institutions that impeded the creation of a single regional organization. Not only
were colonial ties and linguistic differences a barrier to cooperation, Francophone countries,
particularly Côte d’Ivoire—the strongest of the Francophone states—did not want to join a
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project dominated by Nigeria.920 During the Nigerian civil war921 Côte d’Ivoire recognized
Biafra and pressured French President de Gaulle to do the same, demonstrating its strong antiNigerian bias.922
After the Nigerian civil war, which disrupted economic trade and integration, President
Gowon embarked on an aggressive effort to revive a regional economic arrangement both to
gain regional hegemony and to remove western, particularly French, political and economic
influence.923 Thanks to the 1970 oil boom, Nigeria was able to persuade others to its side.
Gowon’s deft political negotiations and “spraying diplomacy”924 led to the signing of the
Treaty of Lagos. The aim of the “Community” was to promote economic, social, and cultural
cooperation and development.925 ECOWAS negotiated a key Protocol on the Free Movement
of Persons, Residence and Establishment at the Dakar Summit in May 1979. 926 The protocol
outlined a three-phase process with the goal of creating “community citizens” who could
travel, reside, and eventually work in any member state. 927 The first phase abolished visas and
granted the right of entry for up to 90-days for any Community citizen into an ECOWAS
member state, with valid travel papers. After three months, Community citizens needed to
regularize their stay with the relevant authorities.928 Nigeria’s ratification of the protocol in

Ojo, 1980: 576.
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1980 resulted in a surge of regional immigration.929 ECOWAS was soon described by some
outside observers as “Greater Nigeria.”930

Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979-1983)
After rotating through five leaders and four military coups, democracy was restored in Nigeria
in 1979, inaugurating the Second Republic with the election of President Shagari of the
National Party of Nigeria (NPN).931 Although the 1979 presidential election results were
contested by the opposition, Nigeria was considered the fourth largest democracy in the world
and the largest African democracy.932 The new constitution of the Second Republic was
influenced by the United States’ model and established a three-branch federal structure with a
President and Vice President in the executive, a National Assembly with a House of
Representatives and a Senate, and a judiciary.933 Below the federal level, power was shared with
19 states run by Governors and Deputy Governors.934 The new constitution intentionally
strengthened the power of the states loosening the reins of the center by raising the share of
state and local revenue allocation from a combined 24 percent to 40.5 percent.935 Nevertheless,
the focus of political competition was less over ideas and more over the capture of the purse,
or as it was known in Nigeria “the national cake.”936
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Despite the return to democracy, the Second Republic was marred by corruption and
patronage. The NPN inherited an economy coming out of minor recession during 1978-1979,
but it enjoyed an 18-month honeymoon before a major recession hit in mid-1981.937 NPN
government officials used their positions to purchase luxury goods including cars, homes, and
private jets—extravagant, ostentatious living was the norm.938 One of the first pieces of
legislation the new National Assembly passed was a salary and fringe benefit increase for all
legislators.939
Using the state oil profits, the Shagari administration rolled out a $175 billion Fourth
National Development Plan (1981-1985) focused on agricultural production, education,
housing, industries, and economic infrastructure.940 The plan was based on projections of an
oil production output of 2.19 million bpd at a price of $55/barrel, assuming continued rising
prices because the 1982 price of oil was $41/barrel.941 The massive investments in the
development plan enriched international contractors and Nigerian middlemen, but benefits
did not trickle down to the urban and rural poor.942 Although Nigeria had more money than
ever before, a culture of what was called “squandermania” developed and the wealth remained
concentrated in the hands of the elite.943
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The Oil Glut
The global oil glut was driven by myriad factors including a widespread recession among
industrialized countries, increased efficiencies in oil usage, and the discovery and production
of new, non-OPEC, oil sources in the North Sea, Alaska, and Mexico.944 The global oversupply
of oil meant Nigeria had to cut production, reducing government revenues which were 95
precent dependent on oil.945 In 1981 Nigeria’s production dramatically fell (See Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Nigeria’s Oil Production (bpd), 1981-1982 (in millions) 946

The corresponding blow to oil revenues was the loss of ₦4.5 billion in two years from 1980
to 1982.947 GDP annual growth dropped 17.3 percentage points (1980-1981) and inflation rose
between 30-50 percent.948 Balance of payment deficits and the rapid depletion of foreign
reserves led to government cash shortages. In mid-1981 the government even skipped several
months of payments to federal and state workers, and many laborers and unskilled workers
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were fired.949 With a depleted treasury and rising debts, Shagari’s government responded with
massive borrowing, seeking loans of billions of naira from European, American, and Middle
Eastern Banks, as well as funds from the World Bank.950
By early 1982 the oil glut reached its peak. To stop the bleeding, the Shagari
administration sought National Assembly approval to institute the Economic Stabilization
Act—the stiffest austerity measures the country had ever seen.951 The Act aimed to drastically
reduce imports, encourage domestic production, improve balance of payments deficits, and
stop smuggling.952 The government hoped the difficult economic cuts in 1982 would lead to a
“clean balance sheet” the following year heading into the 1983 national elections. 953 However,
while implementing austerity measures, the government failed to sufficiently cut its own
spending, accumulating massive internal and external debts.954
The 1982 cuts in oil production led to mass layoffs across all major firms, particularly
in the manufacturing and construction sectors.955 Between 1980 and 1984 the construction
workforce contracted from 300,233 to 112,579 employees.956 The government struggled to
pay for food imports, given the rising prices of finished goods from industrialized countries
and its limited foreign exchange, leading to widespread food shortages.957 Unemployment and
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sky-high prices for basic goods led to increased poverty and crime in urban areas.958 Antiforeigner sentiment grew among the hungry, out-of-work Nigerian population.959
By January 1983 the situation in Nigeria was unstable—a tinder box waiting for the
match. Austerity measures crippled the economy and political anxieties climbed with the
upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. The “match” came on the night of January
3, 1983, when armed robbers, including some foreigners, attempted to break into the Vice
President’s residence.960 Less than two weeks later, the Ministry of Internal Affairs prepared a
memo regarding illegal aliens, writing: “enough is enough.”961 Expulsion was on the agenda.

5.2 Mass expulsion of “illegal” migrants, 1983
In the Nigerian government’s expulsion announcement, it accused migrants of desultory and
unlawful behavior, and of violating ECOWAS protocols overstaying the 90-day-visit
allowance. Ali Baba explained that the government had to act: “[it] cannot, and will not, fold
its hands and allow such unwholesome developments to continually plague the nation.”962 To
ensure compliance with the expulsion order, government agents were to inspect businesses
and households to identify and “repatriate” any defaulting aliens placing them on “stop lists”
to “ensure that they do not return to Nigeria.”963 The announcement came as a shock.964
President Shagari had recently stated at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs’ Patron’s
Dinner that Nigerians must accept the “minor discomforts” of the alien presence in the
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country given the great benefits of the ECOWAS protocol of free movement.965 The lack of
advanced notice and short timeline to depart created panic.
Migrants fled in droves, scrambling to depart by land, sea, or air. At the Nigeria-Benin
border the gridlock of trucks, minibuses, and cars backed-up over two miles.966 Hundreds of
thousands massed at the port in Lagos waiting for ships to take them on the 17-hour sea
voyage to Accra: “the dockside was a deafening babble of noise as people crowded around a
fleet of articulated trucks to bargain fares home for themselves and their luggage, which lay
around them in large piles.”967 At the airport, the wealthiest migrants waited to board $150
USD flights, a cost out of reach for most expellees, with approximately 1,000 people departing
per day on special chartered flights.968 A Nigerian journalist described the scenes: “the borders
were a disaster, crammed with desperate people carrying chairs on their heads, dragging their
checked bags and selling off whatever they couldn’t lift to make money to pay for fares that
had doubled. Millions streamed out through any possible exit they could find.”969
While the Nigerian government emphasized that there was no violence by Nigerian
officials or Nigerian citizens toward the expellees, and observers noted few reports of violence,
the millions who had to pack their bags and leave on a moment’s notice suffered great
hardship.970 Many Ghanaians, the largest national group expelled, were harassed, robbed, and
assaulted on their way of out Nigeria.971 Some were blocked by landlords from obtaining their
belongings before departure, and others were denied payment of their last wages and
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salaries.972 Fearing for their safety and acts of reprisal, many documented, legal immigrants fled
in addition to those without papers.973 Nigerian transporters exploited migrants with price
gouging for exit transportation.974 As they scrambled to get on departing ships some migrants
died in stampedes and others drowned in Lagos harbor.975 Many suffered from hunger,
dehydration, exhaustion, and exposure as they waited at border points in the sweltering heat
with minimal provisions.976
The uncoordinated expulsion announcement, with no notice given to the expellee
home countries, increased the suffering.977 In September 1982 Ghana had closed its eastern
border with Togo because of smuggling and concerns of political subversion, despite the
ECOWAS protocol for the free movement of people.978 To avoid becoming a dumping
ground for transient expellees, Benin quickly closed its eastern border with Nigeria, and Togo
its border with Benin, denying the expelled migrants a western land border to depart.979 These
closures caused the miles-long lines at Nigerian-Benin border posts, where anxious migrants
waited to return home.
Nigerian officials learned of the expulsion announcement at the same time as ordinary
Nigerians and foreign migrants.980 The Cabinet was not consulted before the Minister of
Internal Affairs’ press briefing—they met two days later on January 19, to ratify the order. 981
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Indicative of the lack of planning, the Nigerian public sector was severely affected by the
decision, at risk of losing some of its most talented staff.982 Approximately 35,000 Ghanaian
teachers were employed throughout the country; Ghanaian doctors, lawyers and accountants
worked in the Nigerian civil service; foreign pilots and engineers were employed by Nigeria
Airways; and 7,000 Ghanaian dock workers played a critical role at the chronically overstretched Lagos port.983 In addition to these technical personnel, the Nigerian government
benefited from employing illegal migrants, paying a much lower rate than Nigerian nationals. 984
Demonstrating Shagari’s nonchalance about the expulsion order, he travelled to New Delhi,
India for a state visit on January 25, a week after the expulsion decree, followed by trips to
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.985 Shagari doubled down on the expulsion decision, announcing
from India that those living illegally in Nigeria would be “‘arrested, tried and sent back to their
homes’ if they did not leave by the deadlines set by the Government.”986
Eight days after the expulsion announcement, Ali Baba called another press briefing
outlining important extensions and exemptions to the original order. He acknowledged that
officials from neighboring homeland countries had requested extensions to the deadline to
allow for the “smooth and orderly” exit of expellees.987 In response to ECOWAS members,
the Nigerian government granted a four-week extension, to February 28, for all skilled
workers. However, the unemployed, self-employed, and unskilled workers had to leave by the
original deadline.988
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After outlining the extensions, Ali Baba announced three important exemptions to the
original expulsion order: 1) professionals; 2) pre-1963 immigrants from ECOWAS countries
(plus Cameroon and Chad); and 3) public sector employees. Professional and technical foreign
workers were allowed to remain if their stay was regularized by their employers and the
employers met the state quota for local staff. Immigrants who arrived in Nigeria before 1963,
the year of the Immigration Act, from ECOWAS countries as well as Cameroon and Chad,
were allowed to remain in the country even if they were undocumented.989 Finally, those
working in the Federal or State Governments, as well as parastatal companies, were exempted
from expulsion, but were advised to regularize their status “as soon as practicable.” 990 These
extensions and exemptions announced just over a week after the original order, indicated
additional reflection within the government regarding the feasibility and appropriateness of
removing 1-2 million persons in two weeks, and the impact of the loss of skilled workers on
government offices.
With three days remaining until the first expulsion deadline, Ghana and Togo opened
their borders, and then Benin followed suit on January 29.991 Hundreds of thousands of
stranded expellees streamed across Benin, through Togo, and into Ghana making the 180kilometer trek along the coast road on truck beds, in minibuses, or by foot. 992 Ghanaian and
Togolese police estimated 300,000 Ghanaians crossed the border within 36 hours.993
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Western media outlets documented the suffering associated with the expulsion
decision. Newsweek’s foreign correspondents in Lagos reported in an article titled Nigeria’s
Outcasts: The Cruel Exodus, “…up to 2 million people had fled Nigeria in the largest forced
march in Africa’s recent memory…In the mass exodus, food, water and toilet facilities were
luxuries. Dozens died. Those who completed the exhausting journey were happy simply to be
alive.”994 The London Times reported from Lagos that, “…walls are daubed with ‘Ghana go
home!’ slogans…some fear for their lives if they fail to get away by the deadline.”995 TIME
magazine wrote an article titled Exodus of the Unwanted, that “…the repatriation was frequently
marred by acts of abuse. Some reported that Nigerian police had taken their possessions or
asked for bribes to permit them to pass.”996 The Economist concurred writing, “…the thugs of
Lagos systematically robbed the departing families of their luggage.” 997 And the Frenchlanguage Pan-African magazine, Jeune Afrique, harshly condemned the expulsion publishing a
cover story—“La Honte” (Shame)—which described the expulsion as “a barbarism hitherto
unknown in Africa.”998 The irony was lost on the former colonial power.
Ali Baba held a third press briefing on February 14 to emphasize the “jubilations and
support” of Nigerian citizens for the expulsion and the understanding of the ECOWAS
Secretariat and affected countries.999 He accused western media of “mount[ing] an orchestrated
campaign of vilification and culumy [sic] against this country,” which he categorized as “the
carry-over of the colonialist ‘divide and rule’ mentality of the Western Press.” 1000 He blamed
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the initial closure of the Ghanaian border for much of the suffering covered by the media and
claimed that the “lack of consultation” accusation was false. Ali Baba said: “the persistent
public outcry reported in Nigerian dailies against rising unemployment amongst Nigerians and
[the] increased crimed [sic] wave attributed to illegal aliens should serve as sufficient notice
that [the] Government would have to take such action in the national interest.”1001 In other
words, the neighboring countries should have known expulsion was coming.
Government officials circled the wagons. Minister of External Affairs Ishaya Audu
defended the government’s actions stating, “the aliens themselves [were] to blame for the
crisis.”1002 Nigeria’s Ambassador to the UN stated, “Nigeria has no apology to offer
anyone.”1003 In an interview with the BBC, Shagari said that it was “an act of grace” to give the
migrants two weeks to get out.1004 Federal Attorney General, Richard Akinjide, asserted
“Nigeria owed no apology for expelling aliens who had not observed the 90-day Ecowas
limit.”1005 Nigeria’s Ambassador to Germany, Mohammed Rafindadi stated that “the expulsion
order was carried out humanely, with no confirmed cases of molestation and departing aliens
were allowed to go with their possessions.”1006 He added that “Nigeria’s expulsion of illegal
immigrants is not designed to induce suffering, and any hardship encountered by those
expelled could not have been foreseen and was also not intended.”1007 National Planning
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Minister, Ebun Oyagbola, summed up the government’s stance in his statement “despite the
international outcry there could be no turning back: ‘the aliens must go.’”1008
Estimates of the total number of persons expelled by the February 28 deadline are
wide-ranging. In 1983 Nigeria had no reliable statistics on the size of its own population, let
alone the number of foreigners.1009 On February 13 Ali Baba announced that 1.2 million West
Africans had been expelled—700,000 Ghanaians, 180,000 Nigeriens, 150,000 Chadians, and
120,000 Cameroonians.1010 By the end of February the number was revised up to 1.3 million. 1011
In mid-April Ali Baba announced that 2.2 million illegal immigrants had been “repatriated”
and 3,569 had regularized their status.1012

5.3 Expulsion Motivation: Nativism
The Nigerian government’s expulsion of African migrants is an example of an expulsion
motivated by nativism per my expulsion taxonomy (See Figure 15). Nativist expulsions occur
in a state’s nation consolidating phase when the target group is seen by the government as an
economic threat to the state.1013 The label nativism denotes an expulsion that is driven by the
government’s desire to protect the interests of native-born1014 over those of immigrant
foreigners.

Brown, 1989: 270.
Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B542.
1010 The number of Togolese and Beninoise expelled is estimated at 5,000 each (Adepoju, 1984: 432).
1011 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32610.
1012 Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32610; “2.2m. aliens deported,” 1983.
1013 See Chapter 2, pp. 58-59.
1014 Native-born or established inhabitants of the country, as in the case of the exception of the 1963 migrants.
1008
1009

251

Security

Economic

Establishing

Fifth Column

Anti-Colonialism

Consolidating

Phase of Nation-building

Figure 15: Taxonomy of mass expulsion – Nigeria,
1983
Target Group Threat

Counterinsurgency/
Reprisal

Nativism

By 1983 Nigeria had been independent for over two decades and had fought a brutal
civil war (1966-1970) preventing the secession of Biafra, and firmly establishing the multiethnic Nigerian state. However, the composition of the nation had changed because of largescale immigration. In the run up to the 1983 elections, the Nigerian government returned to
the question of “who belongs,” and who does not, as it sought to consolidate and strengthen
the nation. At the same time, the gravity of the Nigerian economic crisis faced by the Shagari
administration cannot be overstated. Figure 16 depicts several key economic indicators over
the course of the Shagari’s four years (1980-1983) as well as one year before (1979) and one
after (1984).
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Annual oil output declined in three consecutive years (1980, 1981, 1982) before the January
1983 expulsion. At the end of 1982, oil output was almost half of the 1979 total. Oil revenues
fell in tandem, with a slight lag, plunging ₦4.53 billion (from ₦12.35 billion in 1980 to ₦7.81
billion in 1982) in the lead up to the expulsion.1016 GDP annual growth declined significantly
with negative growth rates between 1981 and 1984.1017 Although Shagari inherited a balanced
trade portfolio in 1979, and maintained that balance in his first year in office, during 19811982 imports exceeded exports resulting in a negative trade balance of ₦1.8 billion heading
into 1983.1018 The federal government ran a consistent budget deficit under Shagari, peaking
in 1982 at ₦5.4 billion.1019 Finally, for the average Nigerian, soaring inflation—estimated to be
30-50 percent between 1981-1983—and stagnant, or unpaid, wages reduced already limited
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purchasing power.1020 Those with wages were the lucky ones; unemployment climbed to an
estimated 20 percent with even higher underemployment.1021 By the end of 1982 Nigeria’s
economy was in a free-fall, with another year of negative growth on the horizon.
Amid the worsening recession, Nigerian newspapers and tabloids, widely read and a
strong force in shaping public opinion, increasingly blamed all of the country’s ills on illegal
aliens.1022 Unemployment, crime, prostitution, smuggling, vagrancy, and religious strife were
only some of the accusations hurled at the sizable number of foreign workers in the country.
While the Nigerian government, along with business and academic elites, championed
economic integration across administrations,1023 the public was less supportive.1024 Labor
unions were particularly frustrated because ECOWAS migrants accepted lower wages and
inferior working conditions.1025 One branch of the National Union of Construction and Civil
Engineering Workers called for a review of the Community agreement complaining that,
“contractors in [Gongola] state had indulged in employing cheap labour from neighboring
Cameroon, Chad, and Niger Republics while Nigerians roam about without jobs.”1026 Nigeria’s
Daily Times wrote in 1978, before the protocol on free movement was signed or ratified, “If
the influx into Nigeria continues and it becomes clear that Nigeria is merely paying the Ecowas
piper without knowing what tune to call, this is likely to further weaken the already weak
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domestic support for the Community.”1027As the Nigerian public’s frustrations grew, pressure
built for government action.
The government gave myriad reasons for the “illegal alien” expulsion in its public
announcements. But if one digs beneath the rhetorical surface its nativist motivations are clear.
It consistently emphasized the protection of native, Nigerian economic interests, over those
of immigrants. In his second of three press briefings, Ali Baba commented on the Nigerian
public’s positive response to the expulsion announcement and said “…the departure of the
illegal aliens would mean additional job opportunities for thousands of Nigerians…it is hoped
that employers of this departing labour will quickly replace their work forces with the
thousands of Nigerians now unemployed.”1028 Later in the briefing he emphasized,
“…erstwhile employers [should] engage the services of Nigerians so as to continue with their
respective business without undue disruption.”1029 Perhaps the most direct indication of the
economic-cum-political motives of the government are illustrated in the closing comments of
Ali Baba’s January 25 press briefing:
“Now, Ladies and gentlemen of the Press, the Federal Government relies on you and
all well-meaning Nigerians to help this exercise which is crucial to our economic and political
survival by continuous exposition of defaulting aliens and their employers. This cooperation of all and sundry, especially, states and Local Governments is needed to lead
us to success. Thank you” [emphasis added].1030
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Given the ineffectiveness of the Shagari administration’s austerity measures, and with elections
only eight months away, it is widely agreed that in January 1983 “the time was ripe to start
looking for scapegoats.”1031
Unfortunately for the Nigerian government, the temporary satisfaction of the public’s
nativist sentiment was quickly forgotten as the country’s economic decline continued,
unemployment remained high, and basic needs were not met.1032 Coverage swiftly dissipated,
and the expulsion was largely forgotten, “the measure is not likely to be a major issue in the
general elections coming up later in the year…the populace too appear no longer
interested.”1033 The departure of foreign workers did not resolve the economy’s fortunes. Since
in the end the expulsion largely targeted migrant workers in the informal sector, few new
economic opportunities, at least ones Nigerians were willing to take, were opened. The menial
jobs shunned by citizens thus remained vacant. In fact, as early as April 1983 foreign workers
returned to Nigeria, some at the behest of Nigerian companies.1034 Nevertheless, through
corruption and cooption of the police, the Federal Electoral Commission, and the state media,
the NPN won the 1983 presidential election.1035 However, their victory was short-lived. On
December 31, 1983, Shagari was deposed in a military coup d’état bringing his second term,
and Nigeria’s second attempt at democracy, to a swift end.1036
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Alternative Explanations
There are two possible alternative explanations as to why the Nigerian government expelled
West African migrant workers: aliens as a security threat (for their criminal behavior, and as
perpetrators of religious violence) and expulsion as a foreign policy instrument used against
rivals. Each alternative explanation will be examined and refuted in turn.
The Nigerian government used rising rates of “illegal alien” criminal activity as a core
rationalization for the expulsion decision. Ali Baba stated that the illegal foreigners “…just
roamed our streets and committed all sorts of crimes” and that “this flagrant abuse of our laws
could no longer be tolerated.”1037 Nigeria’s Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Chief
Richard Akinjide, said, “no country would allow the violation of its laws…the aliens had been
responsible for most of the crimes in the country as well as threatening the nation’s
security.”1038 Nigerian Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Mohammed
Rafindadi, said that “Nigeria had been forced to issue an expulsion order last month because
of the immigrants’ involvement in crime.”1039 It would seem that a security concern over
criminal activity was at least one reason for the expulsion decision.
However, further investigation reveals that foreigners were not responsible for more
crime in Nigeria than Nigerian citizens. The Interior Ministry released official statistics
(reproduced in Table 16) on foreigners convicted of crimes during 1980-1983. Although it
pledged to release national statistics, information was only shared about criminal convictions
in Nigeria’s largest, and then capital city, Lagos. According to the figures, over three years, 328
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foreigners were convicted of crimes.1040 Without the total number of criminal convictions, it
is difficult to evaluate these statistics, however given that the population of Lagos at the time
was an estimated 6 million, 328 convictions make foreigners look more like angels than villains;
just over 100 convictions per year.1041
Table 16: Foreign convicted criminals, Lagos
(1980-1983)1042

Country of origin

No. of convictions

Ghana
Niger

163
51

Benin
Chad
Togo
Mali
India

30
30
29
9
16
Total

328

A more likely explanation for the high crime wave was the increasingly desperate economic
conditions in Nigeria and the proliferation of weapons in the post-civil war period. While
crime in Nigeria was high, objectively migrants were not the main source of that problem as
the government’s own selective data show. Therefore, removing migrants because they were
a criminal threat is not a plausible explanation for the 1983 expulsion.
Government officials also blamed illegal aliens for religious unrest in the country. Ali
Baba connected aliens with past religious conflict:
“The recent Kano, Maiduguri and Kaduna religious disturbances when the whole
nation witnessed, with dismay, wanton destruction on properties and lives were
traceable to the lawless activities of aliens. In fact, the central figure in these violent religious episodes,
Maitatsine, was an alien. No responsible Government can fold its arms and allow such
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unwholesome development to plague the Nation; hence the decision to require illegal
aliens to leave the country within 14 days” [emphasis added]. 1043
Shagari stated in an interview with BBC Newsnight that “there was evidence that some of the
illegal aliens were involved in crimes and religious violence” [emphasis added].1044 Foreign Minister
Audu echoed this sentiment stating that, “…most of those deported were unemployed or
unskilled workers linked with religious riots and violent activities.”1045 And Rafindadi said that
“the immigrant’s involvement in crime and in fomenting religious unrest” together justified
their removal.1046
However, the religious explanation was a false distraction. The timing, previous
responses, and the make-up of Maitatsine’s followers, refute its plausibility. The first
significant outbreak of religious unrest in the Second Republic occurred in Kano in 1980.
Controversial Islamic teacher, Mohammadu Marwa, known as Maitatsine, had gathered a
sizable following rejecting western materialism and technology and speaking against the
corruption and profligacy of the “infidel” Nigerian political elite.1047 In December 1980
Maitatsine and his followers, known as the ‘Yan Tatsine, clashed with Kano police and local
authorities in 11-days of violence.1048 The Nigerian military’s response resulted in 4,000-6,000
persons being killed, including Maitatsine, and property destruction valued at over ₦3
million.1049 Hundreds of people were arrested and sent to prison.1050 Undeterred by the
government’s harsh crackdown, the Maitatsine movement unleashed a second round of
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violence in October 1982, after 16 of its members were arrested in Maiduguri.1051 The ‘Yan
Tatsine rioted across Maiduguri and Kaduna burning and destroying buildings—an estimated
500 persons were killed including 100 riot police.1052 If there was a clear connection between
foreigners and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, then why did the government wait so
long to take action and expel the culprits? The timing of the expulsion refutes the religious
rationalization.
After the Kano unrest, the federal government set up a special commission to
investigate the incident. The Aniagolu Tribunal’s report cited the participation of foreign
nationals, particularly post-harvest rural youth along the border who became “vulnerable to
temptations,” but it did not recommend wholesale migrant expulsion, instead it called for
improved Border Patrol Units to control their influx.1053 In response to the Kaduna riots in
November 1982 the government deported 133 foreigners for their suspected involvement. 1054
This targeted expulsion of individuals, contrasts with the mass expulsion a few months later
of all foreign migrants. In addition, after arresting hundreds of Maitatsine supporters in 1980
the government released most of them from prison and Shagari granted clemency to 923
prisoners in October 1982 to “decongest the prisons and save money.”1055 An allegedly severe
national security threat is incompatible with a policy of pardon.
The government accused aliens of fomenting religious unrest, but the evidence suggests
that the majority of Maitatsine’s followers were Nigerians.1056 His disciples were poor,
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marginalized Muslim youth who suffered from increased inflation and few job
opportunities.1057 Some of these youth came from Hausa-speaking areas of the neighboring
countries, but they were a minority of the total movement.1058 Of the 1,000 Maitatsine arrested
after the Kano riots, 185 were foreigners and there was no evidence that they were arrested
during the riots. Rather many were stopped by police at checkpoints outside of the city. 1059
Lastly, given that most of the people expelled in 1983 were Christian Ghanaians, it is not clear
how removing this population was intended to solve the problem of Muslim
fundamentalism.1060
The last possible alternative explanation is that the Nigerian government’s 1983
expulsion was a foreign policy tactic designed to exact revenge against the Rawlings regime in
Ghana, and/or Ghana more generally for its 1969 expulsion of foreigners, including a large
group of Nigerians. The Sunday Times quoted Ghanaian leader Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings
accusing, “the Nigerian government of plotting against his regime by expelling its Ghanaian
immigrants so that they should cause chaos in Ghana’s already crippled economy.”1061 The
Ghanaian media concurred, arguing that the expulsion was “a deliberate effort to undermine
the Ghanaian revolution.”1062 Another version of the retaliation hypothesis linked it to revenge
for Ghana’s 1969 expulsion of an estimated 200,000-1,000,000 foreigners, including tens of
thousands of Nigerians.1063 The African Recorder noted, “the memory of that insult still lingers
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in the minds of many Nigerians who have faced harsh treatment in other African
countries.”1064 While these explanations may seem plausible, investigation quickly refutes their
merits.
If the expulsion was intended to punish Rawlings, who came to power in a coup d’état
in December 1981, we would have expected the expulsion to accompany other sanctions
placed on the country in early 1982.1065 However, it was not until nearly a year later that the
expulsion order was issued. If the expulsion, on the contrary, was intended to retaliate against
Ghana for its 1969 expulsion of Nigerians, the time-lag was even longer, 14 years, and it does
not account for the non-Ghanaians who were also expelled. Furthermore, the timing does not
match the pattern of tit-for-tat reprisal expulsions that typically occur within days of the
offending charge, e.g., Gabon, 1978; Uganda, 1982; Mauritania, 1989; Senegal, 1989.1066
Although relations between Shagari and Rawlings were not cozy, they were not the motive for
Nigeria’s 1983 expulsion decision.
While these alternative explanations highlight other possible motivations for the
Nigerian government’s expulsion, none are as convincing as, nor provide enough evidence to
overturn, the nativism explanation.

5.4 Enabling Factors for Nigeria’s Migrant Expulsion
Nativism is not unique to Nigeria. Policies protecting natives over immigrants are widespread,
but not all governments turn to expulsion policies, as will be demonstrated in the negative case
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of South Africa. So, what factors enabled Nigeria’s government, motivated by nativism, to
implement expulsion? This next section examines the critical role of alliances, the target group
homeland state(s), and the international community in enabling expulsion in Nigeria.
Table 17: Factors that enabled expulsion in Nigeria
Key Factors

Nigeria (1983)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances

Benefit from expulsion (↑)

Transnational Alliances

Indifferent to expulsion (↑)

Homeland State(s)
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

Weak ties (↑)
Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)

International Community
Relation to Government

Strong ties (↓)

Response/Anticipated Response

Ignored expulsion (↑)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
Nigeria’s Second Republic was marked by the establishment of a new constitution. The 1979
constitution established a presidential system of government with a creative electoral system
that required presidential candidates to transcend ethnic partisanship and gain votes across
states. The design aimed to encourage the development of political parties formed along
national, instead of ethnic lines.1067 To win the presidency a candidate had to win a majority
(or plurality if there were more than two candidates) of the popular vote, plus at least 25
percent of the votes in at least 2/3 of the 19 states.1068
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Shagari and the NPN party won a plurality of the votes in the 1979 presidential election
with 33.8 percent.1069 The next closest was Chief Obafemi Awolowo of the Unity Party of
Nigeria (UPN) with 29.2 percent.1070 Shagari also won at least 25 percent of the votes in 12
states, more than double any other candidate—Awolowo won six states (See Map 3).1071
However, Shagari was still short of the constitutional requirement of winning at least 25
percent of the votes in 2/3 of the states, interpreted to be 13 out of 19 for the 1979 election.1072
Thus, the race should have gone to a run off between Shagari and Awolowo, but the military
government,1073 in coordination with the Federal Electoral Commission, creatively reinterpreted section 126, 2(b) of the constitution. They determined that 2/3 of 19 was not 13
but “one-quarter of the votes cast in 12 states and one-quarter of two thirds, that is, at least
one sixth of the votes cast in the 13 th state.”1074 Based on that interpretation, no runoff was
needed. Awolowo and the UPN challenged the result in the courts, but their efforts failed, and
Shagari was ruled president.
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Sokoto
NPN: 66.6%
GNPP: 26.6%

Kano
PRP: 76.4%
NPN: 19.9%
Kaduna
NPN: 43.0%
PRP: 31.0%

Kwara
NPN: 53.6%
UPN: 37.5%

Niger
NPN: 74.9%
GNPP: 16.6%

Oyo
UPN: 85.8%
NPN: 12.8%

Ondo
UPN: 94.5%
NPN: 4.2%

Ogun
UPN: 92.6%
NPN: 6.2%
Lagos
UPN: 82.3%
NPP: 9.6%

Bauchi
NPN: 62.5%
GNPP: 16.4%

Borno
GNPP: 54.0%
NPN: 34.7%

Plateau
NPP: 49.7%
NPN: 34.7%

Benue
NPN: 76.4%
NPP: 11.8%

Gongola
NPN: 35.5%
UPN: 34.1%

Anambra
NPP: 82.9%
NPN: 13.5%

Bendel
UPN: 53.2%
NPN: 36.2%
Rivers
NPN: 72.7%
GNPP: 1%

Imo
NPP: 84.7%
NPN: 8.8%

Cross River
NPN: 64.4%
GNPP: 15.1%

Map 3: Nigeria Presidential Election Results by State, 19791075

Despite this questionable interpretation of the new constitution, the NPN won the
most votes across the country. While each of the five parties had ethnic ties—NPN (Hausa &
Fulani), UPN (Yoruba), Nigerian People’s Party - NPP (Igbo), Great Nigeria People’s Party GNPP (Kanuri), and People’s Redemption Party - PRP (Hausa)—the NPN had the most
nation-wide support.1076 The NPN was the most conservative and “boldly capitalist” of the
five parties, emphasizing the essential role of private capital in national development. 1077 Its
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electoral success was based on widespread bourgeois support across the country that saw the
NPN as their best chance “to advance their business and political interests” or access “state
power and federal protection.”1078 Although the NPN was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani
aristocracy of the north, it widened its appeal by attracting Yoruba, Igbo, and minority political
and business elites from across the country.1079 Indicating its cross-ethnic structure, NPN’s
Vice Presidential candidate was Dr. Alex Edwueme, an Ibgo, and Chief Akinloye, a Yoruba,
was NPN party Chairman.1080
The NPN patronage web extended from the center out to the states and local
governments, distributing resources to cement loyalty among politicians, businessmen, and
constituents to ensure continued NPN rule.1081 The party was soon referred to as the “Naira
Party of Nigeria.”1082 The NPN’s coalition of support built on existing clientelist networks,
and after its victory it repaid key allies with administrative appointments, government
contracts, loans, and subsidies as well as exclusive import and export licenses. 1083 NPN
government and party officials at the federal, state, and local levels were gatekeepers to public
services and business activities and profited sizably from bribes and kickbacks as a result. 1084
Private sector companies who supported the NPN financially were awarded government
contracts in the lucrative construction, industrial, manufacturing, and trading sectors.1085 Loyal
technocrats were selected as key liaisons between the state and multi-national corporations,
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using their skills and networks to extract additional payments from foreign firms. 1086 To
indicate the level of corruption during the Second Republic, a Nigerian Ministerial Committee
estimated that government contracts were 200 percent more expensive than those in Kenya
and 130 percent more than those in Algeria.1087 Shagari’s domestic allies were well
compensated for their support.
Although the NPN won the 1979 elections by drawing support from across the
country, the party was effectively controlled by northern, largely Muslim, elites.1088 Therefore,
in addition to NPN governing officials, businessmen, and professionals, another key domestic
ally was traditional and religious leaders. In fact, the NPN party’s manifesto described
“preserv[ing] the role of traditional rulers ‘as instruments of stability in the maintenance of law
and order’” as a key political aim.1089 Although religious elites did not play a prominent role in
the 1979 election, they were an important lobby that NPN officials relied on for governing
support throughout the Second Republic.1090 They built on a long history of close ties between
Islamic leaders and colonial-era Nigerian governments in order to control religious dissent. 1091
As oil profits flowed freely, the Shagari administration’s domestic allies got what they wanted:
access to, and control over, the “national cake.” However, the oil glut, and the resulting
economic collapse, public dissatisfaction, and political unrest, threatened the party’s control
of power.
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With elections looming NPN Governors hesitated to be associated with Shagari given
the hostility the public felt toward the president, blaming him for the dismal state of the
economy. NPN needed to shore up support in the states it won in 1979 but NPN officials
were not sure which states they could win.1092 They hoped to increase their vote share in three
UPN-dominated states in the southwest including in Oyo, Ondo, and Bendel states where
UPN lost some of its key “strongmen.”1093 However, crime and rising unemployment was
significantly impacting urban areas, particularly in the south.1094 The dramatic signal of
removing millions of migrants en masse was intended to show the lengths the government
would go to address the concerns of indigenous Nigerians across the country, to create
additional job opportunities for the masses of unemployed, and in turn garner their votes. The
expulsion was also a spectacular diversion, shifting attention, albeit temporarily, away from the
crumbling economy. Amid a situation in which Shagari and the NPN were losing electoral
support, expulsion served to remake its image as a powerful government, cracking down on
foreign infiltrators who were stealing jobs and causing disturbances. Expulsion was a last-ditch
effort to rebuild the NPN’s coalition to retain power and satisfy domestic allies.1095

Transnational Alliances
Nigeria’s vast oil wealth granted it significant autonomy and independence from foreign aid,
but its lack of domestic technology, machinery, and skilled personnel made it dependent on

Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 213.
Falola & Ihonbere, 1985: 212.
1094 Brown, 1989: 263-64; Falola & Heaton, 2008: 204.
1095 Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985: 214.
1092
1093

268

international, largely Western, support to drill and extract its oil.1096 Multinational oil
corporations—many of which were owned and operated by Western firms in the U.S., U.K.,
Netherlands, and France—paid the Nigerian government rents for access to its oil fields. 1097
These corporations also dominated the sectors that supported oil: petrochemicals,
telecommunications, and manufacturing.1098 Although the Nigerian government nationalized
some, or portions of, these companies in the 1970s, it still relied on Western companies for
technical expertise, investment, and markets.1099 Furthermore, through a combination of
corruption and mismanagement, domestic markets and domestic capacity were neglected
leading to an increased reliance on foreign companies to implement local projects. 1100 The
Nigerian government awarded contracts to local companies, who then re-awarded them to
foreign firms.1101
Despite its claims of non-alignment, the Nigerian government was closely tied to
Western governments in trade and finance.1102 Nigeria exported most of its oil to OECD
countries with the U.S., Britain, France, and the Netherlands as the top buyers.1103 The Shagari
administration purchased most of its industrial, consumer, and food imports from the West.
And it received significant credit from Western sources including sizable loans from the U.K.,
Euromarket, and the World Bank.1104 The West was a vital consumer, supplier, and financier.
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Britain was Nigeria’s largest trading partner with billions of dollars of trade and
investments.1105 The U.S. was a close second, expanding its trading relationship with Nigeria
during the Second Republic. It exported over $1 billion each year from 1980-1982 (compared
to $630 million in 1979) and imported even more (mostly oil1106), running multi-billion-dollar
trade deficits from 1978-1984, the largest of its major trading partners.1107 In Europe, Nigeria
was France’s second largest African market after Algeria, importing cars, machinery, and sugar
products.1108 Other European countries like West Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Italy
had important trading relations with Nigeria.1109 The country did have economic dealings with
non-Western states including the USSR and China, exporting raw materials such as cocoa,
groundnuts, palm oil, and some petroleum, but all in significantly smaller quantities.1110 Given
the importance of Nigeria’s transnational alliances to its economic stability and growth,
opposition to an expulsion policy by these allies would have considerably constrained its
implementation. However, the transactional nature of its transnational alliances, meant that
these allies were likely to ignore the policy.
Nigeria was the most powerful sub-Saharan African country on the continent: the
most populous, the strongest economy, and the largest democracy. In the early 1980s, one out
of every four Africans was a Nigerian.1111 As regional hegemon it dominated the politics of
West Africa, serving as the headquarters of ECOWAS, the center of continental anti-apartheid
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efforts, and the source of mediation on the Chadian conflict.1112 It earned international
accolades for its new constitution modeled on that of the U.S.1113 Western and Eastern
superpowers courted this African giant.1114 Although the oil glut significantly damaged
Nigeria’s economic prowess, its status largely remained intact. Amid previous political disputes
with Western powers—Nigeria’s recognition of the MPLA in Angola, its criticism of the U.S.’s
support for apartheid South Africa, and the nationalization of British Petroleum in response
to Britain’s resistance to black majority rule in Zimbabwe—economic ties were maintained.1115
While political arguments occasionally got heated, the money and oil kept flowing.
Nigeria was not dependent on international sources for economic or military aid, nor
did it garner much international investment, it was simply a massive market. With 80 million
people, and a large bourgeois elite, Western countries and firms saw Nigerians as valuable
consumers for their finished goods.1116 As economist Tom Forrest notes: “international capital
has been reluctant to invest in the Nigerian market rather than to sell to it.” 1117 Nigeria’s
transnational alliances were based on business exchanges between governing and corporate
elites. Therefore, while there was outrage from the Western press in response to Nigeria’s
mass expulsion, the reaction from key Western government allies and multi-national firms,
aside from a few one-line statements, was substantially one of indifference, with no sanctions.
Ali Baba noted as much in his February 14 press briefing:
“I am glad, though, that there is a silver lining in the clouds; I believe that the
governmnts [sic] of the countries from which these unwholesome attacks have been
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launched on us [referring to the Western media] do not share the views nor have they
been a aprty [sic] to the media’s disgraceful roles.”1118
Economic relations continued, unimpeded, in the aftermath of the expulsion. In February
1983, just weeks after Nigeria announced its expulsion decree, the Shagari administration
negotiated a $1 billion Eurocredit loan and signed an education agreement with the U.K. to
support Nigerian teachers.1119 And in June the World Bank announced a $120 million loan for
the Nigerian Industrial Development Bank. Nigeria’s transnational allies’ indifference to the
expulsion, preferring business as usual, further enabled Shagari’s expulsion policy.

Homeland states
The Nigerian government’s expulsion targeted West African migrants from Ghana, Niger,
Cameroon, Chad, Benin, and Togo but the largest population affected—an estimated 1 million
of the 1-2 million—were Ghanaians. Since independence, Nigeria-Ghana relations oscillated
between competition and cooperation.1120 At the outset of the Second Republic, Shagari had
close relations with Ghanaian President Dr. Hilla Limann, who was democratically elected in
the same year.1121 When Lieutenant Rawlings removed Limann in a coup d’état on December
31, 1981, the Shagari administration was not pleased. Nigeria responded harshly, reinstituting
economic sanctions,1122 including cutting off oil exports—a severe penalty for a country
dependent on Nigeria for 90 percent of its oil.1123 However, in March 1982, after a Rawlings

Nigerian External Publicity Division, 1983: 13.
Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B545, B548.
1120 Aluko, 1985: 548; Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011: 135.
1121 Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011: 138.
1122 The Obasanjo administration had done the same after Rawlings’ first coup in May 1979 (Otoghile &
Obakhedo, 2011: 137-38)
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delegation visited Nigeria, relations between the two nations cooled and Nigeria resumed oil
sales.1124 In early 1983 ties between the two states were weak, marked by a stark regional rivalry,
a factor that enables expulsion decisions.
Furthermore, the target group homeland states1125 acquiesced and resettled their
expelled populations with almost no resistance. Although Nigeria’s expulsion clearly violated
the spirit of ECOWAS, the affected countries did not push back on Nigeria’s decision to expel,
but rather criticized the lack of coordination and the timeline for removal.1126 Though Rawlings
described the expulsion as a “calculated plot” against his government, 1127 his actions were
muted.1128 Similarly, Ghanaian Foreign Secretary, Dr. Obed Asamoah, expressed concern
about the expulsion but stated, “the global economic situation is such that no country will
allow large numbers of foreign nationals living illegally on its economy.” 1129 While there was
certainly frustration among Ghanaian officials at the unexpected mass expulsion, and the task
of resettling over one million persons—nearly 10 percent of Ghana’s total population of 12
million—the government “reacted with coolness and circumspection.”1130
The Ghanaian government chartered ships at its own hefty expense, $43,000 per trip,
to return its nationals from Lagos.1131 Hundreds of private vehicles joined the government’s
effort to return expellees to their homes once back in Ghana, in an exercise compared to the
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1126 “‘Strangers’ and ECOWAS,” 1983.
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announcement (Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 1984: 32610). Hardly a swift or loud response.
1128 Aluko, 1985: 543.
1129 “‘Strangers’ and ECOWAS,” 1983.
1130 Africa Contemporary Record, 1982-1983: B455.
1131 Bentsi-Enchill, 1983b.
1124
1125

273

British response at Dunkirk during World War II.1132 Rather than resisting the Nigerian
government’s expulsion decision by pushing back on the en masse removal of its nationals,
many of whom legally had the right to remain, Ghana quickly acquiesced and facilitated the
return of its citizens.
The second largest population affected by the expulsion after Ghanaians were
Nigeriens. Unlike the tough rhetoric, but empty actions, of Rawlings, the Nigerien
Government made no public statement on the expulsion.1133 In fact, Radio Niamey welcomed
the decision in a broadcast.1134 Like Niger, Cameroon made no public comments about the
quit order, and Cameroonian President Paul Biya made a state visit to Nigeria in mid-April,
just two months after the expiry of the expulsion deadline, to sign an economic agreement
with the Shagari administration. During his visit the two nations reaffirmed, “their desire to
pursue, intensify and consolidate the co-operation between their countries.”1135
The Togo and Benin governments were also subdued in their responses. The Togolese
Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Anani Kuma Akakpo-Ahianyo, met his Nigerian counterpart
in Lagos on January 23. Akakpo-Ahianyo tried to persuade the Nigerian government to extend
the deadline for immigrant departure but, importantly, not to change course. 1136 Benin
President Ahmed Mathieu Kérékou met with Shagari in February, on behalf of the Conseil de
l’Entente,1137 “to gain a better insight into the situation in the interest of understanding and
confidence in the sub-region,” but not to persuade the President to rescind his expulsion

“Booted Out,” 1983: 23.
“Exodus from Nigeria 2: Northern escape route,” 1983.
1134 “Booted Out,” 1983: 22-23.
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1137 The Conseil de l’Entente is a regional institution for economic cooperation that included Benin, Ivory Coast,
Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta (Ojo, 1980: 576n29).
1132
1133

274

decision.1138 Limited information is available about Chad’s response to the expulsion, but it
did describe it as “sudden and brutal.”1139 The country was engrossed in its own domestic
strife, which Nigeria was mediating, and its expelled nationals were largely refugees who had
fled Chad.
The Nigerian government recognized the lack of homeland state resistance. In Ali
Baba’s February 14 press briefing he stated that there had been “understanding on the part
of…some countries including those whose nationals have been affected by the orders.” 1140
And while the Nigerian government partially responded to requests from the homeland states
to extend the timeline for migrant removal—agreeing to a four-week extension for skilled
workers1141—the expulsion decision remained. Heads of state of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone—three ECOWAS countries in the far west of the West Africa region, and not directly
affected by the expulsion—were the lone countries to appeal to Shagari to reconsider his
decision, without success.1142
Why the affected countries submitted to the Nigerian government’s expulsion with
minimal resistance can largely be explained by three factors: their weak position vis-à-vis
Nigeria; their own expulsionist pasts; and their desire to maintain the ECOWAS Community
despite the serious breach of its spirit. As sub-Saharan Africa’s largest and richest oil exporter,
the oil glut notwithstanding, Nigeria was the economic giant of West Africa. Regional
neighbors were hesitant to challenge Nigeria’s expulsion decision for fear of its economic,
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military, or political wrath.1143 Many of the affected countries had joint development plans that
would have been at risk with heavy criticism of the Nigerian government. The hypocrisy of
condemning Nigeria’s expulsion when their countries had implemented expulsionist policies
in the past (e.g., Niger, 1963; Chad, 1979; Ghana, 1969) may have also weighed on the minds
of the neighboring country leaders. Furthermore, neighboring governments may have been
looking to the future, as West Africa magazine wrote “Every country in the area has a greater
or lesser problem with immigrant population[s] and might wish to reserve the right to take
similar measures if, indeed, they have not already done so in the past.”1144
Lastly, although Nigeria’s expulsion was a massive blow to the spirit of ECOWAS and
its protocol on free movement, West African states significantly benefited from the economic
community. There was concern that strongly condemning Nigeria’s expulsion decision could
jeopardize the integrity of the young organization, less than eight years old in January 1983.1145
In sum, the weak ties between Nigeria and Ghana and its acquiescence to the expulsion
decision, including swift resettlement of its nationals, further enabled Nigeria’s mass expulsion.

International Community
The Shagari administration had strong ties with the international community, including the
United Nations, ECOWAS, and the Organization of African Unity. As the most populous,
strongest economy, largest military, and biggest democracy on the continent, Nigeria was an
important international actor. Its sizable army of 120,000-140,000 troops, the largest in sub-
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Saharan Africa, was a critical contributor to UN peacekeeping missions.1146 Nigeria played a
foundational role in the creation of both the OAU and ECOWAS and served as the latter’s
largest donor and host to its headquarters in Lagos.1147 The mass expulsion decision-making
framework predicts that these strong ties with the international community would constrain
expulsion. However, the lack of response of the international community was a more
important enabling factor here. Although the key international actors rhetorically condemned
the expulsion, they effectively ignored its implementation, contributing to a conducive
enabling environment for Nigeria’s expulsion.
Initial international responses to Nigeria’s expulsion were verbally harsh. The U.S.
State Department called the expulsion order “shocking” and “a violation of every imaginable
human rights.”1148 British Opposition leader, Michael Foot, described the expulsion as “an act
of heartlessness, and a failure of common humanity” in a letter to the Nigerian High
Commissioner in London, while the British Foreign Office remained mum.1149 The European
Parliament condemned the expulsion, and the European Economic Community “deplored
the quit order” in a press release from Brussels.1150 Pope John Paul II joined the international
chorus describing the expulsion as “the largest, single and ‘worst human exodus this century’”
in an address to crowds in St. Peter’s Square.1151 While the international community was
“alarmed” by the expulsion announcement, its rhetoric largely focused on extending the
expulsion timeline and providing humanitarian assistance to the affected countries. Given that
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there was minimal violence toward the expellees, there was less “reaction and sympathy” than
toward similar events.1152 For example, UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar’s
statement on January 27 expressed “profound disquiet” at the expulsion of two million
persons from Nigeria, but he limited his comments to “minimizing suffering” of the expellees,
increasing international aid, and opening borders for migrants to return home. 1153 De Cuellar
urged Nigeria “to slow down” the expulsions, not to stop them.1154
The focus of the UN on extending the timeline and reducing expellee hardship is
illustrated in a cable from the Director-General of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
to the Nigerian Minister of Labor:
“Deeply concerned about scale and gravity of the problems connected with decision
of your Government to invite large numbers of foreign workers to leave Nigeria as
quickly as possible. I should like to appeal to your Government to do everything
possible for humanitarian reasons to safeguard the interests of foreign workers
regularly employed in your country and to grant the others, particularly those with
families, in consultation with their countries of origin, the time and facilities that would
protect them against undo [sic] hardship…the International Labour Office is ready to offer
your Government and the Governments of the neighbouring countries concerned all assistance in its
power” [emphasis added].1155
Despite expressing “deep concern,” the ILO offered “all assistance in its power” to the
expulsionist Nigerian government, scarcely pressuring it to reconsider its decision. While UN
humanitarian agencies are, by mandate, non-political and charged with responding to crises,
rather than preventing them from happening, the United Nations itself and organizations like
the ILO, to which Nigeria had been a member since 1960, failed to attempt to persuade the
Nigerian government to change course.
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Regional organizations responded similarly. Although Nigeria’s expulsion clearly
violated the ECOWAS protocol, its Executive Secretary, Dr. Aboubakar Diaby Ouattara
defended the expulsion. He stated that Nigeria was acting within the organization’s rules and
that “Nigeria’s action did not constitute a breach of the ECOWAS protocol on the movement
of goods and people.”1156 This comment overlooked multiple violations of the Free Movement
Protocol including: Article 7 (regarding settling disputes by direct agreement or via the
Tribunal of the Community); Article 11.1 (regarding notifying the citizen, government, and
Executive Secretary of an expulsion); and 11.4 (regarding notifying the government of origin
in case of repatriation).1157 The lack of coordination between Nigeria and the affected
countries, as well as with ECOWAS, was ignored by the Executive Secretary. Dr. Ouattara
instead advised would-be migrants to study the free movement protocol before undertaking a
trip.1158 That the expulsion was not formally raised at the May 1983 ECOWAS summit, just
four months after the quit order, underscores the lack of resistance by the regional
organization and its members.1159
The Conseil de l’Entente also tepidly responded to Nigeria’s expulsion. While not
assertively responding as individual states, the heads of state of Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast, and
Upper Volta jointly issued a communiqué at the conclusion of a two-day meeting in early
February. It expressed “regret that thousands of the deportees were nationals of the Conseil
de l’Entente,” emphasized that “the African states affected should have been notified in
advance so that they could organize the reception of their nationals beforehand,” and
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expressed solidarity with the deportees as well as pledging humanitarian aid. 1160 In line with
other international actors, the Conseil de l’Entente simply complained of no advance notification
of the expulsion policy, but did not advocate a policy reversal. President Ouédraogo of Upper
Volta, a country with minimal nationals expelled from Nigeria, stated in an interview the day
the meeting concluded that the Conseil “understood that [the expulsion] was a sovereign
decision and therefore abstained from judging it. In spite of this we deplored the situation.” 1161
The OAU was also hushed in its response. It sent a delegation to Lagos and the
affected countries but exerted no effort to change minds in the Shagari administration,
focusing instead on greater flexibility.1162 OAU Secretary General, Edem Kodjo of Togo,
limited his calls to “humanitarian treatment” of the expellees.1163 This despite Nigeria’s clear
violation of Article 12(5) of the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights—“The mass
expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohibited”—which was ratified by the Shagari
administration in 1981 and codified to domestic law through the African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act on March 17, 1983.1164 While the
initial expulsion order of January 17 did not violate this new legislation passed in March,
migrants continued to be expelled through April 1983, so it did violate domestic law after
March 17. Nevertheless, Nigeria was one of the OAU’s key founders and, like ECOWAS, the
organization hesitated to speak out against it. In sum, neither international nor regional
organizations pressured the Nigerian government to rescind its expulsion policy.
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Nigeria’s alliances and the response of the target group homeland states were key
contributing factors in enabling expulsion in Nigeria. In addition, the possible constraint of
Nigeria’s strong ties with the international community was outweighed by the limited
resistance of both international and regional organizations in the face of the expulsion policy.
The nativist motivation to remove “illegal aliens,” combined with a conducive enabling
environment, resulted in the mass expulsion of millions of West African migrants.

5.5 South Africa, 2008-2012: A negative case, constraints on mass expulsion
The pairing of Nigeria and South Africa, arguably the two giants of Africa, is legitimately
comparable on multiple dimensions. In the two time periods examined (Nigeria, 1979-1983;
South Africa, 2008-2012), the two countries experienced significant demographic changes
because of immigration, and there was public and elite pressure to consolidate the demos by
differentiating those who belong from those who do not—particularly along citizenship lines.
Both countries were also facing serious economic crises, the oil glut in Nigeria and the fallout
from the 2008 global financial crisis in South Africa. As depicted in Tables 18 and 19, the two
countries faced economic recession.
Table 18: Nigeria GDP Annual Growth Rate (1979-1983)1165
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Percentage
6.8
4.2
-13.1
-6.8
-10.9

In South Africa, GDP growth dropped nearly five percentage points in 2009, to negative 1.5
percent. The bottom of the economic recession hit each country 2-3 years before the expulsion
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or likely expulsion.1166 Both Nigeria and South Africa struggled to reach their pre-crisis growth
rates in the years following the respective crises.1167
Table 19: South Africa GDP Annual Growth Rate (2008-2012)1168
Year
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Percentage
3.2
-1.5
3.0
3.2
2.4

In South Africa the 2008 financial crisis exacerbated the existing inequalities and
economic hardship of the majority black population. Over one million jobs were lost amid
already high unemployment (24-25%), underemployment (30-40%), and youth unemployment
(up to 60%).1169 The South African government raised public sector wages during the
recession, contributing to “one of the largest job-shedding experiences amongst emerging
markets during the global financial crisis.”1170 The recession affected all aspects of the economy
with manufacturing production declining nearly 20 percent as well as decreased output and
retrenchment in mining, the financial sector, real estate, and business services as well as
wholesale and retail trade.1171 All of this was combined with nearly 50 percent of the population
living below the poverty line, over a third of the population food insecure, and a quarter of
children under six malnourished.1172 And despite a return to growth, albeit low, in 2010,
economic challenges remained, and jobs were not swiftly restored. Importantly, 1983 in

This is in line with Adida’s (2014) finding that African mass immigrant expulsions are more likely following
“a two-year decline in per capita economic growth” (144). While this may help to explain why Nigeria expelled
its migrant population, it does not explain why South Africa, under similar conditions, refrained.
1167 Although South Africa’s post-crisis growth rates are less dramatic than Nigeria’s, it is estimated that 6-7%
growth is needed to eliminate chronic unemployment and poverty and ensure sustainable economic development
(Herbst, 2005: 97; Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 120). The country’s 2012 growth rate of 2.2 percent was a third of
this recommended total.
1168 World Bank, 2020d.
1169 Pillay, 2010: 24, 34; Verick, 2012: 381, 383.
1170 Johnson, 2015: 175.
1171 Mohamed, 2010: 40; Verick, 2012: 377.
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Nigeria, and 2012 in South Africa, were politically salient years with national elections in
Nigeria and African National Congress (ANC) leadership elections in South Africa.
Other aspects of the two country’s economies were also comparable. Both were
heavily dependent on extractive industries, particularly Nigeria with most of its state income
coming from the oil sector. South Africa’s economy was more diversified, but still dominated
by the mining and energy complex which was similarly affected by the economic crisis.
Geographically, both countries had long porous borders (See Maps 2 & 4) through which
migrants from neighboring countries easily entered. The economic disparities between Nigeria
and South Africa, and their neighbors, created attractive pull factors.1173

Map 4: Political boundaries of South Africa 1174

Nigeria had a larger population than South Africa, 80 million, compared to 50 million, but
South Africa’s estimated total migrants (2.5-3 million) was approximately 5% of the total
population, double that of Nigeria (2.5%).1175 The sectors of the economy in which the migrant

Campbell, 2006.
Map sourced from Google Maps.
1175 Figures for the number of foreign migrants in South Africa vary widely. The best estimate, as extrapolated
from government census, World Bank, and UN figures, is likely around 2 million legal migrants and asylum
1173
1174
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communities worked, and their skill portfolios, were similar, employed in construction,
industry, mining (in South Africa), services (drivers, cleaners, domestic workers), and
petty/informal trades. The two countries were colonized by the British, although the Boers
were also involved in the South African case. The latter was a settler colony as opposed to
Britain’s administrative mode of colonial indirect rule in Nigeria, but both suffered under
European exploitation. Regarding regime characteristics, both presidents, Shagari and Jacob
Zuma, were democratically elected and according to Polity V, both countries were democratic
regimes.1176
Existing theories of mass expulsion suggest that countries with ethnic minority elites,
previous histories of expulsion, and leaders with exclusionary ideologies are more likely to
expel. In this comparison it was South Africa, the non-expelling country, that was ruled by an
ethnic minority president—Zuma is ethnically Zulu,1177 albeit the plurality group within the
black, racial majority—whereas Nigeria’s president was part of the ethnic Muslim majority. 1178
Similarly, and contrary to existing theory, it was South Africa that had a prior history of
expulsion—Mozambican refugees were expelled in 1993 under the apartheid regime, whereas

seekers (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014: 14-15; World Bank, 2018: 16). However, Statistics South Africa estimates
another 500,000 to 1 million undocumented migrants (Hlatshwayo, 2013: 229). That would put South Africa’s
total foreign migrants at 3-3.5 million, 5.7-6.6% of the country’s total population of 53 million in 2012,
significantly higher than Nigeria’s 2.5 percent.
1176 Polity V coded Nigeria (1983) a 7 and South Africa (2012) a 9; V-Dem scored Nigeria a 0.242 and South
Africa a 0.78 on its polyarchy continuum measuring the level of electoral democracy.
1177 The Zulu are South Africa’s largest ethnic group, an estimated 18 percent of the country’s total population
(Gordin, 2008: 53; Johnson, 2015: 28; BBC, 2021).
1178 In 1983 Nigeria the religious demographic breakdown was 47.4% Muslim, 37.7% Christian, and 14.6%
indigenous religions (Association of Religion Data Archives, 2022).
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Nigeria had never previously expelled.1179 Lastly, elites in both countries held exclusionary
ideologies when it came to African migrants.
Exacerbated by their respective economic slumps, anti-migrant sentiment was high in
both countries. The Nigerian public cry “Ghana must go” was echoed on the streets of
Johannesburg in “Makwerekwere go home.”1180 Indeed, the South African population was
arguably far more anti-foreigner than its counterparts in Nigeria, particularly toward black
African foreigners. A 2006 national survey conducted by the South African Migration Project
documented that 84% of South Africans thought there were “too many” foreigners in the
country, 76% supported (re)electrifying the border fences to keep migrants out (a practice of
the apartheid regime), and 74% said any foreign national not contributing to the economy
should be deported.1181 The survey documented views of foreign nationals as “a threat to the
social and economy well-being of their country,” competing for scarce economic resources,
stealing jobs, engaging in criminal behavior, and bringing disease—language echoed by their
Nigerian brethren in the 1980s.1182 Anti-migrant attitudes in South Africa cut across class, race,
ethnicity, and region.1183 South African nationals were more hostile to immigrants than any of
the other countries surveyed including Nigeria, Philippines, India, Egypt, and China among
others.1184

Nigeria did not have a history of expulsion, but there was large-scale violence against the Igbo (under a
different administration) during the civil war of 1967-1970. However, the Igbo were reincorporated into the state
at the end of the war.
1180 Crush, 2008: 25; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 88.
1181 Crush, 2008: 2.
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Similar sentiments were shared by government officials. In the early days of the ANCled government, Minister of Home Affairs Mangosuthu Buthelezi called on South Africans to
“aid the [Home Affairs] Department and the South African Police Services in the detection,
prosecution and removal of illegal aliens from the country…cooperation of the community is
required in the proper execution of the Department’s functions.”1185 Former Minister of
Defense, Joe Modise, threatened to turn on the apartheid-era “Killer fence”—a 15,000-volt
electric fence along parts of the country’s borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique—to deter
and reduce illegal migration.1186
The negative case of South Africa is particularly apt given the outburst of anti-migrant
violence in May 2008 initiated by the burning to death of 35-year-old Mozambican national
Ernesto Alfabeto Nhamuave.1187 Over the course of two weeks, beginning in Alexandra
township in Johannesburg and spreading throughout the country, more than 60 people were
killed, 700 injured, 100,000 displaced, and hundreds of homes, property, and businesses were
looted and destroyed.1188 The government responded with denial (there was no crisis), blame
(criminal elements), and conspiracy theories (“the hidden hand of white rule”).1189 One man
interviewed after the violence said that, “…The government is not doing anything about this,
so I support what the mob is doing to get rid of foreigners in our country.”1190
More than two weeks after the May 2008 outbreak of violence, President Thabo Mbeki
addressed the nation, stating:
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“The dark days of May which have brought us here today were visited on our country
by people who acted with criminal intent. What happened during these days was not
inspired by a perverse nationalism, or extreme chauvinism, resulting in our
communities violently expressing the hitherto unknown sentiment of mass and
mindless hatred of foreigners.”1191
This denial continued under the Zuma administration with the Minister of Police describing
attacks against migrants as opportunistic crimes, and the police spokesperson stating,
“holistically speaking, South Africans are not xenophobic.”1192 Senior Department of Home
Affairs (DHA) officials lent further credence to the arguments that foreigners were criminals,
blaming them, without evidence, for rising crime in South Africa, as in Nigeria before its
expulsion.1193 To deal with these “criminal aliens” the Deputy Minister of Safety and Security,
was quoted as saying “shoot the bastards.”1194
Citizen-migrant tensions were arguably much higher in South Africa in the late 2000s,
early 2010s, than they were in 1980s Nigeria, which makes this a grimly fascinating case to
examine.
Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions
African Migrants in South Africa
Under apartheid, the movement of black Africans, both within South Africa and from outside,
was highly regulated. Internally, black movement was controlled through the formation of
Bantustans and the introduction of pass laws. Externally, the immigration of black Africans to
South Africa was prohibited, and borders with neighboring states were highly patrolled, albeit
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still porous. Labor contracts between South Africa and its neighbors facilitated foreign African
“guest workers” to work in South African mines.1195 Enforcement of these movement controls
was divided across nine departments but the South African Police Service (SAPS) de facto took
control.1196 The harsh implementation of influx control laws was intended to deter “black
criminality.” When these laws were rescinded in 1986, the police simply shifted their attention
from “illegal” black South Africans to “illegal” black foreigners.1197 The shift was evident in
the drastic increase in deportations from the country from 732 in 1980 to 53,418 in 1990,
further increasing after full democracy was restored in 1994, with over three million migrants
deported in the 19 years between 1994 and 2012,1198 mostly to neighboring countries.1199
While the ANC government overturned many aspects of the previous regime, the
apartheid-era immigration restrictions largely remained in place.1200 The oppressive Aliens
Control Act of 19911201 was among the last pieces of legislation to be reformed. The new
Immigration Act was not passed until 2002 and not put into effect until 2005—more than a
decade after the end of apartheid.1202 Politicians were hesitant to push for immigration reforms
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in the world (Nshimbi & Fioramonti, 2014: 58; Vigneswaran, 2011a: 111).
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in the 1913 Immigration Regulation Act, which tightly restricted immigration and reinforced arbitrary discretion
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given the robust anti-foreigner sentiment within society, and fears of being perceived as
protecting the rights of foreigners over those of struggling South Africans. Even with the new
legislation in place, actions on the ground de facto remained the same.1203
Migrants flocked to ANC-led South Africa from across the continent,1204 but most
came from neighboring Zimbabwe (31 percent) and Mozambique (18 percent). While official
sources only track the number of legal migrants, Zimbabwe and Mozambique are also reported
as the countries of origin of the largest numbers of undocumented migrants. 1205 Immigrants
flocked to the country in search of economic opportunities as well as safety from conflict and
political unrest.
As in Nigeria, African migrants in South Africa work both in the formal and informal
sectors, but the majority are concentrated in the informal marketplace particularly in
construction, agriculture, petty trade, and domestic work.1206 While South African regulations
tightly control foreign labor in the mining sector, migrant labor in commercial agriculture,
construction, and services “takes place in a regulation vacuum.”1207 Businesses in these sectors
benefit from foreign workers that are typically paid less than their South African counterparts
with no legal protections.1208 Foreign traders, who are often the main target of violence in
urban areas, are typically engaged in circular migration patterns arriving in the country to sell
goods not available in the domestic market and then returning to their home countries.1209 The

Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 38; Segatti, 2011: 49.
Most foreign migrants in South Africa are from African countries, with nearly 70 percent from SADC
countries (World Bank, 2018: 21).
1205 Campbell, 2006; World Bank, 2018: 21.
1206 Oucho & Crush, 2001: 146; Murray, 2003: 459; Campbell, 2006; World Bank, 2018: 22.
1207 Segatti, 2016: 87-88, 96.
1208 Hicks, 1999: 402; Human Rights Watch, 1998; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 52.
1209 Human Rights Watch, 1998; Murray, 2003: 459.
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foreign labor market in South Africa is analogous to Nigeria’s in 1983—simply swap
Zimbabwean or Mozambican for Ghanaian.

Post-Apartheid ANC Politics & President Zuma
In 1983, the Nigerian national elections and the prospects of NPN losses due to
mismanagement of the oil glut, was a serious concern for the Shagari administration. The
analogous situation in South Africa was the 2012 ANC leadership elections. Since the South
African government has been dominated by one-party since 1994—the ANC—the leadership
elections that nominate the party’s candidate for president have been more important in
determining the head of government than the national elections. President Zuma had multiple
reasons to be concerned that the December 2012 party conference would not seamlessly
anoint him for a second term: corruption scandals, threats from the ANC Youth League
(ANCYL) and the Congress of South African Trade Union (COSATU) leaders, and ANC
losses in 2011 local elections. In fact, the 2012 party conference was the first in which an
incumbent was challenged for ANC leadership.1210 Zuma’s back was against the wall.
Zuma, like all South African Presidents to date, had been part of the anti-apartheid
struggle. He was imprisoned for ten years on Robben Island alongside Nelson Mandela, and
after his release he became a member of the ANC’s National Executive Committee and served
in various roles, including Chief of Intelligence.1211 After returning to South Africa in 1990,
after 15 years in exile, Zuma rose through the leadership ranks from the ANC’s Deputy
Secretary General (1991) to National Party Chairman (1994) to Deputy Party President (1997)

1210
1211

Johnson, 2015: 82.
Gordin, 2008: 16, 26; Feinstein, 2009: 75; Johnson, 2015: 24.
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and then Deputy South African President under President Thabo Mbeki (1999-2005).1212 Much
of Zuma’s rise to power was because of his ethnic background rather than his administrative
acumen. Mandela wanted an ethnic balance in party leadership and there were not many Zulus
in senior positions, despite being the country’s largest ethnic group.1213 Although the ANC was
founded by John Dube, a Zulu, and led by Zulu Chief Albert Luthuli in the 1950s, the
following three leaders (and first two presidents)—Tambo, Mandela, and Mbeki—were all
Xhosa.1214 With Zuma’s rise to Deputy President, and assumed future presidency, “there was
a feeling that at last the ANC was ‘coming home.’”1215 Zuma assumed the presidency of South
Africa in May 2009.
With Zuma’s ascendance came the belief that South Africa’s wealth would finally be
redistributed to disadvantaged citizens instead of the neoliberal policies pursued under
Mbeki.1216 However, scandal followed Zuma to Mahlamba Ndlopfu, the South African White
House, and expectations of economic and political change were quickly dashed. From his early
days in politics, Zuma had incurred large debts supporting his extravagant lifestyle—including
infamous upgrades to his Nkandla homestead—which made him dependent on, and
vulnerable to, bribery and corruption.1217 Zuma placed his family members and close allies into
positions of power at the national, provincial, and local levels giving them carte blanche to enrich
themselves in return for their loyalty.1218 Although there was corruption within the ANC
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1214 Johnson, 2015: 28, 35.
1215 Johnson, 2015: 35.
1216 Landau, 2011: 12; Basson & du Toit, 2017.
1217 Gordin, 2008: 68; Johnson, 2015: 25.
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before Zuma, he oversaw the “criminalization of the South African state,” similar to Nigeria’s
“tenderprenueurship.”1219
Unrest within the ANC party emerged as expectations for concrete change under
Zuma were not fulfilled. COSATU, having thrown its weight behind Zuma’s candidacy, was
particularly disappointed that its proposals were largely ignored, and corruption was
growing.1220 The union’s General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi, first spoke out against the Zuma
administration and the lack of progress in 2010. Vavi accused the ANC of being “hellbent on
their agenda of self-enrichment and crass materialism” and of becoming “a full-blown
predator state, in which a powerful, corrupt and demagogic elite of political hyenas increasingly
controls the state as a vehicle for accumulation.”1221 Julius Malema, head of the ANCYL,
looking to elevate his own status, similarly attacked Zuma in his rousing militant speeches to
large crowds, channeling popular discontent over persistent inequality and rising
unemployment.1222 Malema advocated nationalizing the banks, mines, and large corporations
as well as land reform and land redistribution.1223
These internal critiques were validated by the public in the ANC’s disappointing 2011
local election results.1224 The party suffered significant loses in large urban centers while
maintaining control across most of the country. These substandard results raised the stakes of
the 2012 party conference. Amid this discontent, two challengers—Tokyo Sexwale and
Kgalema Motlanthe—ran against Zuma for the party leadership, the first time an incumbent

Pillay, 2010: 35; Southall, 2014: 63; Johnson, 2015: 45.
Basson & du Toit, 2017.
1221 The Economist, 2010.
1222 Johnson, 2015: 65; Basson & du Toit, 2017.
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1224 Johnson, 2015: 64.
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president1225 was internally opposed.1226 Despite internal pressure on them to withdrawal their
candidacies, they refused.
On top of this internal ANC discord, in August 2012, South Africa experienced one
of its greatest tragedies since the 1960 Sharpeville massacre. At a platinum mine in Marikana,
34 striking mine workers were killed by the police with many miners shot in the back.1227 The
origin of the strike was over a split between rival unions, the National Union of Mineworkers
(NUM) and the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Unions (AMCU), the former
backed by the ANC and its ruling allies. Rumors swirled that the ANC had ordered the police
to suppress the threat of the split—another blow to Zuma’s leadership mere months before
the party elections.1228 The parallels drawn between Sharpeville and Marikana, and in turn
apartheid and the ANC, were extremely poor optics. In November 2012 the opposition
Democratic Alliance scheduled a vote of no confidence following the public release of details
that Zuma used over $29.3 million in public funds to improve his private residence in
Nkandla.1229 Although the motion was blocked from coming to the floor of parliament, both
the attempted vote, and the scandalous details of the appropriation of state funds for personal
use, were two more strikes to Zuma’s legitimacy.

Zuma had challenged Mbeki at the 2007 ANC party leadership conference, but Mbeki was in his second (of
two) terms as South African president. Since the ANC has no term limits on party presidents, Mbeki tried (and
failed) to run for a third term as party leader. The 2012 party conference was different in that Zuma had only
served part of one term as South African president and thus was the incumbent for both the party and national
elections. The challengers to him at the 2012 conference were de facto challenges to unseat him as the sitting South
African president.
1226 Johnson, 2015: 80, 82.
1227 Johnson, 2015: 82.
1228 Johnson, 2015: 82.
1229 Southall, 2014: 58; Basson & du Toit, 2017.
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Given the lack of results in Zuma’s first three (of five) years in power, and the
particularly tumultuous events of 2012, mass expulsion could have been both a useful
diversion from the president’s challenges as well as a populist appeal to unemployed South
Africans. Malema had used xenophobic, populist appeals to launch his Economic Freedom
Fighters (EEF) party in the wake of Marikana, demonstrating its utility as a political strategy—
there was clear public support for economic chauvinism and nativist policies.
After Zuma’s election to the presidency in 2009, the ANC had been shifting to Zulu
dominance. Nativism was strongest among ethnic Zulus, so mass expulsion would have
appealed to Zuma’s core ethnic base.1230 Zuma was also losing support in urban areas which
also happened to be where anti-migrant sentiment was highest. Expulsion might have won
back some of those urban ANC defectors who had shifted to opposition parties in the 2011
local elections, and were losing confidence in the ANC. Finally, mass expulsion could have
bolstered Zuma’s image as a strongman, in control of the borders and enforcing the rule of
law which may have played well among the ANC base. In sum, expulsion could have been a
useful policy tool for Zuma in 2012 in advance of the party leadership elections, as deployed
by Shagari in advance of Nigeria’s national elections in 1983.
Constraints on Mass Expulsion
Despite the perceived economic threat posed by African migrants in South Africa, the desire
among the public and key government officials for a “South Africa for South Africans,” and
a precarious political situation for the Zuma regime, mass expulsion was not implemented.

It was reported that foreigners would be stopped and asked to correctly state the Zulu word for elbow, a
xenophobic test related to authentic “Zulu-ness” (a proxy for South African-ness), or face violence (Glaser, 2008:
58; Worby et al., 2008: 16; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 133).
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Unlike in Nigeria, the key contributing factors—alliances, homeland states, and the
international community—constrained mass expulsion (See Table 20).
Table 20: Mass Expulsion Decision Making Framework Applied to Nigeria & South Africa
Nigeria (1983)
South Africa (2012)

Key Factors
Alliances
Domestic Alliances
Transnational Alliances
Homeland State(s)
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response
International Community
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

Benefit from expulsion (↑)
Indifferent to expulsion (↑)

Harmed by expulsion (↓)
Harmed by expulsion (↓)

Weak ties (↑)
Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)

Strong ties (↓)
Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)

Strong ties (↓)
Ignored expulsion (↑)

Strong ties (↓)
(Likely) resisted (↓)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
Domestic politics in South Africa are run by a “corporatist” alliance between business, labor,
and the state.1231 The mining and agriculture sectors of the business alliance, as well as the
immigration and policing arms of the state, benefited immensely from status quo policies
regarding African foreigners. An important constraint on expulsion in South Africa was the
potential harm to the status quo immigration arrangement.
Although South Africa has seen a dramatic growth in services, up to 60 percent of
GDP, the mining and energy complex (MEC) is still incredibly powerful, and brings in most
of the country’s crucial foreign exchange.1232 While the sector has reduced its dependence on
foreign labor since 1994, African migrants are still a crucial part of its workforce, both skilled
workers and undocumented “back-door” entries through legal loopholes.1233 In post-apartheid

Klotz, 2000: 841.
Crush & Tshitereke, 2001: 57; Mohamed, 2010: 43-44, 60-61; Southall, 2014: 63; Johnson, 2015: 106, 154.
1233 Crush & Tshitereke, 2001: 53; Segatti, 2016: 86, 89.
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South Africa, ANC-led governments have protected the interests of the mining sector. 1234
Expulsion would have been a major deviation from that approach. The commercial agriculture
sector, the largest employer of migrant labor, also benefited from the foreign migrant status
quo, as did other sectors like construction and manufacturing.1235 Large corporate farms in the
northernmost Limpopo Province, reported up to 80 percent foreign farm workers, many
coming across from Zimbabwe during planting and harvest seasons.1236 In Mpumalanga and
Free State, two of Zuma’s core provinces, large numbers of Mozambican and Basotho were
employed on farms.1237 While agriculture does not have the same exemptions from labor
regulations as the mining sector, de facto the laws are not enforced. It has been reported that
police occasionally work in tandem with farmers, deporting laborers just before their
payday.1238 The expulsion of migrant workers would have significantly harmed the commercial
agriculture sector, a key corporate ally protected by the state.
The South African immigration system, with lax, exploitative implementation of the
laws is immensely profitable for police and immigration officials. Bribery and extortion
enriches DHA and SAPS officials at all levels.1239 Cracking down on this lucrative business by
removing the target—foreign migrants—would have upset some of Zuma’s core allies who
benefited enormously from the status quo.1240 In addition, given South Africa’s high rates of
violent crime,1241 the police are under intense pressure to produce results. Immigration-related

Segatti, 2016: 87, 101.
Klotz, 2000: 841; Oucho & Crush, 2001: 146; Segatti, 2016: 90.
1236 Segatti, 2016: 90, 95.
1237 Crush & Tshitereke, 2001: 57.
1238 Hicks, 1999: 402n52; Crush & Tshitereke, 2001: 66n4; Segatti, 2016: 98.
1239 Klotz, 2000: 838; Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 42; Crush, 2008: 3; Landau & Pampalone, 2018: 160.
1240 Coplan, 2008: 130; Johnson, 2015: 43.
1241 In 2012 South Africa ranked as the most violent country in Africa and the 8 th most violent in the world
(BusinessTech, 2014).
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arrests and deportations pad government statistics and show the public that the government
is doing something. Migrant arrests are a viewed as a “prophylactic measure.”1242 Mass
expulsion would have eliminated this vital data pipeline for the police.1243 Moreover, tacit
agreements existed between the state and employers for “periods of tolerance” in advance of
key public events such as the 2010 Football World Cup, during which large cohorts of migrant
laborers were needed.1244 Just as the business side of the corporatist alliance benefited from
foreigners in the country, so did the state—expulsion would have harmed these interests.
Although labor is not a homogenous bloc in South Africa, key unions, like COSATU
and NUM, have supported migrant rights, albeit with divergent opinions among the national
leadership and local branches.1245 COASTU consistently spoke out against rising anti-migrant
sentiment and discrimination against immigrants, and called on the state and civil society to
combat it.1246 In fact, COSATU dispelled the notion that migrants were responsible for high
unemployment and poor government service delivery and instead blamed unscrupulous
employers as well as the police and DHA.1247 Despite COSATU’s verbal support for
international solidarity with African workers, the organization had to delicately balance
national-level policies with local membership views, which were far more anti-migrant.1248
Mass expulsion would have directly opposed COSATU’s activism around African workers’
camaraderie and collective rights.

Klaaren & Ramji, 2001: 37.
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In sum, all elements of the domestic corporatist alliance—business, labor, and the
state—favored the immigration status quo. Mass expulsion would have negatively affected
those key allies, disrupting essential partnerships the Zuma administration wanted to maintain.

Transnational Alliances
In 2012, South Africa’s key transnational partners were southern African countries and China.
As the world heralded South Africa’s full embrace of democracy, its neighbors were cautious.
They had been through decades of aggressive “destabilization”1249 by the apartheid regime and
were unsure how the new ANC government would wield its power. To rebuild relations with
its African neighbors, South Africa adopted a foreign policy strategy deemed its “African
Agenda.”1250 Although still deeply linked to the west economically, the ANC sought to distance
itself from its former colonial master, and the West in general.1251 Nelson Mandela stated that
South Africa would not continue the apartheid regime’s tactics of using “economic muscle to
bully and intimidate small neighbors.”1252 Through increased trade and investment, South
Africa attempted to reposition itself as an, “African power rather than a mouthpiece of the
West or a vestige of colonialism and white domination.”1253
To gain the support, respect, and trust of African countries, the ANC-led government
sought to improve political and economic relations with the Southern African Customs

As South Africa became more isolated in the 1980s the apartheid government implemented a “destabilization
campaign” against the “frontline” states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe)
attacking them militarily, economically, and politically (Hanlon, 1986: 4; Adedeji, 1996: 9; Hicks, 1999: 397).
1250 Hammerstad, 2012: 12; Olivier, 2013: 401; Landsberg, 2014: 157; Saunders, 2014: 223.
1251 Olivier, 2013: 402; Johnson, 2015: 194-95.
1252 Alden & Soko, 2005: 371.
1253 Hammerstad, 2012: 14-15; Alden & Soko, 2005: 370-71; Landsberg, 2014: 157.
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Union1254 (SACU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).1255 Table 21
shows that South African exports to SADC countries in 2012 totaled $23.79 billion—the
largest of any regional block. Of those $23.79 billion in exports, $17.05 billion, or 72 percent,
went to South Africa’s six immediate neighbors. The shift away from the West, particularly
the EU, which at that time included former colonial power Britain, was an intentional strategy
to signal independence.1256 Africa, particularly southern Africa, was an immense market for
South Africa’s goods and the country actively linked its economic fate to that of the region,
albeit with South Africa in the driver seat.
Table 21: South African exports/imports by regional
block, 2012 - USD (billions)1257

Regional Block
SADC (15)1258
Neighboring countries (6)
EU (27)

Total Exports
23.79
17.05
17.50

Total Imports
7.76
4.23
29.22

South Africa not only augmented its trade relations with African states after 1994, but
it also became the continent’s second largest developing country investor, after Malaysia, and
the largest foreign investor in Southern Africa.1259 The country channeled billions of dollars
into the continent particularly in mining, wholesale, and healthcare products.1260 In 2012 South
Africa’s FDI outflows totaled $4.4 billion.1261 The country aggressively tried to overcome its
tainted past of apartheid-era destabilization, and to strengthen its regional partnerships.1262 The
Established in 1910, the SACU is the oldest existing customs union in the world. It includes South Africa,
Namibia, Botswana, Eswatini, and Lesotho.
1255 Landsberg, 2014: 161-62.
1256 Johnson, 2015: 162.
1257 Data from the South African Revenue Service, 2012.
1258 There are now 16 total countries in the SADC but in 2012 Comoros was not yet a member (added in 2017),
therefore the total SADC member countries was 15.
1259 Alden & Soko, 2005: 374; United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 2013: xvi.
1260 Alden & Soko, 2005: 380; United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 2013: 4.
1261 United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 2013: 214.
1262 Alden & Soko, 2005: 379.
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burst of xenophobic violence in May 2008 had “damaged South Africa’s reputation in the eyes
of Africans to the north.” Mass expulsion would have harmed both economic and political
relations with its southern African transnational allies and jeopardized the solidarity it was
trying to rebuild.
While Southern Africa was a key transnational ally, China was South Africa’s most
important individual trading partner.1263 Zuma elevated Chinese-South African relations in
2010 during a state visit to Beijing in which the two countries announced a “comprehensive
strategic partnership” and nearly 400 South African business representatives signed dozens of
investment agreements with Chinese companies.1264 Table 22 shows that in 2012 China was
South Africa’s top export ($10.34 billion) and import ($14.65 billion) partner. 1265 China was a
large market for South African goods including agricultural products and raw materials; and
South Africa was a large market for Chinese goods—so much so that Chinese textile imports
destroyed South Africa’s domestic textile market.1266 In 2011 South Africa was also the largest
recipient of Chinese FDI of all African countries, albeit a modest amount in comparison to
Western investment.1267 Fostering strong relations with China was another way that South
Africa signaled its reorientation away from the West and white domination.
Table 22: South Africa’s top export/import
partners, 2012 - USD (billions)1268

Exports
China
U.S.
Japan

Total
10.34
7.87
5.70

Imports
China
Germany
Saudi

Total
14.65
10.26
7.85

Oliver, 2013: 315; Saunders, 2014: 230.
Oliver, 2013: 311; Alden & Wu, 2014: 9-10.
1265 South African Revenue Service, 2012.
1266 Hlatshwayo, 2010: 14; Johnson, 2015: 200.
1267 United Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 2013: 5; Alden & Wu, 2014: 18.
1268 Data from the South African Revenue Service, 2012.
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Botswana
Germany

5.06 U.S.
4.55 Japan

7.46
4.62

However, the importance of China as a transnational ally went beyond bilateral
relations. In 2009 the “BRIC” countries1269—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—were officially
codified at a summit in the Ural Mountains in western Russia.1270 At the time, these four
countries represented a combined GDP of $18.5 trillion and were seen as powerful emerging
economies and smart investment opportunities.1271 For our story the critical date is Christmas
Eve 2010 when BRIC became BRICS.1272 By all metrics South Africa should not have been
invited to join the BRIC grouping (see Table 23), the other four members dwarfed it in GDP
and population size.1273

Country
Brazil
Russia
India
China
South Africa

Table 23: BRICS - Comparative Economic Overview, 20111274
Size of
Population
Surface area
Annual growth
economy (USD,
(millions) (millions sqkm)
rate (%)
billions)
204
8.5
2,170
7.5
139
17.0
1,477
3.8
1,200
3.3
4,600
10.4
1,300
9.6
10,090
10.3
51
1.2
524
2.8

Per capita
income
(USD)
10,800
15,900
3,500
7,600
10,700

South Africa’s position in the club had been described as, “an alliance in which the South
African rowing boat is towed behind the Chinese battleship.”1275

Investor Jim O’Neill, British economist and former Chairman of Asset Management at Goldman Sachs, was
the first to coin the concept ‘BRIC’ to indicate lucrative investment markets given the size of the four country’s
combined populations and GDP; the grouping soon took on a life of its own (Olivier, 2013: 406; Johnson, 2015:
196)
1270 Olivier, 2013: 404; Johnson, 2015: 196.
1271 Olivier, 2013: 406.
1272 Olivier, 2013: 406; Johnson, 2015: 197.
1273 Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 115; Olivier, 2013: 400.
1274 Adapted from text in Alden & Schoeman, 2013: 115.
1275 Johnson, 2015: 203.
1269

301

China advocated for South Africa’s inclusion, seeing it as the “gateway to Africa”—a
strategic partner through which to access the African continent.1276 South Africa’s regional
power status and continental leadership was expected to “represent the ‘whole of Africa’ in
the [BRICS] power club.”1277 Since China does not concern itself with the domestic politics of
other states, particularly its partners, South Africa’s bilateral economic partnership with China
would not in itself have constrained mass expulsion. However, an expulsion policy would have
damaged South Africa’s relations with neighboring states and threatened its gateway status,
the core reason for its rather unwarranted entry into the BRICS. Concern about harming
relations with its core transnational alliances was an important constraint on the possibility of
mass expulsion in South Africa.

Homeland states
Since nearly half of all foreign Africans in South Africa are Zimbabwean or Mozambican, this
section focuses on those two countries as the central homeland states of concern. Zimbabwe
and Mozambique are situated along South Africa’s northeastern border and have shared kin,
culture, and languages.1278 Similar to the position of Nigeria’s neighbors in 1983, if South Africa
had decided to expel African migrants neither Zimbabwe, nor Mozambique, would have had
the capacity to close their borders and deny entry to the hundreds of thousands, if not millions,
of people that would have returned home. It was not a hardened border or the ability of its
neighbors to resist that constrained South Africa from expelling. Instead, it was concern about

Calland, 2013: 103; Oliver, 2013: 313, 315; Olivier, 2013: 407; Alden & Wu, 2014: 20; Saunders, 2014: 230.
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damaging the strong relations it had with the two important homeland states. These concerns
are clustered around three themes: solidarity with fellow liberation leaders and movements;
domestic political boomerang effects; and energy and water interdependence.
The ANC party leadership view themselves as part of a regional club southern African
liberation movements-cum-party states: ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, FRELIMO in
Mozambique, MPLA in Angola, and SWAPO in Namibia.1279 This solidarity with neighboring
liberation movements translated into largely unflinching support for their heads of state. Many
SADC country leaders saw themselves as part of a “club of brother presidents in sister
parties”—freedom fighters, turned leaders, with intertwined histories of struggle against white
minority rule.1280 In South Africa this solidarity was clearly depicted in Mbeki’s, and then
Zuma’s, continued support for Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. While the rest of the world
condemned Mugabe’s confiscation of white farms, repression of political dissidents, and
destruction of the country’s economy, Mbeki adopted “quiet diplomacy” in negotiating with
the Zimbabwean president.1281 Mbeki refused to openly condemn Mugabe’s actions or support
economic sanctions, instead keeping his mediation efforts away from public view.1282 Despite
his desire to differentiate himself from his predecessor, Zuma largely continued Mbeki’s
approach, adopting a non-confrontational, accommodative stance, and encouraging western
states to remove sanctions.1283 To indicate the ANC’s unflinching support, in advance of the
2012 Zimbabwean elections the ANC party Secretary General Gwede Mantashe stated, “Our
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relationship [with ZANU-PF] is steeped in blood, the ANC wishes to affirm her commitment
as a trust-worthy neighbor.”1284 The political ties with homeland states were strong.
The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) was also a member of the “old boys
club” as a liberation movement turned one-party state. After winning independence from
Portugal in 1975, FRELIMO fought a brutal civil war against the Mozambican National
Resistance (RENAMO), trained and supplied by the apartheid regime, extending both the
duration and devastation of the conflict.1285 Ties between the ANC and FRELIMO were
strong. Many South Africans spent time in Mozambique as exiles or refugees. 1286 They included
Zuma who spent over a decade in exile in Maputo as the ANC’s chief representative.1287 This
solidarity with liberation parties and politicians meant South Africa was much less likely to
implement a policy that would negatively affect one of its fellow freedom fighters.
The South African government was also aware of the possible boomerang effect of its
actions on domestic politics. ANC-led South Africa did not want to take actions that could
potentially support opposition parties challenging the supremacy of the one-party-states (e.g.,
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe and RENAMO in Mozambique).
Zimbabwe’s opposition MDC was made up a coalition of anti-ZANU-PF groups, but one of
the largest factions was the trade unions. One reason Mbeki did not more strongly condemn
Mugabe’s actions was because of concern that the ANC’s own, even stronger, trade unions
might break away and challenge the ANC.1288 There was a fear among liberation leaders that
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if the MDC took power in Zimbabwe it would “set an uncomfortable precedent.”1289 Thus,
the South African government focused on maintaining the regional status quo, preserving
trusted leaders in fellow SADC countries that would further South Africa’s own interests. 1290
Mass expulsion would have flooded Zimbabwe with hundreds of thousands of its citizens,
destabilizing an already fragile political and economic situation, to the advantage of the
opposition MDC.
In Mozambique FRELIMO had a tighter hold on power, but the opposition
RENAMO had come close to winning the 1999 elections and remained a formidable
competitor in subsequent elections (2004, 2009).1291 Politically, Mozambique was fragile with
recurring anti-government riots (2008, 2010, 2012) against the rising cost of food, fuel, and
transport, as well as the return of low-level guerilla fighting with RENAMO in 2010 after the
national elections.1292 The disgruntled public blamed the government, particularly FRELIMO
President Armando Guebuza—infamously known as “Mr. Gue-Business” because of his
lucrative commercial holdings—for the growing inequality and the lack of government
support.1293 A surge of expellees would have added to the turmoil, possibly shifting more
support to the opposition. In both cases, expulsion would have had a destabilizing effect on
the homeland states, damaging the rule of the liberation party regimes which could have
augmented cracks in the ANC’s rule at home.
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Lastly, climate change, particularly rising temperatures and desertification, is increasing
South Africa’s interdependence with its neighbors for future water and energy needs. 1294
Dating back to apartheid, Pretoria saw the country’s shortages of oil, electricity, and water as
vital national security concerns.1295 The largest Southern African hydro and water resources
are concentrated in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia along the Zambezi river. 1296 Since
the 1980s, South Africa has been moving toward a permanent water deficit and water demands
are increasing because of population growth, urbanization, and expanding industrial and
agricultural production.1297 In this case “upstream users wield formidable power over
downstream users,” making South Africa particularly dependent on Zimbabwe and
Mozambique for its future water needs.1298
South Africa has enormous coal reserves, which has meant its energy generation is
inefficient, costly, and high in carbon emissions.1299 It has been under some pressure to identify
cleaner sources of power, not only to reduce emissions but to combat problems of acid rain
and air pollution.1300 A power crisis in 2007-2008 caused weeks of rolling blackouts, sparking
public cries to move away from coal and a government declaration of an “electricity
emergency.”1301 That South Africa could not provide reliable power was a severe blow to the
Mbeki regime, one Zuma wanted to avoid. The discovery of massive natural gas resources—
estimated among the largest in the world—off the coast of Mozambique in 2011 was a
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1297 Swatuk, 2000: 228.
1298 Hudson, 1996: 9.
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significant development for South African energy security.1302 Months later Zuma and
Guebuza established a Binational Commission to increase engagement between the two
countries, and South Africa’s national oil company (PetroSA) signed a “strategic partnership
agreement” with Petromoc of Mozambique.1303 Bilaterally, and as part of the SADC, South
Africa has taken steps to cooperate around water and energy interdependence.1304 South Africa
has the technical capacity to exploit these resources, which other SADC countries lack,
creating a symbiotic relationship between states.1305 The essential water and energy resources
of Zimbabwe and Mozambique further intertwined the fates of these three countries.
Although South Africa, like Nigeria, was a regional power, and had asymmetrical relations with
its neighbors, it had strong historical, political, and economic ties with Zimbabwe and
Mozambique that constrained a policy of mass expulsion.

International Community
A key thread in understanding South Africa’s decision-making is its goal of becoming, or in
its eyes maintaining its status as, a global player.1306 Since the founding of the Republic, the
country’s leaders have seen the nation as separate from the rest of the continent—a “European
outpost” in the club of states like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. 1307 While there were
many breaks with the white minority regime after 1994, this aura of continental superiority
stuck. South Africa’s self-image is that of an African giant with serious Great Power
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1307 Adedeji, 1996: 5; Klotz, 2000: 837; Hammerstad, 2012: 16.
1302
1303

307

ambitions.1308 These goals were important constraints on the implementation of a mass
expulsion policy.
South Africa was elected, with an overwhelming majority, as a non-permanent
member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) for two terms in the period examined: 20072008 and 2011-2012. South Africa’s repeated election signaled the strong support of the
SADC, which nominated South Africa for the seat, and of the African Union (AU), which
endorsed its candidature.1309 In this role, South Africa promoted its “African Agenda” focused
on peace, security, and development. Although the South African government was pleased
with its status as a non-permanent member, its real ambition was to become a permanent
member of a reformed and expanded UNSC.1310 While other African countries have also
served on the UNSC, South Africa is the only African state included in the exclusive G20
grouping, another signal of its “gateway to Africa” standing.1311 International prestige and
recognition are key drivers of South Africa’s foreign policy.
To be the voice of Africa on the global stage, South Africa had to maintain the
confidence and backing of the continent, particularly the African Union. Although South
Africa was a regional hegemon and a recognized African leader, by 2012 its status was not
unchallenged.1312 Nigeria was a key rival for African supremacy with a growing economy and
population, and its own regional hegemonic status.1313 Nigeria-South African competition
came to a head in 2012 over the AU Commission Chairmanship.
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The AU Commission election illustrates the lengths South Africa was willing to go to
maintain its position as continental leader. The AU Commission is the African Union’s
secretariat, serving as its executive and administrative body, like the EU Commission. The
head of the Commission is the AU Chairman or Chairwoman, a prestigious and coveted role.
In 2011 Zuma put forward Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, former Minister of Health, Foreign
Affairs, and Home Affairs for the post, successfully persuading the SADC to back her
nomination.1314 Dlamini-Zuma challenged the incumbent chair, Jean Ping from Gabon,
drawing criticism from other African states, particularly Francophone and West Africa. 1315
South Africa was accused of dividing the continent and ignoring the unwritten rule that
continental powers should not run for the position. African rivals including Nigeria, Egypt,
Ethiopia, and Kenya, all opposed Dlamini-Zuma.1316
Nevertheless, after a tumultuous campaign and four rounds of voting, Dlamini-Zuma
defeated Ping in the July 2012 election and became AU Chairwoman.1317 Ping’s loss was a blow
to Nigeria, who had supported Ping as ECOWAS’s preferred candidate. A former Nigerian
Minister of Foreign Affairs described Dlamini-Zuma’s victory as “the most successful
projection of South African power over the African continent” and an “unacceptable defeat
for Nigeria’s status and policies in Africa.”1318 Zuma achieved his goal of leading the regional
body and secured South Africa’s status as global and African leader.
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A South African mass expulsion would have destabilized a vital African region,
severely affecting its regional and international reputation. The 2008 xenophobic violence
tarnished the country’s character, but these events were confined within the country and were
relatively small-scale. The mass expulsion of African migrants from South Africa would have
been an international and regional issue that would have damaged South Africa’s status as
continental leader. Particularly in 2012, as a rotating UNSC non-permanent member, and while
pursuing the AU Commission Chairmanship, mass expulsion was not a viable policy option.
Concern about risking relations with the international community—here the UN and AU—
deterred expulsion in South Africa.

Summary
This chapter introduced mass expulsion motivated by nativism as a third type of expulsion,
driven by the perceived economic threat of a target group, during a critical phase of
consolidating the nation. In 1983 the world oil glut drastically affected Nigeria’s economy,
causing a multi-year recession in the lead up to national elections. The Shagari administration
identified African migrants as a scapegoat for the government’s mismanagement of the crisis
and announced their expulsion, en masse, giving them a mere two weeks to leave the country.
Favorable domestic and transnational allies and weak responses of the homeland states and
the international community facilitated its expulsion policy. The negative case of South Africa
illustrates a population and government arguably even more nativist than its Nigerian
counterparts. The 2008 global financial crisis exacerbated existing economic malaise and
President Zuma was particularly vulnerable in the 2012 ANC leadership elections given
allegations of corruption and his failure to deliver on political promises. However, unlike 1983
310

Nigeria, South Africa’s domestic (business, labor, and the state) and transnational (SADC
countries and China) alliances, and desire to preserve relations with homeland states and
maintain its status as a regional and global leader, constrained mass expulsion.
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CHAPTER 6. “You are not Burmese”: Rohingya in Burma

This chapter investigates the expulsion of Rohingya Muslims from Burma 1319 in the early
1990s—systematically removed from March 1991 through July 1992, but then systematically
repatriated beginning in September 1992. This final case study returns to a within case design,
like that in Chapter 3, which examined the Ottoman Empire’s treatment of Orthodox Greeks,
who were expelled from the Aegean and Pontic littoral, but not from Istanbul. From 19911992, over 250,000 Rohingya were forced out of Burma, en masse, by the Burmese military,
paramilitary, border guards, military intelligence, and police.1320 But less than a year later, in
April 1992, Burma signed an agreement with Bangladesh to “repatriate” the Rohingya
refugees, with the support of the international community and the facilitation of the
UNHCR—despite no changes in the environment in Arakan State. Between September 1992
and the end of 1995, nearly the entire expelled population returned to Burma. 1321 This case
illustrates that my expulsion decision-making framework can both explain why Burma expelled
its Rohingya minority in 1991-1992 as well as why it immediately shifted course and agreed to
take them back within one year. The concluding section briefly discusses the similarities
between the most recent 2016-2018 expulsion of the Rohingya and that of 1991-1992.

I use the country name Burma, as well as the older state and capital names (i.e., Arakan instead of Rakhine;
Akyab instead of Sittwe), for the sake of consistency in discussing the colonial and post-colonial periods, and
because of the political nature of the 1989 English language name change of the country from Burma to
Myanmar. This decision by the SLORC will be discussed at length throughout the chapter.
1320 Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 13-14; Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 24; Piper, 1994: 14; Smith,
1994: 29, 56; U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 1993: 6; Van Hear, 1998: 94; Human Rights Watch, 2000.
1321 Loescher, 2001: 286.
1319
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6.1 Contextual Environment & Predisposing Conditions
Ethnicity in Burma
Burma is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. Over 100 languages have
been identified in the country and over 135 ethnic/racial groups.1322 In the early 1990s, ethnic
minorities made up least a third of the country’s 40 million people, inhabiting half the land. 1323
The majority of the population is ethnic Burmese, or Burmans, estimated to comprise 6070%,1324 with the remaining 30-40% ethnic minorities, the largest of which are the Karen, Shan,
Arakanese, and Mon.1325 Buddhism is the dominant religion of over 80% of the population. 1326
Its special status is outlined in Article 21(1) of the 1947 constitution: “The State recognizes
the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of citizens of the
Union.”1327 Minority religions include Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Animism.1328 Though
census figures are highly politicized, the 1983 census specified the Muslim population in
Burma was 3.9 percent of the total population of 34 million, or 1.3 million. 1329
Sub-national ethnic and religious diversity is also salient. In the 1990s, the SLORC
government estimated the total population in Arakan State was 2.4 million, of which 690,000
(or 29%) were Muslim, and the rest (71%) Arakanese Buddhist.1330 However, Muslims
contested that figure claiming their population was more than half of the total, or 1.4

Smith, 1991: 29-30; Smith, 1994: 17-18; Cheesman, 2017: 468; Center for Diversity & National Harmony,
2018: 202; MacLean, 2019: 88.
1323 Smith, 1994: 17.
1324 Walton, 2013: 6.
1325 Smith, 1994: 34.
1326 Smith, 1994: 18.
1327 Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947. Interestingly no specific mention of Buddhism, or any other
religions, was included in the 1974 Constitution.
1328 Smith, 1994: 34.
1329 Yegar, 2002: 358; International Crisis Group, 2014: 18.
1330 Smith, 1994: 57.
1322
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million.1331 Regardless, while the Muslim population in Burma as a whole is quite small,
Muslims are a sizable minority in Arakan state, and in northern Arakan they are the majority. 1332
Most Muslims in Arakan are Rohingya, and they largely reside in the two northernmost
townships of the state—Maungdaw and Buthidaung—which border Bangladesh (See Map
5).1333 The Kaman are another Muslim group in Arakan, but their population is estimated to
be in the low tens of thousands.1334 The Rohingya speak an Indo-Aryan language—a
combination of Arakanese, Bengli, and Urdu—that is distinct but mutually intelligible to the
Bengali dialect spoken across the border by the Chittagonian people in Bangladesh.1335

Smith, 1994: 57.
Van Hear, 1998: 95; Human Rights Watch, 2000.
1333 Van Hear, 1998: 95; Human Rights Watch, 2000.
1334 Kyaw, 2017: 284.
1335 Yegar, 2002: 51; Ibrahim, 2018: 21; Myint-U, 2021: 27.
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Map 5: Ethnic groups and ethnic minority state political boundaries in Burma 1336

During the colonial period, the British governed Burma in two distinct parts:
“Ministerial Burma” including Rangoon and the Irrawaddy delta, and the “Frontier [or
Excluded] Areas” composed of the territory in the border regions.1337 The colonial
government’s focus was on central Burma where the Burmese majority was concentrated. This
division of center and periphery, Burmese and non-Burmese, would have important
implications for the post-colonial state. The geographic division of ethnicity continued in the
post-colonial period with the 1947 constitution codifying three ethnic minority states (Shan,

1336
1337

Source: Smith, 1994: 51; Callahan, 2003: 28; Aljazeera, 2019; Euro-Burma Office (EBO) Myanmar, 2022.
Walton, 2013: 7; Ibrahim, 2018: 26.
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Kachin, Karenni), a special ethnic region (Kaw-thu-lay),1338 and a special ethnic division
(Chins).1339 These minority areas enjoyed some local autonomy from 1948-1962, but that was
rescinded under the dictatorship of General Ne Win (1962-1988), who established Burma as
a unitary state.1340
From its founding, ethnicity has been highly charged in Burma and language and
names are contentious. In 1989, the new SLORC government changed the official Englishlanguage name of the country from Burma to Myanmar,1341 while the name in Burmese
remained unchanged: Myanma pyi.1342 The government claimed that the new [English language]
name, was more inclusive toward country’s indigenous peoples.1343 However, many ethnic
minorities in Burma rejected the name on the grounds that “Myanma” only referred to the
Burmese majority, accusing the government of a larger campaign of Burmanization. 1344
Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi also criticized the name change while under
house arrest:
“No one should be allowed to change the name of the country without referring to
the will of the people. They [the government] say that ‘Myanmar’ refers to all the
Burmese ethnic groups, whereas ‘Burma’ only refers to the Burmese ethnic group, but
that is not true. ‘Myanmar’ is a literary word for ‘Burma’ and it refers only to the
Burmese ethnic group. Of course I prefer the word ‘Burma.’”1345

Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947. Article IX (Part III, Section 180) of the 1947 Constitution allowed
for a Special Commission to be appointed by the President to determine if the majority of people in Karenni
State, the Salween District, and the adjacent areas occupied by the Karens, desired to form a state. Thus Section
181 created the Special Region of Kaw-thu-lay until (and if) Karen State was constituted under Section 180.
1339 Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947.
1340 Steinberg, 1980: 182; Smith, 1999: 200.
1341 Walton, 2013: 12; Myint-U, 2021: 43.
1342 Permanent Committee on Geographical Names, 2007: 7; Myint-U, 2021: xvii.
1343 Walton, 2013: 12; Ferguson, 2015: 16; Myint-U, 2021: xviii.
1344 Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 43; Smith, 1994: 18; Walton, 2013: 11-12, 21; Ferguson, 2015: 16; MyintU, 2021: 44.
1345 Cockett, 2015: 82.
1338
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Burma has been, and continues to be, at war with its ethnic minorities in the world’s longest
running civil conflict.1346 The Rohingya have been a unique target in this complex ethnic
landscape.

Rohingya in Pre-Colonial & Colonial Burma
The Muslim presence in the boundaries of contemporary Burma dates to the arrival of
Moorish, Arab, and Persian traders who settled in the area between the ninth and tenth
centuries and intermarried with the local population.1347 European travelogues from as early as
the fifteenth century document bustling Muslim settlements conducting commercial trade
from ports that were conveniently located at the halfway point along shipping routes from the
Red Sea to the Spice Islands and China.1348 Over the following centuries, Muslim migration
continued across the Bay of Bengal. Many settled in Arakan which is topographically separated
from the rest of Burma by a coastal mountain range, which made contact with—and migration
from—the west much easier than from the east (See Map 6).1349 In 1785 the Kingdom of
Burma annexed Arakan, putting the Burmese on a collision course with British imperial
hegemony in South Asia.1350

Myint-U, 2021: 3.
Piper, 1994: 12; Van Hear, 1998: 94; Yegar, 1972: 72; Yegar, 2002: 19; Ibrahim, 2018: 21.
1348 Yegar, 2002: 19-20.
1349 Yegar, 2002: 23; Ibrahim, 2018: 18.
1350 Christie, 1996: 163; Yegar, 2002: 24; Cockett, 2015: 6; Ibrahim, 2018: 18.
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Map 6: Topography of Burma1351

Beginning in 1824, the British fought multiple wars (1824-1826; 1852-1853; 1885)
against Burmese monarchs to expand their South Asian colonial territories, eventually
conquering all of Burma’s contemporary boundaries.1352 In the first war of 1824-1826, the
British annexed Arakan; in the second (1852-1853) they conquered “Lower Burma,” including
the Irrawaddy Delta and Rangoon; and finally in in third Anglo-Burmese war of 1885 they
captured the Burmese heartland of “Upper Burma” with aspirations to open trade with
China.1353

Sources: Maphill, 2022.
Human Rights Watch, 2000; Yegar, 2002: 27; Callahan, 2003: 22-23; Myint-U, 2021: 14.
1353 Christie, 1996: 164; Cockett, 2015: 7; Ibrahim, 2018: 18, 26; Myint-U, 2021: 15.
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From 1885, the British ruled Burma as a province of their larger Indian empire with
the administrative capital in Calcutta (later New Delhi).1354 The territory served as a convenient
buffer between French Indochina and British India.1355 By ruling Burma as an Indian
appendage, the British stifled the political development of Burmese society. They used the
Indian Army to maintain “internal security” and repress any resistance to their rule. 1356 The
British invested most of their resources in central “Ministerial Burma,” with its capital in
Rangoon, which became a major commercial hub, exploiting the territory’s vast natural
resources including oil, rubber, jade, tungsten, teakwood, and rice.1357 The Frontier Areas, by
contrast, were largely left alone, with limited penetration by the colonial state, and were thus
less developed.1358 As indicated in Map 6, the Frontier Areas were geographical more
mountainous and physically separate from the Burmese core, which practically contributed to
the decision for the dual governance structure. Given the freedom of movement within the
British Indian Empire, many Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and others came by ship to the capital
to work as laborers, administrators, and professionals.1359 They were preferred by the British
over the local Burmese inhabitants and by the early 1930s the Indian-origin population in
Burma grew to one million, or 7% of the total population—most of whom fled Rangoon with
the British during the Japanese invasion (more below).1360
This pattern of migration was not confined to the capital. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, migration to Arakan increased significantly. Many Muslim

Callahan, 2003: 23; Cockett, 2015: 9-10; Ibrahim, 2018: 26.
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1356 Callahan, 2003: 22, 43.
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1358 Callahan, 2003: 27.
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Chittagonians from Bengal moved to the area to work as agricultural laborers. 1361 Burma’s
Irrawaddy Delta was the global center of rice cultivation, and Arakan a hub for rice-export
trade.1362 Some of the Chittagonian Muslims were returning to homes their ancestors had fled
during the Kingdom of Burma’s annexation of Arakan.1363 Colonial figures estimate that in
1872, 58,000 Muslims lived in Arakan, and nearly 40 years later, in 1911, there were three times
as many.1364 During the same period, the Arakanese Buddhists population only slightly
outnumbered the Muslims with a total population of 209,000.1365 In addition to the influx of
Muslims, many Burmese also flocked to Arakan, gravitating to the economic opportunities of
its main port town of Akyab (Sittwe), which became the fourth largest city in colonial
Burma.1366 Large-scale Muslim migration, and rising Burmese nationalism coupled with
Buddhist religious revival, contributed to growing resentment toward these “unwanted
outsiders” in Arakan.1367
The British did not use the term “Rohingya” to describe the Muslim population in
Arakan.1368 Some Muslims in northern Arakan used the label, which translates into English as
“of Rohang,” or “of Arakan.”1369 Some Muslims referred to themselves as Arakanese
Mohammedans, descendents of the ancient Burmese Mrauk-U kingdom, terms the British also
used.1370 Others were Chittagonian immigrants who intermarried with “Rohang” or

Van Hear, 1998: 94; Yegar, 2002: 28; Cockett, 2015: 37; Myint-U, 2021: 18.
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“Arakanese Mohammedans” that had lived in the region for generations. 1371 Many Rohingya
therefore had roots in Arakan before British colonization, but many more arrived with British
colonial expansion into Burma.1372 Intermarriage between these various groups created a
complex picture of “descent” and “origin.”
In 1922, the British granted Burma a semi-elected parliament, like its other Indian
provinces, with a Governor and a Legislative Council, but final decision making on key issues
remained with the British.1373 Then in 1937 the British partitioned its Indian Empire, creating
Burma as a separate colony, but without independence.1374 A few years later in 1942, during
the Second World War, the Japanese invaded Burma. The Japanese invasion destroyed the
British colonial and administrative structure that had been in place for more than five
decades.1375 Burmese nationalists seeking an independent state, initially supported the Japanese
invasion, to remove their British colonizer.1376
After their swift defeat by the Japanese, the British recruited and trained ethnic
minorities in clandestine intelligence and formed paramilitary organizations to fight against the
Japanese.1377 The British “psychological warfare” officers used propaganda to woo recruits to
their side, praising “loyal” ethnic minorities against “treacherous” Burmans supporting the
Japanese.1378 The Rohingya, and other ethnic minorities, supported the British, fearing
Buddhist majority rule. They were also optimistic about the British promise of post-war self-
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determination—in the case of the Rohingya, autonomy in the form of a Muslim National
Area.1379 However, as with its promises to the Kurds, Assyrians, and Palestinians, the British
failed to deliver. In late 1944, the British joined forces with the Burmese nationalists, who had
become disillusioned by the Japanese occupation, and they jointly defeated the Japanese in
August 1945.1380 The British briefly retook control of a war-ravaged Burma, but as part of
imperial down-sizing it was granted independence on January 4, 1948.1381

Post-Colonial Political Transition
The independent government of Prime Minister U Nu tried to govern the country as a unitary
state, something the British had never tried to do. The 1947 Constitution established three
ethnic minority states, granting them some local autonomy, and allowing for the possibility of
secession via a plebiscite after a ten-year period.1382 These autonomy concessions did not
prevent the outbreak of civil war.1383 Various insurgencies sprouted with different political
(communist) and ethnic factions fighting for civil, economic, and territorial control. The
central government tried, unsuccessfully, to contain them but the fighting raged on leading to
an “equilibrium of instability.”1384 Although Burma was perpetually in crisis in its early
independence period it did manage to hold elections in 1951-1952, 1956, and 1960.1385
However, its short life as a parliamentary democracy ended in 1962 when General Ne Win
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took power in a military coup d’état.1386 One of the driving forces for Ne Win’s coup was the
military’s fear that Prime Minister U Nu was granting too many concessions to the ethnic
minority states, risking Burma’s territorial sovereignty. 1387 On the morning of the coup, Ne
Win was quoted as saying, “Federalism is impossible; it will destroy the Union.”1388
After taking power, Ne Win quickly suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament,
outlawed political parties, and ruled through a “Revolutionary Council.”1389 The Revolutionary
Council introduced a Marxist-Leninist state ideology with one-party rule of the Burma Socialist
Programme Party (BSPP) and the Burmese Way to Socialism as the guiding strategy to create
a centralized, command economy, without foreign influence or control.1390 Ne Win pursued a
dual track strategy of centralizing control in Rangoon and conducting ruthless
counterinsurgency programs in the periphery to crush the ethnic insurgent opposition. 1391
Though he successfully pushed some insurgent groups into more remote areas of the border
regions, he could not fully suppress them.1392
In 1974 the government introduced a new constitution which officially established
Burma as a unitary state and renamed the country the Socialist Republic of the Union of
Burma. The Constitution rescinded the local autonomy previously granted to some of ethnic
minorities and created a new administrative structure. Article 31 outlined seven ethnic minority
states1393 (Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah (formerly Karenni), Mon, Arakan, Shan), alongside
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seven Burmese divisions (Sagaing, Tenasserim, Pegu, Magwe, Mandalay, Rangoon,
Irrawaddy).1394 However, these ethnic minority states had no devolved political power, they
were simply administrative units. The new constitution eliminated any possibility of their
autonomy, secession, or independent political representation.1395 There was no division of
powers between the center and the states.1396
Economically, Ne Win’s Burmese Way to Socialism had devastating consequences.
The government nationalized businesses in the 1960s, driving out hundreds of thousands of
private businesses dominated by Indian and Chinese traders, to create a “Burman run
economy solely for the Burmans.”1397 International travel was banned, except for a privileged
military elite, with the intent of eliminating any foreign engagement or influence.1398 The
country became further economically and politically isolated and the people suffered as a
result. This economic and political repression would lead to the 1988 student uprisings.

Rohingya in Independent Burma
Violence in Arakan bridged the pre- and post- colonial periods. As mentioned above, the
Rohingya supported the British during WWII and fought against the Japanese—and their
Arakanese Buddhist backers—to re-take control of the territory. The Arakanese Buddhists
resented the Rohingya for supporting the British, viewing them as national traitors. 1399 This
resentment, and competition over land and resources, led to localized inter-communal
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violence, with previously mixed Rohingya-Arakanese (Buddhist) communities segregating into
a largely Muslim north and Buddhist south.1400 During this period a new wave of immigrants
from Chittagong moved into northern Arakan together with returning Rohingya who had fled
to Bengal during the war.1401
In the post-war, but pre-independence, period the Muslim community in northern
Arakan was politically divided. In May 1946 some Muslim leaders called for secession of the
Muslim-majority areas of Arakan to join what was soon to be East Pakistan. 1402 Later in July,
the North Arakan Muslim League called for self-determination and the creation of an
independent Muslim state.1403 Both of these movements were largely supported by
Chittagonian Muslims rather than the Rohingya.1404 However, these ideas were quickly
squashed by Ali Jinnah, head of the Muslim League of India, who did not want to arouse
Burmese hostility and did not support Arakan secession.1405 Jinnah told General Aung Sang,
the lead Burmese negotiator with the British, that he did not back the irredentist Muslims
groups.1406 In April of 1947, at a meeting in Maungdaw, a third group called for a special
Muslim region, or “Frontier State,” that would be separate from Buddhist Arakan but within
the state of Burma.1407 Many Muslims of Arakan, including the Rohingya, supported this
proposal.
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After Burma’s independence in January 1948, violence continued in Arakan and the
Rohingya took up arms against the state.1408 Arakanese Buddhists replaced Muslim civil
servants, police, and headmen in political positions, and they allowed Buddhists to claim
Muslim land and homes that they had been removed from during the Japanese sweep. 1409 In
April 1948, four months after independence, Muslim religious leaders called for a jihad. 1410
When the government failed to recognize the Mujahideen’s demands for autonomy, language
and education rights, and legal status for their movement they continued their guerilla
warfare.1411 From 1948-1951 the Mujahideen, sometimes called the Mujahid movement, fought
for control of northern Arakan. While the Burmese government was focused on battling the
communist insurgency in the north, and larger ethnic minority insurgencies in the east, the
Mujahideen successfully reclaimed large portions of northern Arakan.1412 During this period,
competing ideas of secession versus autonomy persisted within the rebel movement.
Without the capacity to suppress the Muslim insurgency, the Burmese government
embarked on scattered short-term scorched-earth policies before departing to fight a different
insurgency in another part of the country.1413 This only further galvanized support for the
Mujahidden. From 1951-1954 the government allocated more resources to repressing the
Mujahideen. Eventually in November 1954 the government launched a major offensive called
Operation Monsoon killing many Mujahideen leaders and breaking the strength of the
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group.1414 Small-scale skirmishes continued in the late 1950s but eventually, in 1961, the
remaining Mujahideen fighters surrendered to the Burmese army.1415
Throughout the 1950s, Muslim political leaders continued to lobby the government
for a separate autonomous area within Burma, apart from a future Arakan state, which the
Arakanese Buddhists advocated.1416 In 1961, the same year the rebels surrendered, the
government created the Mayu Frontier Administration—including Maungdaw, Buthidaung,
and western Rathendaung—giving the Muslims the separate area they had demanded. But it
was far from an autonomous territory; instead, it was established under direct military control
and administered by army officers.1417 With limited room for negotiation, the Rohingya
leadership agreed to the new arrangement. The following year, all thoughts of ethnic autonomy
within Burma were crushed by the 1962 Ne Win coup.
Ne Win’s military government sought to suppress all ethnic minority claims, fearing
territorial disintegration of the state. Although the Muslim insurgency was suppressed in 1961,
underground organizations emerged throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In 1963 the Rohingya
Independence Front (RIF) and the Muslim/Arakan National Liberation Party were created,
now seeking separation from Burma rather than autonomy.1418 A little over a decade later, the
Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF) broke away from the RIF in 1974, aspiring to obtain territorial
autonomy for two areas in northern Arakan—Maungdaw and Buthidaung.1419 The RPF quick
fractured into the Islamic-oriented Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) in 1982, and the
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Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF), which was known for being more moderate. 1420 The
RSO and the ARIF were the main Rohingya armed groups at the time of the 1991-1992
expulsion.
While other ethnic minority insurgent groups were militarily targeted by the state, the
Ne Win regime questioned the Rohingya’s very right to reside in Burma, branding them as
“aliens” and accusing them of being “illegal migrants” from Bangladesh. No other minority
group was targeted as being outside of the state, labelled as non-citizens or foreigners. Ne Win
first went after the Rohingya in 1978 in Operation Nag-min (Dragon King). The operation
was presented as a routine check of “illegal immigrants” in advance of a national census. 1421
The alleged administrative process quickly turned violent and the military expelled over
200,000 Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh between April and July.1422 Reports by human rights
groups and refugees documented the Burmese military’s use of torture, rape, eviction at
gunpoint, the desecration of mosques, and the burning of homes to force Rohingya to flee
Burma.1423 The government claimed to be responding to illegal immigrants who had razed
villages and attacked government buildings, declaring that “wild Muslim extremists” had
ransacked indigenous Buddhist villages.1424 They suggested that those who had left were
evading scrutiny of their documentation, or the lack thereof, despite evidence that many
Rohingya had been long-term residents of Arakan and held valid citizenship papers.1425
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Bangladesh did not want to host this influx of Burmese residents, and swiftly reached a bilateral agreement with the government, sanctioned by the UNHCR, to send the Rohingya back
to Burma.1426 This reversal occurred despite no change in the environment in Arakan state. It
was reported that some refugees returned to find Buddhist settlers occupying their homes. 1427
Nevertheless, nearly 200,000 expellees had returned by the end of 1979.1428
Although the Ne Win regime was stymied in its design to remove the Rohingya, the
government, continued its efforts to encourage their voluntary departure. In a public speech
in 1979 Ne Win doubled down on the necessary exclusion of foreigners or “mixed bloods.”
He stated: “Today you can see that even people of pure blood are being disloyal to the race
and country but are being loyal to others. If people of pure blood act this way, we must
carefully watch people of mixed blood.”1429 The reference to disloyal “pure bloods” was a nod
to ethnic insurgents such as the Karen and Kachin whose inclusion within the state was never
questioned. The “mixed bloods” referred to the Rohingya, who were separated as a distinctly
disloyal group to be “carefully watch[ed].”
Not discouraged by the failure of Operation Dragon King, the Ne Win regime passed
a new Citizenship Law in 1982 which further marginalized the Rohingya. In a speech to the
Central Committee members, General Ne Win explained the rationale for the new law:
“During the period between 1824 and the time we regained independence in January
1948, foreigners, or aliens, entered our country un-hindered under various
pretexts…We then find that our country comprised true nationals, guests, issues from
unions between nationals and guests or mixed bloods, and issues from unions between
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guests and guests…This became a problem after independence. The problem was how
to clarify the position of guests and mixed bloods.”1430
To resolve this issue, the 1982 law created three categories of citizens—full, associate, and
naturalized—all of which were limited to members of Burma’s “national ethnic races.”1431 Ne
Win declared that “racially, only pure-blooded nationals will be called citizens.”1432
Table 24: Categories of Citizens in the 1982 Citizenship Law1433
Full citizens
Descendants of ethnic groups residing in Burma before 1823
Associate citizens
People who obtained citizenship under the 1948 Union Citizenship Law
Residents of Burma before 1948 but who failed to obtain citizenship under
Naturalized citizens
the Union Citizenship Law

The Burmese military regime used 1823 as the critical date for determining
citizenship.1434 Those whose ancestors lived in Burma before 1823—the year before Britain
first invaded Burma and annexed parts of Arakan—were considered natives, whereas those
whose ancestors arrived after were classified as foreigners.1435 This decision particularly
affected the Rohingya who the Burmese government, and large segments of the Burman
majority as well as the Arakanese Buddhists, saw as kala1436 or Bengalis.1437 The claim that the
Rohingya were not indigenous but rather “illegal Bengali” migrants from Bangladesh was used
to justify discrimination and their persecution.
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The 1982 Law also stated that the Council of State would “decide whether any ethnic
group is national or not.”1438 It provided a specific body to which one could appeal citizenship
disputes, but the law did not set forth how the Council of State would determine who qualified
as an ethnic group, nor did it provide an authoritative list of the “national ethnic races.”1439
These determinations were left up to Council—a political, not a judicial body. The Rohingya
were thus not denied citizenship because of the 1982 law, but rather through the application
of the law and the absence of any safeguards against discrimination.1440
Ne Win’s focus on citizenship, and the deliberate exclusion of the Rohingya from the
allegedly indigenous “national/ethnic races,” made their situation distinct from the other
ethnic minorities. In addition, during the 1970s and 1980s, in the face of ethnic heterogeneity,
the military shifted to seeing Buddhism at the litmus test for national belonging.1441 The largest
ethnic minorities—Shan, Karen, Mon—were majority Buddhist. Therefore there was a crosscutting religious tie with the majority Burmese, that was absent with the Muslim Rohingya.
From the perspective of the government, the Rohingya were ethnic, national, and religious
outsiders. Therefore, their policy was not just to suppress and control Rohingya insurgencies,
like their policy toward other ethnic insurgent groups, but to remove them. While Ne Win
failed in his efforts to do this, the new SLORC regime would try again.
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Student Uprisings & the SLORC regime
By 1988, Burma had been ruled by the military junta, known as the Tatmadaw, for 26 years.1442
The junta’s “Burmese Way to Socialism” was an abysmal failure and the economy was in
tatters.1443 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Tatmadaw isolated itself from the people of
Burma and focused on its own financial enrichment, to the detriment of society.1444 In
September 1987, Ne Win decided to demonetize major currency notes resulting in an
estimated 70 percent of all currency being immediately rendered valueless, wiping out the
limited savings that people had.1445 The currency devaluation occurred in tandem with
shortages of goods and the collapse of the rice market, Burma’s main connection with
international trade.1446
In March 1988, in response to the economic collapse and years of restricted civil and
political rights, student-led protests erupted across the country calling for the end of one-party
military rule, the introduction of democratic reforms including free and fair multi-party
elections, and the end to human rights abuses.1447 The government responded with repression
and introduced new restrictions, including a ban on all public gatherings.1448 Hundreds of nonviolent protestors were arrested and killed. In response to popular pressure, and pressure
within the Tatmadaw, General Ne Win resigned as head of the ruling party in July 1988. 1449
But protests continued, unsatisfied with the new leaders of the BSPP. On August 8
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demonstrators called for a nationwide general strike and slowly gained the support of workers,
Buddhist monks, government ministries, state media, and even some police.1450 The strike
resulted in the bloodiest days of the year with the UN Commission on Human Rights
estimating that 3,000 people were killed during August 8-12.1451 The army reasserted control
on September 18, replacing the previous BSPP with the SLORC under the chairmanship of
Chief of Staff Senior General Saw Maung—more of a rebranding than any real break with the
past.1452
The SLORC imposed martial law, suspended the 1974 constitution, banned
opposition parties, arrested party leaders, and detained protestors, while simultaneously
announcing democratic elections to be held in May 1990 and opening the country’s
economy.1453 While the Tatmadaw espoused a preference to move toward democratization,
repression continued and the military expanded dramatically from an estimated 180,000 troops
in 1988 to between 250,000 and 300,000 by mid-1992.1454 Thousands of student protestors
fled to the eastern border areas to build an armed resistance against the new government.
Ethnic insurgent groups offered them weapons and training.1455 The military government
viewed the demonstrators, like the ethnic insurgencies, as an existential threat to the state and
mounted a fierce counterinsurgency campaign across the country to snuff out any protestorinsurgent partnerships as well as insurgent secessionist or autonomy revivals.1456 Yet, the
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SLORC decided, simultaneously, to negotiate ceasefires with some insurgent groups that
included economic and territorial autonomy compromises.1457 Between 1989 and 1992 the
government negotiated ceasefires with nine armed ethnic opposition groups, and another five
between 1994-1995.1458 Importantly, ceasefires were not offered to the two Rohingya insurgent
groups (ARIF and RSO).1459
Relatively free elections were held in 1990. To the military’s great surprise, the
opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory, winning 80.8
percent of the parliamentary seats, compared to 2.1 percent for the military’s National Unity
Party (NUP).1460 The SLORC ignored the results, refused to transfer power to the NLD, and
announced that it would remain in power until a new constitution was drafted.1461 After the
elections, the military arrested some of the newly elected NLD politicians and continued its
repression. Amnesty International documented over 1,500 political prisoners arrested and
serious human rights abuses throughout the country—charges the SLORC vehemently
denied.1462
Like the rest of the country, the electorate of Arakan, including the Rohingya, largely
voted against the NUP, and in favor of various opposition parties, including the Muslim
National Democratic Party for Human Rights.1463 Military repression in Arakan state did not
begin until late 1989, and in the northernmost areas where the Rohingya were concentrated,
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not until late 1990.1464 As in the other ethnic minority areas—particularly those of the Karen
and Mon—the Burmese military forced Rohingya men into hard labor, arbitrarily arrested
alleged political opponents, confiscated livestock and crops, raped women, and beat or killed
anyone who did not comply.1465 This repression was meted out across the country to regain
military control and punish those who rebelled—at the ballot box or in the streets. Muslims
that had participated in anti-government protests were punished with distinct severity, despite
country-wide, multi-ethnic, participation in the demonstrations.1466

6.2 Mass Expulsion of Rohingya (1991-1992)
Rohingya refugees began fleeing to Bangladesh in March 1991, with numbers slowly increasing
throughout the early part of the year.1467 In August 1991, the conflict intensified with a
dramatic increase in the military presence in the area—an estimated 10,000-20,000 troops
arrived in Mawdaung and Buthidaung townships—double the total from the year before.1468
The military personnel deployed included various army contingents, local riot police, and the
Lone Htein, a paramilitary border force known for its brutality.1469 While some of the tactics
used against the Rohingya resembled those used against other ethnic minorities in Burma,
others were distinct. The Lone Htein destroyed mosques and Muslim cemeteries, burned
Muslim villages, and evicted Rohingya from their homes, replacing them with Arakanese
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Buddhists.1470 They confiscated the Rohingya’s National Registration Cards, in addition to
money and other goods, and in some cases destroyed their documents—a clear attempt to
deny their right to reside in the country.1471 The army forced the Rohingya to construct new
villages for Arakanese Buddhists.1472
In September 1991, the Tatmadaw launched a “border development programme” in
Arakan in which Rohingya were deliberately expelled from the area and Muslim lands and
property were forcibly transferred to Arakanese (Buddhist) or Burmese settlers.1473 The first
among these settlers were 70 families of former military personnel, who moved north from
Akyab, the capital of Arakan, to Maungdaw.1474 It was alleged that the resettlement of
Buddhists into former Muslim areas and homes was to create a “religious and ethnic buffer”
along the Burma-Bangladesh border.1475 While many minority groups, as well as Burman
protestors, faced repression in the early 1990s, the ethnically distinct tactics used against the
Rohingya and the deliberate and systematic abuses to remove Rohingya from northern Arakan
and to force them into Bangladesh made their treatment unique in Burma.1476
By October, concern rose within the Bangladesh government about the rising number
of refugees, no doubt with memories of the 1978 Operation Dragon King in mind, and Dhaka
officials raised the forced removal of the Rohingya with their Burmese counterparts.1477 These
diplomatic efforts fell on deaf ears. According to one Bangladeshi official: “The Burmese

Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 24; Asia Watch, 1992: 1; Piper, 1994: 15-16; Lambrecht, 1995: 4; Van
Hear, 1998: 98; Yegar, 2002: 63.
1471 Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 14; Asia Watch, 1992: 5; Lambrecht, 1995: 14.
1472 Amnesty International, 1992 (Apr): 2.
1473 Amnesty International, 1992 (Sept): 24; Smith, 1994: 56, 82; Charney, 2009: 184; Van Hear, 1998: 98.
1474 Smith, 1994: 82.
1475 Smith, 1994: 82.
1476 Piper, 1994: 15.
1477 “Burmese Refugee ‘Problem’ Continues.” Hong Kong AFP (20 October 1991).
1470

336

military government has not responded positively to our letter on the exodus of the refugees
and we will seek international help if diplomatic initiatives bear no fruit.”1478
During this period, the RSO and ARIF tried to revitalize their armed struggles,
although they shifted their demand away from independence or local autonomy toward
support for the coalition NLD government, hoping that Aung San Suu Kyi would offer the
Rohingya improved civil and political rights.1479 In November 1991 the RSO clashed with
Burmese armed forces.1480 The same month, Bangladesh sent its Foreign Minister, Mustafizur
Rahman, to Rangoon to discuss the expulsion and the necessity of returning the Rohingya
Muslims.1481 Dhaka Radio broadcast that the Foreign Minister “received firm assurance from
his Myanmar counterpart that Yangon [Rangoon] will take expeditious steps in this regard.”1482
Yet in early December, a refugee from Labadogh village, Buthidaung told Asia Watch that
“soldiers announced that all Muslims must leave.”1483
Tension between Burma and Bangladesh increased in December when the Lone Htein
attacked the Rejupara border outpost in Bangladesh—allegedly in pursuit of Rohingya
rebels.1484 The Burmese paramilitary unit killed four Bangladeshis including one soldier,
wounded 22, and stole weapons and ammunition from the border post.1485 The Burmese junta
accused Bangladesh of harboring insurgents and allowing them to use their territory as a base
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from which to launch attacks against the army, a charge Dhaka fiercely denied. 1486 The Working
People’s Daily, a state-controlled Burma newspaper, reported on January 27, 1992 that,
“Fighting along the border will continue as long as there are insurgents who cross and re-cross
the border carrying out their operations.”1487 Atrocities against the Rohingya intensified at the
end of January with an increase in killings of forced laborers and death because of starvation
and inhumane conditions.1488 Toward the end of January and early February, between 40,00045,000 Rohingya had fled to Bangladesh, with hundreds crossing the border daily.1489
Throughout the first two months of 1992, Bangladesh and Burma held four rounds of
talks to deescalate border tensions and avoid inter-state war.1490 By mid-February the SLORC
retracted its explanation that the border raid was in pursuit of Rohingya rebels and returned
the stolen weapons, but refused to apologize for the deaths.1491 For its part the Burma
government blamed external forces for “trying to drive a wedge between Myanmar and
Bangladesh.”1492 By the end of February, the number of Rohingya in Bangladesh had doubled
to 80,000.1493
The expulsion outflows reached their apex in March 1992, one year after the first
expellees arrived in Bangladesh, with 5,000 Rohingya crossing the border daily. 1494
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Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Khaleda Zia announced that the total number of refugees had
risen to more than 200,000.1495 The Bangladeshi authorities established 12 refugee camps, with
support from the UN, to shelter the Rohingya refugees—temporarily.1496 The Burmese military
demonstrated the intended permanence of the expulsion by increasing its security along the
border with Bangladesh to prevent refugees from returning to their homes.1497
Once in Bangladesh, Rohingya refugees reported a consistent pattern of abuse by the
Burmese armed forces. They told the Rohingya that they “should leave and…weren’t wanted
in Burma,” that they were “Bangladeshi tourists,” that “this is not your land, it is ours,” and
that they “would be killed if [they] tried to go back.”1498 When one Rohingya refugee tried to
report the rape of several women to the local police he was arrested and told, “You are not
Burmese. We are torturing you so you will leave this country. We will continue until you are
gone.”1499 Another said, “When we were beaten at different times we were often told that we
should leave and that we weren’t wanted in Burma. They said also that we would be killed if
we tried to go back.”1500 Refugees reported that their documents were confiscated by the Lone
Htein border guards who told them that they would “shoot them if they returned.” 1501 The
common refrain was “go back to your own country,” and “get out of Burma and go to
Bangladesh.”1502
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The ethnic targeting, the pattern of language used by the military units, and the public
announcements from senior government officials, indicate a clear intention to remove the
Rohingya from Burma through a policy of expulsion. By July 1992, more than 250,000
Rohingya had been expelled, an estimated 18-36 percent of the total Rohingya population of
the country.1503

6.3 Expulsion Motivation: Counterinsurgency
Burma’s expulsion of Rohingya Muslims is an episode of a counterinsurgency expulsion (see
Figure 17). Counterinsurgency expulsions occur when governments seek to consolidate, and
strengthen, the nation and when the target group is perceived to be a security threat to the
state.

Security

Economic
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Fifth Column

Anti-Colonialism
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Figure 17: Taxonomy of mass expulsion - Burma,
1991-1992
Target Group Threat

Counterinsurgency/
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of Rohingya expelled was 36%, using the Muslim figures the total was 18%, and if the true population figures are
somewhere in the middle (1,050,000) then the percentage of the population expelled was 24%. In both absolute
and relative terms this was a large-scale expulsion, targeting a significant portion of the group.
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After it took power in September 1988, the SLORC initiated a new phase of nationbuilding. The junta first changed the official English-language names of administrative units
throughout the country, affecting not only the name of the state (Burma to Myanmar) but also
the names of lower administrative units such as Arakan State to Rakhine State, and the capital
city Rangoon to Yangon.1504 The government explained these changes as an effort to distance
itself from the British colonial era and revise names in line with its ancient roots that were
more inclusive to all people in the country.1505 However, during the colonial period, the British
had recorded the English-language names of locations in the country based on transliterations
of the local names in the respective local languages.1506 Therefore, the SLORC’s Englishlanguage name revisions were an effort by the authorities to reflect the Burmese language
pronunciation of names in locales throughout the country.1507 For example, instead of the
English-language place names in Karen state reflecting the local toponyms, the toponymic
spellings were changed to reflect the place name in the language of the dominant Burman
ethnic group.1508 This explains why many ethnic minorities complained that these seemingly
benign name changes were part of a larger government strategy of coercive Burmanization. 1509
The name changes were the first of several such actions toward the “Burmanization”
of the country.1510 The SLORC also re-wrote textbooks emphasizing the unifying Burmese
identity over generations.1511 It launched initiatives to rehabilitate the Mandalay Palace where
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the last Burmese monarch resided, and restored Buddhist stupas, emphasizing the centrality
of Buddhism to the Burma nation.1512 These efforts aimed to consolidate the nation around
the dominant Buddhist, Burman ethno-religious identity.
Given the ethnic diversity in the country, and the lack of a unifying civic or political
identity, the SLORC instituted another nation-building effort in 1990, releasing a list of 135
“national ethnic races”1513 that identified the “true” people of Burma—the “pure-blooded
nationals” Ne Win had described in 1982. These national races became the central determinant
of membership in the political community of the new Burma, rebaptized as Myanmar.1514 The
government did not explain how the 135 races were selected, nor release any data to support
their classification.1515 Some of the national races were categorized based on their language,
others based on their location or home area, and one group—the Mro/Wakim—was listed
twice.1516 Some have argued that the SLORC’s new national/ethnic race list, with 135
“distinct” groups, was a government strategy to divide the ethnic minorities into sub-groups,
diluting the power of the larger ethnic groups like the Shan and Kachin. 1517 The new list
separated the Shan into 33 ethnic groups and the Kachin into 12 groups, but it did not create
any new administrative units or provide any autonomy for them.1518 While the naming of the
135 national/ethnic races may have seemed like the Tatmadaw’s recognition of the diversity
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of Burma, it was a part of their counterinsurgency strategy to divide-and-rule the ethnic
minorities.1519
The Rohingya were not included in the list of 135 national races. 1520 Given that
citizenship in Burma was predicated on membership to a national race, this solidified the
Rohingya’s exclusion from the state. In February 1992, during the expulsion, Burma’s Minister
of Foreign Affairs, U Ohn Gyaw, stated in a press release that:
“In actual fact, although there are 135 national races living in Myanmar today, the socalled Rohingya people is not one of them. Historically, there has never been a ‘Rohingya’ race in
Myanmar…Since the First Anglo-Myanmar War in 1824, people of Muslim faith from
the adjacent country illegally entered Myanmar Naing-Ngan, particularly Rakhine State...It
should be categorically stated that there is no persecution whatever based on religious ground”
[emphasis added].1521
The SLORC rejected the use of the term “Rohingya,” and denied that they were a distinct
group.1522
The last component of the SLORC’s nation-consolidating strategy was a change in
identity documentation with the introduction of Citizenship Scrutiny Cards (CSCs) to replace
the National Registration Cards (NRCs).1523 The SLORC required that all citizens obtain a
CSC which documented the nationality and religious status of the card bearer in addition to
his residence, occupation, father’s name, and blood type.1524 These identification cards further
cemented the bond between race/ethnicity and citizenship in Burma, and further marginalized
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the Rohingya. To obtain a CSC one had to surrender his NRC. The Rohingya who did so were
not issued CSCs1525 and were thus left undocumented.1526
Although

the

Tatmadaw

implemented

Burmanization

programs,

national

consolidation policies are not sufficient to bring about expulsion, a target group must also be
identified as a security or economic threat. In 1991-1992, the Burmese government
unmistakably designated the Rohingya as a security threat. The SLORC claimed that their
increased military presence in Arakan was in direct response to “insurgent activity in the
area.”1527 They blamed Muslim armed opposition groups, specifically the RSO and the ARIF
for causing the crisis and precipitating their response.1528 In fact, the SLORC blamed the
Bangladesh border incident in December 1991, in which the Lone Htein killed three
Bangladeshi civilians and one soldier, on Muslim insurgents whom the Burmese border guards
were simply pursuing across the border.1529
During a government coordination meeting in January 1992, broadcast on Rangoon
TV, the Chairman of the SLORC and commander-in-chief of the defense forces, General Saw
Maung, stated, “I should say I saved Myanmar, and you must completely crush all insurgents who
are engaged in the armed struggle against the state” [emphasis added].1530 A Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs press release the following month reinforced General Saw Maung’s message. In
response to government actions against the Rohingya it stated:
“The very name Rohingya was a creation of a group of insurgents in the Rakhine State…It
should be categorically stated that there is no persecution based on religious
grounds...Like all other countries of the world, Myanmar exercises its inherent right of
self-defense in suppressing insurgents in the country, but it needs to emphasize that the action
has no connection with race or religion, but was undertaken to suppress armed terrorists”
[emphasis added].1531
Burma’s Foreign Minister Gyaw stated at a press conference in March 1992, “May I take this
opportunity to stress that there exists an inter-relationship between the insurgency in the country
and the so-called cross-border human traffic” [emphasis added].1532 Later in May 1992, Gyaw
told the BBC in an interview that “The Rohingyas had left Myanmar for their own reasons,
possibly being incited to do so by rebel insurgents”1533 [emphasis added].
The state-run media also emphasized that the Rohingya were a threat to the state. The
Working People’s Daily consistently referred to them as “terrorists.”1534 Echoing senior Burma
officials’ language it wrote that,
“The Defense Services has no reason to go on watching those Rohingya insurgents as
admirable objects of beautify [sic]. The Defense Services therefore goes out to remove
them. These insurgents fled to sanctuaries across the border. They regroup on the west of the
border and make preparations to renew their incursions” [emphasis added].1535
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Similarly, the Rangoon TV Network covered an international visit to the Burma-Bangladesh
border in March 1992, led by Foreign Minister Gyaw, reporting that:
“The members of the delegation were briefed on and shown propaganda fabricated
and distributed by Rohingya insurgent organizations RSO [Rohingya Solidarity
Organization], ARIF [Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front], and RPF [Rohingya Patriotic
Front] in U Ottama Hall in Buthidaung” [emphasis added]. 1536
The government and its media organizations explained the military action in northern Arakan
as a response to Rohingya insurgents.
Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh corroborated the military’s accusations about
insurgent activity in Arakan. A Rohingya farmer from Buthidaung township told Amnesty
International that, “One day the MI 18 [military intelligence] came and dragged me from my
house and beat me with a stick stuck through with two nails. They accused me of having contact
with the insurgents and of going to Bangladesh to meet them” 1537 [emphasis added]. Two students
reported a similar experience of being arrested and interrogated by the military and police
accused of “having contacts with the insurgent group the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation”1538
[emphasis added]. Others were not so lucky. Refugees described a 30-year-old man who was
shot outside his home: “They said he was an RSO [Rohingya Solidarity Organization] insurgent, but
he was just an ordinary farmer” [emphasis added].1539
Given the continued armed struggle of the RSO and the ARIF, and the history of
insurgent activity in northern Arakan, the SLORC viewed the Rohingya a security threat. 1540
In early 1992, the leaders of the RSO and ARIF fed into this narrative. In February 1992 as
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Rohingya refugees were flooding into Bangladesh in their thousands, a leader of the RSO told
the media that, “50,000 Rohingyas inside Burma were trained and ready to fight Burmese
troops deployed in Arakan.”1541 Nurul Islam, chairman of the ARIF, told Agence FrancePresse (AFP) in March 1992: “We are determined to fight to free our homeland from the
tyranny of the Burmese military junta.”1542 Yet despite claims of sizable armed forces, evidence
on the ground indicated that the RSO and ARIF exaggerated their tactical military
capabilities.1543 When compared with other insurgent groups such as the Karen or the Kachin
guerrillas, the Rohingya groups were small, unorganized, and poorly armed. 1544 In the early
1990s it was estimated that the ARIF had 200 fighters and the RSO 600; neither group was
organized into regular fighting units; and they were armed with outdated submachine guns, a
few automatic rifles, and some more modern weapons.1545 The RSO and ARIF also had limited
support within the broader Rohingya civilian community; unlike other ethnic armed groups in
Burma, they lacked strong political leadership and organization.1546
Nevertheless, the Tatmadaw believed any sign of weakness would cause the country
to break apart.1547 The Tatmadaw saw itself as embodying the “true spirit of the nation” and
the sole institution capable of defending the new “Myanmar nation” from any threats to the
state.1548 Once the Rohingya were identified as such, the military moved in to remove them en
masse.
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Alternative Explanations
To further validate my theory that Burma’s expulsion of Rohingya Muslims in 1991-1992 was
motivated by counterinsurgency objectives, I evaluate and refute four alternative explanations:
anti-Muslim motivation; the Rohingya as a political threat; the Rohingya as an economic threat;
and the argument that the Rohingya were treated similarly to other ethnic minority groups like
the Karen or Kachin.
The first intuitive alternative explanation for the Rohingya expulsion is that the
SLORC wanted to rid the country of Muslim minorities. In the late 1980s, early 1990s, the
SLORC implemented a nationalist revival of the ethno-religious, Burman-Buddhist state.
Since Muslims were excluded from the new national image it is plausible that anti-Muslim
sentiment motivated the expulsion. However, this explanation can be rejected for several
reasons. In 1972 Burma’s Ministry of Home and Religious Affairs documented four categories
of Muslims in their instruction booklet for the 1973 population census: Burman Muslims,
Arakan Muslims (including Rohingya and Kaman), Panthay Muslims (Chinese), and Pashu
Muslims (Malay).1549 If the Burmese government aimed to remove all Muslims from the
Burman-Buddhist majority Burma, why only single out one Muslim group for removal? If the
goal was Muslim expulsion, writ-large, all Muslim groups should have been targeted, but they
were not. Furthermore, the SLORC’s list of 135 national races included the Muslim Kamans
as a sub-group of the Arakan (Rakhine) ethnic group, while excluding the Rohingya. 1550 The
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fact that the Kaman were not expelled in 1991-1992 is more evidence that the junta was not
targeting Muslims, nor Muslims specifically in Arakan State, but rather a specific subpopulation of Muslims: the Rohingya.
A second possible alternative explanation is that the Rohingya were a political threat
to the state, and that their political behavior motivated their expulsion. Although most
Rohingya were disenfranchised because of the citizenship laws, the government did allow
Rohingya politicians with identity cards issued in 1982 to run for office in the 1990 elections,
and eight candidates joined the Rohingya party platform: the National Democratic Party for
Human Rights.1551 The party won four seats in the election, a victory for the party, but less
than one percent of the 485 seats in parliament.1552 After the Tatmadaw refused to accept the
election results, and decided to remain in power, Rohingya electors were accused of using fake
identification documents to run. Some were arrested like other elected officials, particularly
those from the NLD.1553 In general, the political organization among the Rohingya was limited
and cannot explain the government’s expulsion motivation. If the military aimed to expel
serious political threats, the Rohingya would have been far down their list of targets.
Another alternative motivation for the Tatmadaw’s expulsion of the Rohingya could
have been removing an economic threat, like the Asians in Uganda. However, while there were
some successful Rohingya traders and businessmen, they were very few, and the northern
townships targeted in 1991-1992 were the poorer areas of the Muslim-majority sections of
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Arakan state.1554 Arakan, like many of the ethnic minority areas, was economically neglected
by both the British and the Burmese government.1555 Without the natural resources of some
of the other minority states, Arakan was one of the poorest regions in the country. 1556
Moreover, at the local level, rather than being seen as economic competitors, the Arakanese
Buddhist view the Rohingya as “backward,” with high rates of illiteracy.1557 In fact, the “Asians
of Burma”—Indian (Tamil) traders, largely concentrated in Rangoon—had already been
expelled by Ne Win back in 1962, at the outset of his Burmese Way to Socialism, an example
of what I have called anti-colonial expulsion.1558 Economic motives cannot explain this case.
One final explanation to interrogate is that the Rohingya were treated just like other
threatening ethnic minorities during this period, such as the Karen or Kachin. The Karen were
favored by the British during the colonial period and were recruited into the colonial armed
forces along with the Kachin and Chin.1559 After supporting the British against the Japanese
during WWII, they were promised independence but that did not materialize.1560 After initially
playing a key role in the independent Burmese Army, suppressing other political and ethnic
insurgencies, the Karen mounted an armed rebellion when the Burman government refused
political concessions.1561 Since 1949 the Karen National Union (KNU), and their armed wing
the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), have been at war with the government—at first
for independence, and over time, for greater autonomy. 1562

Van Hear, 1998: 101.
Smith, 1994: 23; Ibrahim, 2018: 9.
1556 Ibrahim, 2018: 9.
1557 Yegar, 2002: 58; Ibrahim, 2018: 9.
1558 Chakravarti, 1971: 183-84; Tinker, 1990: 45; Yegar, 2002: 52; Hein, 2018: 368.
1559 Smith, 1994: 23, 38-39; Christie, 1996: 54-55.
1560 Smith, 1994: 23; Christie, 1996: 64; Yegar, 2002: 34.
1561 Smith, 1991: 28; Callahan, 2007: 34.
1562 Smith, 1994: 44; Christie, 1996: 77-78; Yegar, 2002: 35; Callahan, 2007: 34.
1554
1555

350

The Ne Win and SLORC regimes violently repressed the Karen using their “four cuts”
counterinsurgency strategy to cut them off from food, finance, intelligence, and recruits, but
they were always included within the idea of the Burma “nation.”1563 In the 1974 constitution,
Karen state became an official administrative unit, albeit without local autonomy, and their
citizenship status, and membership in the state, were never questioned. 1564 Although the
Tatmadaw feared Karen separatism, they did not seek to remove the Karen from Burmese
territory. Instead, they sought to suppress them by cutting off support to the insurgents from
the local communities.
The Burmese military distrusted all ethnic minority groups—including both the
Rohingya and the Karen—fearing the dissolution of the state. “Pure blood” non-Burmans
were seen as having to “prove” their loyalty by overcoming their ethnic identity and becoming
“modern” Burmese-speaking people,1565 whereas “non-pure” bloods, like the Rohingya, could
never be incorporated within the Burmese nation. The Tatmadaw approached the two groups
with different policies. The Rohingya were targeted for expulsion, with the intent to remove,
while the Karen were targeted with various control strategies to suppress their insurgency but
to manage the people within the state. There are other features about the Karen that make
their treatment different than the Rohingya. Geographically, the Karen population is dispersed
along the Burma-Thailand border in southern Shan, Kayah, and Karen States as well as in
Mon State, Tenasserim Division, and Irrawaddy Division,1566 making it more difficult to
remove them. In addition, while Karen elites are largely Christian, the majority of Karen are

Smith, 1994: 45-46, 79; Callahan, 2003: 209-210; Callahan, 2007: 33.
Yegar, 2002: 61; Aung, 2005: 273.
1565 Callahan, 2003: 222; Walton, 2013: 13.
1566 Smith, 1994: 42; Callahan, 2007: 34; Christie, 1996: 54, 60.
1563
1564

351

Buddhist, with a smaller minority animist.1567 Therefore, most of the group shares the religion
of the dominant Burman majority.
One might then contend that the variation in Tatmadaw treatment toward the
Rohingya and Karen was simply because of religion. However, that cannot explain why the
Kachin, and their powerful insurgent arm—the Kachin Independence Army (KIA)—who are
predominantly Christian, were not expelled.1568 While the Burmese army fought against the
KIA during the Ne Win and the SLORC regimes, using harsh counterinsurgency tactics, just
like those against the Karen and Rohingya, they were not targeted for removal.1569 During the
Tatmadaw’s counterinsurgency campaigns in 1988-1992 tens of thousands of Kachin were
“forcibly relocated” to army-controlled camps within the state. These internal expulsions are
juxtaposed with the military’s cross-border expulsion policy toward the Rohingya.1570
Furthermore, in 1994, the KIA reached a ceasefire agreement with the SLORC, which was
never proposed to the Rohingya insurgent groups.1571 One key difference, again, is that
government saw the Kachin as “pure bloods,” members of Burma from the “beginning,” that
needed to be punished and reformed, but not excluded from the nation-state. They were a
security threat to be controlled, not eliminated.
In sum, none of the alternative explanations—anti-Muslim, political threats, economic
threats, or ethnic insurgents—can explain the Burmese government’s motivation for expelling
the Rohingya en masse. While many ethnic groups presented security threats to the state after
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1988, demanding local autonomy and civil and political rights, and many mounted significant
attacks against government forces, only the Rohingya were expelled. It is the distinct
combination of national consolidation and security threat that motivated the
counterinsurgency mass expulsion.

6.4 Enabling factors for Burma’s expulsion
Government counterinsurgencies are manifold, yet not all counterinsurgency operations
involve mass expulsion. As with the previous three case studies, I will now examine the role
of alliances, the target group homeland state, and the international community in enabling
expulsion in Burma.
Table 25: Factors that enabled mass expulsion in Burma (1991-1992)
Key Factors

Burma (1991-mid-1992)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
Transnational Alliances
Homeland State(s)
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

Moderate ties (--)
Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)

International Community
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

Weak ties (↑)
Mixed (--)

Benefit from expulsion (↑)
Indifferent to expulsion (↑)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
The military had been in power in Burma since 1962. Although Ne Win resigned, and the
BSPP was ousted by the new SLORC government under the leadership of General Saw
Maung, Tatmadaw control of the state continued. The Tatmadaw was not simply a group of
officers but rather an entire social class made up of active military personnel, veterans, and
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their families, which dominated the political, social, and economic institutions of the
country.1572 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s it further isolated itself from the rest of the
country and focused on its own enrichment.1573 When the SLORC decided to abandon
socialism and pursue a capitalist, market-oriented economy in 1988, the junta and their families
became “Burma’s nouveau riche,” while the rest of the country remained in poverty.1574
The countrywide protests in 1988 threatened the military’s hold on power and it
fiercely fought back, repressing protestors and any appearance of dissent. The 1990 elections
may have looked like an attempt by the SLORC to gain public support, but it expected a
rubber stamp of approval for its military party, the NUP. 1575 It viewed civilian party politics as
disorderly and ripe for the disintegration of the country.1576 Thus, when the NUP lost miserably
in the elections, the SLORC reneged on its promise to accept the election results. The
SLORC’s key constituents were its own members and dependents. The Tatmadaw’s main
domestic concern was maintaining power at all costs, believing it was the only organization
capable of maintaining the unity of the country.1577 The name of its failed military party—
National Unity Party—indicates as much.
The military however was not a homogenous block. There were factional disputes
within the Tatmadaw about the best way to maintain control, and the best tactics to achieve
its objectives.1578 Internal clashes appeared in the decision for Ne Win to step down, or be
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forced out, in 1988 when the protestors were gaining strength.1579 Internal disputes were always
over how to protect the power of the military, including its political and economic privileges,
not about offering concessions to civilian parties.1580
A critical event that affected the military’s domestic strategy toward insurgents, and its
ability to maintain power, was the disintegration of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and
the resulting 1989 ceasefire agreement with the SLORC.1581 Conflict between the military and
the CPB dated to the early days of Burma’s independence and was the oldest, and largest of
the country’s domestic insurgencies.1582 The CPB mutinies occurred at the same time as, but
were not coordinated with, the student protests in Rangoon. As discussed, at this moment the
junta’s power was threatened, and the country’s economic crisis had depleted its financial
reserves.1583 Seeing an opening to end the conflict with the ex-communist armies to their
mutual advantages, in 1989 General Khin Nyunt engaged a local drug kingpin, Lo Hsing-han,
to broker a deal with the communist insurgents.1584 The two sides agreed to a ceasefire, and
the Tatmadaw granted each of the four ex-communist armies of the collapsed CPB a specific
area of operation in which they could conduct business “as they pleased.” 1585 The military, in
turn, redirected its forces toward insurgencies in the rest of the country and reaped the
financial windfall of the booming illicit narcotics trade.1586
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With additional troops and funds at its disposal, the Tatmadaw aggressively suppressed
opposition to its rule and resistance to the suspension of the 1990 democratic election results.
In implementing its expulsion policy in northern Arakan, the SLORC aimed to succeed where
General Ne Win had failed—permanently removing the Rohingya. While the military struggled
to repress ethnic minorities in frontier areas that were better armed and trained, the Rohingya
were both more easily removed and their expulsion fit with the junta’s ethno-nationalist
“Burmanization” strategy.
In addition to the benefit of achieving something the previous regime had failed to do,
anti-Rohingya sentiment united both the SLORC and the opposition NLD.1587 After the 1990
election, NLD politicians colluded with the military in accusing the newly elected Rohingya
members of parliament of falsifying their identity documents to run for office and stripped
them of their seats.1588 In oppressing the Rohingya, the SLORC and the NLD were on the
same page. Although the SLORC did not seek NLD approval of, or support for, the expulsion
of the Rohingya, these unified objectives bolstered the policy. In sum, the expulsion of the
Rohingya benefited the SLORC and its domestic military allies in completing the failed 1978
Operation Dragon King; achieving a tactical win against a group that had spawned several
insurgent movements; furthering its ethnonationalist objectives; and removing a group that
the majority Burmans rejected as alien—all which further cemented its hold on power.
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Transnational Alliances
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Burma’s junta was isolated from the rest of the world by
economic and political sanctions because of its authoritarian rule and human rights abuses. 1589
The Tatmadaw’s engagement in illicit industries, and domination of the domestic economy,
enabled its financial survival despite its isolation. Its transnational alliances were limited, but
two transnational partnerships were critical—those with China and Thailand.
Burma and China had a tenuous relationship since Burma’s independence. The two
countries share a long border in the northeast, and there was a sizable ethnic Chinese minority
in the country, approximately 400,000 in the early 1990s.1590 After Ne Win’s 1962 coup, a time
of tense anti-foreigner sentiment prevailed in Burma, illustrated by the expulsion of 300,000
Tamil Indians in the effort to nationalize the economy. 1591 In 1967, violent anti-Chinese riots
erupted throughout the country, allegedly incited by the government. Hundreds of Chinese
were killed or injured, property was looted and destroyed, and many fled the country. 1592 The
Chinese government responded to the riots by financially and militarily supporting the CPB
insurgents.1593
In the 1980s, as part of Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s reformist shift, China cut off
military aid to the communist insurgents.1594 Not long after, the CPB collapsed, and the four
ex-communist armies signed the ceasefire agreement with the Tatmadaw. Soon after, the
Burma-China border reopened to trade and movement.1595 These dramatic internal events
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occurred in the spring of 1989 while simultaneously across the border, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) was facing its own student uprisings. Like the Burmese junta, the CCP ruthlessly
suppressed the protestors, notably in the Tiananmen Square Massacre.1596 After the massacre,
SLORC Secretary Khin Nyunt, called China’s Ambassador to Burma and “expressed
sympathy and understanding on the Chinese government[’s] use of force against the
demonstration at Tiananmen Square in Beijing.”1597 As the CCP partially opened to the forces
of globalization, and launched its communist market economy, it created tremendous
economic growth.1598 Large numbers of Chinese businessmen returned to Burma. Since the
passage of new foreign investment laws in the late 1980s, most of Burma’s foreign investment
has come from the Chinese.1599 The end of the CPB insurgency and the events of Tiananmen
Square, brought Burma and China together, in what would become a very close
relationship.1600
In 1989, trading relations between China and Burma rapidly increased. They agreed to
a $1.2 billion arms deal, including aircraft, patrol boats, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and
military training—critical to the dramatic expansion of the Tatmadaw in the early 1990s. 1601
China also invested in large-scale development projects including the construction of roads
and hydroelectric dams, and provided cheap consumer goods.1602 In addition to its official
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trade relations, the Chinese were involved in illicit trading and smuggling in the timber, gems,
and narcotics sectors.1603 Lo Hsing-han, who helped to broker the historic ceasefire with the
ex-communist armies on behalf of the Tatmadaw, was a prominent Chinese drug smuggler.1604
Between 1988 and 1995, trade between the two countries grew at an average annual rate of 25
percent.1605 While China in 1989 was not the behemoth that it is today, Burmese government
officials prioritized this relationship as one of mutual interest and economic gain.
Burma was also a strategic security partner for the Chinese. Establishing strong
relations with Burma—including access to its transportation network and ports—gave Beijing
a route to the Bay of Bengal, a strategic waterway to bolster its naval presence, influence over
the Straits of Malacca, and closer proximity to monitor India.1606 Therefore in 1991 at the
outset of Burma’s expulsion of the Rohingya, China was the country’s preeminent
transnational ally—its largest trading partner and arms dealer. If there was a country with
leverage over the military junta, it was China.1607 However, China did not interfere in the
domestic politics of Burma, pursuing a “no strings attached” investment approach. 1608 The
Chinese government was indifferent to the expulsion of the Rohingya and put no pressure on
the Tatmadaw to change course.1609 This lack of opposition to the expulsion decision, further
enabled the removal to proceed.
Burma’s second important transnational ally at the time was Thailand. The two
countries historically had close economic ties, and the Thai-Burmese militaries had especially
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close relations.1610 After the SLORC reasserted control in September 1988, Thailand was the
first ASEAN country to respond. The new regime’s first high-level foreign visitor was the Thai
Commander of the Army, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, in December 1988. 1611 The two
countries signed lucrative cross-border logging contracts during his visit, allowing Thai
companies with links to the ruling junta to “clear cut” forests along the southeastern border. 1612
Like China, trade relations between the two countries included official and unofficial trade—
the latter including large-scale timber smuggling.1613
Given these close economic and military ties, Thailand could also have influenced the
actions of the SLORC. However, Thailand was facing its own domestic turmoil in the early
1990s with a military coup toppling the democratically elected Prime Minister in February
1991.1614 The leader of the coup, Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army General
Suchinda, had very close ties to the Tatmadaw.1615 Thus, Thailand was indifferent to the
Rohingya expulsion policy and refused to condemn the Tatmadaw, despite growing
international pressure to do so. In March 1992, the Thai Foreign Minister stated, “Everybody
shares concern, but there is no need for us to take part in any official declaration to condemn
Burma.” 1616 Thailand had battled its own Muslim insurgency in the south of the country since
the 1960s.1617 Although relations with its Muslim insurgents had thawed in the 1980s, the
military’s fresh takeover in 1991 was laden with memories of battling Islamic challenges to the
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dominant Buddhist state. In sum, neither influential transnational ally—China, nor Thailand—
exerted any pressure on the SLORC to halt the Rohingya expulsion.

Homeland State
Bangladesh is the relevant “homeland state” in this case—the country to which the
government alleged the expellees “belonged.” The ties between Burma and Bangladesh were
moderate. The 168-kilometer border between the two countries is short and geographically
isolated from lower Burma by a coastal mountain range.1618 After the partition of India, and
Bangladesh’s subsequent secession from Pakistan, the poor, Muslim-majority country was not
a priority partner for the Buddhist military regime. The two countries had limited trade
relations. Moreover, since Bangladesh’s independence there had been an ongoing dispute
about the maritime boundaries in the Bay of Bengal related to oil exploration.1619 Nevertheless,
the two countries had maintained cordial ties—not strong but not weak.
Bangladesh was no stranger to the Tatmadaw’s efforts to remove the Rohingya from
its territory and to force them into Bangladesh. They had done this in 1978 and they were
aware of the SLORC’s renewed targeted rhetoric in this regard after they took power in 1988.
Nevertheless in 1991 and early 1992, by force majeure, Bangladesh acquiesced and resettled the
Rohingya refugees in 12 camps along the border.1620 Overwhelmed by the influx, the
Bangladeshi public was initially sympathetic to the Rohingya refugees.1621 The area of concern
was in a peripheral region in the southeast of the country, far from the center of power in
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Dhaka, and not of immediate political concern.1622 Bangladesh was also a very poor country
with a GDP per capita in 1991 of less than $300 USD, with limited resources to patrol and
prevent refugees crossing the border.1623 In addition, in April 1991, just as the Rohingya began
fleeing, a violent cyclone struck south and south-eastern Bangladesh affecting 15 million
people, killing over 135,000, and causing more than $1.5 billion in damages. 1624 As the
expulsion began, the country was focused on responding to the humanitarian disaster.
Bangladesh had neither the capabilities nor resources to deny entry to the Rohingya refugees
and the moderate ties between the two countries did not dissuade Burma from moving
forward with its decision to expel.

International Community
The Tatmadaw had long been an international pariah. Its international isolation increased after
its aggressive, militarized response to the 1988 student protests, the arrest of then international
darling and Nobel Prize winning NLD opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, and its
annulment of the 1990 elections. After the SLORC took power in 1988, western countries,
like the United States, cut off aid to the country and the few UN agencies that remained had
their budgets slashed.1625 In the summer of 1991, European countries formalized an arms
embargo and encouraged other countries around the world to do the same. 1626 Western
countries such as the U.S. and members of what was becoming the European Union had
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supported Burma’s democracy movement. After the nullified elections and gross human rights
violations, they were united in ending financial support to the country, imposing further
sanctions, and funding the opposition government in exile. 1627 In the face of these external
pressures the Tatmadaw was unfazed. It had survived since 1962 without much international
engagement and it perceived international actors as suspicious, intrusive, and with aspirations
of regime change.1628 Thus, when the government began implementing its expulsion policy
toward the Rohingya, its ties with the international community were not only weak, but nonexistent, eliminating a potential constraint.
The response of the international community was mixed. The UN, western states, and
some Muslim-majority countries condemned the expulsion while the regional Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) largely took the stance of “constructive engagement,”
which manifested in non-interference. The UN and western states were more vociferous in
their response to the suppression of the democracy movement than they were to the Rohingya
expulsion. Nevertheless, when the expulsion reached its peak in March 1992, the U.S.,
Australia, European Union, Japan, Kuwait, and others responded with pledges to the UN and
Bangladesh for refugee support.1629 Muslim-majority states including Iran, Indonesia, and
Malaysia condemned the expulsion.1630 In March 1992 the UN Commission on Human Rights
passed a resolution calling for a Special Rapporteur to Burma to investigate human rights
abuses and for an end to “the exodus of Myanmar refugees to neighboring countries as well
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as to facilitate their early repatriation.”1631 However, the UN had minimal leverage with the
Tatmadaw since its presence in the country was small and Burma had not signed on to the
international refugee conventions.1632 Their condemnations of, and resistance to, the expulsion
went unheeded.
The key regional organization was ASEAN, and in the early 1990s it had six members:
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Although Burma was not a
member of ASEAN in 1991, the organization could have exerted influence on the country.
Throughout early 1992 as the expulsion reached its apogee, ASEAN members collectively
agreed not to condemn Burma over the Rohingya removal. The Foreign Minister of Thailand,
Asa Sarasin, stated on March 13, “ASEAN will not take a collective position on Burma’s
repression of its Muslim minority.”1633 The organization’s official policy was “constructive
engagement,” resisting western pressure to apply sanctions or to be more critical of the ruling
junta.1634 Brunei and Singapore voiced “concern” and called for a “peaceful solution” but took
no actions to convince the Tatmadaw to change course.1635 Sarain stated that, “despite its
‘concern’ over the influx of Rohingya refugees to Bangladesh, Thailand will not join the chorus
of condemnation of the Rangoon military regime’s operations.”1636 ASEAN resisted
interfering in Burma’s domestic politics and refused to compel the SLORC to improve its
human rights record.1637
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Muslim-majority Indonesia and Malaysia, however, were more outspoken in their
criticism than the other four ASEAN states. In a statement to the Indonesia House of
Representatives, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, said “Indonesia appeals to the
Myanmarese [Burmese] Government to take the necessary steps to solve the problem
regarding the Rohingya ethnic group and to deal with the fundamental questions that have led
to the flow of refugees into neighboring countries.”1638 Yet he also noted that the “problems
inside Myanmar [are] essentially its internal affairs” but that “recent developments show that
the situation inside Myanmar has carried over into some international dimensions and tends
to have an adverse effect on the peace and stability in Southeast Asia.”1639
Domestically, Indonesia was being pressured to address the Rohingya situation. In
January, the Indonesia Committee of Muslim Solidarity advocated for the government to do
more on behalf of the Rohingya, releasing a statement comparing the SLORC to the Nazis
and the treatment of Rohingya Muslims to the persecution of the Jews.1640 The Aceh chapter
of the Indonesia Ulemas Council wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs appealing to the
government to “adopt a more resolute stand on the violation by the Burmese military regime
of the human rights of the Muslims.”1641 Despite this internal pressure, and its own strong
statements, Indonesia supported ASEAN’s approach of constructive engagement and did not
propose any alternative means of addressing the situation.1642
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Malaysia similarly spoke out against the Tatmadaw’s human rights violations,
specifically its treatment of Muslim refugees.1643 In early March the Malaysian government
demanded that the Tatmadaw “immediately cease acts of alleged oppression and expulsion of
about 135,000 Rohingyas from the country’s Arakan Province.”1644 The Deputy Prime
Minister, Ghafar Baba, stated a few days later that he hoped Burma would take its criticism
over the Rohingya issue “as that from a friend.”1645 The Malay Ministry of Foreign Affairs
summoned the Burmese Ambassador over the Rohingya issue to “immediately cease the
oppression of Rohingya Muslims and be prepared to accept them back.”1646 Later in the month
the Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Dawai announced in a television broadcast that the
“government was deeply concerned over the attacks on Moslems in Myanmar.”1647
Like Indonesia, local organizations in Malaysia pressured their government over the
Rohingya expulsion. The United Malays National Youth Organization protested against the
treatment of Rohingya and raised funds for the refugees in Bangladesh.1648 While speaking out
against the Rohingya abuses, and summoning the Burma ambassador to outline its concerns,
Malaysia did not directly engage with the SLORC. Instead it preferred to go though the United
Nations. Foreign Minister Badawi stated, “it would only be proper for Malaysia to openly
declare its firm stand on the matter and any of the necessary action by the UN.” 1649 Malaysia
was very careful to ensure its concerns about the Rohingya did not violate Burma’s sovereignty
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or constitute any form of domestic interference.1650 Deputy Prime Minister Ghafar affirmed
his confidence that the Rohingya issue would “not affect Malaysia-Myanmar relations.”1651
Despite UN and western condemnation of the Rohingya expulsion, the international
community’s weak ties with the expelling regime meant any harsh rhetoric had little influence.
This combined with ASEAN’s indifference and firm pledge to “constructive engagement,”
bolstered the Tatmadaw and further enabled expulsion. In sum, Burma’s international
isolation meant the international community had limited influence to sway the decision of the
Tatmadaw, and the lack of regional resistance undermined the opposition from the United
Nations and western states.
In this case the benefit of expulsion for the Tatmadaw, the indifference of China and
Thailand, the acquiescence and resettlement of the Rohingya refugees by Bangladesh, and
Burma’s weak ties with the international community, combined with ASEANs lackluster
response, contributed to enabling expulsion in Burma. Yet, unlike any of the other cases
analyzed in this dissertation, the same three factors shifted in the late spring, early summer, of
1992 resulting in the complete reversal of the Rohingya expulsion. We now turn to how this
“repatriation” unfolded.

6.5 Burma, mid 1992-1995: Expulsion reversal & Rohingya repatriation
Between April 1991 and July 1992, Burma’s military government expelled over 250,000
Rohingya from Arakan state. Yet in a surprising reversal, on April 28, 1992, the governments
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of Burma and Bangladesh signed a bi-lateral agreement for the “safe, voluntary return” of the
Rohingya expellees.1652 After five days of talks between the foreign ministers of the two
countries, the Burmese government agreed “to take all necessary measures that would halt the
outflow of Myanmar (Burmese) residents to Bangladesh, and encourage those who left Burma
to return voluntarily and safely to their homes.”1653 So, what prompted this shift in policy from
removing Rohingya “insurgents” and “terrorists” to one accommodating and accepting their
return? The answer is that the key factors of alliances, homeland state, and international
community, shifted to reverse the mass expulsion in mid-1992 (see Table 26).
Table 26: Mass Expulsion Decision Making Framework - Burma
Key Factors

Burma (1991-mid-1992)

Burma (mid-1992-1995)

Alliances
Domestic Alliances

Benefit from expulsion (↑)

Harmed by expulsion (↓)

Transnational Alliances

Indifferent to expulsion (↑)

Opposed to expulsion (↓)

Moderate ties (--)

Moderate ties (--)

Acquiesce & resettle expellees (↑)

Resisted expellees (↓)

Weak ties (↑)

(Cultivating) strong ties (↓)

Mixed (--)

Mixed (--)

Homeland State(s)
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response
International Community
Relation to Government
Response/Anticipated Response

Alliances
Domestic Alliances
When General Saw Maung’s plans for democratic reform, with the NUP in control, failed, and
the Tatmadaw responded with increased repression, economic sanctions tightened, foreign
businesses withdrew, and international condemnation grew. While initially, international
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pressure on Burma’s government was focused on its actions to suppress democratic reforms,
throughout the spring of 1992 there was growing outcry over the treatment of the Rohingya.
As this pressure increased, so did internal dissension within the SLORC. Moderate factions
within the Tatmadaw pushed senior SLORC leaders to temper their policies to increase
domestic legitimacy.1654
Seeds of this growing moderate faction within the Tatmadaw began to emerge at the
end of March 1992 when Burma’s Foreign Minister, Ohn Gyaw, led an international delegation
to northern Arakan, followed by a visit by UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian
Affairs, Jan Eliasson, in an attempt to change the narrative about the situation of the
Rohingya.1655 By April, dissent within the Tatmadaw reached a boiling point and the SLORC
reshuffled its top leadership, removing General Saw Maung and replacing him with the more
pragmatic General Than Shwe.1656
In addition to leadership changes, the SLORC also instituted policy changes. In the
last week of April, they rescinded most of the martial law restrictions, released political
prisoners, including former Prime Minister U Nu, and agreed to repatriate the Rohingya
refugees—an impressive about-face from the policy stance just a few weeks before.1657 After
ignoring invitations to visit Bangladesh for talks on the Rohingya in March, at the end of April
Foreign Minister Gyaw travelled to Bangladesh and met with President Biswas assuring him
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of Burma’s “sincerity to resolve the Rohingya refugee problem.”1658 Speaking about the
meeting afterward Gyaw said, “[Myanmar and Bangladesh] are two close neighbors who have
trust and complete understanding and good neighborliness.”1659 A swift reversal from ignoring
Bangladesh’s previous invitations to meet and resolve the issue. The Thai newspaper, The
Nation, noted that “the recent concessions may indicate that there are elements pushing for
reform within military circles in Rangoon…their tolerance within SLORC has its limits.” 1660
Under the leadership of General Shwe, the SLORC was captured by the moderates, however
relative, within the Tatmadaw.
Importantly, these changes in domestic alliances within the military junta did not
overturn the previous approach or ideology of the SLORC. In May, Foreign Minister Gyaw
again denied the Rohingya were being persecuted by the government, and told the BBC in an
interview that “the Rohingyas had left Myanmar for their own reasons, possibly being incited
to do so by rebel insurgents.”1661 The reversal of the expulsion had not negated the motivation
of the Tatmadaw to remove the Rohingya, a target group that it saw as a security threat in the
phase of strengthening the nation. While the motivation remained constant in the two periods
examined, the key factors that had enabled expulsion from April 1991-March 1992, had
become constraints by April 1992.
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Transnational Alliances
Burma’s two key transnational allies during this period, China and Thailand, had ignored the
expulsion of the Rohingya and continued their strong economic relations. China however, was
a vital ally of both Burma and Bangladesh, and the Bangladeshi government lobbied China to
help resolve the issue. Although China had no concerns with the SLORC’s repressive policies
per se—in fact, it shared a common experience of suppressing student dissent—it was worried
about maintaining regional stability for its own economic and strategic benefit. 1662 In January
1992, shortly after the border clashes between Burma and Bangladesh, the Chinese authorities
assured Bangladesh they would use their influence with Burma to “diffuse the tension”
between the two countries, but did not pledge to stop the human rights abuses. 1663 A senior
Bangladeshi government official told the AFP that, “China, which has close ties with both
Bangladesh and Burma [noting Beijing was a major source of weapons for both countries], has extended
its helping hand to ensure that the two neighbouring countries can settle their problems
amicably.”1664
Throughout 1992, Bangladesh held conversations with senior Chinese officials about
repatriating Rohingya refugees to Burma. In November, Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary held
talks with Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Xu Dunxin.1665 Dunxin stated during the
talks that the Chinese government, “would utilize its close relationship with Myanmar…to
persuade the Myanmar authorities toward speedy repatriation of Rohingya refugees.” 1666
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Human rights protections were of no concern to the Chinese, “except insofar as their absence,
or perceived absence…contributes to instability.”1667 Bangladesh asserted that the massive
refugee influx was destabilizing.
Since access to conversations between Chinese and Burmese authorities are not
available, public statements by Bangladeshi and Chinese officials, after their meetings, serve as
a useful proxy for China’s intentions. Although Chinese recommendations to senior Burmese
authorities were conveyed in private, given the crucial economic support that China provided
the SLORC, their views would have been taken seriously.1668 The Tatmadaw calculated that
repatriating the Rohingya was useful for both its domestic and transnational alliances,
contributing to the expulsion policy reversal.

Homeland State
The strength of ties between Bangladesh and Burma did not change dramatically from 1991
to 1992. While their relations were strained in December 1991 when Lone Htein forces
crossed into Bangladesh and killed four people, the Bangladeshi government was upset but
remained committed to communication and amiable relations with its neighbor. Bangladeshi
Information Minister, Najmul Huda, described the country’s approach to dealing with the
situation as “pursuing quiet diplomacy to resolve the crisis.”1669 The moderate ties between the
two countries were constant in the two periods examined here. What changed was
Bangladesh’s reception of the Rohingya refugees.

Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 330.
Steinberg & Fan, 2012: 311, 333-34.
1669 “Parliament Begins Debate on Burma Border Tension.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (03 February
1992).
1667
1668

372

In early 1992, Prime Minister Zia and Foreign Minister Rahman mounted an
international lobbying campaign for relief funds to temporarily accommodate the Rohingya
refugees, and for commitments to return them to Burma as soon as possible. In February,
Rahman travelled to eight European and Middle Eastern countries to brief leaders on the
refugee situation and to plead for their support.1670 The next month, Prime Minister Zia
travelled to Washington D.C. and met with President Bush, securing his support for refugee
assistance, followed by a trip to New York to brief UN Secretary General Boutros BoutrosGhali on the Rohingya situation.1671 Prime Minister Zia “urged the secretary general to take
urgent measures to create pressure on [the] Myanmar Government to settle [the issue] so that
the refugees can go back to their country with safety and dignity.”1672 While Bangladesh was
unable to resist the entry of Rohingya into Bangladesh, it fiercely resisted their remaining. The
worldwide campaign by the Bangladeshi government to force Burma to take back the
Rohingya refugees—from the United Nations in New York to powerful governments around
the world—was essential to their return to Arakan.
One possible bargaining chip that allowed Bangladesh to “punch above its weight” in
convincing the UN to repatriate the Rohingya was its dramatically increased contribution to
UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO). Although Bangladesh began contributing personnel
to UNPKO in 1988, it was not until four years later in 1992 that it provided substantial
personnel. While there is no direct evidence of a quid pro quo, Bangladesh increased its
peacekeeping troops from 5 in January 1992 to 1,128 by December, rising further to 3,451 by

“Rahman Leaves for Europe, Middle East Visit.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (14 February 1992)..
“Zia Apprises UN of Burmese Refugee Problem.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (21 March 1992); Asia
Watch, 1992: 21.
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1670
1671

373

the end of 1993.1673 In December of 1991 Bangladesh was the 49 th largest contributor of forces
to UNPKO, tied with Romania, Thailand, and Turkey—a year later it rose to 13th largest, and
by December 1993 it was the fourth largest contributor in the world.1674
Senior Bangladesh officials noted their increased contributions to, and prioritization
of, UN peacekeeping in public statements. On September 29, in Bangladesh’s 1992 UN
General Assembly speech, Foreign Minister Rahman stated,
“…we have purposefully contributed to United Nations peace-keeping efforts through
the dispatch of military and civilian contingents…We strongly support the
strengthening of the financial and institutional base of peace-keeping and its growth
in new and imaginative directions” [emphasis added].1675
Separately, after a week-long visit to the UN in January 1993, Rahman told reporters that,
“…his talks with [UNSG] Dr. Butrus Ghali [sic] went on very well. The secretary
general has assured all possible help of the world body for an early repatriation of all
refugees from Bangladesh…Mr. Ghali…also commended Dhaka for its participation
in the peacekeeping operations in the trouble spots in the world.”1676
While the UN and its affiliated agencies were supportive of repatriation as a policy, the small,
impoverished country marshaled support at the UN far above its fighting weight. It may have
used contributions to UN peacekeeping as a bargaining chip—the correlation is certainly
conspicuous.

International Community
Moderate elements in the Tatmadaw were concerned about growing international
condemnation of the SLORC. To rehabilitate its international legitimacy, the regime of
United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021.
United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021.
1675 U.N. General Assembly, 47th Sess., 17th mtg., U.N. Doc A/47/PV.17 (Oct. 8, 1992).
1676 “Rahman on UN, U.S. Talks, Burmese Refugees.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (28 January 1993).
1673
1674

374

General Than Shwe promised a “new direction” and sought to improve relations with the
international community.1677 This was a dramatic shift from General Saw Maung. The desire
to cultivate relations with the international community meant the views of the United Nations
and its member states were of greater concern to the SLORC’s new leadership. This is not to
say that the SLORC improved its human rights record under Than Shwe, but it was more
strategic about how it engaged with the international community—for example, facilitating
international delegations to Arakan state and access to civilians, however scripted. Under
General Saw Maung ties with the international community had been nonexistent. This changed
under Than Shaw who sought to cultivate stronger ties with the UN and agency affiliates,
which influenced the decision to reverse the expulsion.
Critically linked to Bangladesh’s efforts to gain international support for sending the
Rohingya back to Burma, was the backing of the UNHCR. According to international refugee
law, it is illegal to send refugees back to a country where they face a well-founded fear of
persecution.1678 As the institution charged with refugee protection, the UNHCR’s clearance of
a country as “safe” for refugee return was critical for repatriation. Thus, when the UNHCR
sanctioned the [forced] return of the Rohingya, despite the lack of an improved context in
Arakan State, and the absence of guarantees of their safety upon return, the organization
enabled the repatriation.1679

Hein, 2018: 374; Myint-U, 2021: 45.
Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention states, “No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened
on account of his race, religion, nationality, member- ship of a particular social group or political opinion.”
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Conveniently, Bangladesh’s priority to remove the refugees from its territory, aligned
with the UNHCR’s shifting policy priorities toward repatriation as the priority solution. 1680
Previously, the UNHCR’s position, and that of the Refugee Convention, had been that
repatriation was a voluntary choice made by refugees themselves.1681 However, the agency’s
new policies in the 1990s, and new terminology like “safe return,” meant that the UNHCR,
not refugees, would determine if conditions in the home country had improved to allow for
return.1682 The UNHCR also shifted its determination of “safe” countries to when conditions
improved “appreciably” rather than “substantially.”1683 Scholar of refugees and historian of the
UNHCR, Gil Loescher, described this internal policy shift: “there was a growing view that
refugee safety did not necessarily always outweigh the security interests of states or broader
peace-building and conflict resolution goals.”1684 ASEAN’s policy of constructive engagement
remained unchanged, therefore the opinions of the UN were more of a concern for the
SLORC.
As part of Than Shaw’s new direction as SLORC chairman, he acceded to the
repatriation of the Rohingya according to the bi-lateral agreement with Bangladesh signed on
April 28, 1992.1685 The new Burmese leadership’s shift in policy to strengthen ties with the
international community, combined with the stance of the UNHCR in favor of refugee
repatriation as the preferred solution, contributed to the swift reversal of the expulsion.
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Epilogue
This chapter does not cover the details of later events. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of how
the Rohingya refugee repatriation unfolded over the following three years is warranted. The
UNHCR approved of Rohingya repatriation based on a May 1992 agreement with the
Government of Bangladesh that it could independently interview refugees about their voluntary
decision to return.1686 However, in September 1992, Bangladesh began sending Rohingya back
to Burma in large numbers and denied the UNHCR access to the camps to monitor this
process.1687 Human rights organizations documented the Bangladeshi authorities’ use of
coercion and abuse to force the Rohingya to leave.1688 The Bangladeshi government denied
this, and Foreign Minister Rahman told the press on December 26 that, “no Rohingya refugee
has been repatriated from Bangladesh to Burma against his will,” refuting accusations by the
UNHCR otherwise.1689 Negotiations to resolve this issue failed, and the UNHCR withdrew
from the refugee camps in December as returns continued.1690
The following year in July 1993 the SLORC and UNHCR agreed “in principle” to a
“framework of assistance and cooperation in the context of the voluntary repatriation
programme from Bangladesh,” which was followed in November with an official
memorandum of understanding to allow UNHCR to monitor the return of refugees in Arakan
State.1691 This agreement was signed despite evidence that there had been no improvement in

Loescher, 2001: 285.
Lambrecht, 1995: 5.
1688 Weiner, 1993: 159; Piper, 1994: 26; Lambrecht, 1995: 5-6; Human Rights Watch, 1996.
1689 “Foreign Secretary Denies Forced Repatriation.” Dhaka Radio Bangladesh Network (26 December 1992).
1690 Piper, 1994: 25; Lambrecht, 1995: 5; Loescher, 2001: 285.
1691 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Union of Myanmar and the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 05 November 1993; 10a/1-1993/10; Series 1, Box 9; Fonds
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the Tatmadaw’s protections for the Rohingya in northern Arakan.1692 Human Rights Watch
documented continuing discrimination and abuse of Rohingya Muslims including “denial of
citizenship…forced relocations and forced labor,” which had led to renewed refugee flight to
Bangladesh as the repatriation was in progress.1693 Yet returns from Bangladesh continued and
the UNHCR actively promoted the repatriation in 1994 once its staff had access to the area. 1694
Refugees reported signs in front of UNHCR offices in Bangladesh stating, “There is peace in
Myanmar. You can return.”1695 The accuracy of this determination is questionable since the
Burmese military often accompanied UNHCR staff to the field when they visited returnees,
an approach they had similarly used in the spring of 1992 during international delegations to
Arakan, and impartial translators were difficult to find. 1696 Nevertheless, by 1995 nearly all
250,0001697 Rohingya had returned to Burma, reversing the mass expulsion.

Summary
This final case study illustrates the fourth of the mass expulsion motivations in my expulsion
taxonomy: counterinsurgency. The Burmese government was motivated by their national
consolidation efforts in the late 1980s, early 1990s, and their identification of the Rohingya as
a distinct security threat, labelling them “insurgents” and “terrorists.” While the identification
of counterinsurgency as a motivation for mass expulsion is not novel, the comparison of the
SLORC’s shifting policies—expelling the Rohingya beginning in March 1991 but then swiftly
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Human Rights Watch, 1996.
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agreeing to repatriate them a year later—highlights that the motivation to remove the
Rohingya was not enough to explain the expulsion decision. The new leadership of the
SLORC in April 1992 had the same views as the previous regime regarding the Rohingya.
What changed was that the previous enabling conditions had reversed to constrain the policy.
In March 1991, the SLORC, under the leadership of General Saw Maung, aimed to
achieve something the previous Ne Win regime had failed to do—permanently remove the
Rohingya. With a united Tatmadaw, mass expulsion achieved this security objective and
strengthened its control over the revitalized ethno-national state. Simultaneously, it capitalized
on anti-Rohingya public sentiment to gain domestic support, if not legitimacy. Burma’s two
key transnational allies at the time, China and Thailand, refused to intervene in the internal
affairs of their neighbor and partner, and proceeded to strengthen their political and economic
ties with the SLORC government as the expulsion unfolded. Bangladesh, the alleged home of
the Rohingya, was overwhelmed by the influx and acquiesced and resettled the expellees. After
decades of international isolation, and further western sanctions following the harsh
crackdown of the student protests, Burma was immune to international condemnation, and
ASEAN opted for “constructive engagement” rather than pressuring the government to
reverse course. Together, the state of domestic and transnational alliances, the homeland state,
and the international community enabled expulsion in Burma.
But less than a year later the situation changed. General Than Shwe took the helm of
the SLORC and under his “new direction” he moderated the Tatmadaw’s position toward the
Rohingya and agreed to a bi-lateral agreement with Bangladesh to repatriation the refugees.
Shwe’s moderate faction of the Tatmadaw pushed out General Saw Maung over concerns of
losing domestic legitimacy. China, allied with both Bangladesh and Burma, and concerned
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about instability in the region, quietly encouraged Burma to take back the Rohingya, while not
commenting on its human rights abuses. China’s move occurred in parallel with Bangladesh’s
fierce lobbying campaign at the UN and with countries around the world to support the
immediate repatriation of the refugees. The UN, particularly the UNHCR, supported
repatriation as its preferred refugee solution, and facilitated the repatriation and sanctioned
the “conducive and congenial”1698 environment in Arakan for the Rohingya’s return. Interested
in shedding its international pariah status, the Tatmadaw worked with the UNHCR to resettle
the Rohingya, while continuing its human rights violations.
Unfortunately, but perhaps not surprisingly, the Rohingya faced further persecution
once back in Burma. In 2012-2013 Burma’s government, under the administration of Thein
Sein, expelled 20,000 Rohingya.1699 Then three years later, during 2016-2018, over 800,000
Rohingya were expelled from Arakan in the largest expulsion of the group to date.1700 Using
my framework of expulsion decision making I would anticipate that this latest expulsion of
the Rohingya is likely, at least in the short term, to remain permanent unlike the previous largescale expulsions in 1978 and 1991-1992. Burma’s alliances are currently entrenched in their
positions. The Tatmadaw refused to accept the most recent election results and mounted a
coup in February 2021, followed by the mass repression of student protests, very reminiscent
to events in 1988-1990.1701 The junta is not seeking domestic legitimacy and no moderate wing
has emerged to push the military in a “new direction.”

Stephano Severe, UNHCR Head of Cox’s Bazaar Sub-Office in Bangladesh, described the situation in
Myanmar in July 1994 as “conducive and congenial for the refugees to return” (Lambrecht, 1995: 12).
1699 Human Rights Watch, 2013.
1700 Human Rights Council, 2018.
1701 Goldman, 2022.
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Furthermore, in the three decades since 1991, China has only increased its influence
in Burma, turning the country into a client state. It is unlikely that China will pressure Burma
to take back the Rohingya since there is not a similar fear of instability in the region with this
most recent wave. Initially it seemed that Bangladesh would pursue a similar strategy of
repatriation in response to this largest refugee influx, and in fact a bilateral agreement was
signed with Burma in that regard in October 2018.1702 However, no action has been taken to
implement the agreement. That is likely because, unlike in 1992, neither the UN nor the
UNHCR supports the repatriation of the Rohingya; and the Burmese government is not
seeking international legitimacy. The key enabling factors of alliances, the homeland state, and
the international community are why the latest expulsion of the Rohingya is likely to remain
longer lasting, if not permanent.
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CHAPTER 7. Conclusion
7.1 Summary of argument
This dissertation is the first systematic, and cross-regional, examination of why and how
governments expel ethnic groups, en masse, over the longue durée. Three main findings emerge
out of this macro historical approach. The first is that mass expulsion is a distinct phenomenon
of intentional group-based population removal that has a different intention than related
phenomena like genocide, ethnic cleansing, or coercive assimilation. Conceptually extracting
mass expulsion from the ambiguous concept of ethnic cleansing allows for a more precise
apples-to-apples comparison of government policies that seek to remove target groups. This,
in turn, allows for a more systematic examination of the causes and consequences of mass
expulsion policies. The distinct intent of mass expulsion is documented empirically in the
novel Government-Sponsored Mass Expulsion Dataset (GSME) which records 139 expulsion
events, affecting over 30 million people, around the world in the 120-year period from 19002020. While descriptive, this dataset documents when, where, who (is targeted), and how often
mass expulsion occurs, illuminating the prevalence and persistence of this phenomenon in the
modern era.
The second main finding is that while governments use similar policies of mass
expulsion to remove unwanted ethnic groups, their motivations for doing so are varied. This
variation is mapped in my taxonomy of perpetrator motivations for mass expulsions that
introduces

four

main

types:

fifth

column,

anti-colonialism,

nativism,

and

counterinsurgency/reprisal. Governments motivated to remove “fifth columns,” identify a
target group as an existential security threat to the state because of real or alleged ties to an
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enemy state or an external kinstate. Anti-colonialism mass expulsions aim to complete the
decolonizing process, after independence, by targeting “alien” minority groups that held
privileged status under the colonial regime. Governments motivated by nativism, expel target
groups to protect the interests of native-born citizens over those of immigrant foreigners.
Lastly, expulsions motivated by counterinsurgency/reprisal seek to either remove domestic
rebel or secessionist movements or dangerous “refugee warriors,” or seek to retaliate against
another country because of an inter-state dispute or for supporting a hostile side in a thirdparty conflict. These four types may be further specified by the phase of nation-building
(establishing or consolidating) in which they occur, and by the real or perceived threat posed
by the target group (security or economic). The taxonomy helps us identify specific
configurations found in many expulsion cases.
Lastly, building on the genocide studies literature that outlines key restraints on policies
seeking to annihilate targets,1703 this dissertation introduces a framework of government
decision making in implementing mass expulsion policies. When a government is motivated
to remove a target group, I find that three contributing factors enable or constrain mass
expulsion policy decisions: patterns of alliances, the homeland state of the targeted group, and
the international community. Understanding these key constraints leads to important policy
recommendations for deterring the use of mass expulsion, which I outline below. In sum,
these findings improve our understanding of the phenomenon of mass expulsion, why
governments choose this policy option, and what might hold them back even when they are
motivated to expel.
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7.2 Contributions
The findings in this dissertation contribute to the fields of national, ethnic, and sectarian
conflict, forced migration and citizenship studies, and exclusionary politics. The manuscript
fills gaps in the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical literature. Conceptually this dissertation
proposes mass expulsion as a neovalent to identify and explain this distinct form of
demographic engineering more precisely than before. While not the final word on this subject,
the manuscript aims to contribute to the long tradition of conceptual clarification in political
science.1704 Theoretically, my argument expands explanations for mass expulsion beyond war
and security threats, and contestation over territory, that currently dominate the literature, to
highlight an entire class of expulsions targeting alleged economic threats that have been
neglected by scholars and policymakers. This finding highlights that most of what we know
about ethnic cleansing and expulsion comes from detailed case studies of Europe, where
identified motives that have driven expulsion have largely been confined to security threats
emanating from fifth column or insurgent populations. The GSME dataset and cross-regional
comparisons illuminate expulsions driven by the intent to target perceived economic threats,
a class of expulsions largely neglected in the analytical record. The dissertation also expands
our understanding of constraints on atrocities, demonstrating the importance of alliances, both
domestic and transnational, the role of the “homeland” state of the target group, and the
critical function of the international community in both deterring and facilitating expulsion
policies—the latter which has been particularly overlooked.

1704

Sartori, 1984; Baldwin, 1997; Collier & Levitsky, 1997; Straus, 2001; Chandra, 2006.

385

The dissertation contributes to our empirical understanding of mass expulsion through
the introduction of the GSME dataset. This dataset augments the work of other scholars of
mass expulsion and ethnic cleansing (see Table 27), by expanding the temporal, geographic,
and target group scope of the data collection. The last row in Table 27 shows that a significant
amount of new data on the incidence of mass expulsion is documented in the GSME dataset.
The lack of overlap between the GSME dataset and these three others relates to scope
conditions (i.e., episodes with less than 1,000 persons affected, or without an estimate of
persons affected are excluded); the lack of government intent in removing the target or a
different intent (i.e., deportation with individual legal review or destruction – genocide are
excluded); or internal expulsion—specifically many Soviet cases in Bulutgil’s (2016) dataset.
Table 27: Comparison of GSME dataset & existing expulsion-related dataset
GSME
Existing
Temporal Geographic
Concept
Target Group
No. Cases
Case
Datasets
Coverage
Coverage
Overlap
Henckaerts Mass
1945CrossCitizens &
53
37
(1995)
Expulsion 1995
national
Non-Citizens
Mass
Adida
1956Sub-Saharan
Immigrant
Non-Citizens
44
26
(2014)
1999
Africa
Expulsion
Bulutgil
Ethnic
1900Europe &
Residents1705
69
35
(2016)
Cleansing
2000
Africa
Garrity
(2021)

Mass
Expulsion

19002020

Crossnational

Citizens &
Non-Citizens

139

-

Percentage
overlap
70%
59%
51%
-

The distinctiveness of the mass expulsion concept proposed in this dissertation is
illustrated in Table 28. This table compares the GSME dataset to existing data collection
efforts on related concepts including genocide, politicide, refugee mass movements, regimeinduced displacement, mass atrocities, and large-scale (or mass) killing.
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Table 28: Comparison of GSME dataset & existing datasets on related concepts
GSME
Temporal
No.
Existing Datasets
Concept
Case
Coverage
Cases
Overlap
Harff (2003)
Genocide & politicide
1955-2001
37
4
Ulfelder &
State-sponsored mass killing
1945-2006
120
6
Valentino (2008)
Greenhill (2010)
Coercive-engineered migration
1951-2006
561706
7
Orchard (2010a)
Refugee mass movement
1991-2006
44
3
Orchard (2010b)
Regime-induced displacement1707
1991-2006
31
3
Bellamy (2011)
Mass atrocities & armed conflict
1945-2010
103
3
Large-scale violence against
Straus (2015)
1960-2008
33
0
civilians
Butcher et al.
1946Targeted mass killing
205
8
(2020)
20201708
Lichtenheld
Strategic population displacement
1945-2008
160
6
(2020)

Percentage
overlap
10.8%
5.0%
12.5%
6.8%
9.7%
2.9%
0.0%
3.9%
3.8%

The far-right column of Table 28 indicates that there is minimal overlap in the cases
documented in the GSME dataset and other high-profile datasets. This highlights the
boundedness of the mass expulsion concept proposed and examined here and justifies the
dataset’s utility as a research tool in and of itself and as a complement to this existing data. I
also aspire for the data to be useful not just to readers of this manuscript but for further
research into mass expulsion as a dependent variable or an independent variable.
In addition to the introduction of new data on mass expulsion, this dissertation
provides new, in-depth empirical information on crucial cases of mass expulsion, and key
negative cases of non-expulsion. The four case study chapters provide freshly researched

Greenhill (2010) has 64 total cases of coercive engineered migration of which 56 are definitive and 8 are
suggestive. Table 28 documents the overlap with Greenhill’s definitive cases (7 of 56, or 12.5%). The total case
overlap rises to 10 of 64, or 15.6 percent, if the suggestive cases are included.
1707 This only includes regime-induced displacement in cases of refugee mass movement; regime-induced
displacement for IDP movement is excluded for a more accurate comparison since internal expulsions are not
included in the GSME dataset.
1708 This reflects the TMK Version 1.1 update (2021) with additional data for 2018-2020 that extends the original
dataset (1946-2017) in the Butcher et al. (2020) article: https://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/about-targeted-masskilling-dataset
1706
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accounts of how mass expulsion unfolded in each context, particularly in Uganda (1972),
Nigeria (1983), and Burma (1991-1992), which are less researched than the Ottoman Empire’s
expulsions. They also present a “hard case” for my decision-making framework given the
temporal, regional, target group, citizenship status, and regime type variation across the four
expulsion cases. The use of negative cases to tease out the key constraints on mass expulsion
is a research design used by Straus (2015) in explaining why perpetrators escalate from largescale killing to mass categorical violence, or genocide, but this is the first time the approach
has been used to explain mass expulsion. The detailed analyses of Istanbul (1913-1923), Kenya
(1967-1969), South Africa (2008-2012), and Burma (1992-1995) provided here are the first
case studies to examine the motivations of these governments to expel a specific target group
(e.g., Orthodox Greeks, Asians, African migrants, and Rohingya), and the key factors that
constrained the decision to expel, or reversed the decision in the Burmese case. The project
illustrates the methodological utility of negative case studies in identifying key explanations as
well as the value of cross-regional comparisons.1709
Finally, the dissertation introduces new primary sources to the political science of
exclusionary politics, exploiting the archives of humanitarian agencies like the UNHCR and
the ICRC that contain rich insights into how mass expulsions unfolded on the ground and the
role of the UN and other international agencies in liaising with expelling governments and
host states. While some historians have used these archives,1710 they are underutilized by
political scientists. Similarly, though the League of Nations Archives are widely used by
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historians,1711 this is the first project to leverage the Records of Proceedings from the Lausanne
Convention as well as the population exchange sub-committee meeting minutes to explain the
exemption of the Orthodox Greeks in Istanbul from the 1923 population exchange
agreement.
7.3 Policy recommendations
My findings suggest six core policy recommendations that translate beyond my cases and have
broad application. The recommendations are directed toward multiple policy audiences,
particularly the United Nations (and UNHCR), governments committed to reducing human
rights abuses, and regional organizations (AU, ASEAN, ECOWAS, etc.). They are relevant at
the institutional level, but also at the practitioner level for UNSG-appointed special envoys or
special advisors (such as the Special Envoy for Myanmar or the Special Advisor on the
Responsibility to Protect), or government-appointed special envoys (such as USG Special
Envoy for the Horn of Africa or Libya), with direct connections to and, potentially, influence
on government decision making. Furthermore, the recommendations may be useful to human
rights organizations, or other NGOs focused on atrocity prevention, who have various earlywarning tracking systems. Indicators could be created for some of these recommendations—
such as mapping the alliance structure of high-risk countries—that could further enhance
existing early warning mechanisms. The proposed policy recommendations are:
•

The international community can both constrain and facilitate government decisions
to expel—internationally negotiated “exchanges” and government-assisted population
removals should be abandoned.
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•

The lack of international reaction, or response, to small-scale expulsion episodes
emboldens governments to later enact much larger expulsion policies. All expulsions
must be identified and condemned, and governments dissuaded from implementing
this policy option.

•

Concerns about risking transnational support (financial or military) critically constrains
government expulsion decisions. Therefore, the transnational allies of high-risk
countries should be systematically included in prevention strategies.

•

Governments motivated to expel, that are constrained by their existing transnational
allies, may seek to identify new allies who will provide financial or military support for
their expulsionist objectives. Therefore, shifting alliances of high-risk countries should
be closely monitored.

•

Relationships with the executive’s core domestic allies can be a useful point of leverage
with high-risk countries. Emphasizing the potential economic and political harm of
expulsion to these groups, using evidence from previous episodes in other contexts,
may help to restrain its implementation from within.

•

Reducing intra- and inter-state conflict helps reduce expulsion episodes.
The international community has a key role to play when it comes to constraining mass

expulsion. This dissertation has highlighted episodes in which the international community
has pressured governments not to expel, but it has also shed light on incidents when the
international community has directly facilitated and enabled expulsion. To reduce the
incidence of mass expulsion, internationally negotiated population “transfers” or “exchanges”
should be exorcized from diplomatic negotiations as well as any support to expelling
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governments to assist them in removing ethnic groups. In addition, in some cases, expelling
governments “test the waters” with small-scale expulsions to gauge the international appetite
for a much larger expulsion later. The international community should condemn and resist
mass expulsion, no matter the size, as the lack of reaction to small-scale expulsion episodes
often emboldens governments to later enact larger expulsions.
Governments motivated to remove a target group are significantly constrained by risks
of alienating key transnational allies and their financial or military support. Given this
constraint, the transnational allies of countries at high-risk for expulsion, should be included
in dialogue and negotiations about prevention strategies. In the same vein, shifting alliances
among high-risk countries should be monitored because alternative sources of financing from
new transnational allies can lead to a carte blanche for human rights violations, paving the way
for potential expulsion. Since domestic alliances play an important role in either enabling or
constraining government expulsion decisions, in high-risk countries, raising awareness of the
negative economic and political consequences of expulsion among the domestic allies of the
government can be a potential tactic in reducing its implementation. Lastly, I have argued that
the expulsion of targets seen by governments as economic threats are an overlooked aspect of
mass expulsion, but most expulsion episodes in the past 120 years have targeted security
threats (64 percent). Many of these expulsions occurred during intra- or inter-state conflicts
and therefore a final fundamental policy recommendation is that efforts toward reducing
conflict within or between states also has a positive effect in reducing the likelihood of
expulsion.
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7.4 Remaining questions
While this dissertation aimed to answer the questions, why and how mass expulsion occurs, it
inevitably opened other areas of inquiry that merit further investigation and scholarly attention.
There are five broad research areas that are ripe avenues for additional exploration: variation
in eliminationist strategies, indirect mass expulsion, mass internal expulsion, pre-twentieth
century versus post-twentieth century expulsions, and the consequences of expulsion.

Variation in Eliminationist Strategies
This project exclusively examined the governmental policy of mass expulsion. However, the
logical corollary to the question why governments expel, is why governments expel rather than
using another eliminationist policy. Thus, another fruitful area of inquiry is why governments
implement different eliminationist strategies1712 including genocide, mass expulsion, coercive
assimilation, partition, or the recognition of secession. While there are seeds of answers to this
question in the work of Valentino (2004), Mylonas (2012), Butt (2017), and others, choices
among these grim strategies are yet to be comprehensively analyzed. Important questions to
be answered include why do governments implement one eliminationist policy rather than
another? What kinds of groups are most likely to be targeted by each? And what are the
advantages and disadvantages of the various policy options from the perspective of the
government? One means of tackling these questions would be to use a cross-regional
comparative approach and examine the treatment of different ethnic groups within a single
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state, such as the variation in treatment of the Armenians, Orthodox Greeks, and Kurds under
the Ottoman Empire, or the Tamils, Rohingya, and Karen minorities in Burma.

Indirect Mass Expulsion
In this dissertation I have sought to show that governments in all parts of the world have
expelled ethnic groups en masse. Yet some governments have internalized the human rights
norms against mass expulsion and refugee refoulement and have instead turned to other means
of removing “unwanted” populations. One area of further research is to examine systems of
control in which governments create unbearable conditions that induce some of the targeted
group to leave the country “voluntarily.” This inducement of what could be called “voluntary
removal” seems to be an indirect form of mass expulsion that should be analyzed alongside
more explicit eliminationist policies. Examples of this type of indirect expulsion include the
Japanese approach to the Zainichi Koreans after the Second World War, the Tanzanian
government’s tactics against its Asian minority in the post-colonial period, and more recently
policy in Lebanon toward Syrian refugees. The question of how discriminatory segregation
efforts, or “urban renewal” policies in the United States may fit into this framework is an open
question. The fact that black residents in Detroit referred to the city’s 1950s-1960s urban
renewal efforts as “Negro removal” highlights the utility of bringing the U.S. into a
comparative framework. While government efforts at indirect mass expulsion through various
systems of control may not achieve en masse removal as effectively or expeditiously as mass
expulsion, the use of discriminatory legislation and ethnic or racially targeted policies to
provoke removal is an insidious tool of demographic engineering than deserves further
investigation.
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Mass Internal Expulsion
In compiling the GSME dataset I specifically excluded cases of internal expulsion. The main
reason was empirical feasibility. Coding internal expulsions would have required a much larger
number of, arguably subjective, determinations for inclusion. For example, in cases of
development-induced internal displacement it is difficult to assess if the government is
removing a group specifically because of their group characteristics or rather because a specific
group “happens to be in the way” of a development project. In the event of internal
displacement resulting from a natural disaster, if an ethnic group affected was living in a floodor drought-prone area would deliberate government neglect in preventing or mitigating the
disaster count as expulsion? Internal expulsion also opens the question of segregation. Are
government “red-line” policies that limit access to loans disproportionately affecting one racial
group, and in turn forcing them to move out of one area to another, an expulsion? There are
many difficult decisions about inclusion or exclusion of internal expulsion events, which for
now radically complicate the process of developing a scientific dataset for widescale usage.
While this complicated my data collection process, the complexity is ripe for further
investigation.
Another reason I excluded internal expulsions was because of data issues. The Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) is “the world’s definitive source of data and analysis
on internal displacement,”1713 but their data collection does not begin until 1998. Since my data
collection began in 1900 this was a significant limitation. However, research into internal
removal beginning in 1998, and using the IDMC data, is a fertile area for future research. Key
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constraining factors for cross-border expulsion including the homeland state, transnational
alliances, and the international community would likely be less important, if at all relevant,
when it comes to constraining internal expulsion thus this is fruitful area for further inquiry.

Pre-Twentieth Century vs. Post-Twentieth Century Expulsions
This manuscript specifically focused on modern mass expulsions from the beginning of the
twentieth century to our present moment. However, as noted in the introduction, mass
expulsion is far from a new or modern phenomenon—it dates as far back as the Assyrian
Empire in the eighth century BCE.1714 One potential area of future research would be to
compare pre- and post-twentieth century mass expulsions, perhaps with a particular focus on
colonial or settler expulsions, to see how, or if, the motivations for expulsion have changed
over time. Examining the legacies of these expulsions would be particularly interesting and
leads to the final proposed area of future research.

Consequences of Expulsion
The literature on mass expulsion almost exclusively focuses on its causes and constraints,
which is both essential for understanding the phenomenon and preventing its use. However,
an underexplored area of research is the aftermath of mass expulsion. How did the expulsion
of the Volksdeutsche from Czechoslovakia in 1945 affect the later Czech Republic, or the Asians
from Uganda who were invited to return by President Museveni in 1986, 14 years after their
expulsion? Or in contrast, how do expellees affect the societies to which they are expelled

1714

Bell-Fialkoff, 1993.

395

to—the Volksdeutsche in Germany or the Asians in the United Kingdom? How were expellees’
experiences of return similar or different? Since expulsion continues around the world, these
are important questions to investigate.

These are five potential areas for further research among many others. The GSME
dataset demonstrates that mass expulsion is a government policy option that it still very much
in global use. In the decade between 2010 and 2020, thirteen new expulsion events were
initiated, and in every year that decade there was at least one ongoing expulsion somewhere in
the world. Given the millions affected by this abhorrent policy, additional research is both
urgent and essential.
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APPENDICIES
A. Mass Expulsion Episodes (1900-2020)
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#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
1715

Expelling Country
Greece
Serbia
Greece
Bulgaria
Bulgaria
Turkey
Greece
Turkey
France
Bulgaria
Greece
Turkey
Turkey
Greece
Turkey
United States
Mexico
Cuba

Years
1912-1912
1912-1913
1913-1913
1913-1914
1913-1914
1913-1914
1913-1914
1913-1914
1919-1921
1919-1928
1919-1919
1922-1922
1922-1924
1923-1926
1923-1926
1929-1939
1931-1932
1933-1934

Figures listed indicate the range of low- and high-end estimates.

No. Persons Expelled1715
10,000
10,000-20,000
15,000
70,000
48,500-48,570
46,700-46,764
100,000-125,000
150,000-279,000
100,000-150,000
30,000-50,000
53,000-100,000
868,186-1,000,000
35,000
355,635-356,000
189,916-190,000
500,000-2,000,000
3,000
8,000

Target Group(s)
Muslims
Albanians
Bulgarians
Greeks
Muslims
Bulgarians
Muslims
Greeks
Germans
Greeks
Bulgarians
Greeks
Armenians
Muslims
Orthodox Christians (Greeks)
Mexicans
Chinese
Haitians
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19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

1716

Dominican Republic
Cuba
Germany
Germany
Bulgaria
Romania
Germany
Bulgaria
Peru
Greece
Poland
Soviet Union (Russia)1716
Czechoslovakia
Soviet Union (Russia)
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Hungary
Romania
Yugoslavia
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Hungary
Yugoslavia

1937-1938
1937-1939
1938-1939
1939-1941
1940-1940
1940-1940
1941-1941
1942-1943
1942-1943
1944-1945
1944-1946
1944-1946
1945-1946
1945-1946
1945-1947
1945-1947
1945-1947
1945-1947
1945-1947
1946-1946
1946-1946
1946-1946
1946-1946

10,000-30,000
29,900
40,000-50,000
365,000-1,000,000
100,000
61,000
100,000-130,000
210,000
1,771-1,800
18,000
482,000-518,000
1,496,000-2,100,000
50,000-91,079
33,961-42,000
2,252,544-3,000,000
6,000,000-8,250,000
176,843-500,000
50,000-300,000
250,000-271,000
200,000
200,000
40,000
40,000

Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
Haitians
Jews (Austrian)
Jews (Polish), Poles
Romanians
Bulgarians
Jews (French), French
Greeks, Serbs
Japanese
Albanians
Belorussians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians
Poles, Jews (Polish)
Ukrainians
Czechs, Slovaks
Germans
Germans
Germans
Germans
Germans
Magyars (Hungarians)
Slovaks
Serbs, Croats
Magyars (Hungarians)

For consistency the country is referred to as “Soviet Union (Russia)” throughout, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

42
43
44
45
46
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47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Netherlands
Israel
Bulgaria
United States
United Kingdom (British
Imperial Sierra Leone)
Egypt
Indonesia
Cote d'Ivoire
Burma (Myanmar)
Gabon
Republic of Congo
Niger
Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC)
Cote d'Ivoire
Turkey
France (French Somaliland)
Israel
Sierra Leone
Honduras
Ghana
Uganda
Libya
Cambodia

1946-1948
1947-1949
1950-1951
1954-1955
1956-1957

3,000-3,691
600,000-800,000
152,000-155,000
1,000,000-1,300,000

1956-1957
1957-1958
1958-1958
1962-1964
1962-1962
1962-1962
1963-1964
1964-1964

20,200-25,000
50,000-60,000
1,000-2,000
300,000
2,700
3,000
6,918-16,000

1964-1964
1964-1965
1967-1967
1967-1968
1968-1968
1969-1969
1969-1970
1970-1970
1970-1970
1970-1970

16,000
36,000-47,000
2,000-10,000
270,000-390,000
2,000-8,000
60,000-130,000
200,000-1,000,000
30,000
20,000
200,000-250,000

30,000-50,000

1,000-3,000

Germans
Palestinians
Turks
Mexicans
Guineans
Jews
Dutch
Togolese, Beninese
Indians (Tamils)
Congolese (Brazzaville)
Beninese
Beninese (Dahomeyans)
Congolese (Brazzaville), Burundians, Malians
Beninese
Greeks
Somalis
Palestinians
Ghanaians
Salvadorans
Nigerians, Togolese, Burkinabe, Nigeriens
Kenyans (Luo)
Italians
Vietnamese
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65

Zambia

1971-1972

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Iraq
Uganda
Iraq
Turkey
Cyprus
Algeria
Cambodia
Libya
Republic of Congo
Vietnam
Burma (Myanmar)1717
Burundi
Gabon
Bangladesh
Chad
Kenya
Zambia

1971-1971
1972-1972
1974-1974
1974-1975
1974-1975
1975-1976
1975-1978
1976-1976
1977-1977
1977-1979
1978-1978
1978-1978
1978-1978
1978-1979
1979-1979
1979-1979
1979-1979

11,000-60,000
50,000-80,000
60,000
168,000-200,000
37,000-60,000
30,000
150,000-200,000
13,700
5,000-6,000
400,000-1,000,000
200,000
40,000-50,000
6,000-12,000
187,000-190,000
1,000
2,500-4,000

83
84
85

Thailand
Iraq
Kenya

1979-1980
1980-1980
1980-1981

49,000-54,000
20,000-25,000
3,000

150,000

4,000

Rhodesians, Batswana, Zaireans, Tanzanians,
Somalis
Iranians
Asians
Iranians, Kurds
Greek Cypriots
Turkish Cypriots
Moroccans
Vietnamese
Tunisians
Malians
Ethnic Chinese
Rohingya
Zaireans
Beninese
Rohingya
Beninese
Ugandans
Zaireans, Tanzanians, Malawians, Somalis,
Mozambicans
Cambodians
Iranians
Tanzanians, Ugandans

For consistency the country is referred to as “Burma (Myanmar)” throughout the dataset. Officially the country’s name was changed from the Union of Burma to
the Union of Myanmar in 1989.
1717
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86
87
88
89
90

Gabon
Sierra Leone
Uganda
Mongolia
Nigeria

1981-1981
1982-1982
1982-1982
1983-1983
1983-1983

91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Nigeria
Cote d'Ivoire
Libya
Mauritania
Senegal
Bulgaria
Kenya
Kenya
Saudi Arabia
Bhutan
Kuwait
Dominican Republic
Burma (Myanmar)
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Bangladesh
South Africa
Greece
Croatia

1985-1985
1985-1985
1985-1985
1989-1989
1989-1989
1989-1989
1989-1990
1990-1990
1990-1990
1990-1992
1991-1991
1991-1991
1991-1992
1991-1992
1992-1995
1992-1997
1993-1994
1993-1994
1995-1995

5,000-10,000
1,000
44,000-75,000
1,764-10,000
1,500,000-2,000,000
200,000-700,000
10,000
42,000-80,000
70,000-85,000
80,000-100,000
250,000-310,000
5,000
1,000
750,000-1,000,000
106,000-110,000
200,000-400,000
35,000-60,000
250,000-260,000
250,000
2,000,000
230,000
136,279-152,205
96,000-100,000
180,000-200,000

Cameroonians
Guineans (Foulah)
Banyarwanda
Chinese
Ghanaians, Nigeriens, Cameroonians,
Chadians, Togolese, Beninese
Ghanaians, Nigeriens, Cameroonians, Chadians
Ghanaians
Tunisians, Egyptians
Senegalese, Mauritanians
Mauritanians
Turks
Somalis
Ugandans, Rwandans
Yemenis
Nepalis
Palestinians, Iraqis
Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
Rohingya
Croats
Bosnians (Muslims & Croats)
Rohingya
Mozambicans
Albanians
Serbs

110
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111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC)
Libya
Tanzania
Dominican Republic
Ethiopia
Yugoslavia
Eritrea
Dominican Republic
United Arab Emirates
Angola
Tanzania
Soviet Union (Russia)
Iran
Angola
Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC)
Thailand
France
Uganda
Angola
Iran
Burma (Myanmar)
Tanzania
Republic of Congo
Cameroon

1995-1995

14,000-15,000

1995-1995
1996-1996
1996-1997
1998-1999
1998-1999
1998-2000
1999-2000
2002-2002
2003-2005
2006-2007
2006-2007
2007-2007
2008-2009
2009-2009

80,000
250,000-500,000
30,000
54,000-75,000
740,000-900,000
49,000-70,000
10,000-20,000
1,200
80,000-300,000
17,000-60,000
2,300
160,000
154,000-160,000

2009-2009
2009-2011
2010-2010
2011-2012
2011-2012
2012-2013
2013-2013
2014-2014
2015-2019

4,689
23,014-28,955
1,700
60,590-105,000
349,500
19,000-20,000
8,509-52,576
179,000-245,000
100,000-109,000

30,000-40,000

Rwandans, Burundians
Sudanese, Mauritanians
Rwandans, Burundians
Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
Eritreans
Kosovar Albanians
Ethiopians
Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
Afghans
Congolese (Kinshasa)
Rwandese, Burundians
Georgians
Afghans
Congolese (Kinshasa)
Angolans
Hmong
Roma
Rwandans
Congolese (Kinshasa)
Afghans
Muslims (Rohingya & Karman)
Rwandese, Burundians, Ugandans
Congolese (Kinshasa)
Nigerians

134
135
136
137
138
139

Dominican Republic
Pakistan
Burma (Myanmar)
Algeria
Angola
Turkey

2015-2019
2016-2016
2016-2018
2016-2020
2018-2018
2018-2018

250,000-310,000
500,000-565,000
812,000-831,500
67,000
330,000-400,000
137,000-300,000

Haitians, Dominico-Haitians
Afghans
Rohingya
Sub-Saharan Africans
Congolese (Kinshasa)
Syrian Kurds (Afrin)
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B. Mass Expulsion Coding Criteria

Coding decision tree

For an event to be coded as a mass expulsion, the five questions in the coding decision tree below had to be answered in the affirmative.
1) Was the expulsion
state ordered/directed?

If yes:
404

2) Was the intent to
remove?

No. Expulsion driven ‘from below’ or by a Relevant Evidence:
• Explicit state-issued expulsion decree or policy
non-state actor
• Involvement of state military, paramilitary, police and/or
intelligence forces in the physical removal of the target
Yes
group

No. Government intent was to destroy, to
coercively assimilate, etc.; not designed to
systematically remove the target group
Yes

If yes:
3) Was the target an
ethnic, racial, religious,
national group?

No. Population targeted for non-ethnic
reasons (e.g., political opposition,
dissidents, sexual orientation)
Yes

Relevant Evidence:
• Documented govt expulsion decree/order
• Statement by head of state/govt announcing expulsion
decision/policy
• Reports of state or state-sanctioned armed actors deliberately
expelling the target group
• Systematic removal of whole populations
• No govt intervention to prevent systematic removals
• Govt announcement supporting the removals
• Multi-lateral or bi-lateral ‘population transfer/exchange’
agreements or treaties
Relevant Evidence:
• Description of one of the four groups (ethnic, racial,
religious, national) cited in govt expulsion decrees
• Displaced persons documented by response
organizations/host govts as a collective (ethnic, racial,
religious, national) group

Coding decision tree continued…
If yes:
4) Was the group expelled
because of its shared
characteristics

If yes:

5) Was the expulsion
intended as permanent?

No. Population indiscriminately
targeted

Relevant Evidence:
• Target group is instrumentally, not incidentally, removed
• Expellees originate from locations with large populations of
target group

Yes

No. Government temporarily
removes target group
Yes
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Relevant Evidence:
• Govt authorities prevent expellees from returning home
• Expellees forced to sign documents that they are leaving
‘voluntarily’ and/or will not return
• Burning target group residences
• Govt confiscation of property and/or assets of target group
• Resettling dominant populations into the vacated
residences/areas of the expelled group

Scope condition coding criteria

Below is the type of evidence required to indicate the expulsion episode met the two scope
conditions:
1. The target population must be moved across an international border
a. Evidence of cross border expulsion:
i. Removal of members of the target group from their country of legal
residence to another country
ii. Removal of members of the target group out of territory newly
annexed by a foreign power, or out of territory newly ceded to another
state
iii. UN / humanitarian organizations document expellees in neighboring
states
iv. News media report the arrival of expellees in host (or home) states
2. At least 1,000 persons from the target group must be expelled in an annual period
a. Evidence of at least 1,000 persons expelled in an annual period:
i. Numerical figures from governments, UN, humanitarian organizations
and/or news media
1. While quantitative evidence is often lacking or politicized with
each side increasing or decreasing the figures, there must be
recorded estimates of at least 1,000 persons expelled over the
course of a year
2. High and low-end estimates are collected to show the range of
available information
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